Interim Order 12

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: Ct case no. 27345/25
Sarla Devi Vs. Raman Goyal & anr.
14.10.2026
Matter is fixed for passing of order on the application filed by the
applicant under Section 175(3) of the BNSS (henceforth BNSS, 2023)
seeking directions to the SHO, PS South Rohini to register an FIR and
to investigate the matter.
Arguments heard. Records perused.
1. The brief facts of the case are that Smt. Sarla Devi,
resident of Sonipat, Haryana is the complainant who has filed a case
against Raman Goyal, Director of M/s Brij Gopal Construction
Company Pvt. Ltd., having office at 4th Floor, Vikas Surya Shopping
Mall, Plot No. 3, Manglam Palace, Sector-3, Rohini, Delhi. The
complainant's son Sagar runs M/s Sagar Contractor which executed
two contracts for the accused's company in Jalaun and Hathras under
Jal Jeevan Mission. An amount of approximately Rs. 60 lakhs is due
from the accused company, and on demanding the same the son was
threatened with serious consequences by Raman Goyal and Rajan
Goyal. On 22.09.2025 at about 11:29 AM, while the complainant was
travelling with her husband, son and nephew, they passed the accused's
office. Her son and nephew went to meet Rajan Goyal. Raman Goyal
was present outside the lift with his staff and started arguing over
payment. On seeing the argument, the complainant and her husband
intervened and the son dialed 100. Seeing this, Raman Goyal entered
the lift. When the complainant also tried to enter, his staff stopped her
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son and nephew outside and allowed only the complainant inside with
malafide intention. After the lift doors closed, Raman Goyal stated that
there are no cameras in the lift and he will do such an act that she will
not be able to tell anyone, and then pressed/touched her chest and
behaved indecently while his staff held her hands. Thereafter she was
pushed out of the lift. She narrated the incident to her family. The PCR
vehicle that arrived told the complainant to go to the police station and
left the accused. On the same day at about 2 PM, the complainant went
to PS South Rohini with her family and sought action, but police
pressurized her for compromise and kept them till 9:30 PM. In a
distressed state she submitted a written complaint vide DD No. 110A
dated 22.09.2025. No FIR was registered. The accused also filed a
false FIR against her son at Hathras to pressurize the family.
Apprehending threat to life and property, after no action by PS South
Rohini, the complainant sent a complaint dated 22.10.2025 to ACP,
DCP and Commissioner of Delhi Police through speed post on
27.10.2025. Even after 1.5 months no action was taken. Hence the
present complaint under Section 223 BNSS is filed seeking direction
to SHO, PS South Rohini to register FIR under Section
74/75/76/79/351 BNS and other relevant laws, relying on Ramesh
Kumari, Lalita Kumari and other judgments regarding mandatory
registration of FIR on disclosure of cognizable offence.
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2. Before examining the merits of the aforesaid
application, I find it expedient to refer to the law regarding Section
156(3) of CrPC, 1973.
In
M/s. Skipper Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v State, 2001(2) JCC
(Delhi) 67, the Hon'ble High Court, has observed as under:
“It is true that Section 156(3) of the Code empowers to Magistrate to direct the
police to register a case and intimate investigations but this power has to be
exercised judiciously on proper grounds and not in a mechanical manner. In those
cases where the allegations are not very serious and the complainant himself is
in possession of evidence to prove his allegations there should be no need to
pass orders under Section 156(3) of the Code. This discretion ought to be
exercised after proper application of mind and only in those cases where the
Magistrate is of the view that the nature of the allegations is such that the
complainant himself may not be in a position to collect and produce evidence
before the court and interest of justice demand that the police should step in the
help of the complainant”.
