Final Order 1

Order Details: Other
Pdf Text: :1:
IN THE BOMBAY CITY CIVIL COURT FOR GR. BOMBAY
SUIT No.357 OF 2018
1. Smt. Aruna Jagannath Agrawal
2. Malvika Mukesh Agrawal
3. Agarawal Processors .... Plaintiffs.
Versus
1. Samta Builders Private Limited
2. AAP Realtors Limited.
3. Nathoolalji Charity Trust .... Defendants.
APPERANCE
Adv. P.D. Gandhy I/b Adv. Sanket Mungle @ Adv. Kaustubh Patil for
plaintiffs.
Adv. Niranjan Bhadang @ Adv. Ramchandra Narayanan for defendant
nos.1 and 2.
CORAM : Dinesh P. Surana
Court Room No.1
DATED : 27.02.2018.
ORAL ORDER
By this exercise following two preliminary issues framed on
12.02.2018 u/sec.9A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are
adjudicated.
1] Whether the jurisdiction of this court is outstate in view of section 33
of Maharashtra Rent Control Act read with section 41 of Presidency
Small Causes Court Act ?
2] Whether this court has pecuniary jurisdiction to try and decide the
present suit ?
2. Advocate for plaintiffs and advocate for defendant Nos.1
and 2 made statement that they do not want to lead oral evidence for
-- 1 of 28 --
:2:
the purpose of adjudication of the preliminary issues.
3. Brief facts of the case are as under :
The plaintiffs are claiming themselves to be the lessees of the suit
premises bearing Survey No.267 (part), Old C.T.S. No.624 (part) New
C.T.S. No.622 B/1 of Village Mulund, Taluka Kurla, Bombay Suburban
District in respect of area admeasuring 2985 sq. mtrs. + 1001.36 sq
mtrs. = 3986.36 sq. mtrs. of the land. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 are the
builders. Defendant No.1 has given development rights to defendant
No.2 in respect of the suit premises. Defendant No.3 is a registered
trust. For clarity the sketch plan filed by the plaintiffs along with plaint
(ExhibitA) is attached to the present NM and same is treated as a part
and parcel of the order. As per the plaintiffs upper Green portion
admeasuring 1080.72 sq. mtrs. and Orange and Pink portion
admeasuring 1906.83 sq. mtrs. (aggregating 2985 sq. mtrs.) were
leased out to plaintiff Nos.1 and 2 by Indenture of Lease dated
05.11.1990 executed by defendant No.3. The Blue portion admeasuring
1001.36 sq. mtrs. has been leased out to the plaintiff No.3 by Indenture
of Lease dated 01.11.1987. Therefore, all 4 properties shown in Green,
Blue, Orange and Pink colour are the suit premises. The plaintiffs
further contended that the road leading to the suit properties is a
common road to access the suit premises and the same is shown in
Fluorescent colour in the sketch. As per the plaintiffs, they are using the
said access road for accessing their factory as well as for their ingress
and egress to the suit premises since 1978 and there is no alternative
way for them and therefore, they have legal right to way over the suit
access road by way of easement of necessity to the suit premises. The
plaintiffs contended that with malafide intention and ulterior motive,
defendant No.3 stopped accepting the lease rent after March, 2014. It is
-- 2 of 28 --
:3:
further case of the plaintiffs that the Green portion was leased out by
them but defendants have taken the possession of suit premises from
their sublessee, but still their lease hold rights over the Green portion
exist. They further submitted that defendants have forcibly taken the
possession of the Pink portion and separate S.C. Suit No.54 of 2017 is
filed by the plaintiffs u/sec.6 of the Specific Relief Act for the recovery
of the possession of the said pink portion. That, the defendants with
malafide intention have now started obstructing entry of the plaintiffs
by commencing digging, excavating work and keeping various
machineries on the road (Fluorescent colour) and had started
construction activities over the Green portion to defeat the legal rights
of the plaintiffs in respect of said portion of the land. That, beneath the
said access road there are various telephone lines, electricity wirings,
water pipe lines as well as Mahanagar Gas Pipe Lines in the property of
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs apprehend that the defendants with mala
fide intention and ulterior motive to damage the suit pipe line as well as
electric and water connections and to cause damage to the business of
plaintiff No.2 started digging and excavating in the Green and
Fluorescent portion, and therefore, the plaintiffs have grave and serious
apprehension that defendants may enter upon the Blue and Orange
portion of the land and dispossess the plaintiffs. Therefore, the plaintiffs
in the present suit has prayed for the following reliefs.
Prayer (a): that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant permanent
injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants
and/or any person or persons claiming through or under them
from obstructing or interfering with Plaintiff's ingress and
egress, their representatives, servants, agents and person
claiming through or under them to enter the suit premises
by goods carrier, Trucks, Heavy Vehicles, Cycle and by foot
and to go to the Plaintiffs' suit premises i.e. land admeasuring
about 3986.36 sq. mtrs. or thereabouts bearing Survey No.267
-- 3 of 28 --
:4:
(part), Old C.T.S. No. 624 (part) new C.T.S. No.622 B/1 of
Village Mulund, Taluka Kurla, Bombay Suburban District
shown by different colours in plan at Exhibit 'A' by using the
portion of the land marked in Fluorescent neon colour in plan
at Exhibit 'A'.
Prayer (b): that this Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant permanent order
and injunction restraining the defendants, their agents,
servants and/or any person or persons claiming through or
under them from dispossessing the Plaintiff from the suit
premises i.e. land admeasuring about 3986.36 sq. mtrs. or
thereabouts bearing Survey No.267 (part), Old C.T.S. No.624
(part) new C.T.S. No.622 B/1 of Village Mulund, Taluka
Kurla, Bombay Suburban District shown by blue and orange
colours in plan at Exhibit 'A' without following due procedure
of law.
