Order 2

Order Details: Order on Exh.
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BEFORE THE MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
FOR GREATER MUMBAI AT MUMBAI
MACP NO. 515 OF 2024
Danisha Sandesh Wadekar
(through father and next friend
Mr. Sandesh Gopinath Wadekar) … Applicant
Versus
Mr. Sakharam Tukaram Ballad … Opponent No.1
(Owner)
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. … Opponent No.2
(Insurer)
ORDER BELOW EXHIBIT–14
(Application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151
of CPC and Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
as amended)
1. Opponent No.2 – Insurer has moved the present
application Exh.14 under Order VII Rule 11 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) praying for
rejection of the claim petition on the ground that it is
barred by limitation under Section 166(3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as amended by the Motor
Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019.
2. The application is opposed by the applicant–claimant
by written reply and through learned Advocate,
contending that the claim petition is maintainable,
that strict provisions of the CPC do not apply to
proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, that the
amendment introducing Section 166(3) is under
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constitutional challenge and in any case cannot be
applied so as to defeat bona fide claims of victims,
particularly minors. The claimant has relied on
various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and
different High Courts and has also sought liberty to
move an application for condonation of delay, if
found necessary.
I. FACTS RELEVANT FOR THE PRESENT APPLICATION
3. The accident in question occurred on 13.01.2023 on
Sinner–Shirdi Road, District Nashik. The minor
applicant, aged about seven years, is alleged to have
suffered multiple injuries and permanent disability
while travelling in a passenger bus which was hit by
truck No. MH-48-T-1295 allegedly driven in a rash
and negligent manner by the driver of Opponent
No.1.
4. The claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act has been presented on 02.08.2023
(registered thereafter as MACP No.515/2024). The
insurer contends that as per newly inserted Section
166(3), no application for compensation shall be
entertained unless made within six months of the
occurrence of the accident, and that in the present
case the petition has been filed beyond six months
and is, therefore, liable to be rejected at the threshold
under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
II. SUBMISSIONS
A. Submissions on behalf of the Insurer (Opponent No.2)
5. Learned Advocate for the insurer has urged, in
substance, that:
(i) Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, inserted
by Section 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment)
Act, 2019, and notified to come into force with effect
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from 01.04.2022, provides that
“no application for
compensation shall be entertained unless it is made
within six months of the occurrence of the accident”.
(ii) The Central Government has, by notification
dated 25.02.2022, brought into force the above
provision with effect from 01.04.2022, and, therefore,
for all accidents occurring on or after 01.04.2022
there is an absolute bar to entertaining claims filed
beyond six months.
(iii) In the present case, the accident occurred on
13.01.2023, whereas the petition has been filed in
August 2023, i.e. beyond the period of six months;
the Tribunal has no power to condone such delay
because the statute does not contain any proviso
empowering condonation. Hence, the claim petition is
ex facie barred by law and must be rejected under
Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
B. Submissions on behalf of the Applicant
6. Per contra, learned Advocate for the applicant has
contended that:
(i) Proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act are
essentially summary and beneficial; strict application
of the CPC, particularly provisions like Order VII Rule
11, is not warranted in view of Section 169 of the Act.
(ii) Prior to the 2019 amendment, there was no
period of limitation for filing a claim under Section
166 in view of the deletion of sub-section (3) by the
1994 Amendment, as noticed by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in
Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya, (1996) 4 SCC
652, and followed by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court
in several decisions including
Kum. Jyoti M. Shetye v.
Ashok J. Powar & Ors., 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 5356.
(iii) The 2019 amendment re-introducing Section
166(3) is under constitutional challenge before the
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Hon’ble Supreme Court and different High Courts.
The Kerala High Court and other High Courts have
held that the amendment is prospective and cannot be
mechanically applied to defeat claims, and that
limitation in motor accident claims is to be
approached in a justice-oriented manner.
(iv) Most importantly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
while entertaining a batch of petitions challenging the
constitutional validity of Section 166(3), has recently
passed an interim order directing that no motor
accident claim petition shall be dismissed as time-
barred on the basis of Section 166(3) and staying the
operation of that provision.
(v) The present case pertains to a minor victim aged
seven years; in such cases the law requires a liberal
and victim-oriented approach as emphasised in
Kajal
v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413, and other
decisions, and it would be wholly unjust to non-suit
the child on a purely technical plea of limitation.
III. POINT FOR DETERMINATION
7. In the light of the rival contentions, the following
point arises for determination:
Whether the claim petition in MACP No.515 of 2024
is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC as
being barred by limitation under Section 166(3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (as amended)?
IV. DISCUSSION AND REASONS
(A) Scope of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC
8. It is well-settled that for the purpose of an application
under Order VII Rule 11(d), the court has to look only
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at the averments in the plaint (here, claim petition)
and the documents filed by the claimant, and not at
the defence or disputed questions of fact. If on a plain
reading of the plaint the suit appears to be barred by
any law, only then can rejection be ordered. (See
Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India
Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510;
Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd.
v. Hede & Co., (2007) 5 SCC 614).
9. Moreover, limitation is often a mixed question of fact
and law, and unless the bar is clear and unambiguous
on the face of the pleadings, rejection at the threshold
is not justified. In Motor Accident Claims, the
Tribunal functions under a special beneficial statute,
and technical rules of pleading and procedure cannot
be imported so as to defeat substantive justice.
