Full Order Text
Order 1 · 24 Aug 2026 · CNR MHMT010031432025
Order Details: Order on Exh. Pdf Text: 1 MHMT010031432025 BEFORE THE MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, MUMBAI AT MUMBAI M.A.C.P. No. 2272 of 2025 Shahnurbai Shekh Rashid ...Applicant Versus Dayashankar Kanhaiyalal Gupta ...Opposite Party And Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. ...Insurer ORDER BELOW EXHIBIT 18 1. This is an application preferred by Cholamandalam MS General Insurance Co. Ltd. under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking permission to contest the claim petition on all grounds available to the owner/opposite party. 2. I have carefully perused the application at Exhibit 18, the claim petition, written statement of the opposite party/owner, written statement of the insurer, documents placed on record and the say/endorsement of the applicant. Heard the learned advocates to the extent necessary. Case of the insurer 3. The applicant has instituted the present proceeding under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming compensation for -- 1 of 9 -- 2 the injuries allegedly sustained by her in the motor vehicular accident dated 23.11.2025. 4. The insurer, in Exhibit 18, has substantially contended that the opposite party has not been appearing and has not filed written statement and, therefore, there appears to be collusion between the claimant and the opposite party and/or failure on the part of the opposite party to contest the claim. On that foundation the insurer seeks permission under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act to contest the proceeding on all grounds which would otherwise be available to the owner. 5. The applicant has opposed the application. The record is therefore required to be examined to determine whether either of the statutory contingencies contemplated by clauses (a) or (b) of Section 170 is actually established. Statutory position 6. Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act constitutes an exception to the ordinary statutory scheme regulating the defences available to an insurer. It empowers the Claims Tribunal, in the course of an inquiry, to grant the insurer a wider right of contest where the Tribunal is satisfied that: (a) there is collusion between the person making the claim and the person against whom the claim is made; or (b) the person against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim. -- 2 of 9 -- 3 7. Satisfaction of the Tribunal concerning existence of at least one of these jurisdictional facts is therefore a condition precedent. The provision further expressly requires reasons to be recorded in writing. Permission under Section 170 cannot consequently be granted mechanically merely because an insurer has filed an application seeking such permission. 8. In Shankarayya and another v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and another, (1998) 3 SCC 140 : AIR 1998 SC 2968 : 1998 ACJ 513, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that an insurer can be permitted to contest a proceeding on merits only when the conditions precedent contained in Section 170 are satisfied. The Tribunal is required to pass an order in writing and the order must disclose reasons. In absence thereof, the insurer cannot avail itself of the wider defences available to the insured. 9. The principle was authoritatively reiterated by the three-Judge Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others, (2002) 7 SCC 456, holding that unless the Tribunal passes an order under Section 170 upon satisfaction of one of the statutory conditions, the insurer cannot contest the claim on grounds otherwise available to the insured. 10. The same statutory distinction has been recognised in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jyotsnaben Sudhirbhai Patel, (2003) 7 SCC 212, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that the order under Section 170 cannot be merely formal or cryptic and that the -- 3 of 9 -- 4 statutory preconditions must form the basis of the Tribunal's satisfaction. 11. The larger scheme was further examined in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta and others, (2011) 10 SCC 509. The statutory object remains that the insurer's right to defend under the policy and statutory provisions is distinct from the exceptional enlargement of that defence under Section 170. 12. Thus, the question before the Tribunal is not whether allowing the insurer to contest every aspect of the claim would be convenient. The question is whether the factual foundation required by Section 170 exists. Examination of the record 13. In the present case, the principal factual assertion made in Exhibit 18 is that the opposite party has not been appearing and that no written statement has been filed. 14. The judicial record, however, does not support that assertion. 15. Opposite Party Dayashankar Kanhaiyalal Gupta has appeared through learned Advocate Shri Shailesh P. Pansare and has filed a detailed written statement dated 01.04.2026. 