Prayer (c): That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant permanent
injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants
and/or any person or persons claiming through or under them
from in any manner carrying out any construction or
development activity, digging, excavating or carrying out any
activity allied to development and construction and/or
creating any third party rights in respect of the suit
properties i.e. land admeasuring about 3986.36 sq. mtrs. or
thereabouts bearing Survey No. 267 (part), Old C.T.S. No.
624 (part) new C.T.S. No.622 B/1 of Village Mulund, Taluka
Kurla, Bombay Suburban District shown by different colours
in plan at Exhibit 'A' and the access road shown in
Fluorescent Neon colour to the plan at Exhibit 'A'.
Prayer (d): That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to grant permanent order
and injunction restraining the defendants, their agents,
servants and/or any person or persons claiming through or
under them from in any manner disconnecting the water,
electricity and gas supply of the Plaintiffs situated beneath
the access road shown in the Fluorescent colour in plan at
Exhibit 'A'.
4. In order to address the questions posed for our
consideration it would be appropriate to note the relevant statutory
provisions
Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure (in short CPC). Courts to try
-- 4 of 28 --
:5:
all civil suits unless barred
The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have
jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which
their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
Explanation I. A suit in which the right to property or to an office is
contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right
may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites
or ceremonies.
Explanation II. For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial
whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in
Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular
place.
Section 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882 (in
short "PSCC Act").
Suits or Proceedings between a licensor and licensee, or a
landlord and tenant, relating to landlords and the recovery of
possession of any immovable property situated in Greater tenants
for recovery of possession of immovable property and licence fees
or rent, except to those to which other Acts apply to lie in Small
Cause Court.
Section 41(1) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this
Act or in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the
provisions of Subsection (2), the Court of the Small Cause shall have
jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between a
licensor and licensee, or a landlord and tenant, relating to the
recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in
Greater Bombay, or relating to the recovery of any license fee or
charges or rent therefore, irrespective of the value of the subject
matter of such suits or proceedings.
(2) Nothing contain in Subsection (1) shall apply to suits or
proceedings for the recovery of possession of any immovable
property, or of license fee or charges or rent thereof, to which the
provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates
Control Act, 1947, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act,
1955, the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, the Maharashtra
Housing and Area Development Act, 1976 or any other law for the
time being in force, apply.
Section 28 of Bombay Rent Control Act. (In short BRC Act)
Jurisdiction of Courts
-- 5 of 28 --
:6:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and
notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any
other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision,
be within its jurisdiction.
(a) in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay,
(aa) in any area for which, a Court of Small Causes is established
under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, such Court and
(b), elsewhere, the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having
jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or, if there is
no such Civil Judge the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division)
having ordinary jurisdiction, shall have jurisdiction to entertain and
try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant
relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to
which any of the provisions of this Party apply or between a licensor
and a licensee relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charge and
to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any
claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisionsand
subject to the provisions of subsection (2), no other court shall have
jurisdiction to entertain any such suit, proceeding, or application or to
deal with such claim or question.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (aa) of sub
section (1), the District Court may at any stage withdraw any such
suit, proceeding or application pending in a Court of Small Causes
established for any area under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act,
1887, and transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court of the
Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary Jurisdiction in such
area.
(b) Where any suit, proceeding or application has been withdrawn
under clause (a), the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) which
thereafter tries such suit, proceedings or application, as the case may
be, may either retry it or proceed from the stage at which it was
withdrawn.
(c) The Court of the Civil Judge trying any suit, proceeding or
application withdrawn under clause (a) from the Court of Small
Causes, shall, for purposes of such suit, proceeding or application, as
the case may be, be deemed to be the Court of Small Causes.
Explanation. In this section "proceeding" does not include an
execution proceeding arising out of a decree passed before the coming
-- 6 of 28 --
:7:
into operation of this Act.
Section 33 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act. (in short MRC
Act) Jurisdiction of courts
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in, any law for the time
being in force, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, and
notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of the claim or for any
other reason, the suit or proceeding would not, but for this provision,
be within its jurisdiction,
(a) in Brihan Mumbai, the Court of Small Causes, Mumbai,
(b) in any area for which a Court of Small Causes is established under
the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, 1897, such court, and
(c) elsewhere, the court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having
jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or, if there is
no such Civil Judge, the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division)
having ordinary jurisdiction, shall have jurisdiction to entertain and
try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant
relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises and
to decide any application made under this Act (other than the
applications which are to be decided by the State Government or an
officer authorized by it or the Competent Authority); and subject to
the provisions of subsection (2), no other court shall have jurisdiction
to entertain any such suit, proceeding, or application or to deal with
such claim or question.
(2) (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b) of sub
section (1), the District Court may at any stage withdraw any such
suit, proceeding or application pending in a Court of Small Causes
established for any area under the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act,
1887, and transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court of the
Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction in such
area;
(b) where any suit, proceeding or application has been withdrawn
under clause (a), the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) which
thereafter tries such suit proceeding or application, as the case may
be, may either retry it or proceed from the stage at which it was
withdrawn;
(c) The Court of the Civil Judge trying any suit, proceeding or
application withdrawn under clause (a) from the Court of Small
Causes, shall, for purposes of such suit, proceeding or application, as
-- 7 of 28 --
:8:
the case may be, be deemed to be the Court of Small Causes.
