Order 1

Order Details: Order on Exh.
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BEFORE THE MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
FOR GREATER MUMBAI AT MUMBAI
M.A.C.P. No.409 of 2024
Mrs. Babali Devi … Applicant
Versus
Mr. Sakharam Tukaram Ballad ... Opponent
(Owner/Driver)
And
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. ... Insurer/Opponent No.2
ORDER BELOW EXH–15
(Application for Condonation of Delay)
Coram : Shri Shashikant Eknathrao Bangar, Member,
C.R.-3, MACT, Mumbai
I. INTRODUCTION
1. By this application at Exh-15, the applicant – 34 year
old– seeks condonation of delay of about 40 days in filing the
claim petition for compensation under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, in respect of a road traffic accident
dated 13.01.2023.
2. The Insurer has filed its reply, opposing the application
mainly on the ground that, after the insertion of Section
166(3) by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019, there
is a rigid six-month limitation for filing a claim, and that there
is no provision for condonation of delay beyond that period.
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3. The applicant has also filed a list of citations relying
inter alia on:
• Malaravan Vs. Praveen Travels Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Madras
High Court, C.R.P. No. 2558/2023, decided on
18.08.2023;
• Thakor Tinuji @ Tinaji Kamshiji Vs. IFFCO Tokio
General Insurance Co. Ltd., SLP (C) Diary
No.53859/2023 (pending before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court – motor accident compensation group matters);
• Akshay Raj Vs. Ministry of Law and Justice, Kerala High
Court, OP (MAC) No. 6 of 2023, decided on 23.01.2023.
4. In view of the rival pleadings, the following point arises
for determination:
POINT FOR DETERMINATION
• Whether the applicant has shown “sufficient cause” so as
to justify condonation of delay of about 40 days in filing
the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988?
• My finding: In the Affirmative, for the reasons that
follow.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
5. The material facts as borne out from the application
(Exh-15) and supporting affidavit (Exh-16) are as under:
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i. On 13.01.2023, the applicant, Babli Devi, then aged
about 34 years, met with a road traffic accident and sustained
serious bodily injuries.
ii. She was immediately admitted to Shree Shraddha Multi
Specialty Hospital on 13.01.2023 and discharged on
19.01.2023 with advice of bed rest for six months and
continued follow-up treatment in OPD of the same hospital.
Discharge card is annexed to the application.
iii. The affidavit of the applicant (Exh-15) further clarifies
she sustained serious multiple ribs fracture injury.
iv. The applicant is stated to be law-illiterate, unaware of
the newly introduced limitation under Section 166(3), and
belonging to a modest socio-economic background.
v. The claim petition for compensation has been presented
in the filing department of this Tribunal on 04.12.2023, i.e.,
about 10 months and 20 days from the date of accident,
resulting in a delay of approximately 40 days beyond six
months.
vi. The present Misc. Application for Condonation of Delay
(Exh-15) is filed on 13.08.2025, explaining the said delay of
about 40 days.
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III. PLEADINGS & SUBMISSIONS
A. Applicant’s case
6. The applicant’s case can be summarised thus:
6.1 Due to the serious injuries and the bed rest for six
months advised to the applicant, the family’s first priority was
medical treatment and stabilisation of the person rather than
immediate legal action.
6.2 The applicant is an ordinary layperson, not conversant
with the technical legal requirement that a claim has now to
be filed within six months of accident under Section 166(3) of
the amended Act.
6.3 The delay is therefore unintentional and bona fide,
occasioned by medical and psychological circumstances, and
not due to negligence or mala fides.
6.4 A delay of only about 40 days is marginal, especially in
the context of the applicant with grievous injuries, and
deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.
6.5 The applicant relies on authorities including Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst. Katiji (AIR 1987 SC
1353), N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC
123, and Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of
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Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649, which
mandate a liberal, justice-oriented approach in condonation
matters.
6.6 The applicant also relies on decisions such as Akshay Raj
(Kerala HC) and Malaravan (Madras HC), where High Courts
have held that claims cannot be mechanically rejected as time-
barred merely because they cross the new six-month limit, and
that provisions of the Limitation Act can apply to enable
condonation beyond six months.
B. Insurer’s case (Exh-18)
7. The Insurer’s objection is:
7.1 That by virtue of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles
Act, as amended, any claim petition must be filed within six
months of the accident, and no provision exists for
condonation of delay, unlike the earlier regime.
7.2 It is argued that the accident occurred on 13.01.2023,
whereas the present application is filed only on 13.08.2025,
with alleged delay of about two years, which is termed as
inordinate.
7.3 It is contended that the application is misconceived, not
maintainable in law, amounts to abuse of process and that no
sufficient cause is made out.
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7.4 Insurer therefore prays that the application be rejected
and the claim petition be treated as barred by limitation.
