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Order 15

CNR DLSH01002346202306 Jun 2025
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Order 15 · 06 Jun 2025 · CNR DLSH010023462023

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Pdf Text: Page No. 1 of 8
IN THE COURT OF GAURAV: DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS:
DELHI
MCA DJ No. 53/2023
In the matter of: -
Sh. Kunwar Pal .........Appellant
Versus
DDA & Ors. ...…...Respondents
06.06.2025
ORDER
1. Vide this common order, I shall dispose of the application
under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, read with Section 151
of Civil Procedure Code, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as “CPC”)
and, filed by appellant for seeking condonation of delay in filing
appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC, assailing the
order dated 17.12.2022, whereby the Ld. Trial Court was pleased
to dismiss the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
CPC for grant of temporary injunction.
2. No reply to the aforesaid application has been filed by
respondents, denying all the assertions made therein and have
prayed for dismissal of the same.
3. Arguments were heard at length on behalf of Ld. Counsels
for parties.
4. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant contended that the delay
of
65 days in filing the appeal is not intentional or deliberate, but
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has occurred due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances.
He further contended that the he was preoccupied with personal
difficulties, including the demise of his grandmother in the
February-2023, and due to which he had to travel to his native
place to perform last rites and “tehravi” of his grandmother,
resulting in an initial delay of about 40 days. He further
contended that upon his return to Delhi, he had to observe a
mandatory 10-day quarantine as per then-prevailing COVID-19
protocols. He further contended that further delay occurred as the
appellant, being a poor litigant, had to arrange funds for filing the
appeal and obtaining certified copies of the impugned order. He
further contended that the delay is procedural and inadvertent and
ought not to be construed as negligence or lack of diligence. He
further contended that the additional facts explaining the delay
were inadvertently omitted from the original application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, due to his oversight as he had
filed 26 connected appeals against respondents during that time.
5. It is pertinent to mention herein that during the course of
arguments, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant fairly conceded that
no formal application under Section 151 CPC was filed seeking
leave of the Court to place on record or read the contents of the
detailed explanation of
"sufficient cause" separately filed
likewise in others connected appeals filed against the
respondents. However, he submitted that he had filed written
arguments during the pendency of the proceedings, wherein the
entire factual matrix constituting sufficient cause for delay was
elaborated in detail. It was submitted that the said written
arguments ought to be treated as an extension or explanatory
supplement to the original application under Section 5 of the
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Limitation Act, and that the Court has ample inherent power to
read the same as forming part of the appellant's explanation for
delay. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid application may
kindly be pleased to allow and condone the delay.
6. In support of his contentions, he has also relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107,
wherein the Apex Court emphasized that courts should adopt a
liberal and justice-oriented approach in considering applications
for condonation of delay, so that the substantial justice is not
sacrificed at the altar of technicalities.
7. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the respondents
vehemently opposed the present applications, and contended that
the reasons mentioned in the condonation of delay’s application
are vague, unsubstantiated, and lack documentary support. He
further contended that the appellant has failed to establish a
cogent and legally sustainable
"sufficient cause" for condonation
of delay. He further contended that the appellant cannot be
allowed to circumvent procedural requirements by introducing
new material under the guise of written submissions without
seeking the Court’s formal permission. He further contended that
the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and the party
must approach the court with due diligence and bona fides. At
the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid applications may kindly be
pleased to dismiss with heavy cost.
8. I have heard the rival contentions made by the Ld.
Counsels for the parties and carefully perused the entire material
available on record.
9. Before proceedings further, it is a settled principle of law
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that
“procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress” and
that the procedural laws are meant to facilitate and not to obstruct
the cause of justice. Likewise, substantive rights should not be
defeated on technical grounds. The object of the rules of
procedure is to secure the ends of justice and not to thwart them.
When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred.
10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the court
to admit an appeal after the prescribed period if the appellant
satisfies the court that he had
“sufficient cause” for not preferring
the appeal within time. The test of
“sufficient cause” is not
rigidly defined and must be determined on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
11. In
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (1987)
2 SCC 107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legislature
has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5
of the Limitation Act, in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on
merits. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be construed
liberally so as to advance substantial justice. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further observed that a litigant does not stand to
benefit by filing an appeal belatedly, and that refusing to condone
delay may result in miscarriage of justice.
