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Order 18

CNR DLSH01001710202306 Jun 2025
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Order 18 · 06 Jun 2025 · CNR DLSH010017102023

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: Page No. 1 of 6
IN THE COURT OF GAURAV: DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS:
DELHI
MCA DJ No. 31/2023
In the matter of: -
Nanhe Lal .........Appellant
Versus
DDA & Ors. ...…...Respondents
06.06.2025
ORDER
1. Vide this common order, I shall dispose of the application
under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, read with Section 151
of Civil Procedure Code, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as “CPC”)
and, filed by appellant for seeking condonation of delay in filing
appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the CPC, assailing the
order dated 17.12.2022, whereby the Ld. Trial Court was pleased
to dismiss the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
CPC for grant of temporary injunction.
2. In addition to that, the appellant has also moved a separate
application under Section 151 CPC, praying that the grounds
stated therein be read as part and parcel of the application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, due to the inadvertent
omission of specific factual averments constituting
"sufficient
cause" in the original application.
3. Reply to the aforesaid application have not been filed by
respondents, but vehemently opposed the aforesaid applications,
denying all the assertions made therein and have prayed for
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dismissal of the same.
4. Written argument has also been filed on behalf of appellant
but, no written argument has been filed on behalf of respondents.
5. Arguments were heard at length on behalf of Ld. Counsels
for parties.
6. The Ld. Counsel for the appellant contended that the delay
of around
56 days in filing the appeal is not intentional or
deliberate, but has occurred due to unforeseen and unavoidable
circumstances. He further contended that the he was preoccupied
with personal difficulties, including the demise of his
grandmother in the second week of February-2023, and was
consequently, unable to remain in contact with the appellant. He
further contended that the case file was in his exclusive
possession, and during the relevant period, the appellant had no
access to the same. He further contended that during winter
vacations, he made efforts to initiate the appeal, but due to the
absence of typing facilities and his continued illness (cold and
fever), the appeal could not be filed withing stipulated period. He
further contended that the delay is procedural and inadvertent and
ought not to be construed as negligence or lack of diligence. He
further contended that the additional facts explaining the delay
were inadvertently omitted from the original application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, due to his oversight as he had
filed 26 connected appeals against respondents during that time.
At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid applications may kindly
be pleased to allow and condone the delay.
7. In support of his contentions, he has also relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
Collector,
Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107,
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wherein the Apex Court emphasized that courts should adopt a
liberal and justice-oriented approach in considering applications
for condonation of delay, so that the substantial justice is not
sacrificed at the altar of technicalities.
8. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the respondents
vehemently opposed the present applications, and contended that
the reasons mentioned in the condonation of delay’s application
are vague, unsubstantiated, and lack documentary support. He
further contended that the appellant has failed to establish a
cogent and legally sustainable
"sufficient cause" for condonation
of delay. He further contended that the application under Section
151 CPC is nothing but a device to fill lacunae in the original
application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, which is not
permissible in law. He further contended that the law of
limitation is founded upon public policy and the party must
approach the court with due diligence and bona fides. At the end,
it is prayed that the aforesaid applications may kindly be pleased
to dismiss with heavy cost.
9. I have heard the rival contentions made by the Ld.
Counsels for the parties and carefully perused the entire material
available on record.
10. Before proceedings further, it is a settled principle of law
that
“procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress” and
that the procedural laws are meant to facilitate and not to obstruct
the cause of justice. Likewise, substantive rights should not be
defeated on technical grounds. The object of the rules of
procedure is to secure the ends of justice and not to thwart them.
When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted
against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be
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preferred.
11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the court
to admit an appeal after the prescribed period if the appellant
satisfies the court that he had
“sufficient cause” for not preferring
the appeal within time. The test of
“sufficient cause” is not
rigidly defined and must be determined on the facts and
circumstances of each case.
12. In
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (1987)
2 SCC 107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legislature
has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5
of the Limitation Act, in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on
merits. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be construed
liberally so as to advance substantial justice. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court further observed that a litigant does not stand to
benefit by filing an appeal belatedly, and that refusing to condone
delay may result in miscarriage of justice.
13. Now, reverting back to the case in hand, the explanation
furnished by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant for the delay
attributes it to a combination of personal and practical
circumstances, which, though not supported by any documentary
evidence, cannot be outrightly disbelieved on the face of the
record.
14. It has been contended that the Ld. Counsel for the
appellant was unable to remain in contact with the appellant due
to the unfortunate demise of his grandmother in the second week
of February 2023, and that he resumed his professional
responsibilities only after the first week of March 2023. During
this period, it is stated that the file pertaining to the case
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remained in the exclusive possession of the counsel, which
caused further delay. Additionally, it has been contended that
during the winter court vacation, the counsel encountered
practical difficulties, including unavailability of typing
assistance, which hindered the timely preparation of the appeal.
15. It is matter of record that the appeal was eventually filed
on 25.03.2023, and while there is a delay of around
56 days, it is
not excessive in the context of civil litigation. Taken together,
and assessed in light of judicial standards for determining
“sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the
explanation provided although not elaborate or supported by
documentary proof, does not appear to be tainted by mala fide
intent or deliberate negligence. No doubt, such omissions would
weaken the claim of
“sufficient cause”. However, Courts are
expected to consider the totality of circumstances and apply
judicial discretion pragmatically. In the absence of supporting
documents, while reflecting a slightly lack of diligence, does not
render the explanation implausible per se.
16. Therefore, this Court finds that the delay was procedural
and unintentional, and refusal to condone such delay would
defeat the interest of justice, especially when no substantial
prejudice has been caused to the respondents. Accordingly, this
Court is inclined to consider the explanation with a view to
ensuring that the appeal with regard to the right over the
immovable properties, is adjudicated on its merits rather than
being defeated on technical grounds.
17. While it is true that ordinarily, an application under
Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963, must stand on its own legs and
should not be permitted to be amended or supplemented in a
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manner that causes prejudice, the inherent powers under Section
151 CPC are always available to the Court to secure the ends of
justice. The omission in the original application appears to be an
inadvertent and excusable lapse. The subsequent application does
not attempt to introduce new or unrelated facts but seeks to
elaborate upon the same factual matrix already pleaded. In view
of the same, this Court finds it appropriate to read the contents
thereof as part and parcel of the application under Section 5 of
Limitation Act, 1963.
18. In the light of aforesaid discussion and findings and also
the guiding principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this
Court is inclined to take a liberal view in the interest of
substantial justice. Accordingly, the aforesaid application under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is hereby
allowed and
disposed of. The delay of around
56 days in filing the appeal is
hereby
condoned. The application under Section 151 CPC is also
disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
(Typed to the dictation directly, corrected and
pronounced in open court on 06.06.2025).
(GAURAV)
DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT
KARKARDOOMA COURTS
DELHI / 06.06.2025
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