(B) Scheme of Section 166 and its Amendments
10. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as also under
Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act in its original form, a
period of six months was prescribed for filing a claim,
with limited power in the Tribunal to condone delay.
Parliament later realised that this rigid limitation
worked great hardship on victims, who are often poor
and illiterate. Consequently, by the 1994 Amendment,
sub-section (3) of Section 166 was deleted, thereby
removing the limitation altogether.
11. In
Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, noticing this legislative history, held
that after deletion of Section 166(3), claims could not
be thrown out on the ground of limitation and that
the amendment would apply even to pending matters,
emphasising that the Motor Vehicles Act is a social
welfare legislation and a liberal approach is
mandated.
12. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court, in
Kum. Jyoti M.
Shetye (supra), after reviewing the law, reiterated
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that the omission of Section 166(3) manifested the
legislative intent not to prescribe any limitation, and
that tribunals should not dismiss claims as time-
barred save in extremely gross cases of laches.
13. The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 re-
introduced Section 166(3), prescribing that no
application for compensation shall be entertained
unless made within six months of the occurrence of
the accident. The Central Government issued a
notification bringing certain provisions, including
Section 166(3), into force with effect from
01.04.2022.
(C) Constitutional Challenge and Interim Order of the
Supreme Court -
14. The newly inserted Section 166(3) has been
challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court on the
ground that it re-introduces a rigid period of
limitation contrary to the welfare object of the statute
and violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
Various High Courts have also considered similar
challenges and the issue is presently sub judice.
15. It is now a matter of record that, in a batch of
petitions including
ICICI Lombard General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Ayiti Navaneetha & Ors., the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has, by interim order dated
06.11.2025, directed that:
“During the pendency of these petitions, the Tribunal
or the High Courts shall not dismiss the claim petitions on
the ground of such petitions being barred by limitation as
prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.”
and has stayed the operation of Section 166(3).
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16. The above interim order is binding on all Motor
Accident Claims Tribunals throughout the country
under Article 141 of the Constitution. So long as this
interim order continues, no claim petition can be
rejected merely on the ground that it has been filed
beyond six months as contemplated by Section
166(3).
17. Once the operation of Section 166(3) itself
stands stayed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it
cannot be said that there exists, as of today, any
statutory bar in force which would attract Order VII
Rule 11(d) CPC. The very foundation of the insurer’s
application, therefore, disappears.
(D) Beneficial Interpretation, Minor Victim and Section
166(4)
18. Apart from the above, it is pertinent that the
present case concerns a minor girl of seven years. In
Kajal v. Jagdish Chand (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court highlighted that in cases involving children who
suffer permanent disability, the Tribunals must adopt
a liberal and compassionate approach, ensuring just
compensation and not allowing procedural
technicalities to thwart substantive rights.
19. Section 166(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act
(renumbered after the 2019 amendment) read with
Section 159 further enables the Tribunal to treat the
police accident report/Detailed Accident Report
forwarded to it as an application for compensation. In
many decisions, including recent judgments of the
Kerala and Orissa High Courts, it has been
emphasised that for the purposes of limitation and
maintainability, the date of such accident report can
also be relevant and that the issue cannot always be
decided as a pure question of law divorced from facts.
20. In the present case, neither in the application
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nor in the reply are the relevant factual aspects in
relation to the forwarding of the police report/DAR,
the knowledge and capacity of the guardian, and
other circumstances fully pleaded. These are matters
which may, if necessary, be gone into at the stage of
final adjudication; they cannot form the sole basis to
reject the petition at the threshold, especially when
Section 166(3) itself stands stayed.
(E) Conclusion on the Point for Determination
21. In view of the foregoing discussion, this
Tribunal is of the considered opinion that:
(i) In light of the binding interim order of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court staying the operation of Section 166(3) and
directing Tribunals not to dismiss motor accident claims as
time-barred, there is presently no enforceable statutory bar
of limitation which would attract Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
(ii) Even otherwise, questions relating to limitation in
motor accident claims, particularly after the 2019
amendment and in cases concerning minors, involve mixed
questions of fact and law, which cannot be decided solely
on the basis of the insurer’s application without recording
evidence.
(iii) The Motor Vehicles Act being a beneficial and welfare
legislation, and the present claim involving a minor victim,
the Tribunal must lean in favour of adjudicating the claim
on merits rather than shutting the doors at the threshold on
a technical plea.
22. Hence, the point for determination is answered in the
negative, holding that the claim petition is not liable
to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the
ground of limitation.
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V. ORDER
1. Application Exh.14 filed by Opponent No.2 – United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. under Order VII Rule 11 read
with Section 151 CPC and Section 166(3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is hereby REJECTED.
2. It is clarified that, in view of the interim order of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court staying Section 166(3), no
issue of limitation survives for consideration at this
stage. However, the parties shall be at liberty to raise
all permissible contentions at the time of final
hearing, subject to any further orders that may be
passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding the
validity and operation of Section 166(3).
3. The claim petition shall proceed to trial on merits in
accordance with law.
4. No order as to costs on this application.
Pronounced in open Court on this 15th day of
November, 2025.
(Shashikant Eknathrao Bangar)
Member, C.R. 3
Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Mumbai
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