Final Order 1

Order Details: Notice of Motion
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MHCC010060772019
IN THE COURT OF
COURT 1 ADDL SESSIONS JUDGE AT
Mumbai,Mumbai
Presided Over by HHJ SHRI. M. S. AZMI
NOTICE OF MOTION/102191/2019
IN
SUIT NO.1928 OF 2019
Atul Ashar 52 years of Mumbai, an adult
Indian Inhabitant carrying on business in the
firm, in the name and style of M/s. Orion
Advertisers, as the Sole Proprietor thereof
and having his office at 1220, 12th floor
Maker Chambers V, Nariman Point
Mumbai 400 021. ..Plaintiff
Versus
Surya Darshan Cooperative Housing
Society Ltd., a Society registered under the
Maharashtra Cooperative Societies
Act, 1960 and having its Registered address
at 44/50, Walkeshwar Road,
Mumbai400 006. ..Defendant
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MHCC010120552019
IN THE COURT OF
COURT 1 ADDL SESSIONS JUDGE AT
Mumbai,Mumbai
Presided Over by HHJ SHRI. M. S. AZMI
NOTICE OF MOTION/104403/2019
IN
SUIT NO.1928 OF 2019
Atul Ashar 52 years of Mumbai, an adult
Indian Inhabitant carrying on business in the
firm, in the name and style of M/s. Orion
Advertisers, as the Sole Proprietor thereof
and having his office at 1220, 12th floor
Maker Chambers V, Nariman Point
Mumbai 400 021. ..Plaintiff
Versus
Surya Darshan Cooperative Housing
Society Ltd., a Society registered under the
Maharashtra Cooperative Societies
Act, 1960 and having its Registered address
at 44/50, Walkeshwar Road,
Mumbai400 006. ..Defendant
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MHCC010122202019
IN THE COURT OF
COURT 1 ADDL SESSIONS JUDGE AT
Mumbai,Mumbai
Presided Over by HHJ SHRI. M. S. AZMI
NOTICE OF MOTION/104453/2019
IN
SUIT NO.1928 OF 2019
Atul Ashar 52 years of Mumbai, an adult
Indian Inhabitant carrying on business in the
firm, in the name and style of M/s. Orion
Advertisers, as the Sole Proprietor thereof
and having his office at 1220, 12th floor
Maker Chambers V, Nariman Point
Mumbai 400 021. ..Plaintiff
Versus
Surya Darshan Cooperative Housing
Society Ltd., a Society registered under the
Maharashtra Cooperative Societies
Act, 1960 and having its Registered address
at 44/50, Walkeshwar Road,
Mumbai400 006. ..Defendant
Ld. advocate Mr.Dalal with Ld. Advocate Mr.Kanade for plaintiff
Ld. advocate Mr.N.Shah for the defendant
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COMMON ORDER DATED 03/11/2020
1. The Notice of motion No.2191 of 2019 was tendered
by the plaintiff restraining the defendant from taking
steps to demolish or remove his Neonsign
advertisement hoarding/board on the terrace
premises of the defendant’s society building. The
structure is admeasuring 60’ x 20’ (hereinafter
referred to as ‘suit structure’)
2. The Notice of motion no.4403 of 2019 is tendered by
defendant (the plaintiff in the counter claim) for
directing the original plaintiff to dismantle and
remove the suit structure and further restraining the
original plaintiff for continuing the suit structure or
any other structure on the terrace of the defendant’s
society and further restraining the original plaintiff
from entering and/or remaining upon the building
belonging to the defendant’s society. They also
prayed for appointment of Court Receiver or some
other fit and proper person with all powers under
order 40 Rule 1 of C.P.C. to demolish the suit
structure.
3. The notice of motion no.4453 of 2019 is also
tendered by the original defendant’s society for
discharging and varying and to set aside the order of
adinterim injunction dated 12/06/2019.
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4. Heard both the parties.
