Full Order Text
Order 1 · 09 Aug 2019 · CNR MHCC010035862018
Order Details: Copy of Judgment Pdf Text: 1 Misc.app.78.18 Received on : 20/02/2018 Registered on : 15/03/2018 Decided on : 09/08/2019 Duration : Y M D 01 04 25 IN THE BOMBAY CITY CIVIL COURT AT BOMBAY Misc. Appeal No.78 of 2018 1) M/s.B.V. Stars having its office at plot no.55, SEEPZSEZ, Andheri(W), Mumbai96 2) M/s.B.V. Stars Plazza, 55, Gamdevi Road, Mumbai7 3) Ms.Bina Shah having her address at Swapnalok, Napeansea Road, Mumbai6 ..Appellants V/s. 1) SEEPZ Special Economic Zone having its head office at Andheri(W), Mumbai96 2) The Estate Manager, SEEPZSEZ Authority having its head office at Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Andheri(E), Mumbai96 ..Respondents -- 1 of 15 -- 2 Misc.app.78.18 Coram : H.H.THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE V.G. BISHT Dated : 9th August ,2019 (C.R.No.19) Advocate Mr.Cyrus Bharucha i/b. H.K. Law Associates for appellants. Advocate Mr.S.R. Rajguru a/w. advocate Mr.M.S. Bharadwaj for respondents. O R A L J U D G M E N T Being aggrieved by the order of eviction passed by the Estate Manager, SEEPZSEZ Authority under subSection (1) of Section 5 of The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)Act, 1971 (“the P.P. Act” for short) on 5th February,2018 in respect of M/s.B.V. Star, 1st and 2nd floor, plot no.55, SEEPZSEZ, Andheri(E), Mumbai96 (“schedule premises” for short) and subsequent notice dated 6th February,2018 under subSection (3) of Section 7 of the P.P. Act, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. 2 Brief facts: Appellant no.1 is a registered partnership firm was constituted under a Deed of Partnership dated 1st January,1993. The partners of appellant no.1 (save and except one partner) were also partners of one M/s.B.V. Jewels and are engaged in the business of Gems and Jewellery. Respondent no.1 is the Santa Cruz Electronics Export Processing Zone as defined under Section 2(za) of the Special Economic Zone Act,2005 (“SEZ Act” for short). -- 2 of 15 -- 3 Misc.app.78.18 3 The appellants had been conducting their business from schedule premises since 1993. A letter of approval (“LOA”) bearing reference No.NUS/APL/GJ/104/92/112181 dated 18th February,1993 was issued in favour of appellant no.1 for a period of ten years. Partners of appellant no.1, thereafter, alongwith the partners of B.V. Jewels constructed an ultra modern state of the art building. The appellant no.1 conducted its business till 1997 and thereafter, certain dispute arose between the then partners of appellant no.1. The matter went upto Hon'ble High Court and from there to Arbitration. In the midst of the aforesaid proceedings, an enquiry was initiated by the office of Customs, Mumbai, which was carried upto Hon'ble Supreme Court and eventually concluded somewhere in 2005. 4 According to appellants, while appellant no.1 was involved in the aforesaid proceedings, somewhere in the year 2002, the LOA issued in its favour elapsed and has not been renewed till date by respondent no.1. Despite several requests and correspondences made by appellant no.1 in relation to renewal of LOA, respondents have failed to renew the LOA. 5 The appellants allege that to appellant no.1's surprise and utter shock on 18th March,2013, respondent no.1 addressed a letter cancelling/terminating the sublease created in its favour and the reasons stated was expiry of LOA. Further, on 15th April,2013 respondent no.1 addressed a show cause notice under Section 4(1) and 4(2)(ii)(b) of the P.P. Act granting it in unauthorized occupation of the schedule premises. According to appellants, during the pendency of hearing of the matter, the -- 3 of 15 -- 4 Misc.app.78.18 permission of the Officer holding the office of respondent no.2 came to an end and now Officers were appointed on two occasions. Neither did the officer issuing the show cause notice nor did any of her successors conduct a detailed hearing in the matter. After filing of the reply, respondent no.2 did not frame issues nor did the appellant no.1 was called upon by respondent no.1 to file its affidavit of evidence. No opportunity was offered to the appellants to crossexamine respondent no.1. 6 The appellants, lastly, allege that by passing of impugned order, the respondent no.2 has directed the appellants to handover vacant possession of the schedule premises within 15 days and further vide notice dated 6th February,2018 demanded an amount of Rs.78,70,265.76 ps. Hence, this appeal. 