5. Heard arguments advanced by both the sides on
preliminary issues. Advocate Gandhy for plaintiffs submitted that the
defendants No.1 & 2 have already taken the possession of Green portion
and evicted the plaintiffs from the Pink portion. He further submitted
that the defendants with malafide intention and ulterior motive to grab
the properties of the plaintiffs defendants started and continuing their
construction activities over the Green and Fluorescent portion which is
the only access road for the plaintiffs' for all the suit premises. He
submitted that the plaintiffs have right to way and the easement of
necessity in respect of the Fluorescent portion and to enjoy their lease
hold properties. That, by the present suit plaintiffs are seeking relief of
injunctions only. Therefore, though there is relationship of landlord and
tenant between the plaintiffs and the defendants, the suit is not filed for
the recovery of rent or the possession. He submitted that the main relief
of plaintiffs is in respect of prayer clause(a). Other reliefs being in the
form of injunctions and only to protect the possession of the plaintiffs
over demise premises i.e., Blue and Orange portion, which at present is
in possession of the plaintiffs and for injunction protecting the ingress
and egress and disconnection of water, electricity and gas supply to the
plaintiffs through the access road in the Fluorescent colour. Therefor, he
submitted that, this court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the
present matter. He submitted that the bar in sec.33 of the MRC Act or
sec.41 of the PSCC Act will not be applicable in the present suit. He
further submitted that plaintiffs are not seeking any relief under the
Rent Act, but has filed the suit simplicitor for injunction in terms of
prayer clauses (a) to (d) of the plaint. Therefore, as per him, this City
Civil Court, Bombay but not the Small Causes Court, Bombay will have
-- 8 of 28 --
:9:
jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit. He further submitted
that reliefs sought by the plaintiffs is in the form of injunction and
therefore Article 23(f) and not sec.6 (iv)(e) of the Maharashtra Court
Fees Act, 1959 will be applicable for the purpose of valuation of the suit
and payment of court fee. He submitted that sec.6(iv)(e) of the
Maharashtra Court Fees Act, 1959 is for the suit for declaration of
easement etc. however, no declaration is sought by the plaintiffs. He
submitted that therefore, this court has pecuniary jurisdiction to try and
entertain the present suit. He submitted that the plaintiffs were having
two cause of actions however, cause of action being bundle of facts, all
being agitated in the present suit. He submitted that for one cause of
action in respect of suit property plaintiffs cannot be asked to approach
to one court and for another cause of action to other court when, all the
reliefs arising out of causes of actions can be sought in the same suit.
Therefore, he requested that this court should proceed with the suit as
having jurisdiction to try and entertain the same and as the plaintiff has
properly valued the suit for the purpose of the court fees and the
pecuniary jurisdiction.
6. As against this learned advocate Bhadang I/b Adv.
Ramchandra Narayanan for defendants submitted that, even from the
pleadings of plaintiffs it is apparent that the suit is in relation to the
possession and therefore this court has no jurisdiction to try and decide
the present suit. He further submitted that even reliefs in the suit in
respect of the Fluorescent portion can be sought by the plaintiffs before
the Small Causes Court, Bombay. He submitted that main prayers of the
plaintiffs is in relation to the possession of the plaintiffs and therefore
Court of Small Causes, Bombay will have jurisdiction to try and
entertain the present suit. He submitted that claim of the plaintiffs' suit
-- 9 of 28 --
:10:
falls under sec.6(iv)(e) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act wherein, one
fourth of the advalorem fee is to be levied by the plaintiffs that one
fourth of the valuation of the property go beyond Rs.1 crore and
therefore this court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try and decide the
present suit. As such, he prayed for answering both the preliminary
issues in the affirmative.
7. In reply advocate Gandhy for plaintiffs submitted that
when this court can try and decide one or two reliefs then other reliefs
can also be tried and decided by the same court and suit cannot be
returned in toto. He further submitted, that irrespective of the fact and
without prejudice to the contentions of the plaintiffs, that this court is of
the opinion that some prayers are relating to possession, the Fluorescent
colour road is the only access to the suit premises wherein the plaintiffs
have easement of necessity and therefore this court has jurisdiction to
try and entertain suit for injunction and secondly cannot return the
plaint in part and continue with the suit in respect of other prayers.
8. Advocate Gandhy for plaintiffs placed reliance on following
citations.
i. Omprakash Tulsiram & ors. Vs. H.J. Leach & Co. (1988(4) Bom.
CR 97).
ii. Vishnu Dutt Vashisth & Anr Vs. Maharashtra Watch Co. (AIR
1967 Bom 434).
iii. Sushila Kashinath Dhonde & ors. Vs. Harilal Govindji Bhogani &
Ors. (AIR 1971 SC 1495).
iv. Mina Srinivasan Krishnan Vs. Arun Bhaskar Adarkar (2014(5)
Bom. CR 53)
v. Packing Paper Products Vs. Nicaf Pvt. Ltd. (2007(5) ALL MR
791).
vi. M/s. Eagle Soraj Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s. Eagle Agro (2012(6) ALL MR
923).
-- 10 of 28 --
:11:
Advocate Bhadang for defendant No.1 placed reliance on several
citations.
I. Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain & Ors. Vs. Eknath Vithal Ogale ((1995)2
SCC 665).
II. R.J. Mehta & Anr. Vs. Govind R. Nadkarni (1989 Mh. L.J. 809)
III. Century Textiles & Industries Ltd. Vs. Nusli Neville Wadia (2014
SCC Online Bom 513)
IV. Foreshore Coopp. Hsg. So. Ltd. Vs. Praveen D. Desai (Dead) Thr.
LRs. & Ors. (Civil Appeal No.7732 of 2011) with Razia Amirali
Shroff & ors. Vs. M/s. Nishuvi Corporation & Ors. (Civil Appeal
No.5514 of 2012 & Civil Appeal No.5515 of 2012), Nusli Neville
Wadia Vs. Ferani Hotels (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors. (Civil Appeal
No(s).3396 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.24880 of
2012)), Punam Coopp. Hsg. So. Vs. Pratap Issardas Bhatia &
Ors. (Civil Appeal No.3397 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP ©
No.2989 of 2012)) and Rama Vijay Kumar Oberoi Thr. GPH Vs.
Sunita Sudam Ranaware etc. (Civil Appeal No(s). 339395 of
2015 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.1637316375 of 2013)
(decided on 08.04.2015).
V. Sandeep Polymers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bajaj Auto Ltd. & Ors. (Civil
Appeal No.7749 of 2004 decided on 20.07.2007).
VI. ABN Amro Bank Mumbai Pensioners Association & Anr. Vs. The
Royal Bank of Scotland NV (2014 SCC OnLine Bom. 473).
