Full Order Text
Final Order 1 · 01 Dec 2020 · CNR MHCC010010192020
Order Details: Notice of Motion Pdf Text: NM No.414/2020 .. 1 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 CNR NO.MHCC01-001019-2020 IN THE BOMBAY CITY CIVIL COURT AT BOMBAY NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 414 OF 2020 IN L.C. SUIT NO. 4418 OF 2011 (HIGH COURT SUIT NO.2384 OF 2011) Emgee Green Co-Operative Housing ) Society Ltd., ) A Housing Society registered under the ) Maharashtra Co-Operative Societies Act, ) 1960, having its address at MTV Road, ) Antop Hill, Wadala (East), ) Mumbai – 400 037. )…Plaintiff Versus 1. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai) having its office at Mahanagarpalika Marg, ) C.S.T., Mumbai – 400 001. ) 2. Mudhit Gupta, Sole Proprietor of Emgee ) Developers and Consultants, Having his ) address at 17/17A, Babubali Building, ) Cawasji Patel Road, Mumbai – 400 001. ) 3. Hareraj Family Trust ) represented by Mr. Ashwin Gupta, having ) its place of business at India Steels No.1, ) India Bulls, Centre Tower B-2, 10th Floor, ) Elphinstone Road (West), Mumbai ) -- 1 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 2 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 4. SPV Family Trust ) represented by Mr. Ashwin Gupta, having ) its place of business at Inia Steels No.1, ) India Bulls, Centre Tower B-2, 10th Floor, ) Elphinstone Road, (West) Mumbai ) 5. Ashiana Family Trust ) represented by Mr. Ashwin Gupta, ) having its place of India Bulls, Centre ) Tower B-2, 10th Floor, Elphinstone Road ) (West), Mumbai ). ..Defendants APPEARANCE:- Ld. Adv. Brijesh Upadhyay I/b Jash Vyas and Company for plaintiff. Ld. Adv. Nita Jadhav for defendant No.1/MCGM. Ld. Adv. Jayram Chandani a/w Adv. Vinod Talreja for defendant No.2. Ld. Adv. Ashwini Landge for the defendant No.3 to 5. CORAM : HER HONOUR AD-HOC JUDGE SMT. C.P. JAIN (C.R. NO.06) DATED : 1st DECEMBER, 2020. O R D E R This notice of motion is moved by plaintiff praying to set aside consent terms decree and order dated 18.07.2017 passed by this court being unlawful, bad in law, illegal and void-ab-initio so also praying for restraining defendant No.2 from acting upon the consent terms and irrevocable power of attorney both dated 17.07.2017 and for directions to defendant No.2 to deposit/surrender the irrevocable power of attorney dated 17.07.2017 being annexure “C” to consent terms and alternatively for declaration that the consent terms dated 17.07.2017 stands revoked in pursuance of clause-1(a) of consent terms. 2. Read Notice of Motion. Perused reply filed by defendant No.2. Heard both the learned advocates. -- 2 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 3 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 The Background of the case is as follows - 3. Plaintiff society has filed this suit for perpetual injunction directing defendants to demolish the dilapidated structure shown in annexure-B1 and hand over portion of land after demolition to plaintiff for use of the same as garden so also directions to pay sum of Rs.75,000/-to plaintiff society by way of costs of replacement of damaged floor styles. After the suit was filed, on 02nd August, 2015 new managing committee was formed which consisted of Anup Lalwani as Chairman, Ashwin Fernandes as Secretary, Ms. Roshni Udyavar as Member and other ten Managing Committee members. Mr. Ashwin Fernandes who was secretary resigned by his resignation letter dated 20.03.2017. The resignation of Ashwin Fernandes was accepted by plaintiff society on 27.03.2017. Thereafter, Roshni Udyavar was Co- opted as Secretary of the aforesaid Managing Committee. This Managing Committee with Anup Lalwani as Chairman, Ms. Roshni Udyavar as Secretary and other Managing Committee members is (hereinafter referred as “former managing committee” of plaintiff society in short). When suit was posted for evidence of defendant No.2, former managing committee of plaintiff society had settled the dispute by way of consent terms dated 17.07.2017 with defendant No.2. Accordingly, decree in terms of consent terms was passed on 18.07.2017 (hereinafter referred as “impugned decree” in short). The suit proceeded ahead against other defendants and was disposed of against defendant No.2. Thereafter, defendant Nos.3 to 5 had moved Notice of Motion No.2828/2017 challenging the aforesaid compromise decree. The aforesaid Notice of Motion was dismissed by my predecessor in office on 20.06.2018. Defendant Nos.3 to 5 had challenged the order in Notice of Motion No.2828/2017 before Hon’ble High Court in writ -- 3 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 4 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 petition No.13683/2018. This writ petition is disposed of on 03.10.2019 by consent terms dated 30.09.2019 between defendant No.2 and defendant Nos.3 to 5. The new Managing Committee of plaintiff which constituted Pedru Rodrigues as Chairman, Ashwin Fernandes as Secretary and Girish Nair as Treasurer and other committee members (hereinafter referred as “New Managing Committee” in short) took charge on 01.04.2019. This New Managing Committee has moved present notice of motion alleging that the former managing committee has committed fraud upon court. The former managing committee did not bring to notice of the court some facts which if were disclosed, the consent terms dated 17.07.2017 would not have been taken on record by court and the compromise decree dated 18.07.2017 would not have been passed. ARGUMENTS OF BOTH THE SIDES 4. Learned advocate for plaintiff has vehemently argued on following points to substantiate that the impugned decree is null and void. 1) Roshni Udyavar was not the elected secretary of former managing committee. The former managing committee had co-opted Roshni Udyavar after resignation of Ashwin Fernandes who was then secretary of the former managing committee. As per section-73 AC of Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter referred as “The Act” in short), after the resignation of Ashwin Fernandes, the former managing committee was supposed to inform the registrar who in turn will conduct the fresh election for the secretary of plaintiff society. However, the former managing committee did not follow procedure laid down in Section-73 of The Act. Despite rejection of the applications of -- 4 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 5 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 the former managing committee to co-opt Roshni Udyavar as Secretary vide letters dated 16.12.2016, 29.12.2016 and 10.02.2017 of Co- operative department of State Government of Maharashtra, the former managing committee went ahead with the illegal act of co-opting Roshni Udyavar as Secretary of the society. Therefore, the authority letter given by Roshni Udyavar authorising Mr. Anup Lalwani to sign & present consent terms in court is illegal, null & void. 2) The former managing committee did not have adequate strength and quorum to conduct the special general body meeting. The plaintiff society consisted of 133 members. Therefore, former managing committee required the strength of 13 managing committee members. However, 7 committee members had resigned. Therefore, there were only 6 managing committee members remaining. Therefore, the plaintiff society did not have adequate quorum for convening the special general body meeting on 02.07.2017. 3) The so called secretary Roshni Udyavar of former managing committee was not present in the special general body meeting dated 02.07.2017. Even then she had prepared the minutes of special general body meeting dated 02.07.2017 on 10.07.2017. As per the rules of The Act, the secretary of the society must remain present for all meetings. The member remaining absent cannot prepare the minutes of the meeting. Further the draft of the minutes of the meeting have to be circulated to all members of the society within 15 days for inviting any objections if any, from members. The objections raised needs to be considered and thereafter the final minutes are prepared. But this procedure is not followed by the former managing committee. -- 5 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 6 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 4) The notice of the special general body meeting was not given to all members of the society. Further, the consent terms prepared were also not circulated to all the members of the society. In short, the former managing committee did not follow the rules, provisions, byelaws of The Act. 5) The former managing committee in collusion and hand in gloves with defendant No.2 has sold property worth 35 crores only by taking meager signing amount of Rs.10 lakhs so also without taking consent of each member of the society sold the FSI of which the society is owner indirectly owned by all the members of society to defendant No.2. 