7 Mr. Cyrus Bharucha, learned counsel for appellants, submitted that the Letter of Approval (LOA) expired on 31st March,2002 and despite various correspondences for renewal of LOA, the respondents did not pass any order on the letters/applications made by appellant no.1 and this was purposely done so that the appellant no.1 did not have written order rejecting its applications from which it could file an appeal under the provisions of SEZ Act. 8 The learned counsel, then took me through the relevant documents in order to buttress his submissions. Similarly, according to learned counsel, the appellant no.1 was never heard in respect of the -- 4 of 15 -- 5 Misc.app.78.18 alleged nonpayment of custom duty before the cancellation of LOA. Thus, the whole approach adopted by respondents is completely unjustified resulting into illegal cancellation of sublease. The learned counsel placed reliance in Union of India V/s. J.V. Gokal & Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 28334 and Syndicate Bank V/s. Ramachandran Pillai and others (2011) 15 Supreme Court Cases 398. 9 Mr.S.R. Rajguru, learned counsel for respondents, on the other hand, supported the impugned orders passed by Estate Manager. The learned counsel also took me through the original proceedings and pointed out how the impugned orders passed by the Estate Manager are legal and correct. According to learned counsel, there being no merit in the appeal, the same is liable to be dismissed. The learned counsel placed reliance in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and another V/s. Punjab National Bank and others, AIR 1991 Supreme Court 855 and Syndicate Bank V/s. Ramachandran Pillai and others (2011) 15 Supreme Court Cases 398. 10 Following points, therefore, arise for my consideration and my findings thereon for the reasons are as follows: POINTS FINDINGS 1) Whether the impugned orders passed by the Estate Manager ..Partly yes. are legal, just and proper? 2) What order? ..As per final order. -- 5 of 15 -- 6 Misc.app.78.18 R E A S O N S Point No.1: 11 The learned counsel for appellants has squarely put the blame at the door of respondents and while doing so, he vociferously tried to bring home twofold submissions. Firstly, inspite of several communications and fervent plea raised by the appellant to renew the letter of approval, respondents deliberately sat dispassionately on those correspondences, did not take any meaningful action and rather engineered a situation whereby the appellants could be branded as an “unauthorised occupant”. Secondly, while doing so, the respondents committed not only flagrant breach of the guidelines to prevent arbitrary use of powers to evict genuine tenants from public premises but threw all the norms incorporated in the guidelines to the winds. The quintessence is, therefore, that the termination of sublease was unjustified and illegal and, therefore, the impugned order needs to be set aside at once. 12 Countering the above submissions, the stand taken by the respondents is that the grounds of eviction were not holding a valid LOA after 31st March,2002 and a valid sublease agreement since 18 th March,2013. These two aspects read together thus violated the provisions prescribed under Rule 11(5) and Rule 19 of SEZ Rules,2006 (“SEZ Rules” for short). In addition, there were various statutory dues under the Customs Act and Government dues. 13 In the whole scenario, what should engage attention is -- 6 of 15 -- 7 Misc.app.78.18 whether infact the correspondences entreating the respondent to renew LOA was meaningful and justified. Having regard to the rules prescribed by SEZ Rules, so also the nature and significant of said guidelines which the appellants are banking upon the stand taken by the appellants needs to be appreciated visavis the facts and circumstances on record. 14 There is no dispute to the fact that a letter of approval (LOA) bearing reference No. NUS/APL/GJ/104/92/112181 dated 18th February,1993 was issued in favour of appellant no.1 for a period of ten years in accordance with Rule 19 of SEZ Rules. It is also not disputed that subsequent to the issuance of LOA sublease (Exh.C) came to be executed between appellant no.1 and respondents on 14th September,1993. In the words of appellants, the LOA issued in their favour elapsed somewhere in the year 2002 whereas according to respondent LOA elapsed on 31st March,2002. 15 It is pertinent to note here that the appellants for the first time by their letter dated 8th May,2004 (Exh.H) requested respondent no.1 to grant them LOA and thereafter repeated their requests by series of correspondences (Exh.I to R). Apparently, the request came to be made after more than two years of expiration of letter of approval dated 18th February,1993. 