16. In the said written statement, the opposite party has specifically admitted that he is the owner of car bearing registration No. MH- -- 4 of 9 -- 5 03-EF-9602. At the same time, he has specifically denied the allegation that the accident dated 23.11.2025 occurred because of rash and negligent driving attributable to his vehicle. 17. The owner has further disputed the nature and extent of injuries allegedly sustained by the applicant, the alleged medical expenditure of Rs.5,00,000/-, the applicant's allegations concerning the manner of the accident, the quantum of compensation, and his personal liability to satisfy the claim. 18. The owner has pleaded that the vehicle was covered by a valid policy of third-party insurance at the material time and has contended that, if liability is ultimately established, the concerned insurer would be liable in accordance with law. 19. The owner has also produced the driving licence standing in his name. The document on record records authorization for LMV and MCWG and validity up to 02.11.2030. 20. These are not the acts of a party who has "failed to contest the claim" within the meaning of Section 170(b). 21. There is a material distinction between a defence which the insurer considers insufficient or inconvenient and a failure to contest contemplated by Section 170(b). The latter requires real failure or abandonment of defence. A Tribunal cannot enlarge the insurer's statutory defence merely because the insurer would prefer -- 5 of 9 -- 6 to conduct the litigation differently from the insured. Alleged collusion 22. The alternative statutory ground of collusion also does not stand established. 23. Collusion is a serious allegation. For the limited purpose of Section 170, the Tribunal need not conduct a separate trial upon collusion; nevertheless, there must be some objective material from which a reasonable judicial satisfaction regarding collusion can arise. 24. In the present proceeding, there is no such material. On the contrary, the owner has traversed the applicant's case on material particulars. He denies negligence, disputes injuries and expenditure, challenges the quantum and seeks dismissal of the claim against him. 25. Such pleadings are inconsistent, prima facie, with the allegation that the claimant and owner are acting in concert for obtaining an award against the insurer. 26. Mere apprehension, suspicion or a general assertion of collusion is not equivalent to the satisfaction contemplated by Section 170(a). 27. It is significant that Exhibit 18 proceeds substantially upon the -- 6 of 9 -- 7 factual premise that the owner has not appeared and has not filed a written statement. Since that premise is contradicted by the judicial record itself, the statutory foundation of the application disappears. Effect of the insurer's independent statutory defences 28. Rejection of Exhibit 18 does not render the insurer remediless. It remains entitled to raise and establish every defence which is independently available to it under the Motor Vehicles Act and the contract of insurance, subject to the law applicable thereto. 29. Indeed, the insurer has filed an extensive written statement and has raised, inter alia, questions concerning insurance coverage, the nature of its standalone Own Damage policy, the existence of another third-party policy, driving licence, alleged breach of policy conditions and other statutory defences. 30. Those defences have to be considered in accordance with law at the appropriate stage. Rejection of the present Section 170 application merely means that, in absence of either statutory contingency under Section 170, the insurer cannot acquire the additional right to contest the claim on every ground available to the insured. 31. It is also necessary to clarify that observations in this order are confined to adjudication of Exhibit 18. Nothing herein shall amount to a final finding upon negligence, contributory/composite -- 7 of 9 -- 8 negligence, insurance coverage, breach of policy, quantum or ultimate liability. Conclusion 32. Upon considering the pleadings and the record as a whole, I find that: (i) the opposite party/owner has entered appearance; (ii) he has filed a detailed written statement; (iii) he has specifically disputed negligence, injuries, expenditure, quantum and liability; (iv) there is no sufficient material demonstrating collusion between the applicant and the opposite party; and (v) consequently neither clause (a) nor clause (b) of Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act is attracted at this stage. 33. The jurisdictional prerequisites for granting permission under Section 170 are therefore absent. The application deserves to be rejected. ORDER 1. Application at Exhibit 18 filed by the insurer under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is rejected. 2. The insurer shall, however, remain at liberty to raise and prove all statutory and contractual defences independently available to it in law. -- 8 of 9 -- 9 3. All observations made herein are confined to the adjudication of Exhibit 18 and shall not influence determination of the claim petition on merits. 4. No order as to costs. Mumbai. Date: 24/08/2026 (Shashikant Eknathrao Bangar), Member, C.R. No.3 Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Greater Mumbai -- 9 of 9 --
