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Final Order 12

CNR DLSH01002122202325 Apr 2026
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Final Order 12 · 25 Apr 2026 · CNR DLSH010021222023

Order Details: COPY OF JUDGMENT
Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF GAURAV: DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS: DELHI
DLSH010021222023
MCA DJ/44/2023
In the matter of: -
Smt. Raj Kumari
W/o Late Salesh
R/o. Jhugee No. 13
Behind Deepak Memorial Hospital,
Near KarKardooma Village
Delhi-ll0092. ….Appellant
Versus
1. Delhi Development Authority
Through its Director/Chairman,
Vikas Sadan, I.N.A.,
New Delhi
2. Slum and JJ Department.
(DUSIB)
Through Its Chairman
A-4, Vikas Kutir,
I.P. Estate, ITO
New Delhi-110002.
3. Govt of NCT of Delhi
Through its Chief Secretary
MCA DJ No. 44/2023
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Delhi Secretariat
IP Estate, ITO, New Delhi-110002. ….Respondents
25.04.2026
ORDER
1. Vide this order, I shall dispose of the present miscellaneous civil
appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred as CPC), which has been filed by the
appellant/plaintiff against the impugned order dated 17.12.2022, passed by the
Ld. Trial Court whereby the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2
CPC has been dismissed. During the pendency of the present appeal, separate
application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963
(hereinafter referred to as
“LA”) seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal has also been
filed.
2. To avoid confusion and for the ease of reference and clarity in the
order, the appellant and respondents herein, shall be referred to by their
original nomenclature in the suit as
“plaintiff”, “defendant no. 1”, “defendant
no. 2” and
“defendant no. 3” respectively, throughout the present order.
BRIEF MATRIX OF THE SUIT
3. The case of the plaintiff is that she is the owner and occupant of one of
the jhuggis situated behind Deepak Memorial Hospital in Karkardooma
village, Delhi, and has been residing therein along with her family members
for a considerable length of time.
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4. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the said jhuggi forms part of a
larger cluster comprising more than sixty dwellings, all of which have been in
existence for over two decades, thereby evidencing a settled habitation rather
than a transient encroachment. In order to substantiate her claim of continuous
residence and possession, the plaintiff has relied upon various official
documents issued in her favour as well as her family members, including Birth
Certificate, her Election Identity Card, Ration Card, Pan-Card, Bank Passbook,
Driving Licence and Aadhaar Card.
5. According to plaintiff, these documents are demonstrative of her long-
standing occupation of the premises and establish her entitlement to protection
under the statutory and policy framework governing slum dwellers in the
National Capital Territory of Delhi.
6. The grievance of the plaintiff is that officials of defendant no. 1 i.e.
Delhi Development Authority
(hereinafter referred to as “DDA”) have on
several occasions visited the site and threatened her and her family members
with forcible dispossession. Such threats are unlawful and contrary to the
policy of the Government of NCT of Delhi, which according to her, recognizes
the rights of long-term jhuggi dwellers and does not treat them as mere
encroachers upon public land.
7. It is the further case of the plaintiff that her possession is safeguarded
under the provisions of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB)
Amendment Act, 2015. The said enactment, read conjointly with the Master
Plan for Delhi, 2021, provides protection to slum dwellers against arbitrary
eviction and mandates the provision of alternative accommodation prior to any
displacement.
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8. It is the further case of the plaintiff that these instruments confer upon
her a legal right not to be evicted without due process and without the
assurance of rehabilitation. On the strength of the aforesaid statutory
provisions and policy guidelines, the plaintiff has claimed that defendant no. 2
i.e. the Slum and JJ Department of the Government of Delhi
(hereinafter
referred to as “DUSIB”), be directed to prepare a list of eligible persons and to
allot alternative land to those found entitled. Pending such determination, the
plaintiff has prayed for an order of interim injunction restraining the
defendants from dispossessing her and her family members from the suit
premises during the pendency of the suit.
