Final Order 12

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: DLND010105082023
14
CS 473/23
OYO HOTELS AND HOMES PVT LTD Vs.
GURBAXISH SINGH KOHLI
23.07.2026
Present: Sh. Rishi Kapoor and Sh. Ashish Gupta, Ld.
Counsel for Plaintiff.
Ms. Sonal Gupta, Ld. Counsel for Defendant
(through VC).
ORAL
Counsel for the plaintiff has placed on record the
cost receipts to the tune of Rs.10,000/-. He further submits that
the cost receipt for the balance Rs.25,000/- shall be placed on
record within the course of the day.
Briefly stated:- The plaintiff herein is aggrieved by
the various allegedly defamatory statements published by the
defendant against the plaintiff on various media platforms and in
newspapers. The plaintiff has accordingly approached this Court
by filing a suit for damages and injunction seeking the following
reliefs:-
a) A decree for INR 50,00,000/- (Fifty Lakh Only) against the
Defendant for making the defamatory statements against the
Plaintiff;
b) Perpetual injunction against the Defendant, his servants, agents,
employee, person or persons claiming through or under him,
restraining the Defendant from issuing, disseminating, circulating,
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communicating any malicious, scandalous statement(s), allegations,
insinuations, either written or spoken, by way of publication of the
same, against the Plaintiff, its directors, principal officers, agents,
representatives, employees, servants, clients, business associates,
business partners, companies forming a part of the OYO group by
way of emails, letters, social media posts, websites, newspapers print
or electronic, or in any other manner whatsoever, to any third
parties/ general public as will cause disrepute to the Plaintiff or shall
cause the reputation of the Plaintiff to be lowered in the eyes of right
thinking members of society; Value of injunction is INR 200/- and
requisite court fees of INR 25/- has been duly paid.
c) Perpetual injunction restraining the Defendant, his servants,
agents and assignees from publishing and/or causing to be published
by telecasts, or on any online platform, newspapers, or vide emails
or any other form of communication or any other means statements
in the nature of those made previously by the Defendant through
various mediums that is/ are unduly prejudicing the ongoing
proceedings and any other proceedings instituted before any Court
including; Value of injunction is INR 200/- and requisite court fees
of INR 25/- has been duly paid.
d) Interim and ad-interim orders in terms of prayers (b) and (c)
hereinabove; Value of injunctions is INR 200/- each and requisite
court fees of INR 50/- has been duly paid.
e) An order as to costs in the proceedings; and/or
f) Any other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in
the facts and circumstances of the present case may also be passed.
The claim of the plaintiff is contested by the
defendant by filing a detailed written statement. Accordingly,
issues were framed by this court on 22.07.2025 and issues no. 3
and 5, which are reproduced herein for ready reference, were
treated as preliminary issues by this Court:-
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iii) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable for
want of cause of action? OPD
v) Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred by limitation?
OPD
Accordingly, arguments have been addressed by
counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for the defendant on the
abovesaid preliminary issues.
It is forcefully argued by counsel for the plaintiff
that it is not a simplicitor case of damages on account of libel. It
is submitted that the defendant herein has launched a smearing
campaign against the plaintiff herein and the campaign in itself
gives rise to a continuous cause of action. And since a continuing
wrong has been committed by the defendant herein, therefore,
the limitation in the instant matter shall be computed under the
residuary clause i.e. Article 113 of the Schedule appended with
the Limitation Act. Counsel for the plaintiff has placed heavy
reliance upon the judgment of
Dr. Ajai Agarwal Vs. Ibni8 Media
& Software Limited, 2020 SCC Online Del 606.
On the other hand, counsel for the defendant has
forcefully argued that as per plaintiff’s own averments, the last
impugned article was published by the defendant on 12.05.2022
therefore, as per Article 75 of the Schedule appended with the
Limitation Act, the period of limitation shall come to an end on
11.05.2023. It is submitted that the instant suit came to be filed
on 07.12.2023 which is way beyond the statutory time limit. It is
submitted that from the averments made in the plaint coupled
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with the relief clause, it is evident that it is a simplicitor suit for
defamation and no other case for damages is made out. She has
placed specific reliance upon the prayer clause no. ‘a’ of the
plaint to contend that the plaintiff has simply claimed damages
on account of impugned defamatory statements made by the
defendant. It is forcefully argued that once the last libel was
published on 12.05.2022, the cause of action stood crystallized
and based upon the single publication rule propounded by the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in
Khawar Butt Vs. Asif Nazir Mir &
Ors, 2013 (139) DRJ 157, the present suit deserves to be
dismissed being hopelessly time barred. She has further placed
reliance upon the judgment of
Sukhbiri Devi Vs. Union of India,
2022 SCConline SC1322.
Counsel for the plaintiff, in rebuttal, submits that in
any case the question of limitation in the instant matter is a
mixed question of fact and law which cannot be decided at this
stage without leading evidence.
