Final Order 1

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: Union of India Vs. Vijayant Jain
OMP (COMM) No. 50/2026
24.03.2026 (At 2:16PM)
Fresh petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, received by way of random allocation. It be checked and
registered.
Present : Ms. Richa Gambhir, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner
through video conferencing with Sh. Jitender Kumar
Singh, Assistant Section Officer of behalf of
petitioner.
1. This is a fresh petition under Section 34 of Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, challenging the award dated 01.05.2024.
Though there is one application under Section 5 of Limitation
Act, so as to seek condonation of delay, however, from the
averments made in para 7 of the petition, it is revealed that the
award was received by the petitioner on 17.05.2024. Thus, this
petition has been filed much after the maximum period of 120
days (including the extended period).
2. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to
Section 34 of the 1996 Act, refers that application for setting
aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of
Section 34 could be made by a party within three months of
passing the award and the said period can only be extended for
a further period of 30 days on showing sufficient cause and not
thereafter. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the
proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond
thirty days.
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3. In the judgment passed in the case of Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470, it was held that:
“12.
As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996
Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not
thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In
our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express
exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did
not need to go further. To hold that the Court could
entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond
the extended period under the proviso, would render
the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No
principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
4. Application for condonation has to be rejected in view of
aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court and the
inevitable result is that this petition also has to be dismissed
being time barred.
5. Before parting with this order, I wish to record some
observations. Ld. counsel for petitioner was well conscious of
the fact that this petition is time barred. Probably for such
reason, there is no particular paragraph in the petition, so as to
plead the fact of limitation or to claim that petition is within or
without limitation. I am not sure about actual objective behind
filing such petition, which was hopelessly time barred. But one
fact, which is much apparent, is that in the name of filing of this
petition the relevant department of Government of India has
knowingly wasted the public exchequer money and resources.
6. In my opinion, such conduct must be brought to the notice of a
responsible authority. Therefore, this matter is brought to the
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notice of Worthy Secretary, Law and Justice, Govt. of India, to
look into such kind of litigation being undertaken on behalf of
Government of India, with apparent result of wastage of money.
7. Copy of this order be sent accordingly.
8. File be consigned to record room.
Pulastya Pramachala
District Judge (Commercial Court)-01
Patiala House Court, New Delhi.
24.03.2026
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