5. In brief the facts of the case are as under:
The suit structure was erected by the plaintiff
since 1991 after obtaining permission from the
Competent Authority under an agreement dated
13/12/1991. The agreement was time to time
extended by the mutual consent of the parties. In
the year 2012, the plaintiff and defendant
extended the agreement for a period of five years
on the basis of constituted Principal agreement
and Subsidiary agreement dated 27/08/2012. On
26/04/2017, plaintiff issued letter showing
intention to renew the agreement in accordance
with the relevant clauses contained in the
agreement. The plaintiff continued to pay the
requisite amount to the defendant. In March
2018 , the meeting of the plaintiff with committee
members was held to discuss the repair works to
be carried out in the defendant’s society premises
and for the removal of the suit structure. On
23/10/2018, the plaintiff applied with MCGM for
renewal of the permission which was granted. The
plaintiff received letter dated 23/05/2019 from
defendant’s society for termination of the
agreements. The defendant raised issue of
leakage of water into the flats below the terrace
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and entirely incorrect and grossly inflated figures
as to the weight of the hoarding. The defendant
society has switched off the electricity supply to
the hoarding without notice to the plaintiff. Thus,
the plaintiff was constrained to file the present
suit alongwith accompanying notice of motion.
6. The defendant resisted the claim of the plaintiff by
filing the written statement. The defendant
submitted that plaintiff has not issued notice u/s. 164
of the Maharashtra Coop. Societies Act which is a
condition precedent for filing the suit against the
society. The agreements have expired by efflux of
time under which the plaintiff is purportedly
claiming the right for displaying his hoarding on the
terrace of the building. Therefore, the suit for
injunction is not maintainable. The weight of the
hoarding alongwith the columns is about 32000 kgs
and alongwith wind pressure, the total load is of
approx. 37,000 kgs as per the report dated
05/09/2019 of the defendant’s structural engineer
Mr.Milind V.Chindarkar of Rehab Consultants Pvt.
Ltd. The building is about 50 years old and was
required extensive repairs. Wide cracks have
developed on the columns and beams of the building,
affecting the stability of the building. The plaintiff
was informed that the suit structure is required to be
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removed for two reasons i.e. for carrying out urgent
and necessary repairs of the building including the
terrace slab to ensure the stability, preservation and
protection of the building and safeguarding the lives
and properties of the members and their families
occupying the same and as the hoarding has caused
and continues to cause substantial damage to the
stability and strength of the structure of the building.
The plaintiff was time and again informed about the
need for urgent and immediate repairs of the
building. After the receipt of notice dated
23/05/2019, the plaintiff has filed the present suit.
The plaintiff has suppressed the material facts and
misrepresented the facts before the Court and not
entitled for the injunction as sought for. On the
contrary, the defendant is entitled for the relief
directing the plaintiff to remove the suit structure.
7. On the rival contentions of the parties, following
points arise for my determination and findings to it
are recorded for the reasons stated hereinafter:
POINTS
(i) Whether the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case in his favour?
(ii) Whether the needle of balance of convenience
tilt in favour of plaintiff?
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(iii) To whom irreparable loss would be caused?
(iv) Whether the defendant has made out the case
for temporary mandatory injunction?
(v) Whether the defendant has made out any case
for discharge and vary and to set aside the order
dated 12/06/2019?
(vi) What order?
FINDINGS
(i) In the affirmative
(ii) In the affirmative
(iii) To the plaintiff
(iv) In the negative
(v) In the negative
(vi) As per final order
REASONS
Point Nos. 1 to 5
8. It is not disputed that on the basis of an agreement
dated 13/12/1991, the plaintiff erected the suit
structure. The agreement was for a period of five
years and it was time to time extended by the parties.
It is also not in dispute that the agreement was
further extended by the Principal agreement and
Subsidiary agreement dated 27/08/2012 for the
further period of five years. It is the contention of
the defendant society that by efflux of time, the
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agreement came to an end i.e. on 31/08/2017,
therefore the plaintiff has no right to remain in the
building of the defendant society for the display of
said advertisement of hoarding. The claim of the
plaintiff for simplicitor injunction is also not
maintainable. Ld. Counsel for the defendant argued
that as per Sec.41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, the
claim of the plaintiff is barred. He would submit that
mere acceptance of license fee after the expiry of
period of agreement does not mean renewal of the
agreement. In order to support its case, the
defendant placed reliance upon the following
judgments:
AIR 1981 SC 1550(Shanti Devi V/s Amal Kumar
Banerjee
AIR 1996 SC 272(Savita Dey V/s Nageswar
Majumdar and anr)
AIR 1964 SC 461(Pooran Chand V. Motilal and
others)
AIR 1978 SC 1518 (Sardari Lal Vishwa Nath and
others V/s Pritam Singh)
9. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff argued
that the no doubt the agreement expired on
31/08/2017 but the plaintiff is still carrying out
display of advertisement by the suit structure. He
pointed out that he has issued a letter dated
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26/04/2017 invoking his right of renewal of the
agreement well in advance. He pointed out clause
(29) of the Principal Agreement and clause (15) of
the Subsidiary agreement and also letter dated
26/04/2017. It would be appropriate here to
reproduce clause (29) of the Principal Agreement
and clause (15) of the Subsidiary agreement:
(29) The parties herein have agreed that on expiry of
the period provided herein the advertising contractor
shall be allowed to renew this agreement on the same
terms and conditions as set out hereinabove for a
further period of 5(five) years with an increase of 5%
(five percent) over an above the rent payable as
mentioned in the agreement.