Both the counsels fairly endorse that all their
contentions have been duly noted and correctly paraphrased
herein as above and they have nothing more to add to it.
I have heard rival submissions and carefully perused
the record.
Perusal of the prayer clause reflects that besides
seeking damages, plaintiff is also seeking the relief of perpetual
injunction.
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For the sake of convenience, I first propose to deal
with the issue of perpetual injunction to ascertain as to if the
instant suit is maintainable or not.
The meticulous examination of prayer clause no. ‘b’
and ‘c’ would reveal that the plaintiff is seeking to restrain the
defendant from publishing any statement which ‘will cause
disrepute to the plaintiff or shall cause the reputation of the
plaintiff to be lowered’ or make any defamatory statement which
shall prejudice the ongoing proceedings or any other proceedings
instituted before any Court.
In my considered opinion, the relief of perpetual
injunction, as sought for by the plaintiff, is legally not tenable. It
essentially rests upon hypothetical assumptions.
In order to entertain the claim, the Court would have
to presume that the defendant would make utterances against the
plaintiff which shall be defamatory in nature and the defendant
shall be having no valid defence in exercising his fundamental
right of speech and expression.
Based upon such presumptive assumptions, I am
afraid that a blanket gag order placing absolute restraint upon the
defendant is legally not tenable. I am fortified in my opinion by
the observations of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the matter of
Shri Naresh Kumar Vs. The Wire & ors, 2026:DHC:5759, DOD:
20.07.2026, wherein, dealing with an injunction application,
Hon’ble High Court has propounded the legal principles here as
under:-
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“55. That being said, this court is of the view that the direction
issued vidé para 30(iii) of judgment dated 22.11.2023, whereby
defendants Nos.1 and 2 were directed “not to post, circulate or
publish any similar defamatory content against the plaintiff as set
out in the impugned article/publication dated 09.11.2023”, was
over-broad, presumptive in nature and based purely on a
hypothetical situation; and therefore, is untenable in law.
56. In the opinion of this court, defamation as a jurisprudential
concept is different from how it is understood as a lay concept.
Every statement or publication that is derogatory in fact may not be
defamatory in law, since the maker or author or publisher of the
statement may raise one or more of the well-recognised defences to
an allegation that what they said or wrote or published does not
amount to a legal wrong. These include the defence of justification
by truth, fair comment, privilege, or such other legal defences in
answer to an allegation of defamation.
57. Moreover, to assume that what someone may publish would be
defamatory, is egregiously hypothetical and presumptive; and
therefore cannot be the basis of a court injunction. No matter how
perspicacious a court may be, it cannot act as a soothsayer and
predict what an author may publish next, and presume it to be
offensive to a party, and thereby gag what is yet to be put-out in
the public. This proposition has been articulated in various
precedents, some of which are cited below in support.
58. In Bonnard vs. Perryman the Court of Appeal has opined the
following:
“… … But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an action
for defamation is so special as to require exceptional caution
in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before
the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong. The
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right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest
that individuals should possess, and, indeed, that they should
exercise without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is
done; and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong
committed; but, on the contrary, often a very wholesome act
is performed in the publication and repetition of an alleged
libel. Until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not
clear that any right at all has been infringed; and the
importance of leaving free speech unfettered is a strong
reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and
warily with the granting of interim injunctions.”
59. In Fraser vs. Evans & Ors. the Court of Appeal, Queen’s Bench
Division observed as follows:
“First, Libel. In so far as the article will be defamatory of Mr.
Fraser, it is clear he cannot get an injunction. The court will
not restrain the publication of an article, even though it is
defamatory, when the defendant says he intends to justify it
or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest. That
has been established for many years ever since Bonnard v.
Perryman. The reason sometimes given is that the defences
of justification and fair comment are for the jury, which is
the constitutional tribunal, and not for a judge. But a better
reason is the importance in the public interest that the truth
should out. As the court said in that case:
“The right of free speech is one which it is for the
public interest that individuals should possess, and, indeed,
that they should exercise without impediment, so long as no
wrongful act is done.””
60. In Kailash Gahlot vs. Vijender Gupta & Ors a Co-ordinate
Bench of the court noted:
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“47. Similarly, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Sardar
Charanjit Singh (supra), held that the court would not restrain
publication on the plea that if it was published, it would
result in a negative impact on the reputation of the plaintiff.
What has not come into existence cannot be presumed to be
defamatory. The court would not have any material before it
to take even a prima facie view that what would be published
would in fact result in loss of reputation.”
