Full Order Text
Order 15 · 06 Jun 2025 · CNR DLSH010023462023
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: Page No. 1 of 8 IN THE COURT OF GAURAV: DISTRICT JUDGE-01 SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS: DELHI MCA DJ No. 53/2023 In the matter of: - Sh. Kunwar Pal .........Appellant Versus DDA & Ors. ...…...Respondents 06.06.2025 ORDER 1. Vide this common order, I shall dispose of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) and, filed by appellant for seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC, assailing the order dated 17.12.2022, whereby the Ld. Trial Court was pleased to dismiss the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction. 2. No reply to the aforesaid application has been filed by respondents, denying all the assertions made therein and have prayed for dismissal of the same. 3. Arguments were heard at length on behalf of Ld. Counsels for parties. 4. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant contended that the delay of 65 days in filing the appeal is not intentional or deliberate, but -- 1 of 8 -- Page No. 2 of 8 has occurred due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances. He further contended that the he was preoccupied with personal difficulties, including the demise of his grandmother in the February-2023, and due to which he had to travel to his native place to perform last rites and “tehravi” of his grandmother, resulting in an initial delay of about 40 days. He further contended that upon his return to Delhi, he had to observe a mandatory 10-day quarantine as per then-prevailing COVID-19 protocols. He further contended that further delay occurred as the appellant, being a poor litigant, had to arrange funds for filing the appeal and obtaining certified copies of the impugned order. He further contended that the delay is procedural and inadvertent and ought not to be construed as negligence or lack of diligence. He further contended that the additional facts explaining the delay were inadvertently omitted from the original application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, due to his oversight as he had filed 26 connected appeals against respondents during that time. 5. It is pertinent to mention herein that during the course of arguments, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant fairly conceded that no formal application under Section 151 CPC was filed seeking leave of the Court to place on record or read the contents of the detailed explanation of "sufficient cause" separately filed likewise in others connected appeals filed against the respondents. However, he submitted that he had filed written arguments during the pendency of the proceedings, wherein the entire factual matrix constituting sufficient cause for delay was elaborated in detail. It was submitted that the said written arguments ought to be treated as an extension or explanatory supplement to the original application under Section 5 of the -- 2 of 8 -- Page No. 3 of 8 Limitation Act, and that the Court has ample inherent power to read the same as forming part of the appellant's explanation for delay. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid application may kindly be pleased to allow and condone the delay. 6. In support of his contentions, he has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, wherein the Apex Court emphasized that courts should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach in considering applications for condonation of delay, so that the substantial justice is not sacrificed at the altar of technicalities. 7. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the present applications, and contended that the reasons mentioned in the condonation of delay’s application are vague, unsubstantiated, and lack documentary support. He further contended that the appellant has failed to establish a cogent and legally sustainable "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay. He further contended that the appellant cannot be allowed to circumvent procedural requirements by introducing new material under the guise of written submissions without seeking the Court’s formal permission. He further contended that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and the party must approach the court with due diligence and bona fides. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid applications may kindly be pleased to dismiss with heavy cost. 8. I have heard the rival contentions made by the Ld. Counsels for the parties and carefully perused the entire material available on record. 9. Before proceedings further, it is a settled principle of law -- 3 of 8 -- Page No. 4 of 8 that “procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress” and that the procedural laws are meant to facilitate and not to obstruct the cause of justice. Likewise, substantive rights should not be defeated on technical grounds. The object of the rules of procedure is to secure the ends of justice and not to thwart them. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred. 10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the court to admit an appeal after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies the court that he had “sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal within time. The test of “sufficient cause” is not rigidly defined and must be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. 11. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that a litigant does not stand to benefit by filing an appeal belatedly, and that refusing to condone delay may result in miscarriage of justice. 12. Now, reverting back to the case in hand, the explanation furnished by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant for the delay attributes it to a combination of personal and practical circumstances, which, though not supported by any documentary evidence, cannot be outrightly disbelieved on the face of the -- 4 of 8 -- Page No. 5 of 8 record. 