DEFENCE OF DEFENDANT NO. 1/DDA
9. In the written statement filed on behalf of DDA, it is asserted that the
plaintiff has not approached this Court with clean hands and has suppressed
material facts. The plaintiff has no documentary proof in support of her alleged
ownership of the suit property and is attempting to unlawfully grab land
belonging to the DDA.
10. It is further asserted that the land in question is owned by the DDA and
that possession thereof was duly taken by the Authority on 03.12.1968. The
plaintiff has not sought any relief of declaration with respect to ownership or
title, and therefore, the present suit is not maintainable in law.
11. The defendant has categorically denied the plaintiff’s claim of lawful
possession and has described him as a trespasser who is not entitled to any
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discretionary relief from the Court. In support of this contention, the defendant
no.1 has pointed out that the electricity connection at the suit premises shows
the date of energisation as 2013, which is inconsistent with the plaintiff’s
assertion of possession prior to the year 2005.
12. It is further asserted that mere possession of documents such as a bank
account, voter identity card, or any other personal identification records does
not confer ownership rights over immovable property. Such documents only
establish the identity of a person and cannot be relied upon to claim title or
lawful possession of land belonging to the DDA.
13. It is further asserted that the suit property was encroached upon by
labourers of one Jai Bhagwan, who sought to take advantage of a status quo
order passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 10067/2015
titled
Jai Bhagwan vs. Union of India. The said writ petition, however, has
since been dismissed, and therefore, no protection or benefit can be claimed by
the plaintiff under the garb of the said proceedings.
DEFENCE OF DEFENDANT NO. 2/DUSIB
14. In the written statement filed on behalf of DUSIB, it is asserted that it is
the nodal agency entrusted with the responsibility of relocation and
rehabilitation of jhuggi jhopri situated on lands belonging to the Municipal
Corporation of Delhi (MCD), the Government of NCT of Delhi, and its
various Departments and Agencies.
15. It is further asserted that the jhuggi cluster referred to in the present suit,
does not find mention in the list of 675 identified bastis, nor in the additional
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82 bastis subsequently recognized, under the Delhi Slum and Jhuggi Jhopri
Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015.
16. After hearing both the parties, the application under Order XXXIX Rule
1 and 2 CPC was dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court, vide impugned order dated
17.12.2022.
17. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the said impugned order dated
17.12.2022 passed by Ld. Trial Court, preferred the present appeal mainly on
the grounds that:
1. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the cluster where the
appellant resides is covered under Section 2(g) of the Delhi Urban Shelter
Improvement Board Act, 2010, and respondent no. 2 has filed relevant
documents confirming its existence as per the 2015 policy dated
15.01.2020.
2. Because the Ld. Trial Court ignored the site inspection report dated
27.01.2020 by Ms. K. Gupta, which recorded about 60–70 jhuggies at the
site, identified DDA as the land-owning agency, and noted valid
occupancy proofs such as OPD cards (2002), bank passbooks (2006),
ration cards, Aadhaar, and voter IDs issued prior to 2015, though the camp
was not listed in the official DUSIB cluster list.
3. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that respondent no.2’s own
visit confirmed compliance with the 2015 policy and that the sociological
department of DUSIB found the residents were not encroachers.
4. Because the Ld. Trial Court overlooked that the DUSIB official’s report
supports the appellant’s cluster as a notified area, and denial by
respondent no.2 amounts to evasion of duty. Possession is prima facie in
favour of the appellant, supported by the Delhi High Court judgment in
Manoj Kumar & Ors. vs. DUSIB & Ors.
5. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to require respondent no.2 to file the
compliance survey report along with affidavit, which remains absent.
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6. Because the Ld. Trial Court ignored the binding precedent of
Sudama
Singh vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, affirmed by the Supreme Court, which
supports the appellant’s case.
7. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that
Ajay Makan vs.
Union of India (para 112.11) reiterated the principle from
Sudama Singh
that jhuggi dwellers must not be treated as second-class citizens.