(15) It is hereby agreed by and between the
parties hereto that should the advertising contractor
observe and perform the terms and conditions of this
agreement, the advertising contractor shall have an
option to renew this agreement for a further period of
5(five) years at a yearly compensation which will
reflect an increase of 5% (five percent)over the
compensation stipulated herein, the other terms and
conditions, save and except the clause for renewal,
being the same, shall exercise this option for renewal
by a notice in writing to the society as the case may be
at least 3(three) months prior to expiry of the terms of
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this Agreement.
10. After reading the above said clauses it is
apparent that the advertising contractor is permitted
to renew the agreement on the same terms and
conditions as set out hereinabove for a further period
of 5(five) years with an increase of 5%(five percent)
over and above the rent payable as mentioned in the
agreement. But the rider is that he shall exercise his
option for renewal three months prior to the expiry
of the terms of the agreement. The plaintiff issued
notice dated 26/04/2017 and thereby exercised his
right for renewal of the agreement. The very fact of
issuance of notice has been admitted. The stand of
the defendant is that the defendant society has not
accepted the request of the plaintiff as society is
desirous to carry out structural repairs of the
building. On perusal of the record, there is nothing
to show that defendant society has responded to the
said letter of the plaintiff immediately or to say till
23/05/2019. Therefore, the said argument of the Ld.
Counsel for the defendant is not acceptable at this
stage that the defendant society refused the request
of the plaintiff for renewal of the agreement. Had it
been the case that the society had refused the request
of the plaintiff, they would have communicated to
the plaintiff in that regard and would not have
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accepted the rent amount. No doubt the acceptance
of the rent amount would not mean renewal of the
license but at the same time it has to be considered
that the plaintiff has obtained requisite license from
MCGM subsequently after the expiry of the period of
agreement. The parties are governed by the contract.
The contract stipulates renewal of the agreement at
the option of the plaintiff which he has exercised and
there is nothing except the bare pleadings of the
defendant that defendant refused the request of the
plaintiff for the same. In this background, the above
cited judgments would not be of any help to the
defendant.
11. The Learned Counsel for the defendant argued
that after termination of agreements, the plaintiff has
no right to remain in possession. To support his
contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Southern
Roadways Ltd., Madurai V/s S.M.Krishna, AIR
1990 Supreme Court 673. The question in the
above case was that the agent after revocation of his
authority is not entitled to remain in possession of
the premises of the principal and interfere with the
business. Herein the relation of plaintiff and
defendant is not of principal and agent. The issue in
the above cited case is on altogether different issue.
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Hence, the above cited judgments with greatest of
respect is not applicable.
12. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyabrata
Ghose V/s Hungheera M. Banjur & Co and
another, 1954 Supreme Court Reports 310. The
judgment is on the doctrine of frustration as
contemplated under Section 56 of the Contract Act.
The defendant is not coming with the case of
frustration of contract as envisage under section 56
of the Contract Act and therefore the above cited
judgment is not applicable in the present case.
13. The other limb of the argument which is
canvassed is that the agreement has come to an end
and therefore the plaintiff has no right for injunction.
It is also argued that the relief is barred u/s. 41(e) of
the Specific Relief Act. Sec. 41(e) of the Specific
Relief Act contemplates that injunction can be
refused to prevent the breach of a contract, the
performance of which would not be specifically
enforced. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that the
plaintiff has a right on the basis of agreement dated
27/08/2012 for which he has opted for renewal. At
this juncture, it would not be proper to comment
whether the agreement is in existence or not. The
effect of the termination of the contract by defendant
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by virtue of their letters dated 23/05/2019 and
16/09/2019, various grounds have been cited for the
termination of the agreement, it would be proper for
the parties to go for the trial to establish their case on
these issues. Prima facie as pointed above the option
exercised by the plaintiff for renewal of the
agreement is nowhere refused by the defendant in
writing except the bare words of the defendant in the
pleadings. Therefore, the argument that the claim of
the plaintiff is barred u/s. 41(e) of the Specific Relief
Act is not acceptable at this stage.
