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Final Order 10

CNR DLNW01001383202402 Sept 2024
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Final Order 10 · 02 Sept 2024 · CNR DLNW010013832024

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
NORTH WEST DISTRICT: ROHINI COURTS: DELHI
CNR No. DLNW01-001383-2024
RP No. 38/24
Inderjeet v. BSES Yamuna Power Ltd.
02.09.2024
Present: Sh. Amit Gupta, Advocate for BSES/applicant, through
VC.
None for the respondent/non-applicant.
ORDER
The present Review Petition u/o. XLVII Rule 1 of
CPC has been filed with respect to the judgment dated
21.12.2023 passed by the Ld. Predecessor vide which the appeal
bearing PPA No. 19/2021 was decided.
2. The said appeal was preferred aggrieved by the order
dated 02.09.2021 of Ld. Estate Officer/SDM (Civil Lines) and
the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 21.12.2023.
3. Notice of the review application was given to the
opposite party. Original file is also taken up.
4. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the applicant, Ld.
Counsel for the non-applicant and perused the record.
5. Ld. Counsel for the BSES/applicant submitted that the
present appeal alongwith other appeals was disposed of vide a
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common order with respect to the various residential quarters of
Tripolia Colony, Delhi-110007. Those appeals were preferred by
the non-applicants aggrieved by the order passed by Ld. Estate
Officer u/s.9 of The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short ‘Act’). Ld. Counsel submitted
that while disposing of the appeals, the Court has observed as
follows:
“17. Since Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized
Occupants) Act, 1971 has been invoked by the Estate
Officer at the behest of the respondent, therefore, it is
mandatory to establish two facts that the property in
question falls into the definition of Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 as defined
in Section 2(e) of the Act and that the respondent is entitled
to reclaim the said public premises under the provisions of
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971. In this context, it is contended on behalf of the
appellants that the property in question does not fall into
the definition of Public Premises in terms of Section 2 of
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971, therefore, there cannot be any order under the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971. To elaborate it further, the appellants have
relied upon the definition of "Public Premises" in the
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971 and stated that neither Section 2(e)(i) nor parts
of Section 2 of the Act are attracted on the facts of the
instant case.
18. Section 2(e)(3) of the Act is especially enacted in
relation to the NCT of Delhi and there also the respondent
nowhere falls into any definition which may lead to a
conclusion that the premises is a "public premises" on the
ground that respondent is a company in which government
does not have more than 50% share/paid up capital.
Therefore, the respondent remains a private company and
any property belonging to a private company cannot be
equated or treated as public premises. Thus, it is submitted
by the appellants that the case of the respondent is
foundantionally incorrect and the order passed by the so-
called Estate Officer/SDM is without any jurisdiction not
only on this count, but otherwise also that territorial
jurisdiction in respect of the flats in question was not with
SDM (Civil Lines). Since the impugned orders were
passed by the SDM, Civil Lines without any jurisdiction,
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therefore, the impugned orders cannot be sustained.
19. In this context, Gazzette Notification dated 13.11.2001
can be looked into where the transferee company (the
respondent herein) has been given the authority to not only
allot the vacant flats coming under its control, to its own
employees, but has been authorized to have the flats
reclaimed by securing eviction from unauthorized
occupants too. In view of these facts and circumstances, it
is claimed by the respondent that the respondent has acted
in terms of the authority vested in it. It has also been
further submitted that previous attempts by the other
occupants placed in the similar situation have failed to
secure any relief, and in this context relied upon the
judgments in Jagdish Prasad & Ors. Vs. MCD & Ors. AIR
1993 SC 1254 and Ram Gopal Vs. Government of NCT of
Delhi 2015 VII AD (Delhi) 397.
20. The circumstances throw up a situation where
provisions of a statute come in conflict with notification in
Gazzette. A law passed by Legislature carries more weight
as compared to a notification in Gazzette, as the latter
empowers the respondent to manage and control the flats
of the erstwhile DVB, but the provision contained in
Section 2(e)(3) of the Act comes as a roadblock in exercise
of the notification. Apparently, the statutory provisions
have precedence and as per that the respondent is not a
government company, thus, incapable of involving P.P. Act
since it is applicable to ‘Public Premises’ as defined in the
Act.
