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Final Order 3

CNR DLNW01005930202307 Feb 2024
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Final Order 3 · 07 Feb 2024 · CNR DLNW010059302023

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: CR No.285/23
Megha Sehgal Vs. State
1
07.02.2024
Present: Sh. Pankaj Arya, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist.
Sh. Sanjay Jindal, Ld. Addl. Public Prosecutor for the
State / respondent.
1. In case FIR No.117/18, u/s.354/354A/342/506/34 IPC, Ld. Magistrate,
vide order dated 02.05.2023, framed charges for offence u/s.506 IPC
against Megha Sehgal, the petitioner herein. The said order dated
02.05.2023 has been challenged via the present revision petition.
2. The facts of the case are that the complainant / respondent lodged a
complaint, wherein she levelled allegations against accused Ramesh
Sehgal that on 27.04.2018, at about 12.40 p.m., he came to her room and
misbehaved and molested her. She lodged a complaint in this regard on
02.05.2018 and the present case FIR was registered. During
investigation, IO moved an application and a statement of the
complainant u/s.164 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 05.05.2018. In her
statement, the complainant added the allegations against the petitioner
herein that she threatened the complainant by saying that “if anything
wrong happens with her father (accused Ramesh Sehgal), she
(complainant) shall be buried alive”. On these additional allegations, the
petitioner herein was also impleaded as an accused in the case for
offence u/s.506 IPC.
3. During course of arguments, Ld. Counsel has submitted that the alleged
incident had taken place on 27.04.2018, It was reported by the
complainant to the police on 02.05.2018 after delay of five days. In the
initial statement given to the police, the complainant did not level any
allegation against the petitioner herein. The allegations against the
petitioner came on record for the first time on 05.05.2018, when her
statement u/s.164 Cr.P.C. was recorded. The delay in the allegations
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Megha Sehgal Vs. State
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against the petitioner is indicating that same were subsequently
concocted to falsely implicate the petitioner in this case.
4. Ld. counsel has further submitted that the complainant has levelled
general allegations that the petitioner had threatened her by saying that
the complainant shall be buried alive, if anything happens with her
father. She neither disclosed date and time, nor the place, where the
alleged threats were advanced.
5. Ld. Counsel has also submitted that one of the essential ingredient of
offence u/s.506 IPC is the intention of the accused to cause alarm to the
victim to cause him to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of
any word without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to
bring in the application of this offence. Prosecution has to produce
material on record to show that the accused had intention to cause alarm
to the victim / complainant. Here in this case, even if the allegations
levelled by the complainant are accepted at their face value, no such
intention on part of the accused is reflected. Even if it is assumed that
any such threat was advanced, same was merely an expression of
exasperation and frustration without any intention to alarm the
complainant.
6. On the other hand, Ld. Addl. PP for the State has submitted that for the
purpose of framing of charges, the prosecution has to bring out only a
prima-facie case and if that case is made out from the allegations
levelled, Court is not supposed to enter into the defence of the accused
at this stage. Here in this case, the petitioner had threatened the
complainant by saying that she would be buried alive. The words uttered
by the accused / petitioner, were sufficient to alarm the complainant.
Whether the complainant was actually alarmed or not is something to be
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Megha Sehgal Vs. State
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discussed during the trial. Ld. Addl. PP has submitted that the material
on record was sufficient to frame charges for offence u/s.506 IPC.
7. Arguments heard. Record perused.
8. In case titled as Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal, 1979 SC,
Hon'ble Apex Court of India has discussed the scope and extent of
scrutiny of evidence at the stage of charge. The relevant observations
made by Hon'ble Apex Court are as under :
“7.xxxxx The words not sufficient grounds for proceeding against
the accused clearly shows that the judge is not a mere post office
to frame the charge at the behest of prosecution, but has to
exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the
Court to enter into the prose and cones of the matter, or into a
weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities, which is
really his function after the trial starts. At the stage of Section
227, the judge has merely to shift the evidence in order to find
out, whether or not, there is sufficient grounds for proceeding
against the accused. The sufficiency of ground would take within
its fold, the nature of evidence recorded by the police, or the
documents produced before the Court, which ex-facie disclose
that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so
as to frame a charge against him”.