IV. NATURE OF THE MOTOR VEHICLES ACT & APPROACH
OF THE TRIBUNAL
8. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a social welfare
legislation aimed at providing just and reasonable
compensation to victims of road accidents. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court has consistently held that:
The Act must receive a liberal and beneficial
interpretation;
The Tribunal should not be hyper-technical;
Substantial justice must prevail over procedural
technicalities.
9. In N.K.V. Bros. (P) Ltd. Vs. M. Karumai Ammal, the
Hon’ble Supreme Court deprecated the tendency to reject
accident claims on refined technicalities, emphasising that
victims should not be left without remedy because of
procedural niceties.
10. In Bimla Devi Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corp., the
Court reiterated that strict rules of evidence and procedure
should not be allowed to defeat substantive justice in motor
accident claims.
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11. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Kum. Jyoti M. Shetye
Vs. Ashok J. Powar & Ors. (2019) has traced the legislative
history of Section 166 (3) and emphasised that once the
limitation clause was omitted in 1994, the intention was to
ensure that genuine victims are not thrown out on limitation.
12. Thus, the starting presumption in MACT matters is that
claims should ordinarily be decided on merits, and only in
cases of gross laches or mala fides should the bar of limitation
be strictly invoked.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON LIMITATION UNDER
MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
13. Historically:
i. Under Section 110-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939,
a six-month period was prescribed with power to condone up
to twelve months.
ii. Similar restriction existed in Section 166(3) of the 1988
Act initially, again with limited power of condonation.
iii. By the 1994 Amendment, Section 166(3) was entirely
omitted, thereby removing any statutory limitation and
allowing claims to be filed at any time, subject to general
principles.
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iv. The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 re-
introduced sub-section (3) to Section 166, which now reads:
“No application for compensation shall be entertained
unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the
accident.”
14. This re-introduction has led to divergent judicial views
and constitutional challenges across the country:
(a) Kerala High Court – Akshay Raj Vs. Ministry of Law and
Justice
In OP (MAC) No.6 of 2023, the Kerala High Court held
that provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to MACT
claims, applying Section 29(2) and Section 5 of the Limitation
Act.
It was held that Tribunals cannot dismiss claim petitions
in limine merely because they are filed beyond six months;
condonation of delay is permissible in appropriate cases.
(b) Madras High Court – Malaravan Vs. Praveen Travels Pvt.
Ltd. & Ors.
Madras High Court in C.R.P. No. 2558 of 2023 (order
dated 18.08.2023) held that, given the statutory duty of police
to send FIR / DAR to the Tribunal, the issue of six-month
limitation arises only in cases where no such report is filed,
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and that the Tribunal must adopt a victim-centric
interpretation in dealing with limitation under Section 166(3).
(c) Supreme Court – Pending SLPs and Interim Orders
15. Multiple SLPs and writ petitions challenging the
constitutional validity and operation of Section 166(3),
including Thakor Tinuji @ Tinaji Kamshiji Vs. IFFCO Tokio
General Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, are pending before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in a larger group of motor accident
compensation matters.
16. Importantly, in November 2025, in proceedings arising
out of challenge to Section 166(3) (including ICICI Lombard
General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Ayiti Navaneetha & Ors.), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has passed an interim order:-
Directing that all Motor Accident Claims Tribunals and
High Courts across the country shall not dismiss claim
petitions on the ground that they are barred by limitation
under Section 166(3);
Staying the operation of Section 166(3) to the extent of
prescribing a six-month time limit, during pendency of the
proceedings.
This binding interim direction squarely governs all
MACTs, including this Tribunal.
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VI. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONDONATION OF DELAY
17. Even apart from the above, the settled law on
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
which is of general application, may be summarised thus:
(i) Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst. Katiji
The Supreme Court emphasised that courts must adopt a
liberal approach; when substantial justice and technical
considerations are in conflict, substantial justice must prevail.
It recognised that refusal to condone delay can defeat
meritorious causes.
(ii) N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC
123
The Court held that length of delay is not decisive;
acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The law of
limitation is not meant to destroy rights but to ensure
diligence; a pragmatic view must be taken.
(iii) Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of
Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649
• The Supreme Court consolidated principles on
condonation, noting, inter alia, that:
• There should be a justice-oriented, pragmatic approach;
• No pedantic or hyper-technical stance should be
adopted;
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• The explanation must be bona fide and not mala fide or
a dilatory tactic;
A short delay with reasonable explanation generally
deserves condonation.
18. These principles have been followed by various Benches
of the Bombay High Court in condonation matters, even
outside the Motor Vehicles Act, reiterating that beneficial
legislations require a liberal construction.
VII. DISCUSSION & FINDINGS
A. What is the relevant period of delay?
19. The Insurer has asserted that there is an “inordinate
delay of almost two years and one month”. This appears to
arise from confusing the date of filing of the present misc.
Application (13.08.2025) with the date of presentation of the
claim petition (04.12.2023).
20. For the purpose of Section 166(3), what is material is
the interval between:
Date of accident: 13.01.2023; and
Date of making “application for compensation” (claim
petition): 04.12.2023.
