Interim Order 11

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: CS DJ No.687/2023: Nirmal Kumar Jain & Anr. V/s Abhipra Capital Ltd.
CS DJ No.687/2023 (14)
Nirmal Kumar Jain & Anr. V/s Abhipra Capital Ltd.
CNR No.DLNW01-007736-2023
23.03.2026
Present: Shri J.V Rana, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff.
Shri Manish Dewan, Ld. Counsel for the defendant (through
VC).
1. Today the matter is listed for framing of issues/case
management hearing. The learned counsel for the defendant was available
in Court physically before lunch and after lunch, he has been available
through video-conferencing.
2. (i) It was put to learned counsel for the defendant as to why a
decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC be not passed before framing of
issues, on the ground that landlord-tenant relationship as well as rate of
rent having not been disputed and even the termination of tenancy having
not been disputed.
(ii) The sole argument which learned counsel for the defendant
has made is that it is a month-to-month tenancy and monthly rent is being
credited to the plaintiff.
3. The attention of learned counsel for the defendant is drawn to
the following judgments:
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(a) On the aspect that decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be
passed without there being any formal application and suo-moto by the
Court:
In case reported as, “Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No.9975/2025”, titled as, “Rajiv Ghosh V/s Satya Narayan Jaiswal”
(DOD: 07.04.2025), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to lay
down as under:
xxxxx
35. The words “or otherwise” are wide enough to
include all cases of admissions made in the
pleadings or de hors the pleadings. Under Rule 6, as
originally enacted, it was held that the words “or
otherwise” without the words “in writing” used in
Rule 1 showed that a judgment could be given upon
oral or verbal admission also. [See: Beeny, re,
(1894) 1 Ch D 499] The Amendment Act of 1976,
however, made the position clear stating that such
admissions may be “in the pleading or otherwise”
and “whether orally or in writing”. Thus, after the
amendment in Rule 6, the admissions are not
confined to Rule 1 or Rule 4 of Order 6, but are of
general application. Such admissions may be
express or implied (constructive); may be in writing
or oral; or may be before the institution of the suit,
after the suit is brought or during the pendency of
proceedings.
36. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court very
correctly laid down the following interpretation of
the provision of O. 12, R. 6, CPC, in the decision of
ITDC Limited v. Chander Pal Sood and Son,
reported in (2000) 84 DLT 337 (DB): (2000 AIHC
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1990):
“Order 12, R. 6 of Code gives a very wide
discretion to the Court. Under this rule the
Court may at any stage of the suit either on
the application of any party or of its own
motion and without determination of any
other question between the parties can make
such order giving such judgment as it may
think fit on the basis of admission of a fact
made in the pleadings or otherwise whether
orally or in writing”.
37. The use of the expression ‘otherwise’ in the
aforesaid context came to be interpreted by the High
Court. Considering the expression the Court
interpreted the said word by stating that it permits
the Court to pass judgment on the basis of the
statement made by the parties not only on the
pleadings but also dehors the pleadings i.e. either in
any document or even in the statement recorded in
the Court. If one of the parties' statement is recorded
under O. 10, Rr. 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the same is also a statement which
elucidates matters in controversy. Any admission in
such statement is relevant not only for the purpose
of finding out the real dispute between the parties
but also to ascertain as to whether or not any dispute
or controversy exists between the parties. Admission
if any is made by a party in the statement recorded,
would be conclusive against him and the Court can
proceed to pass judgment on the basis of the
admission made therein.
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38. Rule 6 of Order XII, before the amendment,
allowed judgment on admission only on an
application by a party. The Law Commission,
however, suggested that a judgment may be
pronounced either on an application by a party or
even suo motu [See: Throp (supra)].
39. This rule authorizes the court to enter a
judgment where a claim is admitted and to pass a
decree on such admitted claim. This can be done at
any stage. [See: Uttam Singh (supra)]. Thus, a
plaintiff may move for judgment upon admission by
the defendant in his written statement at any stage of
the suit although he has joined issue on the
defence.” [See: Brown v. Pearson, (1882) 21 Ch D
716]. Likewise, a defendant may apply for dismissal
of the suit on the basis of admission by the plaintiff
in rejoinder.