VII. Venkatesan Vs. Kuttiappa Gounder (2012 SCC OnLine Mad. 1680
: (2012) 4 Mad. LJ 492).
VIII. Meher Singh Vs. Deepak Sawhny & Anr. 1998(3) Mh.L.J. 940
IX. Satpuda Tapi Parisar Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. V/s. Jagruti
Industries & Anr. (2008(4) Mh. L.J. 471)
X. Popat & Kotecha Property Vs. State Bank of India Staff Association
((2005)7 SCC 510)
AS TO PRELIMINARY ISSUE No.2 :
9. Advocate for defendants submitted that suit is in relation to
the possession of suit premises. He further submitted that u/sec.34 of
Specific Relief Act, 1963 the court has every power to make declaration.
He submitted that in the present suit plaintiffs are agitating their legal
-- 11 of 28 --
:12:
rights in the suit property. Under such circumstances it will be
incumbent upon the court to make declaration about the allegations of
the plaintiffs that they are having right to way over the access road
shown in Fluorescent colour by way of easement of necessity to the suit
premises. He submitted that therefore sec.6(iv)(e) will be applicable
and not sec.23(f) of of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act. He submitted
that therefore, even one fourth valuation of the suit property will go
beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of this court and as such this court
has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit.
10. Admittedly all the reliefs which is sought by the plaintiffs is
in the form of permanent injunction. As per the Maharashtra Suits
Valuation (Determination of Value of Land for Jurisdictional Purposes)
Rules, 1983 any suit for possession of land, house and garden
mentioning in sec.6(v) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act for the
purposes of jurisdiction, the value of the property shall be determined
according to the market value of the house or garden as follows :
(a) where the subject matter is house or garden – according to market
value of house or garden as the case may be;
(b) where the subject matter is land – a sum equal to 200 times of
assessment payable in respect of land;
As per sec.34 of the Specific Relief Act (reproduced below), this
court has discretion to make a declaration if, the suit is filed in respect
of legal character or any right which is denied or intended to be denied.
Section 34: Discretion of Court as to declaration of status or right Any
person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may
institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such
character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a
declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for
any further relief :
-- 12 of 28 --
:13:
Provided, that no Court shall make any such declaration where the
plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits
to do so.
Section 34 of Specific Relief Act empowers the court to make
declaration if, required to be made in the suit, irrespective of the fact
whether the declaration is sought or not. Therefore, it cannot be said
that only because this court is required to give a finding regarding the
declaration about the easementary right of the plaintiffs, as alleged, the
suit is to be treated as suit filed for declaration for easement. The fact
remains that the plaintiffs have not prayed for declaration of easement
or declaration of their right to the benefits arising out of immovable
property. As such, it cannot be said that sec.6(iv)(e) of the Maharashtra
Court Fees Act will be applicable for the computation of the court fees
for the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs. As stated above, the present suit
is for relief of permanent injunctions. Even in a suit for possession of the
land, the same is required to be valued for the purpose of jurisdiction
for a sum equal to 80 times the survey assessment.
Section 6(v) the Maharashtra Court Fees Act is reproduced.
(v) for possession of lands, houses and gardens
In suits for the possession of land, houses and gardens according to the
value of the subjectmatter; and such value shall be deemed to be, where the
subjectmatter is a house or garden according to the market value of the
house or garden and where the subjectmatte is land, and
(a) where the land is held on settlement for a period not exceeding
thirty years and pays the full assessment to Government a sum equal to (forty
times) the survey assessment;
(b) where the land is held on a permanent settlement, or on a
settlement for any period exceeding thirty years, and pays the full assessment
to Government a sum equal to (eighty times) the survey assessment; and
-- 13 of 28 --
:14:
(c) where the whole or any part of the annual survey assessment is
remitted a sum computed under subparagraph (a) or subparagraph (b) as
the case may be, in addition to (eighty times) the assessment or, the portion
of assessment, so remitted;
As per Rule 2 of the Maharashtra Suits Valuation (Determination
of Value of Land for Jurisdictional Purposes) Rules, 1983 r/w sec.6 of
the Maharashtra Court Fees Act it cannot be said that the valuation of
the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is to be computed as per section
6(iv)(e) of the Maharashtra Court Fees Act. On being questioned
advocate Bhadang fairly submitted that assessment of the Government
in respect of suit premises is around one rupee per sq. mtrs. Therefore,
even if the suit would have simplicitor for the possession, and as
contended by the defendants that it relates to possession, the valuation
of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and computation of court fees
simplicitor for injunction cannot go beyond Rs.1 crore and therefore, I
am of the view that this court has pecuniary jurisdiction to try and
decide the present suit.
AS TO PRELIMINARY ISSUE No.1 :
11. The basic contention of defendant No.1 is that the suit, as
per pleadings in plaint, is between the licensor and licensee and relating
to the possession and therefore u/sec. 41 of the Presidency Small
Causes Court Act, 1882 the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai has
jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit, excluding Civil Court's
jurisdiction. Though the advocate for plaintiffs have denied the said
fact, but from the entire reading of the plaint it is to be seen whether
suit relates to recovery of possession or not. The plaintiffs themselves is
coming with the case that they are lessor in respect of the suit premises
-- 14 of 28 --
:15:
and therefore the suit is between the landlord and tenant. In the plaint
plaintiffs have given instances as to how defendants have taken the
possession in respect of pink and green portion of suit land. The
plaintiffs have also mentioned in paragraph 39 of the plaint that they
have grave and serious apprehension that the defendants shall, in order
to harass the plaintiffs, enter upon the blue and orange portion of the
land and dispossess the plaintiff and commence construction activities
pursuant to the sanctioned plan, as defendants have already
dispossessed plaintiff No.1 and 2 in respect of portion of land marked in
pink colour. The prayer clause (b) of the plaint also indicates that the
plaintiffs have sought permanent injunction restraining the defendants
from dispossessing the plaintiffs from the suit premises i.e., shown in
blue and orange colour. As such, entire reading of the plaint clearly
indicates that the plaintiffs have sought all the reliefs including the
reliefs in respect of Fluorescent portion with apprehension of his
dispossession by the defendants, which can be gathered from the
reading of the plaint as a whole. Therefore, contention of advocate for
plaintiffs that suit is not relating to the possession cannot be taken into
consideration.