6) As per Section-7 and Section-7A of Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the promotion of construction, sale, management and transfer) Act, 1963, written consent of all the members of the society is necessary if the defendant No.2 wants to make any changes, additions, deletion or alteration in the original plan. However, former managing committee without taking such consent, in collusion and in hand in gloves with the defendant No.2, has entered into consent terms dated 17.07.2017. Defendant No.2 in his reply has not dealt with this provision and not denied the averments in notice of motion. Therefore, this fact is admitted by defendant No.2. 7) The former managing committee is expelled. Administrator was appointed. As the earlier audit report dated 19.05.2018 of M/s. H.G. Karnani and associates, statutory auditor appointed by former managing committee was incomplete, on 02.06.2018, members of the society applied for re-audit to Assistant Registrar Co-operative Society -- 6 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 7 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 under Section-81 (1) of The Act. Upon order being passed on 18.06.2018, the District Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Society nominated Shri. Anirudha P. Sengaonkar 3rd Additional Special Auditor Co-operative Society on 16.07.2018 as auditor for plaintiff society. The report of Shri Anirudha P. Sengaonkar dated 29.12.2018 has also pinpointed that the former managing committee had not conducted the special general body meeting dated 02.07.2017 by following due process of law. The report dated 29.12.2018 is supporting the notice of motion of plaintiff. Inquiry is initiated under Section-88 of The Act, on basis of re-audit report dated 29.12.2018. 8) Upon taking charge by the New managing committee on 01.04.2019 and getting the papers from advocate Sapna Raichure on 19.11.2019, the New managing committee has understood the true nature of illegality committed by the former managing committee. The New managing committee with view to safeguard financial and economic interest of 133 members of the society appointed M/s. Thite Valuers and Engineers, Corporate valuer and Surveyer after intimating general body meeting dated 13.10.2019. From the report of valuer dated 31.10.2019, the plaintiff society has learnt for first time that the total FSI generated by plot was 54,509 sq.feet. FSI at the rate of Rs.6,254/- amounting to Rs.34 crore 9 lakhs was sold out under consent terms at the rate of 3,000 per sq.feet by taking nominal sum of Rs.10 lakhs. Former managing committee had sold out the FSI of 133 members to detriment and great prejudice of society with hand in gloves and in collusion with defendant No.2. No valuation report to justify the rates of FSI sold at the rate of Rs.3,000 per sq.feet was circulated either prior to, during course or after special general body meeting dated 02.07.2017. -- 7 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 8 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 9) Learned advocate for plaintiff alternatively argued that under clause-1 (a) of consent terms, the developer defendant Nos.2 was supposed to get the no objection of owners i.e. defendant No.3 to 5 for demolition of the office block within one year or grace period failing which the plaintiff society had option to revoke the consent terms. Defendant No.2 failed to get the NOC from defendants No.3 to 5 within one year. Therefore, the new managing committee had passed resolution dated 14.04.2019 wherein plaintiff society revoked the consent terms dated 17.07.2017. Copy to that effect is sent vide letter dated 25.07.2019. Therefore, the consent terms stands revoked. On this ground also the consent terms stands revoked. 10) Learned Advocate for plaintiff relied upon Section- 73, byelaws No.108, 114, 126, 131(a), (c), (e), 136, 137, 153 (a) and (b) of The Act. He relied upon the observations in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) By LRS. V/s. Jagannath (Dead) by LRS and others. 5. Relying upon the aforesaid points, learned advocate for plaintiff vehemently submitted that if all the aforesaid points are taken into account, it is crystal clear that the former managing committee has committed fraud upon the court and has obtained the consent decree in violation of rules, provisions, byelaws, circulars, notifications of The Act, in collusion and in hand in gloves with defendant No.2. The consent decree therefore passed on 18.07.2017 needs to be set aside. 6. Per contra, Learned Advocate for defendant No.2 has strenuously made following submissions - -- 8 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 9 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 1) The consent terms dated 17.07.2017 were executed in between plaintiff society and defendant No.2 after prolonged deliberation, discussion and negotiation for valuable consideration and after following due process of law. The person who has verified present notice of motion i.e. Mr. Girish Nair had actively participated in finalising the consent terms. He was very well present in all the meetings which finalised the consent terms. The consent terms dated 17.07.2017 were voluntarily entered into by plaintiff and defendant No.2. The court had recorded the satisfaction of same. Therefore, the decree passed in terms of consent terms is valid in the eyes of law. Plaintiff society is estopped from contending contrary. He relied upon observations in Kiran Narottamdas Merchant V/s. Ravindra Narottamdas Merchant and Ors on this point. 2) Plaintiff society though is challenging the consent decree, there is no challenge to the resolution dated 02.06.2017. Plaintiff is challenging the business done by the former managing committee, the election of the officers of the managing committee, conduct of the special general body meeting which is all covering the dispute under Section-91 of The Act. Without challenging under The Act, plaintiff has moved this court. Therefore, this court will not have jurisdiction to decide this notice of motion. The Act confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the co-operative court under Section-91 of The Act, and byelaw No.174 (B) to decide all issues between society and its members touching the business of the society. 3) Girish Nair, the applicant is not authorized to represent the society. He is neither secretary nor chairman of plaintiff society. -- 9 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 10 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 4) The applicant has not challenged the fact that special general body meeting was convened by chairman and was conducted on 02.07.2017. The purpose of said special general body meeting was to spell out the stance of members on each point of the draft consent terms and reach an acceptance of the same by the society in such a way that essence of the terms of settlement result in maximum benefits to the society and members and minimize the impact of any loss/development of liability. Mr. Girish nair was present during the said special general body meeting. 5) Defendant No.2 was not concerned with the internal disputes of plaintiff society. Roshani Udyavar was elected member of the then managing committee and as per byelaw No.125, the managing committee is entitled to elect chairman, secretary, treasurer from amongst the members of the committee and hence fresh election as construed by applicant is not required. 6) There is no explanation as to how defendant No.2 has played fraud upon the court and plaintiff society. 7) The complaint of Mr. Girish Nair against the members of the former managing committee for causing loss to society by executing consent terms and for recovery of said loss is pending before the registrar. 8) The consent terms challenged by defendant No.3 to 5 in Notice of Motion No.2828/2017 was dismissed. -- 10 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 11 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 9) The plaintiff society failed to produce any document to show that the society had acted upon or intimated about alleged termination of consent terms to defendant No.2. On the contrary, in the special general body meeting convened by the new managing committee on 13.10.2019 had specifically decided not to challenge the said consent terms. It was also decided in this meeting to constitute a special committee of 13 members to look into the clauses of consent terms and to suggest points for negotiations to plaintiff society. 10) The plaintiff society never exercised its option of termination even though it is alleged that plaintiff society resolved to revoke the consent terms in minutes of special general body meeting dated 14.04.2019. He relied upon Section-4 of Indian Contract Act, 1872 on this point. There was no communication in this behalf to him by plaintiff society. 11) In compliance with clause-1(a) of consent terms, defendant No.2 obtained written consent from owners for demolition of office block. Defendant No.2 intimated this fact by letter dated 22.07.2019 to plaintiff society. In response to this letter, plaintiff society has intimated about alleged cancellation of consent terms illogically claiming that adoption of audit report by special general body meeting dated 14.04.2019 has led to automatic cancellation of the consent terms. 