Full Order Text
Final Order 10 · 02 Sept 2024 · CNR DLNW010013832024
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE NORTH WEST DISTRICT: ROHINI COURTS: DELHI CNR No. DLNW01-001383-2024 RP No. 38/24 Inderjeet v. BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. 02.09.2024 Present: Sh. Amit Gupta, Advocate for BSES/applicant, through VC. None for the respondent/non-applicant. ORDER The present Review Petition u/o. XLVII Rule 1 of CPC has been filed with respect to the judgment dated 21.12.2023 passed by the Ld. Predecessor vide which the appeal bearing PPA No. 19/2021 was decided. 2. The said appeal was preferred aggrieved by the order dated 02.09.2021 of Ld. Estate Officer/SDM (Civil Lines) and the appeal was dismissed vide order dated 21.12.2023. 3. Notice of the review application was given to the opposite party. Original file is also taken up. 4. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the applicant, Ld. Counsel for the non-applicant and perused the record. 5. Ld. Counsel for the BSES/applicant submitted that the present appeal alongwith other appeals was disposed of vide a Page 1 of 14 -- 1 of 14 -- common order with respect to the various residential quarters of Tripolia Colony, Delhi-110007. Those appeals were preferred by the non-applicants aggrieved by the order passed by Ld. Estate Officer u/s.9 of The Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short ‘Act’). Ld. Counsel submitted that while disposing of the appeals, the Court has observed as follows: “17. Since Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 has been invoked by the Estate Officer at the behest of the respondent, therefore, it is mandatory to establish two facts that the property in question falls into the definition of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act and that the respondent is entitled to reclaim the said public premises under the provisions of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. In this context, it is contended on behalf of the appellants that the property in question does not fall into the definition of Public Premises in terms of Section 2 of Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971, therefore, there cannot be any order under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971. To elaborate it further, the appellants have relied upon the definition of "Public Premises" in the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 and stated that neither Section 2(e)(i) nor parts of Section 2 of the Act are attracted on the facts of the instant case. 18. Section 2(e)(3) of the Act is especially enacted in relation to the NCT of Delhi and there also the respondent nowhere falls into any definition which may lead to a conclusion that the premises is a "public premises" on the ground that respondent is a company in which government does not have more than 50% share/paid up capital. Therefore, the respondent remains a private company and any property belonging to a private company cannot be equated or treated as public premises. Thus, it is submitted by the appellants that the case of the respondent is foundantionally incorrect and the order passed by the so- called Estate Officer/SDM is without any jurisdiction not only on this count, but otherwise also that territorial jurisdiction in respect of the flats in question was not with SDM (Civil Lines). Since the impugned orders were passed by the SDM, Civil Lines without any jurisdiction, Page 2 of 14 -- 2 of 14 -- therefore, the impugned orders cannot be sustained. 19. In this context, Gazzette Notification dated 13.11.2001 can be looked into where the transferee company (the respondent herein) has been given the authority to not only allot the vacant flats coming under its control, to its own employees, but has been authorized to have the flats reclaimed by securing eviction from unauthorized occupants too. In view of these facts and circumstances, it is claimed by the respondent that the respondent has acted in terms of the authority vested in it. It has also been further submitted that previous attempts by the other occupants placed in the similar situation have failed to secure any relief, and in this context relied upon the judgments in Jagdish Prasad & Ors. Vs. MCD & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 1254 and Ram Gopal Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi 2015 VII AD (Delhi) 397. 20. The circumstances throw up a situation where provisions of a statute come in conflict with notification in Gazzette. A law passed by Legislature carries more weight as compared to a notification in Gazzette, as the latter empowers the respondent to manage and control the flats of the erstwhile DVB, but the provision contained in Section 2(e)(3) of the Act comes as a roadblock in exercise of the notification. Apparently, the statutory provisions have precedence and as per that the respondent is not a government company, thus, incapable of involving P.P. Act since it is applicable to ‘Public Premises’ as defined in the Act. 21. In view of these facts, the impugned order qua ‘Public Premises’ which no longer remains a public premises after the respondent took over the responsibility from erstwhile DVB, cannot be sustained. Moreover, the respondent itself is creating confusion by resorting to proceedings under the Company’s Act by initiating proceedings before Ld. ACMM, in addition to invoking jurisdiction of different SDM’s qua the same property/premises, as was pointed out by the appellants and no cogent answer/denial came from respondents.” 6. Ld. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the present application for review has been filed seeking limited review with respect to the observations and findings recorded in paragraph nos.18, 20 & 21 in the order dated 21.12.2023 whereby the court has been pleased to observe that the said Page 3 of 14 -- 3 of 14 -- premises no longer remains a public premises after the applicant/respondent took over the responsibility from erstwhile Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB). Ld. Counsel submitted that the flats in question still fall within the definition of “public premises” as defined u/s.2(e) of the Act even after the applicant/respondent took over the responsibility from erstwhile DVB. The flats were handed over to the applicant having only right to use basis and were not transferred to the applicant/respondent. The applicant/ respondent is merely a licensee of the Govt. of NCT of Delhi with respect to the said flats in accordance with the Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000 and Delhi Electricity (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001. 