12. Another contention of plaintiffs is that the main relief
sought by them is in terms of prayer clause(a). He further contended
that plaintiffs have already filed suit u/sec.6 of the Specific Relief Act in
respect of pink portion. That, the plaintiffs may file another suit in
respect of taking over the possession of green portion. He further
submitted that the plaintiffs have sought relief of injunction only in the
present suit in respect of Fluorescent portion. However, the contention
of the plaintiffs that their basic prayer is in respect of Fluorescent
portion and the suit is simplicitor for injunction cannot be taken into
-- 15 of 28 --
:16:
consideration. Having regard to the reading of the plaint as a whole, it
seems that plaintiffs have alleged that they have lost possession in
respect of two demised lands in pink and green colour. Their
apprehension is in respect of construction activities being carried out is
in respect of Fluorescent portion. The dispossession of the plaintiffs
from the orange and blue portion clearly indicates that their basic relief
is to protect their possession over the remaining demised premises in
blue and orange colour. Other reliefs are ancillary relief. Therefore,
basic relief of the plaintiffs, even in the present suit, is for injunction to
protect their possession, apprehending their dispossession over the
orange and blue portion in their possession. Even as per the plaintiffs'
contention, by reading the plaint as a whole, it seems that relief which
is sought by the plaintiffs in respect of Fluorescent portion is for their
ingress and egress over the suit property, and thereby they again want
to protect their possession in respect of blue and orange portion.
Therefore, it is apparent from the reading of the plaint, that all the
reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs, including prayer clause (a), (c) and (d),
are to protect their possession over the suit premises, especially over the
blue and orange portion, and to secure their rights in respect of entire
suit premises. As such, all the reliefs, in my view, sought by the
plaintiffs are relating to possession, though the same are cleverly and
skillfully drafted to show that the reliefs are for permanent injunctions
only. Therefore, irrespective of the fact that whether sec.28 of the BR
Act, sec.33 of the MRC Act or sec.41 of the PSCC Act are applicable to
the present suit, I am of the view, that suit and relief of the plaintiffs
being relating to the possession of the demised premises, the same is to
be tried by the Court of Small Causes, Bombay and not by this court.
-- 16 of 28 --
:17:
13. Even in the ratio laid down in the authorities relied by the
plaintiffs and especially by the defendants, it is apparent that in case
suit relates to recovery of the possession and between landlord and
tenant the Court of Small Causes, Bombay and not this Civil Court
would have jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit. In the case of
Omprakash Tulsiram & Ors. V/s. H.J. Leach and Company (cited
supra) the Hon'ble High Court found that there is no averment in the
plaint to suggest even remotely that by such obstruction (of the access)
the defendants desire to recover the possession of demise premises.
However, in the case in hand it is not so. Even in the case of Vishnu
Dutt Vashisth (cited supra), in para 22 the Hon'ble High Court was of
the opinion that suit does not relate to recovery of possession as it was
relating to use of passage. In the case cited supra suit was for
preventing the defendants from permitting the formation of queues in
the passage in the manner which way obstruct access to their shop
(demise premises) of the plaintiffs. Para 22 is reproduced herein below.
“None of these reliefs strikes me as a back door method to obtain
possession of any part of the premises included or alleged to be included
in the lease of the plaintiffs. If these reliefs are considered in the context
of the plaint as a whole, it would be clear and though the suit is
between a landlord and tenant, it neither relates to recovery of
possession not does it raise a claim or question arising out of the Act or
any of its provisions. The suit is, therefore, within the competence of the
City Civil Court and the learned Judge was right in taking the view he
has taken on the preliminary issue of jurisdiction.”
However, in the case in hand, having regard to the averments in
the plaint as a whole, it seems that plaintiffs wants to protect their
possession over orange and blue portion alleging that defendants have
started construction in Fluorescent neon portion wherein, they have
only right to way and access i.e., easement of necessity. Therefore,
contention of the plaintiffs apparently seems to me that they are
-- 17 of 28 --
:18:
alleging that defendants have adopted back door method to recover the
possession of demise premises in blue and orange colour.
14. In the case of Packing Paper Products (cited supra) in
paragraph 15 the Hon'ble High Court has observed, that it has to be
taken into consideration that the suit is neither for recovery of rent, nor
for recovery of possession of any premises nor relating to the recovery
of rent, nor relating to the recovery of possession of the premises. In the
case of Mina Srinivasan Krishnan (cited supra) too, the Hon'ble
Bombay High Court in paragraph 80 has expressed their view that this
is not a case or proceeding between a landlord and tenant relating to
recovery of rent or possession of any premises. However, as already
stated, the position is different in case in hand.
15. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Century
Textiles and Industries Ltd. (cited supra) has taken into consideration
sec.41 of the PSCC Act. In the case in hand and already discussed
above, all the prayers of the plaintiffs are directly or indirectly relating
to the possession therefore, even u/sec.41 of the PSCC Act all the reliefs
sought by the plaintiffs can be entertained by the same court i.e., the
special court i.e., the Court of Small Causes. In the case of Century
Textiles and Industries Ltd. too reliance on the verdict of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Dhanraj Jain and others V/s.
Eknath Vithal Ogale, (MANU/SC/0633/1995 : (1995) 2 SCC 665)
(particularly paragraphs 2 to 4, 14 to 16 and 18 to 24) was placed, which
relates to suit between the licensor and licensee in respect dispute relating to
(directly or indirectly) recovery of possession u/sec.41(1) of the Small Causes
Court Act. Paragraphs 2 to 4, 14, 16 and 18 to 24 read thus:
-- 18 of 28 --
:19:
2. The High Court by the impugned judgment in these appeals has
taken the view that such a suit is not maintainable before the City Civil
Court and should be filed in the Small Causes Court, Bombay, under
Section 41(1) of the Small Causes Courts Act. The learned Counsel for
the appellants contended before us that the said view is not correct.
Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand has supported
the same view.
3. Before we consider the aforesaid question, a few relevant facts
leading to both these appeal deserve to be noted at the outset.
FACTS IN C.A. No. 4913 OF 1989
4. The appellantplaintiffs filed suit No. 1290 of 1984 in the
Bombay City Civil Court against the respondentdefendant for
permanent injunction on the ground that the appellants are in
possession of the suit shop. That the respondentdefendant is tenant of
the suit premises being Shop No. 4, Meghji Vallabhdas Trust Building,
Bhavanishankar Road, Dadar, Bombay. That the defendant took the
same premises in December, 1974 on rent and put the appellants into
possession thereof under an irrevocable licence/tenancy agreement. It
was agreed that Plaintiff No. 1 had to pay licence fee to the defendant or
to the landlord. The plaintiff further averred that due to some difference
of opinion between the parties, the defendant started threatening the
appellants that he would physically throw them out of the suit premises
and hence the suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondent
licensor from disturbing the possession of the plaintifflicensees of the
suit premises.
14. So far as the first condition is concerned, a comprehensive
reading of the relevant averments in the plaints in both these cases
leaves no room for doubt that the plaintiffs claim relief on the basis that
they are licensees on monetary consideration and the defendants are the
licensor. The first condition is clearly satisfied. Then remains the
question whether the third condition, namely that the suits must relate
to the recovery of possession of immovable property situated in Greater
Bombay is satisfied or not. It is not in dispute that the suit properties are
immovable properties situated in Greater Bombay but the controversy is
around the question whether these suits relate to recovery of possession
of such immovable properties. The appellants contended that these are
-- 19 of 28 --
:20:
suits for injunction simpliciter for protecting their possession from the
illegal threatened acts of respondentsdefendants. Relying on a series of
decision of this Court and the Bombay High Court, Guttal, J., Pendse, J.
and Daud, J. had taken the view that such injunction suits can be said
to be relating to the possession of the immovable property. Sawant, J.
has taken a contrary view. We shall deal with these relevant decisions at
a later stage of this judgment. However, on the clear language of the
section in our view it cannot be said that these suits are not relating to
the possession of the immovable property. It is pertinent to note that
Section 41(1) does not employ words "suits and proceedings for recovery
of possession of immovable property". There is a good deal of difference
between the words "relating to the recovery of possession" on the one
hand and the terminology "for recovery of possession of any immovable
property". The words "relating to" are of wide import and can take in
their sweep any suit in which the grievance is made that the defendant is
threatening to illegally recover possession from the plaintifflicensee.
Suits for protecting such possession of immovable property against the
alleged illegal attempts on the part of the defendant to forcibly recover
such possession from the plaintiff, can clearly get covered by the widest
weep of the words "relating to recovery of possession" as employed by
Section 41(i). In this connection, we may refer to Blacks' Law Dictionary
Super Deluxe 5th Edition. At page 1158 of the said Dictionary, the term
"relate" is defined as under:
to stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to pertain, refer,
to bring into association with or connection with.
It cannot be seriously disputed that when a plaintifflicensee seeks
permanent injunction against the defendantlicensor restraining the
defendant from recovering the possession of the suit property by forcible
means from the plaintiff, such a suit does have a bearing on or a
concern with the recovery of possession of such property: In the case of
Renusagar Power Company Ltd. v. General Electric Company and Anr.
MANU/SC/0001/1984 : [1985] 1 SCR 432, a Division Bench of this
Court had to consider the connotation of the term "relating to",
Tulzapukar, J. at Page 471 of the report has culled out propositions
emerging from the consideration of the relevant authorities. At page 471
proposition No. 2 has been mentioned as under:
-- 20 of 28 --
:21:
Expressions such as "arising out of or "in respect of or "in connection
with" or "in relation to" or "in consequence of or "concerning" or
"relating to" the contract are of the widest amplitude and content and
include even questions as to the existence, validity and effect (scope) of
the arbitration agreement.
16. It is, therefore, obvious that the phrase 'relating; to recovery of
possession' as found in Section 41(1) of the Small Causes Court Act is
comprehensive in nature and takes in its sweep all types of suits and
proceedings which are concerned with the recovery of possession of suit
property from the licensee and, therefore, suits for permanent injunction
restraining the defendant from effecting forcible recovery of such
possession from the licensee plaintiff would squarely be covered by the
wide sweep of the said phrase. Consequently in the light of the
averments in the plaints under consideration and the prayers sought for
therein, on the clear language of Section 41(1), the conclusion is
inevitable that these suits could lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of
Small Causes Court, Bombay and the City Civil Court would have no
jurisdiction to entertain such suits.
18. When sec.41(1) of the Small Causes Courts Act is read in
juxtaposition with the aforesaid sec.28 of the Bombay Rent Act, it
becomes clear that pari materia words are used about nature of suits, in
both these provision for conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Small Causes
Court, namely, they alone can entertain such suits or proceedings
relating to recovery of possession of premises. It is of course true that
sec.41 of the Small Causes Courts Act deals with such suits between the
licensee and licensor while sec.28 of the Bombay Rent Act deals with
suits between landlord and tenant. But the nature of such suits as
contemplated by both these sections is the same, namely, it should be the
suit relating to the recovery of possession of premises. Interpreting the
phrase 'relating to recovery of possession' as found in sec.28 of the
Bombay Rent Act, a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the
case of Babulal Bhuramal and Anr. V/s. Nandram Shivram and Ors.