12) After informing by letter dated 22.07.2019, the defendant No.2 has executed consent terms with owners i.e defendant Nos.3 to 5 in Writ Petition No.13683/2018 before Hon’ble Bombay High Court. This writ petition is disposed of in terms of consent terms dated -- 11 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 12 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 30.09.2019. The owners have agreed to demolish the office block as per consent terms dated 30.09.2019 in furtherance of letter dated 22.07.2019. Therefore, the intimation of alleged automatic cancellation of consent terms is illegal, illogical, and bad in law. Defendant No.2 has performed its obligation under consent terms during the grace period and before communication of alleged cancellation of consent terms by applicant society. 13) Section-7(1) of MOFA Act, is not applicable as plaintiff society has agreed to allow the unused FSI with respect to undivided portion of land conveyed to plaintiff society under deemed conveyance order dated 20.04.2015 read with conveyance deed. Therefore, individual consent is not required as society is now owner of the undivided portion of land and unconsumed development rights are sold to defendant No.2. 14) The auditors report dated 29.12.2018 is reproduction of details provided by submissions of the society made with regard to complaint with Assistant Registrar and matter pending inquiry. They are not findings of the auditor. The observations of the auditor do not amount to order nor conclusive evidence. The inquiry before Registrar is pending. 7. In support of his submissions learned advocate for defendant relied upon Section-72, 91 of The Act, Sec.7- of MOFA Act, Byelaws-96, 110, 131 (e), 172 to 174, 174 (B) of The Act. He also relied upon the observations in Jayantilal Investments V/s. Madhuvir Co-operative Housing Society and Ors., Vardhman Developers Limited -- 12 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 13 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 V/s. Andheri Krupa Prasad Co-operative Housing Society Limited. 8. Learned advocate for plaintiff relied upon observations in case of R. Rajanna V/s. S.R. Venkataswamy and others reported in (2014) 15 SCC 471 to counter the arguments on the point of jurisdiction raised by learned Advocate for defendant. REASONING & DISCUSSION Maintainability of this notice of motion in this suit. 9. The argument of learned advocate for plaintiff on the point of maintainability of this notice of motion in this suit has substance. Under Order 23 Rule 3A of CPC, there is bar to file seperate suit challenging lawfulness of consent decree. Similarly, appeal is not maintainable challenging consent decree u/sec.96(3) of Code of Civil Procedure. The observations in the case of R. Rajanna cited supra relied upon by learned advocate for plaintiff are squarely applicable. It is observed that- “It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC.” 10. The decree dated 18.07.2017 against defendant No.2 is passed in terms of consent terms. Therefore, in light of aforesaid -- 13 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 14 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 provisions and the observations in the aforesaid citation, no doubt can be taken with respect to maintainability of this notice of motion in present suit. The observations in the case of R. Rajanna relied upon by learned advocate for plaintiff are squarely applicable in present case. The arguments of learned advocate for plaintiff therefore, on this point has substance and therefore, acceptable. Whether decree passed on consent terms is null & void 11. The main crux in present notice of motion is whether the decree passed on consent terms dated 18.07.2017 between plaintiff and defendant No.2 is obtained by committing fraud and in violation of the rules, laws, byelaws and notifications of the Act, and is therefore, null and void. 12. The consent terms dated 17.07.2017 is the contract between plaintiff and defendant No.2. Any contract which is without free consent of parties is void. What is free consent is defined in Sec.14 of Indian Contract Act, 1872. If the consent is obtained by playing fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, undue influence, mistake, same is not free consent. Therefore, if any of the parties to the consent terms plays fraud upon the other party or upon court, the consent terms would be void. Fraud is defined in Sec.17 of the Indian Contract Act. It reads as follows - “17. Fraud” defined - “Fraud means and includes any of the following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract - 1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true ; 2) the active concealment of a fact by one having -- 14 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 15 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 knowledge or belief of the fact; 3) a promise made without any intention of performing it; 4) any other act fitted to deceive; 5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent.” 13. Therefore, applicant has to point out that either defendant No.2 or the former managing committee has played fraud upon each other or upon court in order to get success in this notice of motion. 14. As stated in the arguments of learned advocate for plaintiff, following are the interalia grounds for consent decree being obtained by fraud. According to plaintiff, Roshani Udyavar was not the elected secretary of former managing committee. The former managing committee did not follow the procedure as laid down in Sec.73 CB of Maharashtra Societies Co-operative Act for election of alleged secretary i.e. Roshni Udyavar. Further, according to plaintiff, there was no adequate strength, quorum to conduct the special general body meeting. The plaintiff society consisted of 133 members. Therefore, plaintiff committee required the strength of 13 managing committee members. However, as 7 committee members had resigned, there were only 6 managing committee members remaining. Therefore, the plaintiff society did not have adequate quorum for convening the special general body meeting on 02.07.2017. Further according to plaintiff, the so called secretary Roshni Udyavar of former managing committee was not present in the special general body meeting. The notice of the special general body meeting was not given to all members of the society. Further, the consent terms prepared were also not circulated to all the members of the society. In short, the former managing committee did not follow the rules, provisions, byelaws of The Act more specifically -- 15 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 16 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 Section-73, byelaws No.108, 114, 126, 131(a), (c), (e), 136, 137, 153 (a) and (b) of The Act. The alleged secretary Roshni Uyavar therefore, cannot authorize chairman Mr. Anup Lalwani to present and sign the consent terms in court. Therefore, the authority letter issued by Roshni Udyavar authorising Mr. Anup Lalwani to present and sign the consent terms in court is illegal, null and void. 15. All the aforesaid provisions reads as follows - Section 73 CB – State Co-operative Election Authority – (1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to a society shall vest in the authority called ‘the State Co-operative Election Authority’ as may be constituted by the State Government in that behalf, Every general election of the members of the committee and election of the officer-bearers of a society including any casual vacancy to the extent applicable shall be held as per the procedure prescribed. (2)………... (emphasis supplied.) Byelaw No.108 - “108. The Committee shall finalise the draft minutes of every General Body Meeting of the Society within 3 months of the date of the meeting and circulate the draft minutes amongst all members of the society within 15 days of the meeting of the Committee at which the draft minutes, were finalised. The Members of the society may communicate to the Secretary of the Society, their observations, if any, on the draft minutes within 15 days of the date of their circulation. The Committee, at its subsequent meeting shall prepare the final minutes of the General Body Meeting after taking into consideration the observations, if any, made by the members on the draft minutes and cause them to be recorded in the minutes book, by the Secretary of the society or any other person authorised in that behalf.” Byelaw No.114 - “114. The Committee shall consist of 11/13/15/17/19 members of the Society. This strength includes the reservation of seats as provided under section 73 B and 73C of the Act.” The Strength of the Managing Committee and Strength of the quorum for conducting the meeting would be as under. -- 16 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 17 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 No. of Members of the Society Strength of the Managing Committee General Reserved Total Quorum for Meeting Woman SC/ST OBC VJ/NT/ 101 to 200 8 2 1 1 1 13 7 “Quorum for the meeting will be simple majority of the existing Committee Members” (Emphasis supplied) Byelaw No.126 - “126. It shall not be competent for the committee to transact any business unless there is the quorum at the time of consideration of every item on the agenda of the meeting of the committee” Byelaw No.131(a) - “131.