Order 3

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: 110 Ct. Cases 954/2025
SANDEEP CHAUDHARY Vs. KUNAL KAMRA
(K.N. Katju Marg)
15.09.2025.
Present: Ld. Counsel for the complainant through VC.
Arguments concluded. Put up for orders at 4:30 pm.
(Himanshu Sehloth)
JMFC-03/North/Rohini/Delhi
15.09.2025
At 4:30 PM
Present: None
ORDER
Vide this order, this court shall decide the application u/s 175(3) BNSS preferred by the
complainant.
1. Introduction
1.1. “A democracy that fears laughter has already begun to fear itself.” This
observation, aptly captures the essence of the present matter. The complaint before the
Court situates itself at the intersection of individual freedom of expression and the
State’s duty to ensure public order. At its core is a satirical video, widely disseminated,
which lampoons political realignment and leaders in Maharashtra.
1.2. The task of this Court is not to adjudge taste, civility, or artistic merit, but to
determine whether the coercive machinery of the State may lawfully intervene.
Freedom of speech is the oxygen of democratic life; the law must breathe with it, not
smother it.
1.3. Beyond the personal or political, the matter touches on the role of satire, dissent,
and critique in a vibrant democracy. It compels reflection on whether criminal law
may be wielded against speech that is provocative, irreverent, or uncomfortable, yet
does not issue a command to violence.
1.4. In approaching this question, this Court must weigh multiple considerations: the
statutory provisions invoked, the factual matrix, the threshold of cognizable
criminality, and the constitutional protections enshrined in Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of
the Indian Constitution. The challenge is to balance liberty against order, dissent
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against security, and humor against offense, ensuring that the law remains a
guardian, not a predator, of democratic freedom.
1.5 At this stage, it suffices to note that the matter concerns a satirical expression
directed at political conduct, and the Court must examine the same in light of the law
and the duties of a constitutional democracy.
2. Complainant Allegations
2.1. The present application, filed under Section 175(3) BNSS, seeks registration of an
FIR against Mr. Kunal Kamra, a comedian, in relation to a satirical video titled “Naya
Bharat”, posted on or about 23.03.2025. The video contains remarks and musical satire
directed, inter alia, at the Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Mr. Eknath Shinde.
2.2. The complainant, the State Chief, Delhi, of the current faction of the Shiv Sena,
alleges that the video employs provocative language and terminology, including
“gaddar”, “dalbadlu”, and “Fadnavis ki godi”, which, according to the complaint,
lampoon not merely the individual but also a political transformation involving shifting
allegiances and purported betrayal.
2.3. The video allegedly includes lines such as:
 “Jis thaali mein khaye usme hi wo chedh kar jaye”, and
 “Guwahati mein chup jaaye, meri nazar se tum dekho gaddar nazar aaye”,
which, the complainant contends, portray Mr. Shinde as a betrayer and someone
involved in political horse-trading.
2.4. It is submitted that the video deliberately distorts facts, with intent or likelihood to
stir enmity and ill-will between political, regional, and ideological groups. Further, the
video has been widely disseminated across major social media platforms — X
(formerly Twitter), Instagram, and YouTube — garnering over a million views and
significant engagement.
2.5. The complaint notes that the video has been reposted and endorsed by a
prominent political leader from a rival faction, amplifying the political edge and
contributing to inter-factional tensions.
2.6. Additionally, the complainant orally asserted that the party maintains a functioning
office within the jurisdiction of this Court in Delhi, where several party workers were
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visibly agitated and humiliated by the content. It is contended that this context —
sensitive political environments, factional tensions, and prior history of clashes in
Maharashtra — is crucial to understanding the alleged intent and likely effect of the
video.
2.7. The complainant argues that actual rioting or breach of public peace is not a
prerequisite under Section 353(2) BNS. The statutory language, as per the complaint,
contemplates that the existence of intent or likelihood to promote enmity, hatred, or
ill-will between groups constitutes sufficient grounds to invoke the provision.