21. In view of these facts, the impugned order qua ‘Public
Premises’ which no longer remains a public premises after
the respondent took over the responsibility from erstwhile
DVB, cannot be sustained. Moreover, the respondent itself
is creating confusion by resorting to proceedings under the
Company’s Act by initiating proceedings before Ld.
ACMM, in addition to invoking jurisdiction of different
SDM’s qua the same property/premises, as was pointed out
by the appellants and no cogent answer/denial came from
respondents.”
6. Ld. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the
present application for review has been filed seeking limited
review with respect to the observations and findings recorded in
paragraph nos.18, 20 & 21 in the order dated 21.12.2023
whereby the court has been pleased to observe that the said
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premises no longer remains a public premises after the
applicant/respondent took over the responsibility from erstwhile
Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB). Ld. Counsel submitted that the flats
in question still fall within the definition of “public premises” as
defined u/s.2(e) of the Act even after the applicant/respondent
took over the responsibility from erstwhile DVB. The flats were
handed over to the applicant having only right to use basis and
were not transferred to the applicant/respondent. The applicant/
respondent is merely a licensee of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi
with respect to the said flats in accordance with the Delhi
Electricity Reforms Act, 2000 and Delhi Electricity (Transfer
Scheme) Rules, 2001.
7. Ld. Counsel submitted that there is no conflict in the
statute and the notification dated 13.11.2001 issued by the Govt.
of NCT of Delhi. Ld. Counsel submitted that from bare reading
of the order, the error is apparent on the face, which has occurred
due to the misconception of facts and law. Ld. Counsel
submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club
(2005) 4 SCC 741 has already interpreted the reasons as
mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC and held that sufficient
reason also includes misconception of fact and law. It was held
as under:
“Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an
application for review. Such an application for review
would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new
and important piece of evidence or when there exists an
error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same
is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other
sufficient reason.
Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would
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include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also
call for a review of the order. An application for review
would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason
therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The
words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is
wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a
court or even an Advocate. An application for review may
be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus
curiae neminem gravabit".
8. Ld. Counsel submitted that in reply to the appeal, the
applicant herein had already made submissions that applicant
company is a licensee in terms of license granted by Delhi
Electricity Regulatory Commission u/s.20 of Delhi Electricity
Reforms Act, 2000. After coming into force of Delhi Electricity
Reforms Act, 2000 and Delhi Electricity (Transfer Scheme)
Rules, 2001, the applicant company has taken over the charge of
distribution of electricity in Central and East circles of the NCT
of Delhi from erstwhile DVB alongwith all the rights, titles,
interests, claims, liabilities and demands etc. qua all properties/
assets belonging to and/or owned by erstwhile DVB. All the
claims, rights, liabilities and demands of DVB against its
employees were transferred/assigned to applicant w.e.f.
01.07.2002 vide notification no. F.11/99/2001-Power/PF-III/2081
dated 12.11.2001 and notification no. F.11/1999/2001-Power/
2867 dated 20.11.2001.
9. Ld. Counsel submitted that another notification dated
13.11.2001 was issued by Department of Power, Govt. of NCT of
Delhi bearing notification no. F.11(99)/2001-Power-III/2828
regarding allegation of residential colony and sub-station flats of
DVB alongwith the amenities to the successor entities and as
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such 429 residential flats including the flat in dispute located in
Tripolia Colony came under the present applicant. Ld. Counsel
submitted that the notification was challenged by the occupants
of Tripolia Colony in Writ Petitions, which were decided vide
judgment dated 04.09.2014 in the case titled as
Ram Gopal v. Lt.
Governor, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, holding that there was no
merit in the challenge to the notification.
