Interim Order 25

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: FIR No. 45/1995
State vs. Kuldeep @ Mintu
PS Chanakyapuri
05.12.2025 @ 6 PM
Pr: None
1. The present matter is listed for order on charge qua the accused
Kuldeep @ Mintu.
2. For the purpose of brevity, facts are not being reproduced here and
would be discussed at the relevant stage.
3. Ld. Counsel for the accused Kuldeep @ Mintu submitted that the said
accused 	was 	falsely 	implicated 	in 	the 	present 	case. 	He 	was
implicated 	in 	the 	present 	case 	solely 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	disclosure
statement made by the co-accused Paramjeet Singh, which would be
inadmissible in evidence. No other incriminating materials could be
found against the accused Kuldeep @ Mintu. Also, he did not make
any forge or false documents in the present case. He was also not
involved in any kind of conspiracy with the co-accused Paramjeet
Singh.
4. Per contra, Ld. APP for the State submits that as per the charge-
sheet there exists prima facie case against the accused Kuldeep @
Mintu for all the offences as alleged in the charge-sheet.
5. I 	have 	heard 	both 	the 	parties 	and 	have 	gone 	through 	materials
available on record.
6. Section 240 Cr.PC provides for framing of charge in a trial or warrant
cases by Magistrate. It provides that if the Magistrate is of the opinion
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that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an
offence in a warrant case, then a charge can be framed against the
accused. It is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of the trial to
consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the
facts, if proved, would be in compatible with the innocence of the
accused. Only a prima facie case against the accused needs to be
seen at the stage of framing of charge. Reference can be taken from
the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar
vs. Ramesh Singh 1978 SCR (1) 257, wherein while discussing the
legal position with respect to framing of charge the Hon'ble Court has
interalia held the following:
“Reading 	the 	two 	provisions 	together 	in 	juxta
position, as they have got to be, it would be clear
that at the beginning and the initial stage of trial the
truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the
prosecutor 	proposes 	to 	adduce 	are 	not 	to 	be
meticulously 	judged. 	Nor 	is 	any 	weight 	to 	be
attached to the probable defence of the accused. It
is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of the
trial 	to 	consider 	in 	any 	detail 	and 	weigh 	in 	a
sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would
be in compatible with the innocence of the accused.
The standard of test and judgment which is to be
finally applied before recording of finding regarding
the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to
be applied at the stage of deciding the matter u/s
227 or 228 of the Code. At that stage, the court is
not to see whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure
to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against
the accused if the matter remains in the region of
suspicion cannot take the place of the proof of his
guilt at the conclusion of trial. But at the initial stage,
if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to
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think that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence then, it is not
open to the court to say that there is not sufficient
ground 	for 	proceeding 	against 	the 	accused. 	The
presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to
be drawn at the, initial stage is not in the sense of
law governing the trial of criminal cases in France
where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless
the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose
of deciding prima facie whether the court should
proceed with the trial or not.”
7. It is a settled proposition of law that the stage of framing charge only
a prima facie case against the accused needs to be established. The
Court at that stage is under no obligation to make an elaborate
inquiry by shifting and weighing the material to find out a case against
the accused beyond reasonable doubt which is required at the time of
final 	hearing. 	Reference 	can 	be 	taken 	from 	the 	decision 	of 	the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of State vs. Someshwar & Ors.
(2005) (82) DRJ 246.
8. However, it should also be noted that the Court has to independently
apply its mind in order to find out the existence of a prima facie case.
At this stage, reference can be taken from the decision of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI (2010) 9 SCC
368 wherein after referring to the decision of Union of India Vs.
Praful Kumar Samal (1909) 3SCC 4 and Dilawar Balu Kurane vs.
State of Maharashtra (2002) 2 SCC 135, the Hon'ble Apex Court
has laid down the principles which need to be followed by the court
while deciding a discharge application.
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“On consideration of the authorities about the scope
of Section 227 and 228 of the Code, the following
principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.
has 	the 	undoubted 	power 	to 	sift 	and 	weigh 	the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether
or not a prima facie case against the accused has
been made out. The test to determine prima facie
case would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
has not been properly explained, the Court will be fully
justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the
trial.
(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office
or 	a 	mouthpiece 	of 	the 	prosecution 	but 	has 	to
consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total
effect of the evidence and the documents produced
before the Court, any basic infirmities etc. However, at
this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the
pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence
as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the
Court could form an opinion that the accused might
have 	committed 	offence, 	it 	can 	frame 	the 	charge,
though for conviction the conclusion is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the
probative value of the material on record cannot be
gone into but before framing a charge the Court must
apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record
and must be satisfied that the commission of offence
by the accused was possible.