21. From 13.01.2023 to 13.11.2023 is 10 months. The claim
is filed on 04.12.2023, thereafter, roughly 40 days of delay
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beyond six months, which is precisely what the applicant
pleads.
22. The fact that the formal application for condonation is
filed later in 2025 does not alter the quantum of delay in filing
the claim petition. The Insurer’s computation, therefore, is
factually misconceived.
B. Existence of “sufficient cause”
23. The explanation offered by the applicant is based on
severe injuries to the applicant, advised bed rest, continuous
follow-up treatment in hospital and Genuine preoccupation
with treatment and stabilisation rather than litigation.
24. These reasons are supported by the discharge card and
affidavit (Exh-16). There is nothing on record to suggest that
the applicant has manipulated any record, acted with mala
fides, or deliberately delayed the filing of the claim.
25. On the contrary, considering the age of the injured, the
nature of injuries, it would be unnatural to expect the family
to immediately seek legal advice and file a claim within strict
six months.
26. Applying the principles in Katiji, Balakrishnan and Esha
Bhattacharjee, the explanation appears reasonable, plausible
and bona fide, and fully meets the test of “sufficient cause”.
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C. Role of Person Status
27. It is a settled principle that the law leans in favour of
persons under disability. Courts/Tribunals are expected to be
particularly cautious before non-suiting the applicant on
technical grounds such as limitation.
28. In a claim where the primary injured is a 34-year-old
with grievous injuries, throwing out the claim for a delay of
approximately 40 days would be manifestly disproportionate
and contrary to the very beneficial object of the Motor Vehicles
Act.
D. Impact of High Court Decisions on Section 166(3)
29. As noted earlier:
The Kerala High Court in Akshay Raj has held that claim
petitions filed beyond six months cannot be dismissed in
limine, and that provisions of the Limitation Act, including
Section 5, are attracted via Section 29(2), enabling
condonation.
The Madras High Court in Malaravan has effectively
read Section 166(3) in a manner that upholds victim’s rights
and recognises the statutory role of DAR/FIR, emphasising
that MACTs must not adopt an interpretation which defeats
the social-welfare character of the statute.
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30. These judgments, though not binding on this Tribunal as
precedents, are highly persuasive, especially in absence of any
contrary binding pronouncement specifically on the re-
introduced Section 166(3).
31. The Insurer has not cited any decision to show that no
condonation is possible whatsoever after the 2019
amendment, nor that the Tribunal’s hands are completely tied.
E. Binding interim directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court
(2025)
32. Most importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
considering a batch of matters challenging the constitutional
validity and operation of Section 166(3), has very recently
Stayed the six-month deadline prescribed under Section
166(3) and directed that MACTs shall not dismiss motor
accident claims as time-barred solely on the ground that they
were filed beyond six months under Section 166(3).
33. Thus, even assuming that Section 166(3) were to be
strictly read, as on today, this Tribunal cannot reject a claim
petition only on limitation. A fortiori, when an application for
condonation is made showing cogent reasons and involving
the applicant victim, refusal to condone a short delay would
be contrary both to the Supreme Court’s interim directions and
the spirit of the Act.
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F. Prejudice to Insurer
34. The Insurer has vaguely pleaded “impediment” to defend
the case effectively but has not demonstrated Loss of any
evidence, Unavailability of witnesses, or any concrete
prejudice caused by a delay of 40 days.
35. On the other hand, refusing condonation would
extinguish the applicant’s right to seek adjudication of just
compensation on merits. The balance of convenience and
comparative hardship strongly favour the applicant.
36. The Supreme Court has held that limitation rules are
meant to ensure diligence, not to destroy rights or cause
miscarriage of justice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
37. In the light of:
• The beneficial nature of the Motor Vehicles Act;
• The serious injuries to the applicant and her treatment;
• The short and reasonably explained delay of about 40
days;
• The principles laid down in Katiji, Balakrishnan and
Esha Bhattacharjee on condonation;
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• The persuasive High Court pronouncements in Akshay
Raj and Malaravan on Section 166(3);
• And the binding interim directions of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court staying the rigid application of Section
166(3) and restraining MACTs from dismissing claims as
time-barred;
I hold that the applicant has amply demonstrated
“sufficient cause” for condonation of delay.
38. Refusing condonation on these facts would amount to
denial of access to justice to the applicant accident victim and
would be inconsistent with both the constitutional ethos and
the beneficial object of the Motor Vehicles Act.
IX. ORDER
1. Application Exh-15 is hereby allowed.
2. The delay of about 40 (forty) days in filing the claim
petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in
M.A.C.P. No.409 of 2024 is condoned.
3. The claim petition shall proceed on merits in accordance
with law.
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4. Considering that the delay is short and bona fide, no
order as to costs is passed on this application.
Pronounced in open Court on the 15th day of November,
2025 at Mumbai.
(Shashikant Eknathrao Bangar)
Member, C.R. 3
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,
Date : 15.11.2025 Mumbai
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