14. Ld. Counsel for the defendant placed reliance
upon the following judgments:
(i) 1987(Supp)SCC 161: Bruce V.Silva Raj and
ors
The ratio in the above cited judgment is that
the injunction can be obtained on the basis of
possession. I failed to understand as to how
this judgment is applicable in the present facts
and circumstances of this case.
(ii) (1994) 5 SCC 547, Premji Ratansey Shah
V/s Union of India
The ratio laid down in this case is that,
“Issuance of an order of injunction is
absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief.
In a given set of facts, injunction may be given
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to protect the possession of the owner or
person in lawful possession. It is not
mandatory that for mere asking such relief
should be given. Injunction is a personal right
under Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act,
1963; the plaintiff must have personal interest
in the matter. The interest of right not shown
to be in existence, cannot be protected by
injunction.”
In the case in hand, the plaintiff is claiming
protection of his right on the basis of the
agreement, therefore it cannot be said that the
plaintiff has not shown the interest of right to
be in existence in his favour and therefore the
above cited judgment with greatest of respect
is not helpful to the case of the defendant.
(iii) 234(2016) Delhi Law Times 36: Indu V/s
Shri Kishan
This judgment is altogether on the different
footing. The adopted daughter claims to be
tenant after the death of her father and as per
Delhi Rent Control Act, the spouse of a tenant
is in higher category than of the deceased
statutory tenant and the widow of the
deceased tenant was alive when he expired. It
was held that the person has no legal right to
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stay in the suit flat is not entitled for the
discretionary relief of injunction. As discussed
above, herein in this case, the plaintiff claims
to be in possession after the expiry of the
agreement on the basis of option of renewal
exercise by him as per the contract. Therefore,
at this stage, it appears that some prima facie
case and right occurs in favour of the plaintiff.
The Ld. Counsel for the defendant also placed
reliance upon the following judgments:
AIR 1986 Orissa 22: M/s. Misra & Co. V/s
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd
AIR 1971 Rajasthan 292, Ramchandra V/s
M/s.Ram Rakhmal
AIR 1972 Delhi 84, Shashi Kapoor V/s
Subhash Kapoor.
AIR 2002 SC 2051, Corporation of Calicut
V/s. K.Sreenivasan
1996 AIHC 2018(J & K High Court), Ghulam
Ahmed Kuchhai V/s J & K Bank Ltd
2017(5) ABR 43 (Aurangabad Bench), M/s.
Raghuveer Agencies Pvt.Ltd V/s Santosh
Anantrao Jagtap
AIR 2005 SC 2905, Shanti Prasad Devi V/s
Shankar Mahto
AIR 1982 Gauhati 69, Bindeshwar V.
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Managing Committee, S.H.H. High School
AIR 1978 Delhi 174(Full Bench), Chandu Lal
V/s Delhi Municipality
15. I have considered the law cited in the above
said judgments. The most of the judgments laid
down the criteria for grant of injunction. There is no
quarrel about the position of law laid down in the
above cited judgments. In the peculiar facts of this
case how the ratio cited in the above judgments are
applicable is not demonstrated by the defendant.
16. The issue which is raised by the defendant is
appears that the building is 50 years old and it is
dilapidated and requires immediate repairs and for
that purpose the suit structure is required to be
removed. The defendant has placed reliance upon
the report of Milind Chindarkar who has opined that
the load of each column is approx. 2150 Kg. Total
load of the columns is approximately 26,000 kgs.
Self weight of the hoarding and neon sign is approx.
6000 kgs. Total wind force per frame is 16200 kg.
Vertical force in the frame is 4860 kgs. Thus, the
total load due to dead load is 32,000 kgs. The total
load is approx. 37,000 kgs. The building is 50 years
old constructed in 1967. The hoarding structure was
put on the terrace in the year 1991 after 24 years of
construction. The building was not designed to take
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huge load of the hoarding. This is very dangerous
and risky and affecting the safety and stability of the
building and therefore he recommended to remove
the hoardings in order to avoid any accident or
mishap and to ensure safety and stability of the
building. It is also argued that the condition of the
columns are precarious. Wide cracks are already
developed in most of the columns of the building.