7. Ld. Counsel submitted that there is no conflict in the statute and the notification dated 13.11.2001 issued by the Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Ld. Counsel submitted that from bare reading of the order, the error is apparent on the face, which has occurred due to the misconception of facts and law. Ld. Counsel submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club (2005) 4 SCC 741 has already interpreted the reasons as mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC and held that sufficient reason also includes misconception of fact and law. It was held as under: “Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code provides for filing an application for review. Such an application for review would be maintainable not only upon discovery of a new and important piece of evidence or when there exists an error apparent on the face of the record but also if the same is necessitated on account of some mistake or for any other sufficient reason. Thus, a mistake on the part of the court which would Page 4 of 14 -- 4 of 14 -- include a mistake in the nature of the undertaking may also call for a review of the order. An application for review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason therefor. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. The words 'sufficient reason' in Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an Advocate. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine "actus curiae neminem gravabit". 8. Ld. Counsel submitted that in reply to the appeal, the applicant herein had already made submissions that applicant company is a licensee in terms of license granted by Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission u/s.20 of Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000. After coming into force of Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000 and Delhi Electricity (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001, the applicant company has taken over the charge of distribution of electricity in Central and East circles of the NCT of Delhi from erstwhile DVB alongwith all the rights, titles, interests, claims, liabilities and demands etc. qua all properties/ assets belonging to and/or owned by erstwhile DVB. All the claims, rights, liabilities and demands of DVB against its employees were transferred/assigned to applicant w.e.f. 01.07.2002 vide notification no. F.11/99/2001-Power/PF-III/2081 dated 12.11.2001 and notification no. F.11/1999/2001-Power/ 2867 dated 20.11.2001. 9. Ld. Counsel submitted that another notification dated 13.11.2001 was issued by Department of Power, Govt. of NCT of Delhi bearing notification no. F.11(99)/2001-Power-III/2828 regarding allegation of residential colony and sub-station flats of DVB alongwith the amenities to the successor entities and as Page 5 of 14 -- 5 of 14 -- such 429 residential flats including the flat in dispute located in Tripolia Colony came under the present applicant. Ld. Counsel submitted that the notification was challenged by the occupants of Tripolia Colony in Writ Petitions, which were decided vide judgment dated 04.09.2014 in the case titled as Ram Gopal v. Lt. Governor, Govt. of NCT of Delhi, holding that there was no merit in the challenge to the notification. 10. Ld. Counsel submitted that the Govt. of NCT of Delhi has also appointed the SDMs of all the Sub-Divisions under the office of Divisional Commissioner, Govt. of NCT of Delhi as the Estate Officers u/s.3 of the Public Premises Act in respect of the public premises, which have been transferred to the respective companies as licensee of GNCT of Delhi by virtue of Delhi Electricity (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001. Ld. Counsel submitted that this fact itself shows that the flat in question is a public premises and that is why the Estate Officers were appointed. Ld. Counsel further submitted that in terms of Section 14 & 15 of Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000 with effect from the date on which the transfer scheme came into effect, any property, interest in property, rights and liabilities, which before the said date belonged to Delhi Vidyut Board stood vested in the Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Ld. Counsel submitted that as per the notification dated 13.11.2001 the allocation was subject to the condition that no part of the land shall form part of the assets transferred under this allocation. The Transferee shall be entitled to use such land as a licensee subject to the provisions of the Delhi Electricity (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001 to be notified by the Govt. of NCT of Delhi. Page 6 of 14 -- 6 of 14 -- 11. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the Transferee Company i.e. the appellant herein was also responsible for the eviction of the unauthorized occupants. Ld. Counsel submitted that under the circumstances, the flat in dispute is still owned and is under the control of Govt. of NCT of Delhi. The applicant is only a licensee and, therefore, the premises still falls within the ambit of public premises as defined under the Act. Ld. Counsel submitted that there is an error apparent on the face of the record whereby the court has observed that it is not public premises and prayed that the order be reviewed. 12. Ld. Counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the court has rightly observed that the flat in question is not a public premises as per the definition of public premises given in the Act. There is no error in the finding. Even otherwise, the review can be only with respect to the error of the fact or the error apparent on the face of the record where the court after considering all the submissions and the facts reached to a conclusion that cannot be challenged in review. Such finding can only be challenged in appeal. It is prayed that there is no merit in the application, the same be dismissed. 13. After hearing the arguments and going through the record, I find that my Ld. Predecessor vide order dated 21.12.2023 dismissed the appeal of the non-applicant herein. The brief arguments that in para 21 of the judgment, the court has specifically observed that premises in question is no longer a public premises after the BSES i.e. the applicant took over the Page 7 of 14 -- 7 of 14 -- responsibility of the premises in dispute from the erstwhile DVB. And, thereafter, dismissed the appeal. 14. Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC reads as under: “1. Application for review of judgment. (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved- (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record of for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.” 15. From the bare perused of the same, it is clear that if the error is apparent on the face of record, then the review is maintainable but if one has to go into detail for finding out the error that it is not permissible u/o. XLVII Rule 1 of CPC. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India discussed the law on review in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320, and summarize the same as follows: “16. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: (A) When the review will be maintainable: - (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; Page 8 of 14 -- 8 of 14 -- (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki, AIR 1922 Privy Council 112 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius & Ors., (1955)1 SCR 520, to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule". The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors., 2013(3) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 436 : JT 2013(8) SC 275. (B) When the review will not be maintainable :- (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 16. As per the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the error must be apparent on the face of the record and any other sufficient reason must be analogous to those specified in the rules. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that a review by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected. The error apparent on the face must be apparently visible and has not to be fished out and searched. If the relief sought was argued in the main matter and was negatived then review is not maintainable. Page 9 of 14 -- 9 of 14 -- 17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as Kerala State Electricity Board v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd., (2005) 6 SCC 651, has held as follows: “10. This Court has referred to several documents on record and also considered the documentary evidence brought on record. This Court on a consideration of the evidence on record concluded that the respondent had been denied power supply by the Board in appropriate time which prevented the respondent from starting the commercial production by December 31, 1996. This is a finding of fact recorded by this Court on the basis of the appreciation of evidence produced before the Court. In a review petition it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the Court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.” 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 501, has held as follows: “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior Court to correct all errors Page 10 of 14 -- 10 of 14 -- committed by a subordinate Court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.” 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170, has held as follows: "8. It is well settled that the review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In connection with the limitation of the powers of the court under Order 47, Rule 1 , while dealing with similar jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking to review the orders under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court, in the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389 : AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1047], speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., has made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 390, para 3) "It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1909], there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude the High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every Court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court." 9. Now it is also to be kept in view that in the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court has clearly observed that they were entertaining the review petition only on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record and not on any other ground. So far as that aspect is concerned, it has to be kept in view that an error apparent on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere Page 11 of 14 -- 11 of 14 -- looking at the record and would not require any long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. We may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [AIR 1960 Supreme Court 137 : (1960) 1 SCR 890] wherein, K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court has made the following observations in connection with an error apparent on the face of the record: An error which has to be established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. Where an alleged error is far from self-evident and if it can be established, it has to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments, such an error cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ." 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case titled as State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612 , has held as follows: "22. The term "mistake or error apparent" by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47, Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision. 27. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1372] it was held that a review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereof an erroneous decision can be corrected. 28. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715] it was held as under: (SCC p. 716) xxx xxx xxx In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be 'reheard and corrected'. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the face of the record. Page 12 of 14 -- 12 of 14 -- While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in disguise'." 21. The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case titled as Jia Lal Kapur v. U.O.I., 2016 (3) AD (Delhi) 163, has held as follows: “21. The above discussion would show that all contentions which have been pressed before us, were placed before the learned Single Judge and considered and in the detailed judgment dated 11th February, 2004. The same issues were pressed before this court when the judgment dated 28th September, 2004 was passed. The review has been sought of the decisions on the very grounds on merits which stand heard and decided. It is trite that the petitioner stand precluded from seeking review of the judgment dated 28th September, 2004 on these very grounds on merits.” 22. In view of the law settled, it is clear that a review petition is not maintainable for re-hearing the original matter, which has been heard, discussed in detail and negatived. In the present case, the contention is that the court has wrongly reached to the conclusion that premises in dispute is not a public premises as defined under the Act. The contention is that Delhi Govt. is still the owner of the property in dispute and only the right to manage and maintain the property has been given to the present applicant. Hence, it still remains a government property and that is why the government has also appointed the SDMs as the Estate Officers with respect to the various properties belonging to the erstwhile DVB including the premises in dispute, which were later on given on license to the present applicant and hence, the court should review its decision and decide in favour of the applicant that the premises in dispute is still the government property and, hence, public premises. Page 13 of 14 -- 13 of 14 -- 23. I have gone through the order of my Ld. Predecessor. This argument has already been taken care, considered by my Ld. Predecessor and negatived. As laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the various judgments discussed above, if the case of the party has already been heard on merits including the arguments now forwarded and has been negatived then it does not fall within the purview of Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC but it is the subject matter of the appeal. Therefore, in my opinion, the application for review has no merits. The same is dismissed. 24. File be consigned to Record Room. Announced in the open Court today i.e. 2nd September, 2024 (Virender Kumar Bansal) Principal District & Sessions Judge (NW) Rohini Courts, Delhi (sb) Page 14 of 14 -- 14 of 14 --