2.8. In sum, the complaint alleges that the acts of the accused were performed with
intent, or in an attempt, to cause mischief, disorder, hatred, and public provocation
between political, regional, and ideological factions. The complainant submits that
these allegations must be examined against the backdrop of Maharashtra’s volatile
political environment, where political rivalries have historically triggered clashes,
outrage, and other unpleasant incidents.
3. Action Taken Report (ATR)
3.1. An Action Taken Report dated 19.05.2025 has been filed under the signatures of the
ACP/Prashant Vihar.
3.2. As per the report, the impugned footage was recorded in Maharashtra. A complaint
regarding the same video had already been lodged by one MLA, Andheri West, namely
Murji Kanji Patel, at PS Khar, Mumbai. On that complaint, FIR No. 194/2025 under
Sections 353(1)(b)/ 353(2)/356(2) BNS has been registered and is presently under
investigation.
3.3. It is further stated that the accused, Mr. Kunal Kamra, has been granted anticipatory
bail by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in connection with the said FIR. Accordingly,
the ATR concludes that no further action is required at PS KNK Marg in Delhi.
4. Issues for Determination
Upon careful consideration of the complaint, the Action Taken Report, and the
submissions, the following questions arise for adjudication:
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4.1. Multiplicity of FIRs — Whether, in light of the admitted fact that an FIR has
already been registered in Mumbai concerning the same impugned video, a second or
subsequent FIR on identical allegations can lawfully be directed in Delhi.
4.2. Existence of Cognizable Offence — Whether the allegations in the complaint and
the content of the impugned footage, taken at their face value, disclose the commission
of any cognizable offence so as to justify the registration of a fresh FIR.
4.3. Free Speech and Constitutional Guardrails — Whether the allegations, even if
accepted at their highest, fall within the permissible limits of satire, dissent and political
expression protected under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, thereby requiring
courts to tread with special caution before criminal law is set in motion.
5.1 Issue I — Multiplicity of FIRs: whether, in the face of an admitted FIR already
registered in Mumbai in respect of the same impugned video, the law permits
registration of a second or subsequent FIR in Delhi arising from the very same
transaction.
5.1.1. The first legal threshold presented by this matter is procedural, but its
implications are constitutional. The question is not merely one of police practice; it is
the question whether the State or an individual may, by multiplying complaints and
investigations, subject a citizen to the attrition of repeated criminal process for one act
of expression. That prospect, once opened, corrodes the Rule of Law more surely than
many administrative misstep, for it converts investigation into persecution and
procedure into punishment.
5.1.2. The law on this point has been settled by the highest judicial voice. It is no longer
arguable that the police enjoy an unfettered right to investigate ad infinitum. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 put it in
plain terms: there cannot be a second FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence
or the same incident or occurrence. The Court warned that the plenary power of
investigation, though indispensable for law and order, is not unlimited; it must be
balanced against fundamental rights under Articles 19 and 21. Subjecting a person to
repeated investigations on account of successive complaints, would be an abuse of
statutory power, and inimical to the guarantee against arbitrary State action.
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5.1.3. This principle has since been fleshed out into a judicial test — the test of
“sameness” — which asks whether the subsequent complaint relates to the same
transaction, the same incident, or the same gravamen as the first FIR. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Surender Kaushik vs State of U.P. (Criminal Appeal No. 305 of
2013, Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl) No. 9276of 2012) and the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Akbaruddin Owaisi vs State of Andhra Pradesh (2014 Cri. LJ 2199 )
have emphasised that sameness is not a metaphysical identity of words but a practical
inquiry into mixed question of law and facts depending on the merits of a given case. If
the subsequent complaint merely rehashes the original allegations, or seeks to
“improve” upon them, it is impermissible; if, however, it pleads a distinct occurrence,
or new and materially different facts, it may be maintainable.