61. In S. Charanjit Singh vs. Aroon Purie a Co-ordinate Bench of
this court held:
“22. In the instant case the article is not in existence. The
defendants intend to publish an article preferably after
obtaining the views and comments of the plaintiff on the
questionnaire dated 21st January, 1982. The difficulty in
dealing with this case is that I do not know what the article
when published will contain. It is not known what facts will
be stated and what comments will be made. It is therefore not
possible at this stage to determine whether the proposed
article would be defamatory or not. But as the defendants
state that they would plead justification and fair comment for
publishing the article pertaining to the plaintiff, I am of the
opinion that injunction should not issue. None of the
questions asked by the defendants relate to the private life of
the plaintiff. All questions are directly connected with his
public life. Defence of fair comment and justification has
been raised by the defendants and therefore injunction not to
be issued.”
62. It is important to appreciate that in matters of defamation, the
defences referred to above would only arise once a publication is
made. There is no conceivable way, whether in fact or in law, by
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which it can be presumed that what an author or publisher is
proposing to publish would be defamatory, even going by any past
publication that may have been made by the author/ publisher.”
In view of the above, I am of the opinion that such
vaguely worded relief cannot be granted to the plaintiff herein
and therefore, the instant suit for the relief of perpetual injunction
is devoid of any legally tenable cause of action.
Even otherwise also, if the main relief is barred by
limitation, ancillary reliefs cannot be invoked to extend the
period of limitation. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon
the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Nikhila
Divyang Mehta & Anr Vs. Hitesh P. Sanghvi & ors,
2025 INSC
485.
Admittedly, the relief of perpetual injunction is
ancillary to the main relief of defamation. Therefore, let us now
examine as to if the main releif is within limitation or not?
As far as the issue of defamation is concerned, the
relief sought is hopelessly time barred. From the cause of action
clause i.e. para no. 29 of the plaint, it is evident that the
impugned defamatory statement was published by the defendant
lastly on 12.05.2022. It is neither averred nor argued that after
12.05.2022 there was any fresh publication of the libelous
material. Consequently, as rightly argued by counsel for the
defendant, the period of limitation, as per Article 75 of the
Schedule appended with Limitation Act, would come to an end
on 11.05.2023. Admittedly, the instant suit came to be filed on
07.12.2023 which is way beyond the period of limitation. It is no
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longer
res integra that the tort of defamation stands crystallized
on the date of publication. Reliance in this regard can be placed
upon the judgment in the matter of
Khawar Butt Vs. Asif Nazir
Mir & Ors, 2013 (139) DRJ 157, wherein Hon’ble Delhi High
Court while examining the issue has observed here as under:-
“38. I am of the view that the Single Publication Rule is more
appropriate and pragmatic to apply, rather the Multiple Publication
Rule. I find the reasoning adopted by the American Courts in this
regard to be more appealing than the one adopted by the English
Courts, prior to the amendment of the law by the introduction of
the Defamation Act, 2013. It is the policy of the law of limitation
to bar the remedy beyond the prescribed period. That legislative
policy would stand defeated if the mere continued residing of the
defamatory material of article on the website were to give a
continuous cause of action to the plaintiff to sue for defamation/
libel. Of course, if there is re-publication resorted to by the
defendant- with a view to reach the different or larger section of
the public in respect of the defamatory article or material, it would
give rise to a fresh cause of action.”
Upon meticulous examination of the plaint, it is
evident that the suit of the plaintiff for damages essentially rests
upon the tortious liability under the tort of defamation. Prayer
clause no. ‘a’ of the plaint reveals that the damages to the tune of
Rs.50 Lakh is sought by the plaintiff on account of defamatory
statements made against the plaintiff by the defendant. Except for
the liability under libel no case for damages on account of some
other legal injury is discernible, either from the body of the plaint
or from the relief clause.
Consequently, the instant suit is clearly
distinguishable on facts from the case of
Dr. Ajai Agarwal
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(supra), relied upon by the plaintiff wherein Hon’ble Delhi High
Court has categorically observed that the suit filed by the
plaintiff therein was not an action simplicitor for compensation
of libel but the plaintiff therein claimed a decree of punitive
damages on account of mental harassment due to the proceedings
initiated by the defendant therein before the Medical Council,
police etc. and also before the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court.
The case of Dr. Ajai Agarwal (supra) is clearly distinguishable
from the facts of the instant case.
Consequently, I am of the opinion that the suit of the
plaintiff is hopelessly time barred.
Issues no. (iii) and (v) accordingly stand decided in
favour of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
The present suit is accordingly dismissed being time
barred. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment
of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of
Sukhbiri Devi Vs. Union
of India, 2022 SCConline SC1322.
File be consigned to record room after necessary
compliance.
(Dharmender Rana)
District Judge – 01
PHC/New Delhi/23.07.2026
However, at this stage, while pronouncing the order,
Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff has turned up with an application
under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking to amend the plaint.
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Order has already been pronounced and this Court
has become
functus officio. Consequently, this court cannot
entertain the plea of amendment. The application is disposed off
as infrunctuous.
File be consigned to record room.
(Dharmender Rana)
District Judge – 01
PHC/New Delhi/23.07.2026
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