xxxxx
(underlining which is mine emphasized)
(b) On the aspect that there is “no automatic renewal of
tenancy/lease deed”, even on payment to month-to-month rent by the
tenant:
The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case reported as, “RFA
No.557/2011”, titled as, “Abhinav Outsourcing Pvt. Ltd. V/s Sunita Seth”
“(DOD: 02.12.2011), which was an appeal before the Hon'ble High Court
against a decree of possession passed by the Ld.Trial Court U/o 12 Rule 6
CPC, wherein the challenge in the appeal was to the effect that in the lease
deed, the tenant had the option to continue in the premises for a total
period of nine years (3 years + 3 years + 3 years) w.e.f 01.11.2004 and the
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first option of three years was to end on 31.10.2010 and as to whether in
the teeth of such terms in the lease deed, the landlord was without any jural
succour in case he did not want to go for extension of the lease deed. The
tenant/appellant in that case relied upon the following two judgments of
Hon'ble Supreme Court:
(i) AIR 1969 SC 405, titled as, “Caltex (India) Ltd. V/s Bhagwan
Devi Marodia”, and;
(ii) 95 (2002) DLT Page 373, titled as, “Smt.Sneh Vasih & Anr.
V/s Filatex India Ltd.”
to emphasize the point that once a tenant exercises the option
as per terms laid down in lease, authorizing him to have the renewal of the
tenancy for a further period, then the landlord is contractually bound to
renew the lease. The Hon'ble High Court after considering the judgment
of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case reported as, “
2007 (5) SCC 614”, titled
as, “
Hardesh Ores (P) Ltd. V/s Hede and Company”, was pleased to hold
as under:
xxxxx
4. In my opinion, both the arguments as raised
on behalf of the appellant are wholly devoid of
substance. The first aspect as to whether by
mere exercising an option of renewal, a person
can continue for a fixed period in the tenanted
premises, though there is no lease for the fixed
period, was the subject matter of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Hardesh Ores
(P) Ltd. Vs. Hede and Company, 2007 (5) SCC
614. The Trial Court has referred to this
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judgment in para 17 of the impugned judgment.
The Supreme Court in the decision in the case
of Hardesh Ores(supra) has specifically
observed that to give effect to a renewal of a
lease, a document has to be executed
evidencing the renewal of the agreement of
lease and there is no concept of automatic
renewal of the lease by a mere exercise of
option by the lessee. This proposition of law
that mere exercise of option cannot
automatically mean entitlement of continuation
in a tenant for a fixed period without any lease
being executed, is on account of the provisions
of Section 17(1)(b), Section 17(1)(d) of the
Registration Act, 1908 and Section 107 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882. By virtue of
these provisions, there cannot be a lease for a
fixed period in excess of one year, unless, there
is a registered lease deed for the fixed period.
The argument as raised on behalf of the
appellant flies in the face of the aforesaid
provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 and the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 which require
that a lease deed for a period in excess of 12
months has necessarily to be only by means of a
registered instrument, and, there cannot be
estoppel against law i.e. these statutory
provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
and the Registration Act, 1908. Therefore, the
argument as raised on behalf of the appellant is
misconceived. The judgment in the case of
Caltex(Supra) has no application to the facts of
the present case which was only dealing with
the aspect of the period within which an option
has to be exercised and which has to be strictly
exercised in the period as mentioned in the
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contract between the parties. The judgment in
Caltex's Case(supra) does not lay down that if
the option is exercised within the required
period, but if no registered deed is executed, the
tenant can without existence of a registered
lease deed continue in the tenanted premises for
a fixed period.
5. Even in the facts of the present case, there is
no doubt that a fresh lease deed was to be
executed for the additional term inasmuch as
the registered lease deed dated 15.10.2004
contains para A.4 which specifically sates that a
fresh lease deed will be executed at the time of
renewal of the lease.
6. Accordingly, the argument on behalf of the
appellant that an option having been exercised,
the appellant is entitled to continue in the
tenanted premises solely by virtue of option
exercised, without there existing a registered
lease deed for the period for which an option is
sought to have been exercised, is clearly
misconceived and hence rejected.
7. The incidental argument on behalf of the
appellant that parties have acted on the renewal
by accepting enhanced rent, will not take the
appellant any further, because even in such
circumstances, at best after the expiry of the
original period of lease, for the further period,
the tenant continues as a month-to-month tenant
and such monthly tenancy can always be
terminated by giving a notice under Section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act because the
payment by the tenant can be received by the
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landlord as use and occupation charges payable
for occupation of the premises after termination
of tenancy. So far as the requirement of a notice
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 of having been served before filing of
the suit for possession, I have had an occasion
to consider the aspect of requirement of a
service of notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 prior to the
institution of the suit in the case of M/s. Jeevan
Diesels & Electricals Ltd. vs. M/s. Jasbir Singh
Chaddha (HUF) & Anrs. 2011 (182) DLT 402. I
have in the judgment of M/s. Jeevan Diesels
(supra) held that the service of summons in a
suit filed by landlord accompanied by the plaint
can always be treated as notice under Section
106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. I
have also held that along with the suit, the
notice by which the tenancy was terminated is
filed as a document, and which document/notice
is again served on the defendant along with the
other documents in the suit, and which also can
be treated as service of the notice of termination
of tenancy. I have taken the aforesaid two
aspects read with Order 7 Rule 7 CPC which
entitles the Courts to take notice of subsequent
events. The subsequent event being that at the
very maximum, the tenant has to vacate on a 15
days' notice being given for vacating the
premises and which period expires on service of
summons of the suit and the copy of the notice
terminating the tenancy which is sent with the
suit plaint. In fact there is such legislative
intendment by virtue of the Act 3 of 2003 which
amended Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, and which amendment has
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done away with the objections pertaining to
defences of improper service of notice of
termination of tenancy, once a period of 15 days
expires giving the tenant that time of 15 days to
vacate the premises. An SLP against this
judgment has been dismissed by the Supreme
Court vide SLP No15740/2011 dated 7.7.2011.