5.1.4. The test articulated with salutary realism, notes that modern communication
means a single utterance may reach many places and many ears; yet a single transmitted
message does not become many offences simply because many felt offended. The
lesson is plain: in an age of viral speech, the law must resist a multiplication of
prosecutions that would otherwise reduce every nationwide expression to a hundred
local causes of action.
5.1.5. The constitutional stakes are reinforced by Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah vs CBI
(Writ Pettion (Criminal) No. 149 of 2012), where it was held by Hon’ble Supreme
Court that a second FIR in respect of the same transaction is not only impermissible as a
matter of criminal procedure, but may also violate Article 21 of the Constitution. The
point is not mere technicality; it is that liberty is not secured by law that can be worn
down by repeated process. Investigations have costs — reputational, financial and
psychic. A citizen should not be made to endure a relay of prosecutions in different fora
for the identical alleged act.
5.1.6. Applying the test to the facts before this Court is, therefore, necessarily practical
and contextual. There are certain immutable facts: the impugned video is the same
video; FIR No. 194/2025 has been registered at PS Khar, Mumbai on the complaint of
an MLA; that FIR invokes substantially the same offences as are alleged in the present
application; an investigation is under way; and anticipatory bail has been obtained by
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the accused from the Bombay High Court. The applicant’s grievance in Delhi does not
point to a separate act, to fresh allegations of a different tenor, or to a distinct
transaction occurring in Delhi independent of the original upload and its consequences.
The asserted “cause of action” in Delhi — that party workers here were offended upon
viewing the video — is evidence of reception, not of a new occurrence.
5.1.7. The law draws a distinction between multiplicity that is warranted and
multiplicity that is abusive. A counter-case — a genuinely distinct proceeding based on
different facts — is permissible; successive complaints that merely reframe or
embellish the original allegations in the hope of obtaining a different forum or
favourable policing are not. If the registration of an FIR were permitted each time a
video uploaded in State A is viewed in State B, every broadcaster and every comedian
would be at the mercy of a thousand simultaneous inquiries. That is not justice; it is
harassment.
5.1.8. To permit the registration of another FIR in Delhi under these circumstances
would not only offend the decisions cited, but would also be to countenance forum-
shopping by complaint. More perniciously, it would convert criminal investigation into
a device of competition in grievance. The salutary restraint demanded by T.T. Antony,
Surender Kaushik, Akbaruddin Owaisi and Amitbhai Shah decisions, is intended to
prevent precisely this outcome: a fractured, duplicative, and oppressive criminal
process.
5.1.9. This Court therefore holds, for purposes of integrated reasoning, that the
registration of a second FIR in Delhi in respect of the identical video and the same core
allegations is not permissible under established law. The complaint, insofar as it seeks
registration of a fresh FIR in Delhi for the same occurrence, must be declined on
grounds of multiplicity and abuse of process; the remedy is coordination with, not
duplication of, the existing investigation in Mumbai.
5.1.10. That conclusion is neither technical nor harsh; it is a vindication of a citizen’s
right against being hounded by multiple processes and a reaffirmation that the criminal
law is not intended to be fragmented by the vagaries of offended sensibilities across
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jurisdictions. The law, in short, requires that one incident give rise to one investigation
— substantial, focused and fair — not to many.
5.2 Issue II — Whether the complaint and the impugned footage disclose the
commission of any cognizable offence
5.2.1. The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita is not a mechanical one. It is hedged by a solemn responsibility — to
ensure that the criminal process, once set in motion, does not become an instrument of
political score-settling or suppression of dissent. The law requires not only that
allegations be made, but that they disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.
Anything less is an invitation to abuse.
5.2.2. The complaint before this Court revolves around a satirical video that caricatures
political realignments and calling into question the conduct of a constitutional
functionary. Words such as “gaddar” or “dalbadlu” may well sound harsh and offensive
to some, but the task of this Court is not to sit in judgment over taste or civility. It is to
decide whether such expressions, taken at their highest, cross the legal threshold of
cognizable criminality.