8. Because the Ld. Trial Court wrongly applied
Manoj Kumar & Ors.
judgment, where the 2015 policy criteria were not met. In contrast, the
appellant’s cluster fulfils the policy, with about 70 households existing
prior to 01.01.2006.
9. Because the Ld. Trial Court wrongly equated the appellant’s case with
Dinesh Singh & Ors. vs. DDA and
Kasturba Nagar Residents Welfare
Association vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, which are distinguishable.
10. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the Government of NCT
Delhi’s order dated 16.02.2015, which directed that no demolitions of
jhuggies or residential houses be carried out without prior approval of the
Urban Development Minister.
11. Because the Ld. Trial Court ignored respondent no.2’s own admission
under Part A Clause 2(v) of the 2015 Policy, which prohibits demolition of
eligible jhuggi bastis except under limited circumstances: (i) court orders,
(ii) encroachment on public ways or safety zones, or (iii) urgent public
projects under the Special Provisions Act, 2011.
18. Notice of this appeal was sent to defendants and trial court record was
also requisitioned for adjudicating the present appeal.
19. Defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 have duly appeared through
counsel and filed written submission/reply to the appeal, denying all the
assertions made therein and have prayed for dismissal of the same.
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20. Having heard the rival contentions of Ld. Counsels for the parties and
meticulously perused the impugned order, trial court record, and the
documents placed before this Court, as well as the relevant provisions of law.
21. Before proceedings further, firstly, this court has to decide as to whether
the application under Section 5 of LA, seeking condonation of delay in filing
appeal is deserves to be allowed or not.
22. The Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that the delay of around
56
days in filing the appeal is not intentional or deliberate, but has occurred due
to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances. He further contended that the he
was preoccupied with personal difficulties, including the demise of his
grandmother in the February-2023, and due to which he had to travel to his
native place to perform last rites and
“tehravi” of his grandmother, resulting in
an initial delay of about 40 days. He further contended that upon his return to
Delhi, he had to observe a mandatory 10-day quarantine as per then-prevailing
COVID-19 protocols. He further contended that further delay occurred as the
appellant, being a poor litigant, had to arrange funds for filing the appeal and
obtaining certified copies of the impugned order. He further contended that the
delay is procedural and inadvertent and ought not to be construed as
negligence or lack of diligence. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid
applications may kindly be pleased to allow and condone the delay.
23. In support of his contentions, he has also relied upon the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v.
Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107, wherein the Apex Court emphasized that courts
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should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach in considering
applications for condonation of delay, so that the substantial justice is not
sacrificed at the altar of technicalities.
24.
Per Contra, Ld. Counsels for the defendants vehemently opposed the
present application, and contended that the reasons mentioned in the
condonation of delay’s application are vague, unsubstantiated, and lack
documentary support. They further contended that the appellant has failed to
establish a cogent and legally sustainable
"sufficient cause" for condonation of
delay. They further contended that the law of limitation is founded upon public
policy and the party must approach the court with due diligence and bona
fides. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid application may kindly be
pleased to dismiss with heavy cost.
25. Before proceedings further, it is a settled principle of law that
“procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress” and that the procedural
laws are meant to facilitate and not to obstruct the cause of justice. Likewise,
substantive rights should not be defeated on technical grounds. The object of
the rules of procedure is to secure the ends of justice and not to thwart them.
When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each
other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred.
26. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the court to admit an
appeal after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies the court that he had
“sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal within time. The test of
“sufficient cause” is not rigidly defined and must be determined on the facts
and circumstances of each case.
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27. In
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legislature has conferred the power to
condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in order to enable
the courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on
merits. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be construed liberally so as to
advance substantial justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that
a litigant does not stand to benefit by filing an appeal belatedly, and that
refusing to condone delay may result in miscarriage of justice.
28. Now, reverting back to the case in hand, the explanation furnished by
the Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff for the delay attributes it to a combination of
personal and practical circumstances, which, though not supported by any
documentary evidence, cannot be outrightly disbelieved on the face of the
record.