xxxxx
(underlining is mine emphasized)
(c) On the aspect of issuance of Notice U/s 106 of Transfer of
Property Act, 1882:
The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case reported as, “183
(2011) DLT 712”, titled as, “Jeevan Diesels & Electrical Ltd. V/s M/s
Jasbir Singh Chadha (HUF) & Anr.” has been pleased to lay down that
even the service of summons of the suit can be treated as a notice U/s 106
of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Furthermore, in case reported as, “AIR
2008 SC 673”, titled as, “M/s Nopani Investment (P) Ltd. V/s Santokh
Singh (HUF)” the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also been pleased to hold
that mere service of summons of a suit for ejectment is treated as a valid
service for termination and after six months of the receipt of summons by
the defendant in the said case, he should have vacated the same.
(d) The established law for the points to be considered in terms of
Order XII Rule 6 CPC in the cases of recovery of possession is there in the
decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case reported as, “JT
2012 (9) SC 214”, titled as, “Payal Vision Ltd. V/s Radhika Choudhary”,
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whereby the Hon’ble Court has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
6. In a suit for recovery of possession from a
tenant whose tenancy is not protected under the
provisions of the Rent Control Act, all that is
required to be established by the plaintiff-
landlord is the existence of the jural relationship
of landlord and tenant between the parties and
the termination of the tenancy either by lapse of
time or by notice served by the landlord U/s
106 of the Transfer of Property Act. So long as
these two aspects are not in dispute the court
can pass a decree in terms of Order XII Rule 6
of CPC, which reads as under:
“6. Judgment on admissions: (1) Where
admissions of fact have been made either in the
pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in
writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit,
either on the application of any party or of its
own motion and without waiting for the
determination of any other question between the
parties, make such order or give such judgment
as it may think fit, having regard to such
admissions.
(2) Whether a judgment is pronounced under
sub-rule (1) of a decree shall be drawn up in
accordance with the judgment and the decree
shall bear the date on which the judgment was
pronounced.”
7. The above sufficiently empowers the
Court trying the suit to deliver judgment based
on admissions whenever such admissions are
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sufficient for the grant of the relief prayed for.
Whether or not there was an unequivocal and
clear admission on either of the two aspects to
which we have referred above and which are
relevant to a suit for possession against a tenant
is, therefore, the only question that falls for
determination in this case and in every other
case where the plaintiff seeks to invoke the
powers of the Court U/o XII Rule 6 CPC and
prays for passing of decree on the basis of
admission. Having said that we must add that
whether or not there is a clear admission upon
the two aspects noted above is a matter to be
seen in the fact situation prevailing in each
case. Admission made on the basis of
pleadings in a given case cannot obviously be
taken as an admission in a different fact
situation. That precisely is the view taken by
this court in “Jeevan Diesels & Electricals Ltd.”
(supra) relied upon by the High Court where
this court has observed:
“Whether or not there is a clear,
unambiguous admission by one party of the
case of the other party is essentially a question
of fact and the decision of this question depends
upon the facts of the case. The question,
namely, whether there is a clear admission or
not cannot be decided on the basis of a judicial
precedent. Therefore, even though the
principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be
unexceptionable they cannot be applied in the
instant case in view of totally different fact
situation”.
xxxxx
(underlining is mine)
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4. After arguing the matter for some time, learned counsel for the
defendant seeks adjournment by stating that he was not prepared for
arguments that the Court would invite him to argue on decree on
admission(s). In the interest of justice, renotify the matter for arguments
under Order XII Rule 6 CPC/framing of issues on 01.04.2026, as prayed
for by learned counsel for the defendant as per his convenience.
(Vinod Yadav)
District Judge (Commercial Court)-02
North-West/Rohini Courts/23.03.2026
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