5.2.3. A cognizable offence, by its very nature, must threaten public order, social
harmony, or the individuals in a manner so grave as to justify immediate state
intervention. It is not enough that speech embarrasses, unsettles, or even deeply
offends. If offence alone were the test, democracy would soon become monochrome,
bereft of the hues of criticism, parody, and satire that animate public discourse.
5.2.4. Tested on this plane, the allegations in the complaint do not pass muster. The
video in question, though distasteful, does not contain a call to violence, nor does it
exhibit an imminent tendency to disturb public tranquillity to cause/promote enmity,
hatred or ill will among different groups. It reflects, at best, the ordinary rhetoric of
political contest — where metaphors of betrayal, loyalty, and opportunism are freely
employed across party lines. To criminalise such rhetoric is to conflate political
contestation with public mischief.
5.2.5. Equally, the suggestion that the video has “distorted facts” or “humiliated
workers” cannot, by itself, amount to a cognizable offence. The law does not recognise
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a right against humiliation in political life. Public figures, by virtue of their position,
must endure a degree of scrutiny, satire, and parody greater than ordinary citizens.
Those who stand tallest in public life must learn to stand thickest in public ridicule.
5.2.6. The danger of expanding the contours of criminal law to cover such expression is
not merely theoretical. It risks creating a precedent where every parody, every cartoon,
every biting remark becomes the subject of an FIR. That would chill the spirit of Article
19(1)(a), and cast a long shadow over the rights guaranteed under Article 21. In such an
environment, the citizen would speak not with liberty but with fear, measuring every
word against the prospect of prosecution. Such a result is foreign to our Constitution.
5.2.7. Therefore, this Court finds that, even taking the complaint and the video at their
highest, the essential ingredients of any cognizable offence are absent. The alleged
satire may sting, it may provoke indignation, but indignation is not the test of
criminality. What the complaint discloses is speech, however unpalatable to some —
not a crime inviting the coercive machinery of the State.
5.2.8 The Court is mindful that speech can at times be distasteful. But the Constitution
protects not only agreeable speech, but also that which irritates, unsettles, or even
shocks. The test is not whether we agree with the speech, but whether we permit
freedom for the thought that we dislike. To allow registration of an FIR on such facts
would be to weaponize the criminal law against free expression. That, this Court cannot
permit. For in the final analysis, democracy is not imperilled by satire — it is imperilled
by intolerance of satire.
5.3 Issue III — On Dissent, Democracy, and the Constitutional Spirit
5.3.1. This Court cannot approach the complaint merely as a question of statutory
construction. When political satire is sought to be met with the blunt force of criminal
law, the issue assumes a larger dimension. It is not only about the proposed accused
comedian or the aggrieved political leader. It is about the terms of engagement between
citizen and State in a constitutional democracy.
5.3.2. The Constitution of India was not drafted to secure the comfort of those in power.
It was framed to ensure that the governed could speak to their governors without fear.
Article 19(1)(a) guarantees that right in the widest terms; Article 21 secures liberty
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against arbitrary intrusion. Our founding fathers, having themselves faced
imprisonment for their words under colonial rule, knew too well that democracy
without free speech is a shell without life.
5.3.3. Dissent, even when barbed, is not disorder; it is the music of democracy. The
framers did not create a Republic of silence but a Republic of debate, disagreement and,
yes, satire. To laugh and question at one’s rulers, to mock their choices, to call out
betrayal real or imagined — these are not vices, they are the constitutional virtues that
distinguish free citizens from subjects.
5.3.4. The complainant urges that such satire distorts facts, insults leaders, and causes
party workers to feel humiliated. That may well be so. But the Constitution does not
promise freedom from discomfort or indignation; it promises freedom of expression.
What is wounded in such cases is pride, not peace. Pride may bristle, but it is not a
cognizable injury under the law.