(a) The Chairman of the Society may resign his office as Chairman by a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Society.” (b) The secretary or Treasurer of the Society may resign his office as Secretary or Treasurer by a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Society. (c) Chairman/Secretary/Treasurer’s resignation will be effective only after its acceptance and handing over the charge of the newly elected Chairman/Secretary/Treasurer, as the case may be” (d) The committee may accept the resignation,of the office of the Chairman/Secretary/Treasurer only after it is satisfied that the Chairman or as the case may be the Secretary or Treasurer of the society has brought upto date the work entrusted to him and has produced the entire papers and property of the society in his possession before the committee. “(e) This fact of acceptance of resignations of the entire committee by the General Body, shall be communicated to the Registrar by the out-going officers and registrar may take necessary action as provided under Section 77 A of the Act. However, the existing Committee shall continue to carry on with only routine functioning of the Society till alternate arrangement is made by the Registrar.” Byelaw No.136 - “136. The Secretary of the Society shall -- 17 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 18 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 attend every meeting of the Committee and record its minutes and place same for confirmation before the next meeting of he Committee, after the minutes are signed by the Secretary of the Society and the Chairman of the meeting. In the absence of the Secretary, the Chairman of the society shall make alternate arrangements for recording minutes of the meeting” Byelaw No.137- “137. The members of the Committee shall be jointly and severally responsible for all the decisions taken by the committee during its term relating to the business of the Society. The members of the Committee shall be jointly and severally responsible for all the acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the Society” Byelaw No.153 (a) and (b) - 153(a) On receipt of the audit reports from the Statutory and internal Auditors, the Secretary of the Society shall prepare draft audit rectification reports of the objections raised and suggestions made, in the form ‘O’ prescribed under Rule 73 of the MCS Rules 1961 and place the same before the meeting of the Committee, held next after the date of the receipt of the audit reports, for its approval. The Committee shall submit Audit Rectification Report to the Registrar and the Annual General Body Meeting of the Society. (b) If the Committee of the Society fails to submit Audit Rectification Report to the Registrar and the Annual General Body Meeting, all the members of the Committee shall be deemed to have committed an offence under Section 146 of the Act shall be liable for penalty under Section 147 of the Act.” 16. In counter learned advocate for defendant No.2 relied upon following byelaws - “96. When a Special General Body Meeting should be convened-A Special General Body Meeting of the society may be called at any time at the instance of the Chairman or by the decision of the majority of the Committee and shall be called within one month of the date of the receipt or requisition in writing signed by at least 1/5th of the members of the society or from the Registering Authority or from the Housing Federation, to which the society is affiliated.” -- 18 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 19 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 “110. General body meeting to be the supreme authority – Subjects to the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the bye-laws of the society, the final authority of the Society shall vest in its General Body Meeting summoned in such manner as is specified in these bye-laws.” 131. (e) In case entire committee intends to resign, the resignation of the committee shall be placed before the General Body and such resignations be effective from the date of acceptance of such resignations by the Body. This fact of acceptance of resignations of the entire committee by General Body, shall be communicated to the Registrar by the outgoing officers and Registrars may take necessary action as provided under Section77 A of the Act. However, the existing committee shall continue to carry on with only functioning of the society, till alternate arrangement is made by the Registrar” 172. Complaint application - Member/Members shall submit their complaint application to any of the office bearers of the society, in writing, giving thereby the details of the complaint. 173. After receipt of such complaint application, the committee shall take decision thereof in the coming managing committee meeting . Such decision shall be communicated to the concerned member, within 15 days thereafter. 174. If the member/members are not satisfied by the decision of the committee or does not receive any communication from the committee within 15 days, the complainant member may approach below mentioned competent authority.” 174 (B). Co-operative Court- Matters for Co-operative court Disputes between the Members and/or the members and society, falls under Section91 of the MCS Act, 1960 such as :- Disputes pertaining to :- (i) Resolutions of the Managing Committee and General Body. (ii)…….. (iii)……. -- 19 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 20 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 (iv)……. (v)…….. (vi)……. (vii)……. (Emphasis supplied) 17. The aforesaid grounds upon which plaintiff is relying are all relating to the election of committee members, conduct of the special general body meeting, management or business of the plaintiff society. Therefore, the grievance of plaintiff is with respect to the aforesaid facts of the election of committee members, conduct of the special general body meeting, management or business of the plaintiff society. It is well settled law that if there is a dispute of society, its committee, any past committee, any past or present member of the society touching the constitution, election of committee members, conduct of general meetings, management or business of society, the same has to be dealt under Sec.91 of the Act. There is bar u/sec.163 r/w Sec.91 of the Act to deal with such dispute by Civil Court. 18. Section 91 of the Act reads as follows - Section 91, Disputes- “(1) Notwithstanding (anything contained) in any other law for the time being in force any dispute touching the constitution (elections of the committee or its officers conduct of general meetings, management or business of a society shall be referred by any of the parties to the dispute, or by a federal society to which the society is affiliated or by a creditor of the society (to the co- operative Court) if both the parties thereto are one and other of the following - (a) a society its committee, any past committee, any past or present officer any past or present agent, any past or present servant or nominee, heir or representative of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased servant of society, or the liquidator of the society (or the official -- 20 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 21 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 assignee of a de-register society) (b) a member, past member of a person claiming through a member, past member of a deceased member of society, or a society which is a member of an society (or a person who claims to be a member of the society) (c) a person other than a member of the society with whom the society any transactions in respect of which any restrictions or regulations have been imposed made or prescribed under sections 43, 44 or 45 and any person claiming through such person. (d) a surety of a member, past member or deceased member, or surety or person other than a member with whom the society has any transactions in respect of which restrictions have been prescribed under sections 45, whether such surety person is or is not a member of the society. (e) Any other society, or the liquidator of such a society (or-de-register society or the official assignee of such a de-registered society)” 19. Section 163 reads as follows - (1) Save as expressly provided in this Act, no Civil or Revenue Court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of - (a) The registration of a society or its by-laws, or the amendments of its by-laws, or the dissolution of the committee of a society, or the management of the society on dissolution thereof; or (b) any dispute required to be referred to (the co- operative court) for decision; (c) any manner concerned with the winding up and dissolution of a society. (Emphasis supplied) 20. Therefore, if plaintiff has any grievance with respect to the election of committee members, conduct of the special general body meeting, management or business of the plaintiff society, plaintiff has to raise before appropriate forum. No doubt, in present notice of motion plaintiff is not challenging directly the resolution passed in the special -- 21 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 22 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 general body meeting dated 02.07.2017, but as discussed above, plaintiff in this notice of motion is indirectly raising all grievances with respect to the resolution passed in special general body meeting dated 02.07.2017. All the aforesaid grievances of plaintiff are with respect to the election of committee members, conduct of the special general body meeting, management or business of the plaintiff society. Indirectly in this notice of motion, plaintiff is trying to get orders by not moving before appropriate forum. 