The load carrying capacity of the columns is reduced
as the diameter of the main reinforcement is reduced
and concrete is getting deteriorated with time. Mr.
Milind Chindarkar has personally inspected the
interior of flat no.17 below terrace and observed that
the fall ceiling is bulged out at some places and
leakage is observed from the terrace. Part of the fall
ceilng which was bulged out is removed in dinning
area. Cracks are seen in the ceiling and in the
beams. The aluminum windows are not able to move
due to sagging of the drop beam above the window.
The flooring of the room is disturbed. He advised to
remove the load on the building. The plaintiff has
given the photographs of the leakage and damage.
Therefore, it is argued that if the injunction is
granted, and the suit structure exist on the terrace,
then it would be at the cost and life of the occupants.
Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff argued that these
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condition of the building have been presented in
order to remove the plaintiff’s hoarding from
defendant society. On perusal of the record, it
appears that the defendant has filed two affidavits of
Milind Chindarkar, One is dated 05/05/2019 based
upon visit to the building on 30/08/2019. He has
taken inspection of the building and flat nos.17 and
18 on the 9th floor which are just below the terrace.
The report with the above said averments is annexed
with his affidavit. The suit admittedly was filed in
June 2019. The visit of the Structural Engineer was
on 30/08/2019. It is not the case of the defendant
that plaintiff was issued with a notice about the visit
of the said engineer. On single visit, the findings
have been given as regard the structural stability of
the building more particularly above the terrace
portion. The said person has carried out structural
audit some what in the year 2016. His report was
annexed alongwith affidavit dated 26/02/2020. The
report shows on page no.11, that the condition of
the terrace waterproofing and water tank appears to
be satisfactory but the terrace waterproofing may
have to be carried out in patches if the condition of
terrace floor slab is found to be bad. Also on page 17
of the said report, he opined that the condition of the
terrace waterproofing appears to be satisfactory. But
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if it is required to recast a certain section of ceiling
of the top floor slab then the terrace waterproofing
will have to be carried out at that section. The report
suggest the method and the way by which
scientifically he has carried out the testing. But at
that time he did not notice anything which he
noticed in the year 2019. No doubt there is
considerable period of three years but the report dt
05/09/2019 is absolutely silent as to which test he
has carried out to ascertain to arrive at a findings for
recommending to remove the suit structure is not
coming from the said report. This report prima facie
appears to be after thought i.e. obtained after filing
of the suit. If the letter dated 23/05/2019 of the
defendant is considered, it shows that defendant has
engaged the service of Civil and Structural Engineer.
The said engineer had come to the conclusion that
the building of the society is neither strong enough
nor it is advisable for the society to continue to have
the said signboard on the terrace of the building, so
as to maintain the stability and durability of the
building; and putting up and continuing with the
said signboard has caused substantial damage to the
building of the society. The defendant has only filed
two reports; one is dated 05/09/2019 and the other
is of the year 2016. The notice is dated 23/05/2019
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in which there is no disclosure about the period when
the said inspection and structural audit were carried
out by the structural engineer. The affidavit of
Structural Engineer dated 30/09/2019 shows that he
has given earlier report on 2nd May 2019. But the
said report is not produced by the defendant society
for the reason best known to them. The contents of
the said notice forms the part of the report dated
05/09/2019. This prima facie, at this stage creates
certain doubt. Even in the notice dated 23/05/2019,
it is alleged that the plaintiff failed and neglected to
maintain the hoarding structure and to erect and to
keep erected by his own expenses. It is also alleged
that the plaintiff earlier removed the sign board and
new sign board was installed at the said place. There
is nothing on record to show that any letter was
issued for any breach by the plaintiff for not
maintaining the terrace and the structure as
contemplated in the agreement save and except the
termination notice dated 23/05/2019. Even there is
nothing on record prima facie to show that when the
plaintiff replaced the old structure by new. The
plaintiff in the year 2018 has applied for renewal of
the permit from MCGM and for that plaintiff has
taken the report of the structural engineer dated
19/10/2018. The Corporation has issued the
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renewal of the permit for the period 01/01/2019 to
31/12/2020. Prima facie from the letter of the
plaintiff dated 23/03/2018 addressed to the
defendant shows that there was meeting held
between him and the members of the society wherein
plaintiff was informed that the advertisement
structure is heavy and due to which the building is
weakened on account of load and he was requested
to remove the suit structure. When this was the
situation in 2018, the defendant kept mum thereafter
when the plaintiff renewed the permit from the
Corporation. This prima facie shows the seriousness
and the conduct of the defendant. The Corporation
is an authority granting permit and its renewal after
considering the report of the structural engineer as
regard the stability of the building. The defendant
did not make any representation with MCGM at the
time of renewal of permit as regard stability of
building and to continue with the advertisement
board as per their contention has caused substantial
damage to the building of the society.