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(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the
Court 	is 	required 	to 	evaluate 	the 	material 	and
documents on record with a view to find out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value discloses
the existence of all the ingredients constituting the
alleged 	offence. 	For 	this 	limited 	purpose, 	sift 	the
evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial
stage 	to 	accept 	all 	that 	the 	prosecution 	states 	as
gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or
the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) 	If two views are possible and one of them
gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from
grave 	suspicion, 	the 	trial 	Judge 	will 	be
empowered to discharge the accused and at this
stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in
conviction or acquittal.”
9. The 	above 	discussed 	decision 	enlightens 	that 	the 	court 	should
discharge the accused if the allegation made in the charge sheet only
points towards suspicion rather than grave suspicion. Story of the
prosecution must not be taken as gospel truth and the court must
apply its independent mind to see the existence of the prima facie
case.
10.In the instant case, as per the charge-sheet, in the year 1995, the
accused Paramjit Singh had applied for non immigrant visa at the US
Embassy. As per the part of the visa application process, the accused
had filled visa application form wherein he claimed himself to be a
social worker involved in politics. He also claimed himself to be Joint
Secretary 	of 	District Youth 	Congress, 	Urban, 	Jalandhar. 	He 	also
submitted 	one 	letter 	issued 	by 	District 	Youth 	Congress, 	Urban,
Jalandhar wherein he was shown as Joint Secretary and also a letter
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from 	Royal 	International 	Travel 	Service, 	Chandigarh, 	letter 	of
invitation from Hardyal Singh, President, FIA, New Jersey, USA etc.
11.During the visa interview of the accused Paramjit Singh, it was found
that the claim made by the said accused regarding him holding the
position 	of 	Joint 	Secretary 	of 	District 	Youth 	Congress, 	Urban,
Jalandhar was false. He also disclosed to the Visa Officer that these
documents were handed over to him by the co-accused Inderjeet.
12.During the course of the investigation, it was found out that the
accused Kuldeep @ Mintu had issued the certificate on the letter
head of District Youth Congress (I), Urban, Jalandhar wherein it was
certified that the accused Paramjit Singh was holding the position of
Joint Secretary in the said organisation.
13.It was further found out during the forensic examination that the
signatures of the accused Kuldeep @ Mintu appearing on the above
mentioned certificate issued to the co-accused matched with his
specimen signatures and admitted signatures which were collected
during the course of the investigation.
14.In the present case, in so far as the culpability of the accused Jaipal
for the offence of forgery is concerned, it should be noted that the
accused Kuldeep @ Mintu can be charged for the said offence only if
he is the maker of any forged document. In order to prove the
commission of forgery in the present case, it is imperative for the
prosecution 	to 	prima 	facie 	establish 	the 	existence 	of 	a 	“false
document”.
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15.Section 464 IPC defines the “making of false documents”. It reads as
under:
“464. Making a false document.—A person is said to
make a false document or false electronic record —
First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently—
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or
part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part
of any electronic record;
(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic
record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a
document 	or 	the 	authenticity 	of 	the 	electronic
signature, 	with 	the 	intention 	of 	causing 	it 	to 	be
believed that such document or part of document,
electronic record or electronic signature was made,
signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by
or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose
authority he knows that it was not made, signed,
sealed, executed or affixed; or
Secondly.—Who without lawful authority, dishonestly
or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a
document or an electronic record in any material
part thereof, after it has been made, executed or
affixed with electronic signature either by himself or
by any other person, whether such person be living
or dead at the time of such alteration; or
Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes
any 	person 	to 	sign, 	seal, 	execute 	or 	alter 	a
document 	or 	an 	electronic 	record 	or 	to 	affix 	his
electronic 	signature 	on 	any 	electronic 	record
k n o w i n g 	t h a t 	s u c h 	p e r s o n 	b y 	r e a s o n 	o f
unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that
by reason of deception practised upon him, he does
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not know the contents of the document or electronic
record or the nature of the alteration.
Explanation 1.—A man’s signature of his own name
may amount to forgery.
Explanation 2.—The making of a false document in
the name of a fictitious person, intending it to be
believed that the document was made by a real
person, 	or 	in 	the 	name 	of 	a 	deceased 	person,
intending it to be believed that the document was
made by the person in his lifetime, may amount to
forgery.
Explanation 3.—For the purposes of this section, the
expression “affixing electronic signature” shall have
the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of sub-
section 	(1) 	of 	section 	2 	of 	the 	Information
Technology Act, 2000.”