21. When this court had raised query with respect to this point & Sec.91 and Sec.163 Of MCS Act, learned advocate for plaintiff relied upon case of R. Rajanna cited supra. 22. No doubt as discussed above, R. Rajanna’s case speaks about agitating the question whether agreement or compromise is lawful or not by the court which passed the decree but it no where states to encroach upon jurisdiction of another forum when the court passing consent decree is not vested with such jurisdiction & when there is express bar provided in MCS Act. As discussed above, the grievance of applicant is between members & former managing committee of plaintiff society touching the conduct of election of managing committee members of society, business & administration of society. There is no dispute between former managing committee & defendant No.2 who had entered into consent terms. Nor any act of parties to consent terms i.e. either former managing committee of plaintiff society or defendant No.2 while filing consent terms in court is pointed out to be deceiving or amounting to playing fraud upon court as is embraced in Sec.17 of definition of fraud in contract Act. All the terms in consent terms were discussed, negotiated prior in special general body meeting -- 22 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 23 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 dated 02.07.2017 & prior to that as discussed in detail in subsequent part of this order. Therefore, I am unable to digest arguments of learned advocate for plaintiff on this point. 23. It is important to note that the former managing committee had filed the consent terms in court. Therefore, the act of former managing committee is binding upon the subsequent managing committee i.e. new managing committee. Unless and until the resolution passed in special general body meeting dated 02.07.2017, the election of the Roshni Udyavar, the conduct of the special general body meeting, the business of the society which is alleged to be in violation of the byelaws is challenged and set aside, same will be binding upon the subsequent managing committee i.e. the new managing committee. Concluding that the provisions of the Act, rules, byelaws, notifications and circulars are followed or not followed by the earlier managing committee of plaintiff society will directly affect the passing of resolution dated 02.07.2017 which is business of society. Therefore, indirectly it touches the resolution dated 02.07.2017 passed by the former managing committee of plaintiff society. Present new managing committee will be estopped from contending contrary to the act of former managing committee unless and until the act of former managing committee is got declared as illegal and set aside. As discussed above, this is the arena of Co-operative Court as provided in Sec.91 of Act. If plaintiff fails to challenge the acts of earlier managing committee, the resolution passed in the special general body meeting will not be set aside; it will be then binding upon plaintiff and therefore, same will operate as estoppel against new managing committee. Nothing is on record that plaintiff has challenged the Acts of former managing committee with respect to appointment of Roshni Udyavar, -- 23 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 24 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 the conduct of special general body meeting, the business of the former managing committee before appropriate forum to get it set aside. In such scenario, the observations in the case of Vardhman Developers Limited V/s. Andheri Krupa Prasad Co-operative Housing Society Limited 2015(4) ALLMR 651 and Kiran Narottamdas Merchant V/s. Ravindra Narottamdas Merchant and Ors. 2013 (7) ALLMR 143 will squarely apply. 24. In case of Vardhaman Developers Limited, members of the defendant No.1 society filed suit against the plaintiffs and defendant No.1 society under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act 1960, interalia praying for a declaration that the managing committee of the society functioned illegally and in violation of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, rules and bye-laws for the period 2003 to 2013 and for a declaration that all the decisions taken by the managing committee of the society are illegal, in-operative, without authority of law and are not binding on the members of the society. The applicants could not point out any order staying the effect of the resolutions passed by the society. 25. Even in present case, plaintiff did not file any such suit for declaration to set aside the acts of former managing committee about which plaintiff has raised grievances with respect to election of managing committee members, conduct of special general body meeting, business of former managing committee. 26. Further it is observed in case of Kiran merchant that - “14. The principle of law is, hence, well settled. Where the Court delivers or pronounces a judgment by consent, what the Court does not effect is to place its imprimatur on a contractual -- 24 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 25 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 arrangement between the parties. The agreement between the parties which forms the foundation of the judgment is a contract nonetheless like any other contract. A judgment by consent, therefore, binds the parties as effectively as a judgment delivered upon adjudication and hence, it has been held to constitute an estoppel as between the parties.” 27. Moving ahead, for sake of orders, even if we keep apart the aforesaid discussion, let us see whether the argument of learned advocate for plaintiff applicant on point of fraud is digestible upon considering the conduct of plaintiff society. 28. The conduct of the plaintiff society, the managing committee members of plaintiff society, the members of the plaintiff society in the span from 19.03.2017 till the allegations of fraud were raised against the former managing committee of plaintiff society i.e. 08.03.2018 will be important to assess as to whether there was element of fraud. 29. From the documents tendered on record, it appears that till 08.03.2018 there were no allegations of alleged fraud against the former managing committee. From the documents tendered on record, it appears that for first time the allegations of fraud by the former managing committee against the members of the society was alleged in the letter issued by the plaintiff society to Assistant Registrar of Co- operative societies dated 08.03.2018. From the documents on record, it appears that there is no whisper about the alleged fraud as is alleged in present notice of motion in the next Annual General Meeting dated 20.08.2017 in which there was approval and confirmation of the earlier minutes of Annual General Meeting dated 07.08.2016 and Special General Body Meeting dated 02.07.2017. -- 25 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 26 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 30. Further, from the documents on record, it reflects that the talk of settlement between plaintiff society and defendant No.2 were in process since the Special General Body Meeting dated 19.03.2017. As per the notice for Special General Body Meeting dated 05.06.2017, tendered by defendant No.2 on record, it appears that the notice of Special General Body Meeting to be scheduled on 10.06.2017 was displayed along with the agenda which includes all the terms which were incorporated in consent terms dated 17.07.2017. Thereafter, from the documents tendered on record by defendant No.2, it appears that the applicant Mr. Girish Nair had raised objection for scheduling the Special General Body Meeting on 10.06.2017. Therefore, on his request the Special General Body Meeting