29. The contention of the defendants that the appellant failed to support her
plea with documentary evidence, such as a death certificate, COVID protocol
advisory, or proof of financial condition, is noted. However, the absence of
supporting documents is not per se conclusive against the plaintiff where the
facts pleaded are otherwise plausible, natural, and not inherently improbable.
It is recognized that events like bereavement, travel to native place for last
rites, and financial constraints are not unusual in common human experience
and do not always leave behind formal documentation. In such circumstances,
mechanical insistence on documentary proof would elevate form over
substance, and unjustly penalize a party seeking adjudication on merits. The
overall explanation appears bona fide and deserving of acceptance, especially
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when no serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the respondents
due to the delay.
30. It is matter of record that the appeal was eventually filed on 22.03.2023,
and while there is a delay of around three months. Taken together, and
assessed in light of judicial standards for determining
“sufficient cause” under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the explanation provided although not
elaborate or supported by documentary proof, does not appear to be tainted by
mala fide intent or deliberate negligence. No doubt, such omissions would
weaken the claim of
“sufficient cause”. However, Courts are expected to
consider the totality of circumstances and apply judicial discretion
pragmatically. In the absence of supporting documents, while reflecting a
slightly lack of diligence, does not render the explanation implausible per se.
31. Therefore, this Court finds that the delay was procedural and
unintentional, and refusal to condone such delay would defeat the interest of
justice, especially when no substantial prejudice has been caused to the
defendants. Accordingly, this Court is inclined to consider the explanation with
a view to ensuring that the appeal with regard to the right over the immovable
properties, is adjudicated on its merits rather than being defeated on technical
grounds.
32. In the light of aforesaid discussion and findings and also the guiding
principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is inclined to take
a liberal view in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the aforesaid
application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is hereby
allowed and
disposed of. The delay in filing the appeal is hereby
condoned.
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33. Now, the main question that arises for consideration in the present
miscellaneous civil appeal is whether the plaintiff was able to establish a
prima facie case,
balance of convenience, and
irreparable loss so as to warrant
the grant of interim injunction, and whether the Ld. Trial Court was justified in
dismissing the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
34. Before adverting to the merits of the present miscellaneous civil appeal,
it would be apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of Order XXXIX Rules
1 and 2 CPC, which provide for the grant of temporary injunctions. Rule 1
CPC provides that where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise: that
any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or
alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree;
or that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of her property
with a view to defraud her creditors; the Court may by order grant a temporary
injunction to restrain such act. Rule 2 CPC empowers the Court to grant an
injunction to restrain the defendant from committing a breach of contract or
other injury of any kind to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in
the suit.
35. It is a settled principle that, while considering an application under
Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the court must examine whether a
prima
facie case exists, where the
balance of convenience lies, and whether
irreparable harm would ensue if interim relief is not granted.
36. It is imperative to mention herein that during the course of arguments,
Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff placed on record two orders passed by the Court
of Sh. Mayank Goyal, Ld. JSCC/ASCJ, Shahdara District, Karkardooma
Courts, Delhi; in CS No. 1387/19 titled as
“Lochan Lal vs. DDA & Ors.” dated
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23.10.2024 and CS No. 262/20
“Sanjay Kumar vs. DDA & Ors.” dated
23.10.2024. In both matters, the defendants were restrained from dispossessing
the plaintiffs from their respective jhuggis situated behind Deepak Memorial
Hospital, Karkardooma Village, Dayanand Vihar, Delhi, without following due
process of law. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that these orders pertain
to the same cluster in which the present plaintiff resides, and therefore, the
plaintiff is entitled to similar protection.
37. On being specifically queried from the defendant no. 1/DDA to which
Ld. Counsel for the defendant no. 1 fairly submitted that the aforesaid orders
have not been challenged before any higher forum. At the same time, he
contended that those directions were passed in separate suits and cannot bind
this Court while deciding the present appeal. He further contended that the
appellant cannot derive any vested right merely because neighbouring
residents obtained interim protection.