16 Section 2(g) of the P.P. Act defines “unauthorised Occupation” as under: -- 7 of 15 -- 8 Misc.app.78.18 “unathorised occupation”, in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises, has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever.” 17 From the above definition it is clear that a person becomes unauthorised occupant if the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever. In the case in hand, admittedly, the validity of letter of approval dated 18th February,1993 expired on 31st March,2002. That is to say, there was no valid LOA after 31st March,2002. Neither appellant got the said LOA extended before its expiration nor immediately moved the respondents within reasonable time to get the same extended in accordance with SEZ Rules. 18 The learned counsel for appellants have heavily placed reliance in the judgment given in Union of India V/s. J.V. Gokal & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). In this case, the letter of approval (LOA) was valid for a period of five years and was then liable to be renewed upon an application for renewal. There was no dispute that during the validity of the letter of approval, application for renewal was filed. In this factual backdrop, the Hon'ble High Court (Kerala) held that before the Development Commissioner considers the question of refusal to renew the letter of approval, she was required to issue notice to the parties giving out grounds -- 8 of 15 -- 9 Misc.app.78.18 and seeking a response. Thus, striking future in respect of renewal of letter of approval in the said case was that the application for LOA was moved during the validity of the letter of approval. Whereas it is not so in the case in hand. 19 Reverting backs to the case in hand, at the cost of repetition, let me place it on record straightway that the appellants were not at all alive to expirational aspect of LOA inasmuch as it took them for more than two years to beseech respondents to renew the LOA. This apathy is not justifiable by any means. In this regard, SubRules (6A)(1)(2) of Rule 19 of SEZ Rules are worth quoting. “(6A)(1) The Units which intend to renew the validity of Letter of Approval shall submit, before two months from the date of expiry of the Letter of Approval, the completed application in Form F1 along with requisite document, to the Development Commissioner, duly signed by the proprietor or managing partner or if it is a company, by the Managing Director or the Director(s) or any person who has or have been duly authorised for this purpose by a resolution of the Board of Approval of Directors of the Company: Provided that in case an application is not submitted before the said period of two months, such application shall be placed before the Approval Committee and the said Committee, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filling the same before the said period, may direct for entertainment of such application. (2) in case of noncompliance of the procedures specified in clause (1), the Letter of Approval shall not be considered for renewal.” -- 9 of 15 -- 10 Misc.app.78.18 20 By virtue of above Rules, a right is conferred on the units to get their LOA renewed before two months of the date of expiry of LOA. That period of two months is further extended by another two months in case units are prevented from doing so because of sufficient and reasonable cause. The record nowhere shows appellants having availed the benefit of above Rules. Therefore, the blame, if at all, is to be placed, must be squarely placed at the door of appellants. 21 During the course of argument, learned counsel submitted that the respondents have also failed to follow the procedure for renewal of LOA as stipulated in Rule 19 (6B) of the SEZ Rules. 22 The said Rule provides number of criteria to be taken into consideration by the concerned authority before renewal of letter of approval is granted. It must be reminded at once that the said Rule must be read in conjunction with Rule (6A)(1)(2) of Rule 19 of SEZ Rules and not in isolation. Therefore, it is wrong on the part of learned counsel to canvass before me that there was failure on the part of respondents to follow Rule 19(6B) of SEZ Rules. 23 This takes me to equally important facet viz. guidelines issued by Central Government. The Central Government has issued guidelines to prevent arbitrary use of powers to evict genuine tenants from public premises under the control of public sector undertaking/financial institutions vide Resolution no.21013/1/2000Pol.1 dated 30 th May,2002 -- 10 of 15 -- 11 Misc.app.78.18 (Gazetted on 8th June,2000). The Hon'ble Apex Court had an occasion to interpret these guidelines in Syndicate Bank V/s. Ramachandran Pillai and others (Supra). The observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraph nos.6 and 7 are quite relevant for our purpose which are as under: “6. If any executive instructions are to have the force of statutory rules, it must be shown that they were issued either under the authority concerned on the Central Government or a State Government or other authority by some statute or the Constitution. Guidelines or executive instructions which are not statutory in character, are not “laws”, and compliance therewith cannot be enforced through courts. Even if there has been any violation or breach of such nonstatutory guidelines, it will not confer any right on any member of the public, to seek a direction in a court of law, for compliance with such guidelines. An order validly made in accordance with a statute (as in this case the Public Premises Act), cannot be interfered with, even if there has been any transgression of any guidelines, except where it is arbitrary or mala fide or in violation of any statutory provision. These are wellsettled principles. 