9. Further, in case titled as State of Odisha Vs. Debender Nath Padhi,
2005 SC, the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the stage of discharge
was incorporated in the Code with a view to save the accused from
prolonged harassment which is a necessary concomitant of protracted
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criminal trial. It is calculated to eliminate harassment to accused
persons, when evidence gathered after investigation fall short of
minimum legal requirements.
10. It is clear from the judicial pronouncements referred above that a Court,
at the stage of charge, has to apply its judicial mind to determine as to
whether the evidence placed before it by the investigating agency is
sufficient to fulfill the basic ingredients of the offence under
consideration or not. If the material falls short of the basic legal
requirement, Court justified in discharging the accused. This procedure
has been incorporated to save the accused from the turbulence of
unnecessary trial.
11. Here in this case, the incident had happened on 28.04.2018, when
accused Ramesh Sehgal allegedly molested the complainant. This
incident was reported to police on 02.05.2018. Till reporting of the
incident, apparently the petitioner had not advanced any threat to the
complainant as complainant did not whisper about any allegation in her
complaint dated 02.05.2018. These allegations came on record for the
first time in statement of the complainant recorded u/s.164 Cr.P.C. on
05.05.2018. In this statement also, the complainant did not disclose any
specific date, time and place when the alleged threats were advanced.
She vaguely stated that petitioner was threatening her by saying that she
will be buried alive. So, the allegations were belatedly levelled and same
were not specific.
12. Proceeding further, one of the basic requirements of offence u/s.506 IPC
is that the accused advanced the threats to intimidate or alarm the
complainant to compel her to do or omit to do something. Here in this
case, if the alleged allegations are accepted as gospel truth, they would
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probably fall short of the basic ingredients required for this offence.
Firstly, it appears that the accused had uttered the words exasperation
without having any intention to alarm the complainant. Secondly, the
complainant has nowhere stated that she was actually alarmed the words
uttered by the petitioner.
13. In case titled as Manik Taneja & Anr. Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr.,
2015 Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has made following observations
relating to offence u/s.506 IPC :
“14. A reading of the definition of "Criminal intimidation"
would indicate that there must be an act of threatening to
another person, of causing an injury to the person, reputation,
or property of the person threatened, or to the person in whom
the threatened person is interested and the threat must be with
the intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it must be
to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or omit to do
an act which he is legally entitled to do.
15. In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have
abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent
from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of
the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has
to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated
comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat
must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to
cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression
of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be
sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material
has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause
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6
alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of
the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the
appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent
causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the
comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears
that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act
of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not
attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC”.
14. In case in hand, it appears that the alleged words were uttered by the
petitioner more in form of abuse than any intimidation. Neither any
intention to intimidate the complainant is reflected from the
circumstances under which the threats were advanced, nor the
complainant has claimed anywhere that she was actually alarmed by the
words uttered by the petitioner. So, even if the allegation that the
petitioner had uttered the words mentioned above are accepted at their
face value, same shall not be sufficient to fulfill the basic statutory
ingredients required for offence u/s.506 IPC.
15. In view of the discussion above, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the material placed before the Ld. Magistrate was not sufficient to
frame charges against the revisionist / petitioner herein. The revision
petitioner is accordingly allowed. The order on charge against the
petitioner Megha Sehgal is accordingly set-aside.
16. The revision petition is disposed of accordingly.
17. A copy of this order alongwith TCR, if any, be sent back.
18. At request, copy of this order be given dasti to the Ld. Counsel for the
complainant / revisionist.
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Megha Sehgal Vs. State
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19. File be consigned to Record Room.
( BABRU BHAN)
ASJ-03 (NORTH-WEST)
ROHINI COURTS
DELHI/07.02.2024
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