17. The report of the structural engineer is after
filing of the suit when the defendant claims that the
building is not capable to resist the load of the
advertising structure of the plaintiff. At the time of
issuance of the notice dated 23/05/2019, they might
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have possessed any report of the structural engineer
which is not coming on record creates doubt.
18. Ld. Counsel for the defendant argued that this
is a fit case for grant of temporary mandatory
injunction for removal of suit structure in order to
protect the inhabitants of the building. In support of
his contentions, he placed reliance upon the
following judgments:
AIR 1990 SC 867, Dorab Cawasji Warden
V/s Coomi Sorab Warden
AIR 1985 Calcutta 248, Indian Cable Co.Ltd
Vs Sumitra Chakraborty
Hammad Ahmed Vs Abdul Majeed(2019) 14
Supreme Court Cases 1
19. As discussed above, the reports of the
structural engineer is based upon a day visit to the
site and without any details of carrying out test at the
building. The report of the same engineer of the year
2016 does not set out anything about the stability
and loss to the building due to the suit structure. On
the contrary, plaintiff’s structural engineer has given
the report as regard the stability of the building and
the Corporation renewed the permit after the dispute
of the plaintiff with the defendant. Since the
issuance of notice dated 23/05/2019, defendant did
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nothing after obtaining the report of structural
engineer dated 05/09/2019 approached this Court.
When the building was in such a bad condition and
required immediate removal of the suit structure, the
defendant kept mum till filing of the suit by the
plaintiff. In these background it is clear that the
defendant has not made out exceptional case and
failed to demonstrate immediate and extreme
hardship to show that the case of defendant is of
higher standard. In absence of strong prima facie
case the claim of defendant for interim injunction is
mandatory cannot be accepted. Thus, the ratio cited
in above judgments in these facts and circumstances
are not applicable to the case in hand.
20. The defendant tried to disconnect the
electricity supply which they admitted that the
disconnection was due to short circuit whereas the
plaintiff claims that electricity cable as well as
electricity board of the suit structure is independent
and defendant has illegally switched off the
electricity supply to the suit structure. It appears
prima facie the high handed act of the defendant for
switching of the electric supply. Thus, the plaintiff
has made out prima facie case in his favour. The
needle of balance of convenience tilt in favour of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff who is carrying out his
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advertising business, if the protection is not granted,
he would suffer irreparable loss. The defendant has
not made out any rare and exceptional case to
exhaust the jurisdiction of the Court to grant
mandatory temporary injunction. As plaintiff has
made out the case for grant of temporary injunction,
the relief of setting aside the order dated
12/06/2019 is redundant. Therefore, I answer point
nos.1 to 5 accordingly.
POINT NO.6
21. In view of the above discussion, the notice of
motion of plaintiff needs consideration. Hence, it is
expedient to pass following order:
ORDER
1.Notice of Motion no.2191/2019 is made absolute
in terms of prayer clause (a) and (b).
2.Notice of Motion no.4403/2019 is rejected.
3.Notice of Motion no.4453/2019 is redundant.
4.Costs in cause.
5.Notice of motions disposed off accordingly.
03/11/2020 M.SALMAN AZMI
CITY CIVIL COURT,
GR.MUMBAI.
Dictated on:03/11/2020
Typed on:06/11/2020
Signed on:05/12/2020
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'CERTIFIED TO BE TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE
ORIGINAL SIGNED JUDGMENT/ORDER”.
06/12/20 at 02.16 pm.
Mrs.Tanushree C.Kamble
Name of the Judge HHJ SHRI M.S.AZMI, CR NO.1
Date of Pronouncement of
judgment/order
03/11/2020
Judgment and order signed by P.O. 05/12/2020
Judgment/order uploaded on 06/12/2020
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