38. The Court is conscious of the fact that the orders relied upon by the
plaintiff were passed by a Ld. ASCJ and, strictly speaking, are not binding
precedents upon this Court. However, the significance of those orders lies in
the fact that they pertain to the same cluster of jhuggis and were passed after
consideration of similar facts and circumstances. The admitted position that
those orders remain unchallenged lends weight to the plaintiff’s contention and
that the defendants have not sought to disturb the judicial protection already
extended to similarly situated residents. While not binding, such orders are
relevant for assessing the existence of a
prima facie case and the balance of
convenience.
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39. Turning now to the essential requirements of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and
2 CPC, the first requirement is whether the plaintiff has disclosed a
prima
facie case. The plaintiff has produced documentary evidence of residence,
including Birth Certificate, voter IDs, Ration Card, Gas connection, passbook,
electricity meter, and other relevant documents, prior to the year 2015. The site
inspection report dated 27.01.2020 records the existence of 60–70 jhuggis at
the site and identifies the DDA as the land-owning agency. The aforesaid
unchallenged orders in
“Lochan Lal vs. DDA & Ors.” and
“Sanjay Kumar vs.
DDA & Ors.” further corroborate that residents of the same cluster have been
recognized as being in possession. While the defendants contended that
identity documents do not confer ownership and that the land belongs to DDA
since 1968, it is herein clarified that the plaintiff is not seeking declaration of
ownership at this stage but only protection of her residence until the suit is
finally adjudicated. In these circumstances, a
prima facie case stands
established.
40. The second requirement is the
balance of convenience. The plaintiff
resides in the suit premises along with her family, and eviction at this stage
would result in immediate homelessness. The defendants, being statutory
authorities, are bound to act in accordance with law and policy, and
maintaining status quo during the pendency of the suit does not cause them
any prejudice. The fact that similarly placed residents in the same cluster have
already been granted protection by competent courts, and those orders remain
unchallenged, further tilts the
balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff.
To deny her similar protection would result in unequal treatment of persons
similarly situated.
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41. The third requirement is
irreparable loss. It is well settled that
deprivation of shelter amounts to irreparable injury which cannot be
compensated in monetary terms. In the present case, refusal of interim
protection would expose the plaintiff to precisely such irreparable harm. The
contention of defendant no. 1/DDA that the electricity connection was
obtained only in 2016 does not negate the plaintiff’s claim of prior residence,
as the inspection report dated 27.01.2020 shows occupation prior to that date.
42. At the same time, it is necessary to clarify herein that the grant of
interim protection does not amount to recognition of ownership or title in
favour of the plaintiff. The restraint order is intended only to preserve the
status quo and to ensure that the plaintiff is not dispossessed during the
pendency of the suit. The rights of the parties shall be determined finally at the
stage of trial, and nothing stated herein shall prejudice that determination. The
plaintiff’s protection is limited to safeguarding her residence until the suit is
adjudicated, and does not confer any proprietary rights over the land in
question.
43. In view of the above observations, this Court finds that the plaintiff has
established a
prima facie case, the
balance of convenience lies in her favour,
and
irreparable loss would ensue if interim protection is denied. The impugned
order dated 17.12.2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court is accordingly set aside.
The appeal is hereby disposed of as allowed. The defendants are restrained
from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit premises until the final disposal
of the suit.
44. It is clarified that nothing stated herein shall be construed as a final
expression on the merits of the suit.
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45. Ld. Trial Court is also requested to proceed with the suit expeditiously
and decide the same on its own merits without being influenced by any
observations made in this order.
46. A copy of this order along with the trial court record be sent back to the
Ld. Trial Court for information.
47. Appeal file be consigned to Record Room as per rules.
(Typed to the dictation directly, corrected and
pronounced in open court on 25.04.2026).
(GAURAV)
DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT
KARKARDOOMA COURTS
DELHI
Certified that this order contains 16 pages and each page bears my
signature.
(GAURAV)
DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT
KARKARDOOMA COURTS
DELHI
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