10. Ld. Counsel submitted that the Govt. of NCT of Delhi
has also appointed the SDMs of all the Sub-Divisions under the
office of Divisional Commissioner, Govt. of NCT of Delhi as the
Estate Officers u/s.3 of the Public Premises Act in respect of the
public premises, which have been transferred to the respective
companies as licensee of GNCT of Delhi by virtue of Delhi
Electricity (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001. Ld. Counsel
submitted that this fact itself shows that the flat in question is a
public premises and that is why the Estate Officers were
appointed. Ld. Counsel further submitted that in terms of
Section 14 & 15 of Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000 with
effect from the date on which the transfer scheme came into
effect, any property, interest in property, rights and liabilities,
which before the said date belonged to Delhi Vidyut Board stood
vested in the Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Ld. Counsel submitted that
as per the notification dated 13.11.2001 the allocation was
subject to the condition that no part of the land shall form part of
the assets transferred under this allocation. The Transferee shall
be entitled to use such land as a licensee subject to the provisions
of the Delhi Electricity (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 to be
notified by the Govt. of NCT of Delhi.
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11. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Transferee
Company i.e. the appellant herein was also responsible for the
eviction of the unauthorized occupants. Ld. Counsel submitted
that under the circumstances, the flat in dispute is still owned and
is under the control of Govt. of NCT of Delhi. The applicant is
only a licensee and, therefore, the premises still falls within the
ambit of public premises as defined under the Act. Ld. Counsel
submitted that there is an error apparent on the face of the record
whereby the court has observed that it is not public premises and
prayed that the order be reviewed.
12. Ld. Counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the
court has rightly observed that the flat in question is not a public
premises as per the definition of public premises given in the Act.
There is no error in the finding. Even otherwise, the review can
be only with respect to the error of the fact or the error apparent
on the face of the record where the court after considering all the
submissions and the facts reached to a conclusion that cannot be
challenged in review. Such finding can only be challenged in
appeal. It is prayed that there is no merit in the application, the
same be dismissed.
13. After hearing the arguments and going through the
record, I find that my Ld. Predecessor vide order dated
21.12.2023 dismissed the appeal of the non-applicant herein.
The brief arguments that in para 21 of the judgment, the court has
specifically observed that premises in question is no longer a
public premises after the BSES i.e. the applicant took over the
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responsibility of the premises in dispute from the erstwhile DVB.
And, thereafter, dismissed the appeal.
14. Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC reads as under:
“1. Application for review of judgment.
(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved-
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed,
but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed,
or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small
Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be
produced by him at the time when the decree was passed
or order made, or on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record of for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree
passed or order made against him, may apply for a
review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree
or made the order.”
15. From the bare perused of the same, it is clear that if the
error is apparent on the face of record, then the review is
maintainable but if one has to go into detail for finding out the
error that it is not permissible u/o. XLVII Rule 1 of CPC.
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India discussed the law on review in
the case of
Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, and
summarize the same as follows:
“16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
(A) When the review will be maintainable: -
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within
knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by
him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
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(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been
interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 Privy
Council 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar
Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius
& Ors., (1955)1 SCR 520, to mean "a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule".
The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India
v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., 2013(3)
Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 436 : JT 2013(8) SC 275.
(B) When the review will not be maintainable :-
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error,
manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness
or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby
an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies
only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should
not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within
the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to
be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief
sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been
negatived.”
16. As per the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, it
is clear that the error must be apparent on the face of the record
and any other sufficient reason must be analogous to those
specified in the rules. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held
that a review by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected. The error apparent
on the face must be apparently visible and has not to be fished
out and searched. If the relief sought was argued in the main
matter and was negatived then review is not maintainable.
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17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as
Kerala
State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower
Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 651, has held as follows:
“10. This Court has referred to several documents on
record and also considered the documentary evidence
brought on record. This Court on a consideration of the
evidence on record concluded that the respondent had been
denied power supply by the Board in appropriate time
which prevented the respondent from starting the
commercial production by December 31, 1996. This is a
finding of fact recorded by this Court on the basis of the
appreciation of evidence produced before the Court. In a
review petition it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate
the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that
is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to
impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the
parties did not support the conclusion reached by this
Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be
permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The
appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the
evidence produced, the Court records a finding of fact and
reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in
a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error
apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin
thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is
any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the
review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of
evidence would amount to converting a review petition
into an appeal in disguise.”