scheduled on 10.06.2017 was postponed to 02.07.2017. It further appears from the copy of email of applicant Girish Nair dated 15.06.2017 that he had shown his gratitude for considering his request for meeting with other friends in the society for getting clarification on the settlement matter with defendant No.2. From the copy of this email it appears that all the doubts of applicant Girish Nair were tried to be satisfied from Mr. Rafiq. There was discussion and deliberation on the various aspects with respect to the consent terms with the defendant No.2. Further, the copy of email dated 17.06.2017 of applicant Girish Nair reflects that he was satisfied with the clarification given, the discussion and deliberation so also the negotiations and the terms of settlement with defendant No.2. Vide this email he has expressed his gratitude and also vented his satisfaction to enter the consent terms. The various aspects with respect to availability of FSI with society, the rates of FSI, the consequences of not entering into consent terms, the benefits of entering into the consent terms etc. were understood by applicant Mr. Girish Nair and then concluding to -- 26 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 27 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 the decision of entering into the consent terms with defendant No.2 by plaintiff society as need of hour. These emotions and feelings are expressed by applicant Mr. Girish Nair in aforesaid emails. 31. The fact of payment of 10 lakhs as signing amount, selling of FSI and all other allegations upon which learned advocate for plaintiff is harping in this notice of motion were the subjects of agenda of the Special General Body Meeting convened on 02.07.2017. It is not disputed that the notice of this Special General Body Meeting dated 02.07.2017 was displayed. There is no counter on the aforesaid facts of displaying the notice, applicant Girish Nair participating in the negotiations, deliberation, discussion and getting clarified on his doubts with respect to entering into settlement with defendant No.2. 32. Though all the aforesaid documents which defendant No.2 tried to rely upon during arguments, were disputed by plaintiff, this court while rejecting the chamber summons of intervenor Anup Lalwani to put their defence to present notice of motion had reserved the discretion to accept the arguments or submissions on behalf of the applicant if felt necessary to decide present notice of motion. As defendant No.2 is not member of the plaintiff society, in order to rebut the allegations of the new Managing Committee in this notice of motion which are with respect to fraud, the documents are necessary on record and therefore, the filing of the aforesaid documents by defendant No.2 was permitted. The documents were necessary to decide present notice of motion smoothly and effectively. Therefore, they are permitted to be taken on record by overruling the objection of plaintiff. 33. Further, the minutes of Managing Committee meeting -- 27 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 28 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 dated 26.03.2017 reflect that the resignation of Mr. Ashwin Fernandes the then Secretary of the plaintiff society was accepted. It further appears that there was subject of appointment of temporary caretaker secretary on account of resignation of Mr. Ashwin on the agenda of the Managing Committee meeting held on 15.01.2017 and 19.02.2017. The agenda No.5 of this meeting further reflects that Ms. Roshni Udyavar was appointed as acting secretary and all the members had accepted the said fact. From this minutes, it is also appearing that present applicant Mr. Girish Nair was present in this meeting as member. Upon the confirmation and approval of the minutes of the Managing Committee meeting, Ms. Roshni Udyavar who was earlier member of the former managing committee started acting as acting secretary since this confirmation and approval. 34. The three letters dated 16.12.2016, 29.12.2016 and 10.02.2017 of Assistant Registrar Co-operative Society addressed to plaintiff society upon which learned advocate for applicant has vehemently argued that the request of former managing committee to co-opt the Roshni Udyavar as secretary of the society was rejected do not appear to support the arguments advanced by the learned advocate for plaintiff. The aforesaid three letters are relied upon by plaintiff. On perusal of these letters, it nowhere reflects that there was request from the former managing committee of plaintiff society for co-opting Roshni Udyavar as the secretary of the society. There is no reference or whisper about the co-opting Roshni Udyavar as secretary of society in these letters. On the contrary, as discussed above, Mr. Ashwin Fernandes has submitted his resignation on 20.03.2017 and which is accepted by the society on 27.03.2017. Therefore, prior to tendering of resignation by Ashwin Fernandes how society can request for co-opting Roshni -- 28 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 29 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 Udyavar as secretary through these letters, on 25.11.2016, 20.12.2016 and 23.01.2017. Further byelaw No.115(b)is with respect to co-opting two expert directors and not for the purpose of co-opting secretary of society. For this reason also, these letters do not appear to be with respect to rejecting request of co-opting Roshni Udyavar as secretary of society. Plaintiff failed to file their letters dated 25.11.2016, 20.12.2016 and 23.01.2017 to show that the former managing committee had made request to co-opt Ms. Roshni Udyavar as secretary of society vide these letters. In absence of clear picture as is tried to be depicted by learned advocate for plaintiff , the arguments of learned advocate for plaintiff cannot be digested on this point. 35. It is further important to note that the authority letter authorising Mr. Anup Lalwani to present and sign the consent terms in court is issued by Roshni Udyavar as acting secretary and not as secretary of the plaintiff society. This fact is clear from the aforesaid authority letter tendered on record. As discussed above, the minutes of managing committee meeting dated 26.03.2017 of which there is no dispute by the new managing committee has confirmed and approved the appointment of Ms. Roshni Udyavar as acting secretary of the plaintiff society which was unanimously accepted by the members in this meeting. There is nothing on record that even these minutes are challenged by the New Managing Committee or they are set aside. Therefore, they do bind present New Managing Committee. If Roshni Udyavar is acting as acting secretary of plaintiff society on approval of the members of the Managing Committee meeting dated 26.03.2017, how the authority letter issued by Ms. Roshni Udyavar can be faulted with. -- 29 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 30 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 36. It is further pertinent to note that the minutes of Special General Body meeting dated 02.07.2017 clearly have resolution of authorising any committee member of the former managing committee to present and sign the consent terms representing the society and to execute any document or take any other action on the lines indicated in the minutes of the Special General Body Meeting dated 02.07.2017. 37. On basis of the minutes of meeting dated 02.07.2017, the then chairman of plaintiff society Shri. Anup Lalwani, on basis of authority letter had filed and signed the consent terms in court on 17.07.2017. My predecessor in office had verified the authority letter, the minutes of meeting, the power of attorney and after finding the compromise as voluntarily entered into between parties, recorded the same and posted for orders on 18.07.2017. My predecessor in office found the consent terms as lawful and no hurdle in passing decree in terms of compromise and therefore, passed the consent terms decree against defendant No.2 on 18.07.2017. 