(MANU/SC/0136/1958 : [1959]1 SCR 367), held that a suit for
declaration that one of the plaintiffs was the tenant of the defendant
landlord and the other plaintiffs were his subtenants and they were
entitled to be protected from evidence squarely falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, u/sec.28 of the Bombay
-- 21 of 28 --
:22:
Rent Act and jurisdiction of the City Civil Court for entertaining such a
suit is excluded. Imam, J. Speaking for the threeJudge Bench in that
case observed at page 374 of the report as under:
The present suit filed in the City Civil Report raised in substance a
claim to the effect that the plaintiffs were the tenants of the premises
within the meaning of the Act. Such a claim was one which arose out of
the Act or any of its provisions. The suit related to possession of the
premises and the right of the landlord to evict any of the plaintiffs was
denied on the ground that the first plaintiff was a tenant within the
meaning of the Act and the premises had been lawfully sublet by him to
the second and third plaintiffs. The City Civil Court was thus called upon
to decide whether the first plaintiff was a tenant of the premises within
the meaning of the Act and whether he had lawfully sublet the same to
the second and third plaintiffs. The City Civil Court, therefore, had to
determine whether the plaintiffs had established their claim to be in
possession of the premises in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
19. The situation in the present case is almost parallel. The
plaintiffslicencees claim their light as licensees to protect possession of
the suit premises from licensors by invoking the help of the Court. Such
suits obviously would have to be styled as suits relating to recovery of
possession, on a party of reasoning which appealed to the threeJudge
Bench of this Court in Babulal's case (supra).
20. The same phraseology employed by Section 28 of the Bombay
Rent Act, namely, 'suits relating to recovery of possession' also came up
for consideration before a latterJudge Bench of this Court in the case of
Natraj Studios v. Navrang Studios MANU/SC/0477/1981 : [1981] 2
SCR 466. In that case the facts were that there was a leave and licence
agreement the parties. By virtue of Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act,
a licensee in occupation on 1.2.1973 became a deemed tenant. The
appellantlicensee filed a declaratory suit praying for a declaration that
the plaintiffappellant was a monthly tenant of the two studios and all
other structures and open land covered by the agreement. It was
submitted by counsel for the appellant that the essence of the dispute
between the parties was the right to possession of the two studios. This
Court, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., held at page 477 as
follows:
-- 22 of 28 --
:23:
We may now proceed to consider the submission that the Court of Small
Causes alone has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the
parties. Section 28(l) of the Bombay Rent Act, positively confers
jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes to entertain and try any suit
or proceeding between landlord and tenant relating to the recovery of
rent or possession of any premises or between a licensor and a licensee
relating to the recovery of license fee or charge and to decide any
application made under the Act and to deal with any claim or question
arising out of the Act of any of its proceedings, and negatively it excludes
the jurisdiction of any other Court from entertaining any such suit,
proceeding or application or dealing with such claim or question: After
analysing the previous decisions of this Court in Babulal Bhuramal,
Raizada Topandas etc., this Court held at page 483B as follows:
The relationship between the parties being that of licenserlandlord
and licenseetenant and the dispute between them relating to the
possession of the licenseddemised premises, there is no help from the
conclusion that the Court of Small Causes alone has the jurisdiction and
the Arbitrator has none to adjudicate upon the dispute between the
parties.
21. It was submitted by learned Counsel for the respondents that in
these two cases plaintiffs had prayed for declaration of their status.
While in the present cases on such declaration is sought. In our view this
will make no difference. Even in the present cases before getting interim
injunction or perpetual injunction, plaintiff will have to show that he is
a licensee on monetary consideration as claimed by him and the
defendant is licensor and that he has threatened to illegally disturb his
possession of the suit premises. It is the substance of the relief which
matters and not its form.
22. In view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it must be held
that the impugned judgments under appeal were rightly decided by the
High Court and call for no interference in these appeals.
23. Before parting with these cases, we may mention that the
Gujarat High Court in the case of Ambalal v. Narmada
MANU/GJ/0104/1962: (1963) 4 GLR 90 has taken the view that a suit
where plaintiff claims that he is entitled to possession and seeks a
-- 23 of 28 --
:24:
permanent injunction restraining the respondentlandlord for recovering
possession, would fall under Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. The
very same view was taken by a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court in the case of Ramkishore v. Vijaybahadursingh
MANU/MH/0017/1964 : AIR 1964 Bom 85. A full Bench of the
Bombay High Court in the case of Dattatreya Krishna v. Jairam Ganesh
MANU/MH/0113/1965 : AIR 1965 Bom 177 which a held that suits for
injunction against defendantlandlords restraining them from forcibly
evicting the plaintifftenants from possession of the suit premises would
lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, Bombay
as such suits will be suits relating to recovery of possession of premises.
In our view the aforesaid decisions lay down correct law on the point.
Swant, J. in the impugned judgment under appeal in Civil Appeal No.
4913 of 1989 was inclined to take a contrary view on the ground that
the plaintiff had not prayed for a declaration about his licence and all
that he was claiming was to protect his possession against threats of
unlawful eviction and the Court had not to decide the status of the
plaintiff. With respect, on the clear recitals and prayers in the plaint
such a view is not sustainable. It is easy to visualise that before getting
injunction whether temporary or permanent the plaintiff has to
establish a legal right for the said relief, as seen earlier. Once the
plaintiff contends that he is a licensee of the suit premises and the
defendant is a licensor and on that basis he wants the assistance of the
Court to protect his possession, it would be a suit between a licensee and
licensor relating to the recovery of possession.