12. Now, reverting back to the case in hand, the explanation
furnished by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant for the delay
attributes it to a combination of personal and practical
circumstances, which, though not supported by any documentary
evidence, cannot be outrightly disbelieved on the face of the
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record.
13. The contents of the written arguments filed by appellant,
do not introduce an altogether new case but merely expand upon
and substantiate the earlier plea of “family difficulty and
unavailability of file” as stated in the original application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. The core foundation of the
delay being personal hardship of the counsel, remains consistent.
Procedural rules are meant to facilitate justice, not to frustrate it.
In this context, the written arguments filed by the appellant’s
counsel during pendency of the application, though not
accompanied by a formal application under Section 151 CPC,
may be treated as a clarificatory supplement to the main
application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. This Court
is empowered to adopt a liberal and pragmatic approach,
particularly where the respondents had due notice of the
submissions and was able to respond to the same. The objection
raised by the respondents is therefore, not sustainable, as no
element of prejudice or surprise has been demonstrated to have
resulted from the manner in which the additional explanation was
placed on record. The law is well-settled that substance must
prevail over form, and the Court is not powerless to consider
supplementary material explaining delay, even if initially
omitted, particularly when no prejudice is shown to have been
caused to the respondents.
14. As regards the objection of the respondents that the written
argument is nothing but an attempt to fill lacunae left in the
application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, it is settled
law that procedural laws are handmaid of justice and must be
interpreted in a manner that advances the cause of justice rather
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than defeats it on mere technicalities. Though, it is true that
litigants must be diligent and that limitation cannot be condoned
mechanically, it is equally true that courts must adopt a liberal
and justice-oriented approach while considering applications for
condonation of delay, particularly where the delay is neither
deliberate nor motivated by mala fides.
15. The contention of the respondents that the appellant failed
to support his plea with documentary evidence, such as a death
certificate, COVID protocol advisory, or proof of financial
condition, is noted. However, the absence of supporting
documents is not per se conclusive against the appellant where
the facts pleaded are otherwise plausible, natural, and not
inherently improbable. It is recognized that events like
bereavement, travel to native place for last rites, and financial
constraints are not unusual in common human experience and do
not always leave behind formal documentation. In such
circumstances, mechanical insistence on documentary proof
would elevate form over substance, and unjustly penalize a party
seeking adjudication on merits. The overall explanation appears
bona fide and deserving of acceptance, especially when no
serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the
respondents due to the delay.
16. It is matter of record that the appeal was eventually filed
on 25.04.2023, and while there is a delay of around 65 days, it is
not excessive in the context of civil litigation. Taken together,
and assessed in light of judicial standards for determining
“sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
explanation provided although not elaborate or supported by
documentary proof, does not appear to be tainted by mala fide
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intent or deliberate negligence. No doubt, such omissions would
weaken the claim of
“sufficient cause”. However, Courts are
expected to consider the totality of circumstances and apply
judicial discretion pragmatically. In the absence of supporting
documents, while reflecting a slightly lack of diligence, does not
render the explanation implausible per se.
17. Therefore, this Court finds that the delay was procedural
and unintentional, and refusal to condone such delay would
defeat the interest of justice, especially when no substantial
prejudice has been caused to the respondents. Accordingly, this
Court is inclined to consider the explanation with a view to
ensuring that the appeal with regard to the right over the
immovable properties, is adjudicated on its merits rather than
being defeated on technical grounds.
18. While it is true that ordinarily, an application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, must stand on its own legs and
should not be permitted to be amended or supplemented in a
manner that causes prejudice, the inherent powers under Section
151 CPC are always available to the Court to secure the ends of
justice. The omission in the original application appears to be an
inadvertent and excusable lapse. The written argument does not
attempt to introduce new or unrelated facts but seeks to elaborate
upon the same factual matrix already pleaded. In view of the
same, this Court finds it appropriate to read the contents thereof
as part and parcel of the first application under Section 5 of
Limitation Act, 1963.
19. In the light of aforesaid discussion and findings and also
the guiding principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this
Court is inclined to take a liberal view in the interest of
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substantial justice. Accordingly, the aforesaid application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is hereby
allowed and
disposed of. The delay of around
65 days in filing the appeal is
hereby
condoned. No order as to costs.
(Typed to the dictation directly, corrected and
pronounced in open court on 06.06.2025).
(GAURAV)
DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT
KARKARDOOMA COURTS
DELHI / 06.06.2025
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