In the case of
Mohd. Salim vs State, (2010) 175 DLT
473 :
“11. The use of the expression may" in sub-section (3) of s. 156(3) of the Code
leaves no doubt that the power conferred upon the Magistrate is discretionary and
he is not bound to direct investigation by the Police even if the allegations made
in the complaint disclose commission of a cognizable offence. In the facts and
circumstances of a given case, the Magistrate may feel that the matter does not
require investigation by the Police and can be proved by the complainant himself,
without any assistance from the Police. In that case, he may, instead of directing
investigation by the Police, straight away take cognizance of the alleged offence
and proceed under s. 200 of the Code by examining the complainant and his
witnesses, if any. In fact, the Magistrate ought to direct investigation by the Police
only where the assistance of the Investigating Agency is necessary and the Court
feels that the cause of justice is likely to suffer in the absence of investigation by
the Police. The Magistrate is not expected to mechanically direct investigation by
the Police without first examining whether in the facts and circumstances of the
case, investigation by the State machinery is actually required or not. If the
allegations made in the complaint are simple, where the Court can straight away
proceed to conduct the trial, the Magistrate is expected to record evidence and
proceed further in the matter, instead of passing the buck to the Police under
156(3) of the Code. Of course, if the allegations made in the complaint require
complex and complicated investigation of which cannot be undertaken without
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active assistance and expertise of the State machinery, it would only be
appropriate for the Magistrate to direct investigation by the Police. The Magistrate
is, therefore, not supposed to act merely as a Post \Office and needs to adopt a
judicial approach while considering an application seeking investigation by the
police”.
This being the legal position, based on the averments
made in the application, arguments furthered by the counsel and
documents filed on record, I am of the view that no case is made out
for directing registration of FIR. The reasons for reaching this
conclusion are as follows:
a. In the complaint at pare no 8 complainant alleges that the
accused Raman goyal’s staff stopped the complainant’s son and
nephew to enter into the lift and allowed the complainant to enter into
the lift with malafide intention, whereas in page no 32 of the complaint
made to CP it was mentioned that the alleged accused had thrown out
her husband, her son and her nephew except her. There are
discrepancies in the version of the complainant herself as on the one
hand she stated that staff of accused Raman Goyal stopped the
complainant’s son and nephew to enter into the lift, on the other hand,
she stated her husband, son and nephew were thrown out of the lift.
Further as per the ATR she herself entered into the lift with the accused
and staff. Therefore, there are contradictions in the version of the
complainant. Hence, it cannot be safe to rely upon the version of the
complainant. Moreover as per the ATR it was mentioned that the
CCTV footage of the incident was observed and it is stated that
complainant entered into the lift along with the alleged accused and
and staff members, while her family members remained outside.
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Moreover as per the Indian Evidence Act, the subsequent conduct is
also important before reaching any conclusion and the subsequent
conduct of the complainant clearly shows that she has exited the lift
along with the accused and went to his office and there was no mention
regarding the alleged act done in the lift. Upon reaching the office
floor, she exited the lift and proceeded to the office area where
discussions continued. The CCTV system also had audio recording.
However, no conversation relating to any alleged act of molestation or
inappropriate conduct was found in the available recordings.
b. No assistance of investigating agency is required and the facts
and circumstances of the case are within the knowledge of the
applicant.
c. The the contents of the application made by the complainant
reveal that the complainant is well conversant with the identity of the
accused.
d. The reliance placed on Lalita Kumari judgment is misplaced
for the purposes of disposal of the present application. The cited
judgment of the Hon’ble apex court deals with the mandatory
registration of FIR by the police u/s. 154(1) of CrPC. This has to be
distinguished from the power of the magistrate to direct registration of
FIR u/s. 156(3) of CrPC. While the former provision uses the word
“shall”, the latter provision in contradistinction uses the word “may”,
thereby indicating a discretion on the part of the magistrate in exercise
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of the power. The said discretion is to be exercised in the manner
provided by the afore cited precedents.
(See: Priyanka Srivastava vs
State of U.P; 2015(6) SCC 287).
In light of the aforesaid, the exercise of discretionary
power under Section 156(3) of CrPC, 1973 is declined and the
aforesaid application is dismissed.
Before parting with this Order, it is clarified that the
option of directing police investigation under Section 202 of CrPC,
1973 is kept open for consideration after examination on oath of the
complainant and his witnesses under Section 200 of CrPC, 1973.
Complainant is at liberty to lead PSE on 11.3.2027
(Jitender)
JMFC-07, NW Rohini, Delhi
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