13. The contents of the written arguments filed by appellant, do not introduce an altogether new case but merely expand upon and substantiate the earlier plea of “family difficulty and unavailability of file” as stated in the original application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The core foundation of the delay being personal hardship of the counsel, remains consistent. Procedural rules are meant to facilitate justice, not to frustrate it. In this context, the written arguments filed by the appellant’s counsel during pendency of the application, though not accompanied by a formal application under Section 151 CPC, may be treated as a clarificatory supplement to the main application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. This Court is empowered to adopt a liberal and pragmatic approach, particularly where the respondents had due notice of the submissions and was able to respond to the same. The objection raised by the respondents is therefore, not sustainable, as no element of prejudice or surprise has been demonstrated to have resulted from the manner in which the additional explanation was placed on record. The law is well-settled that substance must prevail over form, and the Court is not powerless to consider supplementary material explaining delay, even if initially omitted, particularly when no prejudice is shown to have been caused to the respondents. 14. As regards the objection of the respondents that the written argument is nothing but an attempt to fill lacunae left in the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, it is settled law that procedural laws are handmaid of justice and must be interpreted in a manner that advances the cause of justice rather -- 5 of 8 -- Page No. 6 of 8 than defeats it on mere technicalities. Though, it is true that litigants must be diligent and that limitation cannot be condoned mechanically, it is equally true that courts must adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach while considering applications for condonation of delay, particularly where the delay is neither deliberate nor motivated by mala fides. 15. The contention of the respondents that the appellant failed to support his plea with documentary evidence, such as a death certificate, COVID protocol advisory, or proof of financial condition, is noted. However, the absence of supporting documents is not per se conclusive against the appellant where the facts pleaded are otherwise plausible, natural, and not inherently improbable. It is recognized that events like bereavement, travel to native place for last rites, and financial constraints are not unusual in common human experience and do not always leave behind formal documentation. In such circumstances, mechanical insistence on documentary proof would elevate form over substance, and unjustly penalize a party seeking adjudication on merits. The overall explanation appears bona fide and deserving of acceptance, especially when no serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the respondents due to the delay. 16. It is matter of record that the appeal was eventually filed on 25.04.2023, and while there is a delay of around 65 days, it is not excessive in the context of civil litigation. Taken together, and assessed in light of judicial standards for determining “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the explanation provided although not elaborate or supported by documentary proof, does not appear to be tainted by mala fide -- 6 of 8 -- Page No. 7 of 8 intent or deliberate negligence. No doubt, such omissions would weaken the claim of “sufficient cause”. However, Courts are expected to consider the totality of circumstances and apply judicial discretion pragmatically. In the absence of supporting documents, while reflecting a slightly lack of diligence, does not render the explanation implausible per se. 17. Therefore, this Court finds that the delay was procedural and unintentional, and refusal to condone such delay would defeat the interest of justice, especially when no substantial prejudice has been caused to the respondents. Accordingly, this Court is inclined to consider the explanation with a view to ensuring that the appeal with regard to the right over the immovable properties, is adjudicated on its merits rather than being defeated on technical grounds. 18. While it is true that ordinarily, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, must stand on its own legs and should not be permitted to be amended or supplemented in a manner that causes prejudice, the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC are always available to the Court to secure the ends of justice. The omission in the original application appears to be an inadvertent and excusable lapse. The written argument does not attempt to introduce new or unrelated facts but seeks to elaborate upon the same factual matrix already pleaded. In view of the same, this Court finds it appropriate to read the contents thereof as part and parcel of the first application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. 19. In the light of aforesaid discussion and findings and also the guiding principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is inclined to take a liberal view in the interest of -- 7 of 8 -- Page No. 8 of 8 substantial justice. Accordingly, the aforesaid application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is hereby allowed and disposed of. The delay of around 65 days in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. No order as to costs. (Typed to the dictation directly, corrected and pronounced in open court on 06.06.2025). (GAURAV) DISTRICT JUDGE-01 SHAHDARA DISTRICT KARKARDOOMA COURTS DELHI / 06.06.2025 -- 8 of 8 --