24. Analogy drawn by Sawant, J. from cases under Section 6 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 on the clear averments in the plaints in present
cases is also not apposite. It is trite to say that Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act given a summary remedy to the plaintiff to seek restoration of
possession from the defendant within six months of illegal recovery of
possession by the defendant, without referring to the title of the plaintiff
and defendant. It is purely a possessory suit wherein status of the party
is irrelevant. In such type of suits the plaintiff is not required to prove
his title or a superior right to possession as compared to the defendant
and has only to show that he was in possession of the suit immovable
property and he was illegally dispossessed within a period of six months
prior to the date of the suit. Once the plaintiff proves this case, he
becomes entitled to succeed and can get status quo ante and restoration
-- 24 of 28 --
:25:
of possession of the suit premises through the assistance of the Court. In
given cases, even injunction suits purely bused on previous peaceful
possession and subsequent threatened dispossession may stand on an
entirely different footing and might not attract the sweep of Section
41(1) of the Small Causes Courts or for that matter Section 28 of the
Bombay Rent Act. But the present suits are not of that type. They are
suits clearly based on the allegation that the plaintiffs are licensees on
monetary considerations and they apprehend to be dispossessed, not in
accordance with law, at the hands of defendantlicensors. Such suits as
we have discussed earlier, clearly attract the applicability of Section 41
of the Small Causes Courts Act as both the conditions for its
applicability, namely, that they are suits between licensees and licensors
and they relate to recovery of possession of immovable properties
situated in Greater Bombay are complied with. Consequently the
conclusion is inevitable that the aforesaid suits as filed by the appellants
were not cognizable by the City Civil Court, Bombay and they could be
entertained only by the Small Causes Court, Bombay, and fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the latter court.
16. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Century
Textiles and Industries Ltd. (cited supra) in para no.58 and 59 has
cleared there view in this regard, with are the guiding principle for
deciding this application too. The suit in the case of Century Textiles
was for permanent injunction restraining respondent – licensor from
disturbing the possession of the plaintiff – licensee of the suit
premises. Those paras are reproduced herein below :
58. In my view, merely because the plaintiffs are in physical
possession of the suit land, this Court cannot accept the submission of
the plaintiffs that the present suit would not be a suit relating to
recovery of possession. Supreme Court has dealt with the concept of suit
relating to recovery of possession and suit relating to possession in great
detail in the judgment in case of Mansukhlal Jain (supra). The relevant
paragraphs of the said Judgment are already highlighted in the earlier
paragraphs of the Judgment. Court has to consider the purpose object
and intent of the plaintiffs to file a suit in entirely. The submissions of
the learned senior counsel in my view are contrary to the Judgment of
-- 25 of 28 --
:26:
Supreme Court and are accordingly rejected.
59. A perusal of the questions formulated in the originating
summons would clearly indicate that the manner in which the questions
are formulated, is a clear case of ingenious drafting to disguise the real
object of the suit. In my view, the reliefs as claimed if granted would be
in the suit which is in the nature of the suit relating to recovery of
possession of the suit land, which in my view, is clearly barred under
Section 41(1) of Presidency Small Causes Court Act. In my view what
reliefs cannot be claimed directly cannot be claimed and/or granted
indirectly.”
Therefore, I am of the view that jurisdiction of this court is ousted
in view of sec.41 of Presidency Small Causes Court Act.
17. It was contended by the plaintiffs that without prejudice to
their contentions and even assuming for the sake of arguments that in
respect of few prayers this court has no jurisdiction however, for cause
of action in respect of the Fluorescent neon portion and relief pertaining
to the same this court has every jurisdiction and under such
circumstances, court can proceed with part of the claim which it has the
jurisdiction and under such circumstances it is not required to return
the plaint merely because part of the claim is out side its jurisdiction.
He submitted, that under such circumstances, the court have power to
allow the plaintiffs to amend the plaint to lop off those portions beyond
its grip and proceed with the portions within its grasp. He submitted
that this exercise is to be done when neither the suit can be disposed off
as a whole or plaint can be returned as a whole. He placed his reliance
on the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court and the Hon'ble
Calcutta High Court in following cases.
i} State Bank of India V/s. Sanjeev Malik 1996(36) DRJ 484
ii} Sheela Adhikari V/s. Rabindra Adhikari AIR 1988 Cal 273
18. However, in the case in hand and has rightly argued by
-- 26 of 28 --
:27:
advocate for defendant No.1 that all the cause of action and reliefs
sought by the plaintiffs in the present suit relates to recovery of
possession and therefore this is a case wherein Special Court i.e., the
Small Causes Court, Bombay u/sec.41 of the PSCC Act will have
exclusive jurisdiction and therefore jurisdiction of this court is ousted in
respect of all the relief claim. Therefore, both the citations relied by the
plaintiffs are not applicable to the present set of facts. All the reliefs of
injunction sought by the plaintiffs are directly or indirectly relating to
protecting his possession over the demised suit properties and therefore,
the Court of Small Causes, Bombay only has the jurisdiction to try and
entertain the present suit. As such, my answer to Preliminary Issue No.1
is in the affirmative.
19. Needless to say, that irrespective of the Preliminary Issue
No.2 being answer in affirmative, having regard to the fact that the
Preliminary Issue No.1 is answered in affirmative, irrespective of the
valuation of the suit, the Court of Small Causes can try and decide
present suit. Therefore, I proceed to pass following order.
O R D E R
Issue No.2 is answered in the affirmative. Issue No.1 is answered
in affirmative thereby, under Order VII Rule 10 of Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 the plaint is ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs to
be presented to the Court in which suit should have been instituted.
On the request of advocate of plaintiff and as per the consent and
convenience of the advocates, the parties are directed to remain present
before the Bombay Small Causes Court on 15.03.2018.
(Dinesh P.Surana)
Judge, City Civil Court,
Date : 27.02.2018. Gr. Bombay.
-- 27 of 28 --
:28:
Dictated on : 27.02.2018
Transcribed on : 01.03.2018
Checked on : 06.03.2018
Signed on : 12.03.2018
“CERTIFIED TO BE TRUE & CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL SIGNED
JUDGMENT/ORDER.”
12.03.2018 5.15 p.m. Mr.Vishnu S. Shinde
UPLOAD DATE AND TIME NAME OF STENOGRAPHER
Name of the Judge (with Court Room No.) HHJ Shri D.P. Surana (C.R.No.01)
Date of pronouncement of Judgment/ order 27.02.2018
Judgment/Order signed by the P.O. on 12.03.2018
Judgment/Order uploaded on 12.03.2018
-- 28 of 28 --