18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as
Jain
Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 501,
has held as follows:
“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is
concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in
submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief
which had been sought at the time of arguing the main
matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been
refused, no review petition would lie which would convert
rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the
power of review cannot be confused with appellate power
which enables a superior Court to correct all errors
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committed by a subordinate Court. It is not rehearing of an
original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is
not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of
review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and
circumspection and only in exceptional cases.”
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as
Meera
Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170, has
held as follows:
"8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by
way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the
scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection
with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47,
Rule 1 , while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to
the High Court while seeking to review the orders under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the
case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma
[(1979) 4 SCC 389 : AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1047],
speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the
following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3) "It is
true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of
Punjab [AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1909], there is nothing in
Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court
from exercising the power of review which inheres in every
Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice
or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But,
there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of
review. The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,
after the exercise of due diligence was not within the
knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be
produced by him at the time when the order was made; it
may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on
the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on
any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of
review is not to be confused with appellate power which may
enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors
committed by the subordinate court."
9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned
judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly
observed that they were entertaining the review petition only
on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and
not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it
has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of
record must be such an error which must strike one on mere
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looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn
process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably
be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations
of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan
Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [AIR 1960
Supreme Court 137 : (1960) 1 SCR 890] wherein, K.C. Das
Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following
observations in connection with an error apparent on the face
of the record:
An error which has to be established by a long-drawn
process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably
be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on
the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from
self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be
established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an
error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the
rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such
a writ."
20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as
State of
W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612 , has held as
follows:
"22. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from
the record of the case and does not require detailed
examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or
the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and
detection thereof requires long debate and process of
reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the
face of the record for the purpose of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC
or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order
or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because
it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view
could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of
fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of
review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal
over its judgment/decision.
27. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR
1964 Supreme Court 1372] it was held that a review is by
no means an appeal in disguise whereof an erroneous
decision can be corrected.
28. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] it
was held as under: (SCC p. 716) xxx xxx xxx In exercise of
the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC it is not
permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and
corrected'. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous
decision and an error apparent on the face of the record.
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While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the
latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review
jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'."
21. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case titled as
Jia Lal Kapur v. U.O.I., 2016 (3) AD (Delhi) 163, has held as
follows:
“21. The above discussion would show that all contentions
which have been pressed before us, were placed before the
learned Single Judge and considered and in the detailed
judgment dated 11th February, 2004. The same issues were
pressed before this court when the judgment dated 28th
September, 2004 was passed. The review has been sought of
the decisions on the very grounds on merits which stand
heard and decided. It is trite that the petitioner stand
precluded from seeking review of the judgment dated 28th
September, 2004 on these very grounds on merits.”
22. In view of the law settled, it is clear that a review
petition is not maintainable for re-hearing the original matter,
which has been heard, discussed in detail and negatived. In the
present case, the contention is that the court has wrongly reached
to the conclusion that premises in dispute is not a public premises
as defined under the Act. The contention is that Delhi Govt. is
still the owner of the property in dispute and only the right to
manage and maintain the property has been given to the present
applicant. Hence, it still remains a government property and that
is why the government has also appointed the SDMs as the
Estate Officers with respect to the various properties belonging to
the erstwhile DVB including the premises in dispute, which were
later on given on license to the present applicant and hence, the
court should review its decision and decide in favour of the
applicant that the premises in dispute is still the government
property and, hence, public premises.
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23. I have gone through the order of my Ld. Predecessor.
This argument has already been taken care, considered by my Ld.
Predecessor and negatived. As laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the various judgments discussed above, if the
case of the party has already been heard on merits including the
arguments now forwarded and has been negatived then it does
not fall within the purview of Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC but it
is the subject matter of the appeal. Therefore, in my opinion, the
application for review has no merits. The same is dismissed.
24. File be consigned to Record Room.
Announced in the open Court
today i.e. 2nd September, 2024
(Virender Kumar Bansal)
Principal District & Sessions Judge (NW)
Rohini Courts, Delhi (sb)
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