38. If all the aforesaid facts are taken into account it is clear that in special general body meeting dated 02.07.2017 all points of consent terms were discussed as same was agenda of the meeting. Even prior thereto whoever including applicant Girish Nair have got clarified all their doubts with respect to consent terms. The applicant had full knowledge of the consent terms. Since 19.03.2017 the talks, the negotiations and deliberations were going on. Applicant also clarified all his doubts and also shown his gratitude for same by email as discussed above. As there was nothing sort of element of fraud, same was not averred in next annual general meeting dated 20.08.2017. If all this conduct is taken into account can any prudent person say that there -- 30 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 31 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 was any element of concealment, deceit or fraud. Appointment of Ms. Roshani Udyavar and everything related to and in consent terms was discussed earlier, members knew, and then resolution was passed on 02.07.2017. Then how one can conclude that there was fraud practised. The attack on the procedural aspects of convening the special general meeting, the requisite of adequate strength, quorum for passing the resolution, special general meeting, circulation of the draft of special general body meeting, the absenty of Roshni Udyavar in special general body meeting and she further preparing the minutes etc. are all procedural aspects which is within the arena of Sec.91 of the Act and not with respect to playing fraud upon the court or the other party as required in definition of fraud under Sec.17 of the Contract Act. 39. It is not the case of applicant that Anup Lalwani was not the chairman, Roshni Udyavar was not the acting secretary, that no resolution was passed on 02.07.2017, that no minutes were prepared on 10.07.2017, that no authority letter was issued, that no power of attorney was executed. It is neither case of applicant that the former managing committee or Anup Lalwani concealed any facts from this court. Neither there is any representation of facts which were not true. Nothing is pointed out on record that former managing committee knowingly represented something which is not true though believing it to be not true, or concealed something from court having knowledge or belief of the fact. The allegations of the plaintiff which are enumerated above are all allegations by the new managing committee against the irregularities or fraud by the former managing committee upon the members of the plaintiff society. As discussed above, this is all relating to the dispute between the society, managing committee and members touching the constitution, business and conduct of the society squarely -- 31 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 32 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 coming within the arena of Sec.91 of the Act. There has to be element of intention of deceiving or concealing the facts from the other party or from court. There are no pleadings or evidence that the former managing committee had intention to defraud, had knowledge about getting more amount from the FSI sold, had intention to defraud by appointing Roshni Udyavar as acting secretary, in violation of the provisions of the Act, the byelaws the rules, notifications and circulars. There is difference in the fraud committed by party upon other party or upon court to get the consent terms executed on one hand and the fraud committed by the managing committee against the members of the society. The former act would squarely come within the arena of this court to set aside the consent terms. However, the later act would not fall within the arena of this court. As discussed above, giving findings on any of the aforesaid allegations reproduced above would be indirectly deciding the fact that the resolution dated 02.07.2017 is not as per law which clearly falls under the ambit of Sec.91 of the Act. 40. If plaintiff would have succeeded in showing that though Anup Lalwani was not chairman but he represented so and got executed consent terms or any other fact as discussed above, then it would come within the definition of fraud. As discussed above, in foregoing paragraph No.31, nothing of such sort is pleaded or is made out. Whatever allegations are made, are touching the business, affairs of society, its managing committee and its members. 41. In the cited case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu the facts are totally different. In this cited case Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Exh.B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar -- 32 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 33 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Therefore, it was observed that Non-production and even non-mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. 42. In present case, applicant could not show that the former managing committee concealed any fact from this court knowingly and intentionally. Therefore, the observations in aforesaid cited case will not help plaintiff in present case. 43. The fact of former managing committee being expelled, administrator being appointed, the re-audit report of Shri. Anirudh Sengaonkar dated 29.12.2018, the pending enquiry u/sec.88 of the Act, the factum of appointment of M/s. Thite Valuers and Engineers and its report dated 31.10.2019 are all facts subsequent to the filing of consent terms which are not important and not relevant to decide this notice of motion. Whatever may be the observations made by the auditor Shri. Anirudh Sengaonkar, they are made from the angle of administration and functioning of society. The arena of the department of Co-operative Societies is totally different then the fraud which can be entertained by this court. Furthermore, the report of Anirudha Sengaonkar dated 29.12.2018 are not depicting any conclusions of him on the allegations of fraud as is averred by applicant in present case. The observations of -- 33 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 34 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 the Shri. Anirudha Sengaonkar are in the form of raising doubts on the functioning of the plaintiff society but are not any clear findings on any of the alleged allegations in present notice of motion. For aforesaid discussion, these facts are not helpful to applicant in this notice of motion. 44. If aforesaid discussion, is taken into account, what can be concluded is that, if conduct of plaintiff society, members of plaintiff society is taken into account, it cannot be concluded that there was element of fraud committed upon either of parties or upon court. 45. Learned advocate for plaintiff has further invoked Sec.7 and 7A of the MOFA Act. According to him, consent of all the members of the society is not taken and without taking such consent, the consent terms dated 17.07.2017 are entered thereby changing, adding, deleting, altering the original plan. 46. Learned advocate for defendant No.2 relied upon the observations in Jayantilal Investments V/s. Madhuvir Co-operative Housing Society and Ors in AIR 2007 SC1011 decided on 10.01.2007 on this point. It is observed in this citation that - “After the amendment question of taking prior consent of flat takers before constructing any additional structure does not arise- However, right to construct additional structures/builders accrue only after approval of plan by competent authority- Intention of amendment was to remove impediment in construction, if total lay out allows construction of more buildings-Obligation of promoter under MOFA to make true and full disclosure of flat takers remains unfettered even after amendment – Every agreement between promoter and flat taker shall comply with prescribed Form V” 47. Sec.7 of the MOFA Act reads as follows - 7. After plans and specifications are disclosed no alterations or -- 34 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 35 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 additions without consent of persons who have agreed to take the flats; and defects noticed within (three years) to be rectified ---(1) after the plans and specifications of the buildings as approved by the local authority as aforesaid, are disclosed or furnished to the person who agree to take one or more flats, the promoter shall not make (i) any alterations in the structures described therein in respect of the flat or flats which are agreed to be taken, without the previous consent of that person; or (ii) any other alterations or additions in the structure of the building without the previous consent of all the persons who have agreed to take the flats in such building. (2).....… (Emphasis supplied) 48. According to this section, once the plan and specifications of the building is approved by the local authority and is disclosed or furnished to the person who agrees to take flat, the promoter cannot make any alteration in the structure described in the plan in respect of the flat which is agreed to be taken without prior consent of that person or make any alteration or addition in structure of the building without prior consent of all the persons who have agreed to take the flats in such building. 49. It is pertinent to note that in present case, applicant has pointed out no specific clauses in the consent terms which are affecting or changing, altering, adding in the structure rather building which is pertaining to the members of the society i.e. A,B and C wing. Nothing is pointed out that the defendant No.2 is making any alteration, addition in the flats which are pertaining to the members of the society i.e. A,B and C wing. Whatever is reflecting from the consent terms is in respect to D wing which is not pertaining to the flats, structures of the members of the society i.e. A,B and C wing. D wing is yet to be constructed. Therefore, Sec.7 or 7A of MOFA Act will not come in the way of consent -- 35 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 36 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 terms as is argued by learned advocate for plaintiff. The arguments of learned advocate for defendant No.2 on this point carries merits. Vague and emotional arguments will not tilt the case in favour of plaintiff applicant. Unless and until the resolution is set aside, it remains binding on the applicant and principle of estoppel will come in way of plaintiff. 