7. As the guidelines relied upon in this case were snot issued in exercise of any statutory power under the Public Premises Act or any other statute, even if there was violation or noncompliance with the aforesaid guidelines by the appellant, relief to the appellant could not be denied by relying upon the guidelines. To do so would amount to reading the guidelines into the statute, which is impermissible. The only “remedy” of any person complaining of noncompliance with such guidelines, is to bring such violation to the notice of a higher authority. We therefore hold that the enforcement of any right or exercise of any power by the appellant, under the Public Premises Act cannot be set at naught by relying upon or referring to the guidelines issued by the Central -- 11 of 15 -- 12 Misc.app.78.18 Government.” 24 Keeping in mind the above interpretation of Hon'ble Apex Court, what is immediately obvious from the record is that the procedure followed by respondents in no way can be termed as arbitrary or malafide. There was abysmal failure on the part of appellants to follow SEZ Rules in letter and spirit. In the circumstances, the utility and applicability of the guidelines could not have gone into. Therefore, the guidelines in the facts and circumstances of the present case do not further in any manner the cause of appellants. 25 In view of above discussion, I hold that as the lease period was coterminus with the LOA as per Rule 11(5) of the SEZ Rules, the lease rights ceased to exist after the expiration of the letter of approval. As there was no renewal of the LOA, the learned Estate Manager rightly concluded that the appellants were unauthorised occupants. To that extent, the finding of Learned Estate Manager is upheld. 26 The appellants have also challenged a demand notice (Exh.B) dated 6th February,2018 issued under subSection (3) of Section 7 of the P.P. Act by the learned Estate Manager. 27 On going through the impugned order dated 5th February,2018 it appears that one of the ground for eviction was various statutory dues under the Customs Act and Government outstanding in the name of -- 12 of 15 -- 13 Misc.app.78.18 appellants. However, there is no constructive discussion and speaking order in that regard. If one goes through the show cause notice (Exh.B) then one finds that in the light of annexureA appended to Exh.B, the learned Estate Manager found appellants in the arrears of Rs.78,70,265.72 ps. towards rent and service charges as on 31st December,2017. Neither annexureA nor the show cause notice give the details of the said amount. No material is placed on record to show that the period of limitation, if any, was taken into consideration while calculating the rent amount. Moreover, the show cause notice and as also annexure nowhere show the specific period covered by the learned Estate Manager for arriving at a particular amount. It has, therefore, become necessary to direct learned Estate Manager to consider the rental claim afresh keeping in mind the law of limitation, by affording fresh opportunity to the appellants. 28 In view of above, I pass the following order: O R D E R Misc.Appeal No.78/18 is partly allowed. The impugned order under subSection (1) of Section 5 of the P.P. Act passed by learned Estate Manager on 5th February,2018 stands confirmed. However, the show cause notice (Exh.B) dated 6th February,2018 issued by learned Estate Manager is hereby set aside with a direction to consider the same afresh in the light of above observations and -- 13 of 15 -- 14 Misc.app.78.18 by affording opportunity to both the sides. R & P be sent back. 09/07/2019 (V. G. BISHT) Principal Judge, Gr.Bombay. Dictated on : 09/08/2019 Transcribed on : 09/08/2019 Signed by HHJ on : 09/08/2019 -- 14 of 15 -- 15 Misc.app.78.18 CERTIFIED TO BE TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL SIGNED JUDGMENT/ORDER Name of Stenographer: Mrs.Aruna S. Jayade Upload date and time: 09/08/2019 (5.30 p.m.) Name of the Judge H.H.THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE Shri V.G. BISHT(C.R.No.19) Date of Pronouncement of Order 9th August,2019 Order signed by P.O. on 9th August,2019 Order uploaded on 9th August,,2019 -- 15 of 15 --
