Full Order Text
Order 18 · 06 Jun 2025 · CNR DLSH010017102023
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: Page No. 1 of 6 IN THE COURT OF GAURAV: DISTRICT JUDGE-01 SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS: DELHI MCA DJ No. 31/2023 In the matter of: - Nanhe Lal .........Appellant Versus DDA & Ors. ...…...Respondents 06.06.2025 ORDER 1. Vide this common order, I shall dispose of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “CPC”) and, filed by appellant for seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC, assailing the order dated 17.12.2022, whereby the Ld. Trial Court was pleased to dismiss the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC for grant of temporary injunction. 2. In addition to that, the appellant has also moved a separate application under Section 151 CPC, praying that the grounds stated therein be read as part and parcel of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, due to the inadvertent omission of specific factual averments constituting "sufficient cause" in the original application. 3. Reply to the aforesaid application have not been filed by respondents, but vehemently opposed the aforesaid applications, denying all the assertions made therein and have prayed for -- 1 of 6 -- Page No. 2 of 6 dismissal of the same. 4. Written argument has also been filed on behalf of appellant but, no written argument has been filed on behalf of respondents. 5. Arguments were heard at length on behalf of Ld. Counsels for parties. 6. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant contended that the delay of around 56 days in filing the appeal is not intentional or deliberate, but has occurred due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances. He further contended that the he was preoccupied with personal difficulties, including the demise of his grandmother in the second week of February-2023, and was consequently, unable to remain in contact with the appellant. He further contended that the case file was in his exclusive possession, and during the relevant period, the appellant had no access to the same. He further contended that during winter vacations, he made efforts to initiate the appeal, but due to the absence of typing facilities and his continued illness (cold and fever), the appeal could not be filed withing stipulated period. He further contended that the delay is procedural and inadvertent and ought not to be construed as negligence or lack of diligence. He further contended that the additional facts explaining the delay were inadvertently omitted from the original application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, due to his oversight as he had filed 26 connected appeals against respondents during that time. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid applications may kindly be pleased to allow and condone the delay. 7. In support of his contentions, he has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, -- 2 of 6 -- Page No. 3 of 6 wherein the Apex Court emphasized that courts should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach in considering applications for condonation of delay, so that the substantial justice is not sacrificed at the altar of technicalities. 8. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the present applications, and contended that the reasons mentioned in the condonation of delay’s application are vague, unsubstantiated, and lack documentary support. He further contended that the appellant has failed to establish a cogent and legally sustainable "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay. He further contended that the application under Section 151 CPC is nothing but a device to fill lacunae in the original application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, which is not permissible in law. He further contended that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and the party must approach the court with due diligence and bona fides. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid applications may kindly be pleased to dismiss with heavy cost. 9. I have heard the rival contentions made by the Ld. Counsels for the parties and carefully perused the entire material available on record. 10. Before proceedings further, it is a settled principle of law that “procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress” and that the procedural laws are meant to facilitate and not to obstruct the cause of justice. Likewise, substantive rights should not be defeated on technical grounds. The object of the rules of procedure is to secure the ends of justice and not to thwart them. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be -- 3 of 6 -- Page No. 4 of 6 preferred. 11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the court to admit an appeal after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies the court that he had “sufficient cause” for not preferring the appeal within time. The test of “sufficient cause” is not rigidly defined and must be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. 12. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that a litigant does not stand to benefit by filing an appeal belatedly, and that refusing to condone delay may result in miscarriage of justice. 13. Now, reverting back to the case in hand, the explanation furnished by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant for the delay attributes it to a combination of personal and practical circumstances, which, though not supported by any documentary evidence, cannot be outrightly disbelieved on the face of the record. 14. It has been contended that the Ld. Counsel for the appellant was unable to remain in contact with the appellant due to the unfortunate demise of his grandmother in the second week of February 2023, and that he resumed his professional responsibilities only after the first week of March 2023. During this period, it is stated that the file pertaining to the case -- 4 of 6 -- Page No. 5 of 6 remained in the exclusive possession of the counsel, which caused further delay. Additionally, it has been contended that during the winter court vacation, the counsel encountered practical difficulties, including unavailability of typing assistance, which hindered the timely preparation of the appeal. 15. It is matter of record that the appeal was eventually filed on 25.03.2023, and while there is a delay of around 56 days, it is not excessive in the context of civil litigation. Taken together, and assessed in light of judicial standards for determining “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the explanation provided although not elaborate or supported by documentary proof, does not appear to be tainted by mala fide intent or deliberate negligence. No doubt, such omissions would weaken the claim of “sufficient cause”. However, Courts are expected to consider the totality of circumstances and apply judicial discretion pragmatically. In the absence of supporting documents, while reflecting a slightly lack of diligence, does not render the explanation implausible per se. 16. Therefore, this Court finds that the delay was procedural and unintentional, and refusal to condone such delay would defeat the interest of justice, especially when no substantial prejudice has been caused to the respondents. Accordingly, this Court is inclined to consider the explanation with a view to ensuring that the appeal with regard to the right over the immovable properties, is adjudicated on its merits rather than being defeated on technical grounds. 17. While it is true that ordinarily, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, must stand on its own legs and should not be permitted to be amended or supplemented in a -- 5 of 6 -- Page No. 6 of 6 manner that causes prejudice, the inherent powers under Section 151 CPC are always available to the Court to secure the ends of justice. The omission in the original application appears to be an inadvertent and excusable lapse. The subsequent application does not attempt to introduce new or unrelated facts but seeks to elaborate upon the same factual matrix already pleaded. In view of the same, this Court finds it appropriate to read the contents thereof as part and parcel of the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963. 18. In the light of aforesaid discussion and findings and also the guiding principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is inclined to take a liberal view in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the aforesaid application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is hereby allowed and disposed of. The delay of around 56 days in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. The application under Section 151 CPC is also disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs. (Typed to the dictation directly, corrected and pronounced in open court on 06.06.2025). (GAURAV) DISTRICT JUDGE-01 SHAHDARA DISTRICT KARKARDOOMA COURTS DELHI / 06.06.2025 -- 6 of 6 --