50. The observations in the cited case of Jayantilal Investments are salutary. However, for discussion above, they are not relevant in present case. 51. Coming to the alternative argument of learned advocate for plaintiff with respect to plaintiff society invoking clause-1(a) of consent terms and alleging cancellation of the consent terms. 52. No doubt discretion of revoking the consent terms was given to plaintiff society vide clause-1(a) of consent terms that if the defendant No.2 fails to get no objection from the owners i.e. defendant No.3 to 5 for demolition of office block within 1 year or grace period, plaintiff society could revoke the consent terms. It is pertinent to note that though in Special General Body Meeting dated 14.04.2019 it was resolved that defendant No.2 failed to bring no objection of the owners within 12 months and therefore, the consent terms should be cancelled, the further conduct of plaintiff society which is discussed below do not show that the said resolution of plaintiff society was acted upon. It was specifically mentioned in this resolution that the defendant No.2 be informed of this resolution. 53. Though applicant is claiming that the plaintiff society has informed defendant No.2, vide letter dated 25.07.2019, it is subsequent -- 36 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 37 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 to the letter of defendant no.2 informing plaintiff society that he has obtained consent from the owners. The letter of defendant No.2 is dated 22.07.2019. Plaintiff society claims to have informed defendant No.2 about their act of revoking consent terms by letter dated 25.07.2019 which is letter issued in response/reply to the aforesaid letter of defendant No.2 dated 22.07.2019. 54. If plaintiff society had acted upon the resolution passed in Special General Body Meeting dated 14.04.2019, they would not go for modification and accepting the consent terms in Special General Body Meeting dated 13.10.2019. The agenda of minutes of Special General Body Meeting dated 13.10.2019 is to discuss and deliberate item-wise the points of the consent terms dated 17.07.2017, to identify and suggest modifications to the consent terms either part or whole, the operating part of the clauses thereto, which is giving additional benefits to the society. It appears that this Special General Body Meeting dated 13.10.2019, was convened by the new managing committee. It is further reflecting that resolution was passed that present applicant and Mr. Anup Lalwani who were conversant with the issues shall obtain current market valuation report/feasibility report on the valuation of FSI @ Rs.3,000/- per sq.ft. Further it was discussed that if the difference was considerable viz. more than 20%, then the Managing Committee would try to renegotiate the FSI rates with the Developer. These minutes further reflect that all the clauses of the consent terms were given review and whether any modification is required or not was discussed and accordingly the resolution was passed and no modifications were suggested with respect to clause-1(a) of the consent terms. Similarly, the comment of requiring modification or not was dealt with for every clause in the consent terms and accordingly the -- 37 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 38 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 resolution was passed. 55. If there is substance in the argument of learned advocate for plaintiff that the consent terms were revoked by plaintiff society invoking clause-1(a) of the consent terms then how in special general body meeting dated 13.10.2019, the agenda was to discuss and deliberate item-wise the points of the consent terms dated 17.07.2017, to identify and suggest modifications to the consent terms either part or whole, the operating part of the clauses thereto, which is giving additional benefits to the society. 56. Furthermore, if the resolution dated 14.04.2019 was acted upon, then there was no hurdle for plaintiff society to inform the same to defendant No.2. There is no explanation as to why plaintiff society did not inform defendant No.2 till 25.07.2019 till they received the letter from defendant No.2 dated 22.07.2019. Plaintiff society not informing defendant No.2 and further the conduct of the plaintiff society in the Special General Body Meeting dated 13.10.2019 clearly reveal the conduct of plaintiff to have given the grace period to defendant No.2 to obtain no objection from the owners after the expiry of one year as was agreed in clause-1(a) of the consent terms dated 17.07.2019. 57. It was also argued that no prudent person can say that defendant No.2 has obtained no objection from owners if the averments in the letter dated 22.07.2019 of defendant No.2 is gone through. 58. On perusal of this letter dated 22.07.2019 issued by defendant No.2 to plaintiff society, it is clearly revealing that defendant -- 38 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 39 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 No.2 has informed plaintiff society that he has been successful in arriving composite settlement with owners. It is further pertinent to note that in pursuance of this letter the defendant No.2 and owners i.e. defendant No.3 to 5 have entered into the consent terms before the Hon’ble High Court in Writ Petition No.13683/2018 and this writ petition is disposed of in terms of consent terms on 03.10.2019. 59. If all the aforesaid conduct of plaintiff society is taken into account, the arguments of learned advocate for plaintiff that, plaintiff society had revoked the consent terms cannot be accepted. Per contra, the arguments of learned advocate for defendant No.2 is acceptable. 60. It was argued by learned advocate for defendant No.2 that applicant Girish Nair is not authorised to move this notice of motion. This argument has no force. The plaintiff applicant has tendered on record the copy of resolution dated 08.07.2019 whereby the chairman, secretary and the treasurer i.e. the present applicant were authorized to look into the ongoing cases before this court and all other courts. They are authorized to file any application on behalf of the plaintiff society in the pending lis before various forums. In light of this resolution, the locus of applicant to file present notice of motion cannot be doubted. As regards the technical point of not filing the same despite objection taken by defendant No.2 in his reply, same being technical and procedural part, I do not give any weightage to this aspect. It is settled legal position as on today that procedural technicalities should not be given that importance which will become hurdle in the dispensation of justice. Keeping in mind this legal position, I had allowed the application of plaintiff to tender the copy of resolution authorizedly to file this notice of motion even at the stage of arguments. -- 39 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 40 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 61. For all aforesaid discussion, the arguments of learned advocate for plaintiff do not appeal to my mind. The consent terms which are recorded by my predecessor in office were after due verification of confirming the voluntariness of them. I have already concluded that whatever fraud is alleged by plaintiff is not upon court or either party in present suit. The case of plaintiff in present notice of motion is not covered in definition of fraud as defined in Sec.17 of the Contract Act. Even the alternative argument of plaintiff is not carrying merits. Therefore, the notice of motion of plaintiff deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, I proceed with following order - ORDER 1. Notice of Motion No. 414/2020 is hereby dismissed. 2. Costs in cause. 3. Notice of Motion No.414/2020 is accordingly disposed of. (C.P. Jain) Ad-hoc Judge, (C.R.No.06) Date : 01.12.2020 City Civil Court, Gr. Bombay Directly dictated on Computer : 25.11.2020, 26.11.2020, 27.11.2020 & 01.12.2020 Checked on : 02.12.2020 & 03.12.2020, 04.12.2020 05.12.2020 & 07.12.2020 Signed on :10.12.2020. -- 40 of 41 -- NM No.414/2020 .. 41 .. L.C. Suit No.4418/2011 “CERTIFIED TO BE TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL SIGNED JUDGMENT/ORDER.” UPLOAD DATE AND TIME : 10.12.2020, 04.41 pm. NAME OF STENOGRAPHER : Mr. Harshal D. Jagtap Name of the Judge (With Court Room No.) HHJ Smt. C.P. Jain C.R. No.06 Date of Pronouncement of JUDGMENT/ORDER 01.12.2020 JUDGMENT/ORDER signed by P.O. on 10.12.2020 JUDGMENT/ORDER uploaded on 10.12.2020 -- 41 of 41 --