5.3.5. The real danger lies elsewhere. If every lampoon or parody were to invite the
coercive machinery of the State, citizens would soon whisper in private what they once
declared in public. Fear would replace candour, and conformity would strangle
creativity. As history teaches us, liberty seldom dies in one stroke; it is eroded when
small freedoms are curbed in the name of order, until silence becomes the only safe
speech.
5.3.6. This Court is not blind to the discomfort satire can cause. It may sting, sometimes
it may cross lines of taste or decorum. But the remedy for bad speech is not the
policeman’s knock; it is better speech, sharper rebuttal, stronger argument.
Leaders who command public power must cultivate a thicker skin, for they govern not
a court of praise but a society of free citizens.
5.3.7. The judiciary, in such moments, is called upon to stand as sentinel. The task of
this Court is not to assess the merits or propriety of satire directed at political figures,
but to ensure that criminal law is not weaponised to silence dissent. A criminal court
cannot be converted into a forum for the vindication of personal or political
sensitivities. To allow that would be to place liberty at the mercy of power — the very
inversion the Constitution was designed to prevent.
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5.3.8. This Court therefore is of the view that the satire in question, however
uncharitable in tone, falls within the protective embrace of Article 19(1)(a). It does not
incite violence, it does not threaten public tranquillity, and it does not step across the
boundary into criminality. To prosecute such speech would not be an act of justice but
of intolerance.
5.3.9. Democracy does not perish because a citizen alleges betrayal or questions the
loyalty of those in office. Democracy perishes when such expression is met, not with
debate, but with the summoning of criminal law to silence it. Liberty is not lost in the
noise of criticism; it is lost in the silence that follows enforced conformity.
6. Conclusion
6.1 Satire may sting, and speech may often bruise the sentiments of those in public life.
The statements in the impugned video may not be civil in tone, they may even be in bad
taste, and they may well cause political discomfort or unease. But criminal law does not
exist to soothe the itch of political sensitivities; its concern is with conduct that crosses
the threshold of public mischief or unlawful harm. What is unpleasant or offensive is
not necessarily criminal.
6.2 Liberty, as Justice Khanna reminded us, is not the gift of the State but the birthright
of the individual. Article 21 demands that liberty cannot be sacrificed at the altar of
political discomfort. Article 19(1)(a) ensures that satire, parody and criticism — even
when distasteful — remain protected, save when they spill over into the narrow bands
of incitement, public order or defamation recognised by Article 19(2).
6.3. It must be emphasised that the constitutional promise of freedom is not tested in the
times of consensus but in the seasons of discord. The complainant here is a political
functionary; the subject of the satire is a high constitutional functionary. It is precisely
in such cases that courts must be vigilant, for history teaches us that the meek citizen
armed with wit is often the first casualty of a State intolerant of criticism. To silence
satire is not to protect public order; it is to wound the democratic soul.
6.4 In the quiet light of constitutional reason, the position becomes unmistakably clear.
The present complaint, read with the annexed material, does not disclose the
commission of any cognizable offence. The attempt to secure a second FIR on the same
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foundation is equally barred by settled law. To allow otherwise would be to convert the
criminal law from a shield of order into a sword against liberty — a result the
Constitution neither contemplates nor permits.
6.5 Democracy does not tremble because of dissent; it trembles only when dissent is
silenced. It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that the law is not invoked as a
tool to stifle voices, however uncomfortable they may sound to some. Accordingly,
both in law and in fact, the present application is found to be devoid of merit and
stands dismissed. Freedom is the first condition of democracy; its negation is the first
step to tyranny.
6.6 Before parting, it is apt to remind ourselves of the words of Mahatma Gandhi,
spoken in 1922: 'Liberty of speech means that it is unassailed even when speech hurts.'
Let this order be read in that spirit — as an affirmation that the freedoms and liberty
guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 are not concessions granted by the State, but the
birthright of every individual under our constitutional order.
Put up for PSE on 30.01.2026.
Announced in open court (Himanshu Sehloth)
on 15.09.2025 JMFC-03/ North/ Rohini/ Delhi
15.09.2025
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