16.In the case of Md. Ibrahim and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Anr.
(2009) 8 SCC 751, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while discussing the
contours of forgery and false documents, has held that
“a person is said to have made a `false document', if
(i) he made or executed a document claiming to be
someone else or authorised by someone else; or
(ii) he altered or tampered a document; or
(iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception,
or from a person not in control of his senses.”
17.The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheila Sebastian vs. R.
Jawaharaj 2018 (7) SCC 581 has also held the following:
“In Md. Ibrahim (supra), this Court had the occasion
to examine forgery of a document purporting to be a
valuable security (Section 467, IPC) and using of
forged document as genuine (Section 471, IPC).
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While considering the basic ingredients of both the
offences,this 	Court 	observed 	that 	to 	attract 	the
offence of forgery as defined under Section 463, IPC
depends upon creation of a document as defined
under Section 464, IPC. It is further observed that
mere 	execution 	of 	a 	sale 	deed 	by 	claiming 	that
property being sold was executant's property, did not
amount 	to 	commission 	of 	offences 	punishable
under 	Sections 467 	and 	471, IPC even if title of
property did not vest in the executant.”
18.Further, in the case of Mir Nagvi Askari vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation (2009) 15 SCC 643 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
also held that
“A person 	is 	said 	to 	make 	a 	false 	document 	or
record if he satisfies one of the three conditions as
noticed 	hereinbefore 	and 	provided 	for 	under 	the
said 	section. 	The 	first 	condition 	being 	that 	the
document has been falsified with the intention of
causing it to be believed that such document has
been 	made 	by 	a 	person, 	by 	whom 	the 	person
falsifying the document knows that it was not made.
Clearly the documents in question in the present
case, even if it be assumed to have been made
dishonestly or fraudulently, had not been made with
the intention of causing it to be believed that they
were made by or under the authority of someone
else.”
19.Thus, in light of the above mentioned judgments, it is clear that only
the maker of a false documents as defined u/s 464 IPC can be
charged for the offence of forgery. Also, the false document is said to
be made when one of the three conditions u/s 464 IPC is satisfied.
This would mean that a false document is said to have been made if
and only if 	the maker has made or executed a document claiming to
be someone else or authorised by someone else; or any document is
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altered or tampered or the document is made by practicing deception,
or from a person not in control of his senses.
20.In the present case, from the perusal of the charge-sheet, it cannot
be inferred that the accused Kuldeep @ Mintu was not the President
of District Youth Congress (I) Urban, Jalandhar at the relevant time
i.e. in the year 1995. Thus, it could be said that the accused Kuldeep
@ Mintu had issued the said certificate in the capacity of being the
President. The said certificate was not made by the accused Kuldeep
@ Mintu by claiming to be someone else. It was not tampered or
altered 	by 	the 	accused 	Kuldeep 	@ 	Mintu. The 	experience 	letter
issued to the co-accused was also not forged in as much as it was
issued by the President only. Thus, the said experience document per
se was not a false document. Therefore, it cannot be said that the
accused Kuldeep @ Mintu has made any false document as defined
u/s 464 IPC. The experience document which was handed over to the
co-accused Paramjit Singh was not false documents per se even
through 	the 	content 	of 	the 	experience 	certificate 	certifying 	the
Paramjit Singh as Joint Secretary was false.
21.Therefore, in view of the above, since, the prosecution could not
prima facie establish the existence of any false document, therefore,
no 	forgery 	is 	made 	out 	in 	the 	present 	case. 	Consequently, 	the
accused Kuldeep @ Minuty cannot be charged for the offence of
forgery. He stands discharged for the said offence.
22.However, it cannot be ignored that the certificate in question was
indeed issued by the co-accused Kuldeep @ Mintu wherein he falsely
certified the accused Paramjit Singh to be the Joint Secretary of the
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said organisation. It cannot be believed that the accused Kuldeep @
Mintu being President of the District Youth Congress was unaware
that the accused Paramjit Singh was not the Joint Secretary of the
said organisation. Therefore, it would prima facie appear that the
accused Kuldeep @ Mintu was involved in the conspiracy along with
the other co-accused persons in order to induce the US Embassy to
issued visa to the co-accused Paramjit Singh on the basis of false
claim and certificate.
23.Therefore, I find that there are prima facie sufficient materials on
record to frame charge against the accused Kuldeep @ Mintu for
the offence punishable u/s 120B r/w 34 and 420 r/w 511 r/w 120 B
IPC only.
24.Put up for framing of charge on 19.12.2025.
[ANIMESH KUMAR]
JMFC-02/Patiala House Courts
New Delhi
05.12.2025
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