Full Order Text
Final Order 2 · 25 Feb 2025 · CNR DLND010008532025
Order Details: COPY OF JUDGMENT Pdf Text: 1 IN THE COURT OF SH. SUMIT DASS, ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE – 05, NEW DELHI DISTRICT, PATIALA HOUSE COURTS, NEW DELHI Criminal Revision No. 79/2025 Arvind Saraf S/o Late Ram Gopal Saraf Having its office at F-701-A, Lado Sarai, Mehrauli, New Delhi-110030. …….Revisionist VERSUS 1. State of NCT of Delhi Through SHO PS Economic Offences Wing, Mandir Marg, New Delhi 2. Gautam Khaitan s/o Late O.P.Khaitan r/o N-12, Panchsheel Enclave, New Delhi. Having office at B-1, Defence Colony, New Delhi-110024. …… Respondent Date of Institution : 06.02.2025 Date of Arguments : 10.02.2025 Date of Decision : 25.02.2025 JUDGMENT 1. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 31.01.2025 passed by the Court of Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate [in short Ld. CJM/Ld. Trial Court] in complaint case bearing no. 81842/2023 titled Cr. Rev. 79/2025 1/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 1 of 13 -- 2 as Gautam Khaitan v/s Arvind Saraf & Anr. PS EOW, Mandir Marg whereby and whereunder the Ld. CJM had allowed an application U/s 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [in short Cr.PC] and had directed registration of FIR. 1.1 In compliance of the said order in fact FIR No.15/2025 dated 03.02.2025 U/s 406/420 IPC at PS EOW was lodged/registered. 1.2 The revision petition was received in this Court on 06.02.2025 - by then the FIR had already been lodged. Infact on 06.02.2025 I had passed an order directing the notice of the revision petition to be served on the opposite party and the impugned order directing registration of the FIR was stayed. However, the said order in the given set of facts and circumstances did not survive and on 10.02.2025 arguments on the revision petition were heard and the matter was reserved for orders. 2. Sh. Sidharth Aggarwal, Ld. Sr. Advocate for the revisionist contended that notwithstanding the said aspect i.e. the FIR having been registered, this Court is duly empowered to examine the legality, correctness and propriety of the impugned order dated 31.01.2025 on the touchstone of the provision of Section 397 Cr.PC to check whether the same is not illegal, improper or otherwise in any manner perverse. He submits that since the revision petition emanates from the order directing registration of the FIR that order - being a judicial order is subject to scrutiny by this Court. In support thereof he has relied upon the following judgments: i) Arun P.Gidh v/s Chander Prakash & Ors. Writ Petition Cr. Rev. 79/2025 2/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 2 of 13 -- 3 2517/2022 decided by Hon'ble Bombay High Court. ii) Ravinder Lal Airi v/s S.Shalu Constructions Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2023) 1 High Court Cases (Delhi) 597 iii) Alok Kumar v/s Harsh Mander & Anr. reported in 2023 SCC Online Delhi 4213. iv) Om Prakash Ambadkar v/s State of Maharashtra, Crl. Appeal No. 352/2020. 2.1 On the other hand Sh. Madhav Khurana, Ld. Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of complainant/respondent no.2 contended that more or less once the FIR has been lodged it would be only an academic exercise to continue with the present revision petition - in fact the revision petition should be dismissed on this short ground only. He submits that even if the order passed by Ld. CJM is considered on a stand alone basis it is in consonance with the direction passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Lalit Kumari v/s Govt. of U.P. & Ors. coupled with the settled case law on the subject as to what course of action the Ld. Magistrate should take upon receipt of the application U/s 156(3) Cr.PC. He submits that the entire case law on the subject has been cited/relied upon by the Ld. CJM in para no.6 of the impugned order. In fact the said judgments/the ratios are again perused the revision petition perse would liable to be dismissed. 3. Matter was heard at length and reserved for orders. 4. First and foremost question which arises for consideration is whether once the FIR has been lodged whether this Court should exercise any revisional jurisdiction over the subject matter notwithstanding the fact Cr. Rev. 79/2025 3/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 3 of 13 -- 4 lodging of FIR or the said event cannot be effaced even for the sake of argument the revisionist is successful. To that extent Ld. Counsel for the revisionist also conceded but stated that the Ld. Trial Court had not considered the judicial precedents on the subject matter i.e. U/s 156(3) Cr.PC and therefore it is imperative that this Court should exercise its revisional jurisdiction and pass necessary directions. 4.1 In support thereof Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of revisionist contended that in the judgment i.e. Arun P. Gidh v/s Chander Prakash Singh & Ors. (supra) the Hon'ble Bombay High Court had opined that this Court while exercising its revisional jurisdiction is competent to deal with the said matter even post registration of the FIR. Ld. Sr. Advocate has extensively relied upon the said judgment and read over the questions as formulated in para no. 45 and contended that the said judgment is directly applicable in the given set of facts and circumstances. He has particularly drawn the attention of the Court to para 119 to 122 and para 125 to 128 which reads as here under : 119. The distinction propounded by Mr. Ostwal cannot be said to be inconceivable. The illegality in the order passed by the Magistrate may manifest in the form of procedural breach or want of compliance of the pre- requisite under the statute or a law declared by the Supreme Court. For instance, if the Magistrate passes an order under Section 156(3) without an affidavit having been filed in the manner ordained by Priyanka Srivastava (supra), the procedural irregularity would be writ large. Likewise, if an order is passed in respect of an act done by a public servant while acting in official capacity or in discharge of his official duties without the previous sanction envisaged under Section 197 of the Code, where the proviso to Section 156(3) introduced by the Maharashtra Amendment operates, the legality of the order under Section 156(3) can be questioned on that ground. Cr. Rev. 79/2025 4/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 4 of 13 -- 5 120. In the case of Jacob Mathew V/s. State of Punjab and Anr.55 55(2005) 6 SCC 1 WP2517-20222+-.DOC the Supreme Court directed that a private complaint of medical negligence may not be entertained, unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence before the Court in the form of a credible opinion given by another competent doctor to support a charge of rashness or negligence, on the part of the accused doctor. The investigating officer should, before proceeding against the doctor accused of rash or negligent act or omission, obtain an independent and competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in government service qualified in that branch of medical practice. If a direction for registration of FIR without adhering to the aforesaid mandate is given, it may be assailed as being illegal for being in violation of the law declared by the Supreme Court. It can be conceivably urged that, in the aforesaid cases, when the order of the Magistrate is set aside, all the actions which have been taken, in the interregnum, must be declared illegal and non-est. 121. Mr. Ponda joined the issue by canvassing a submission that it is well settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the illegality committed during the course of investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the Court. A strong reliance was placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. V/s. Bhajan Lal and Ors.56 to lend support to the submission that the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the resultant prosecution, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. In the case of Bhajan Lal (Supra), in the context of the investigation having been carried out by an 561992 Supp.(1) SCC 335 WP2517-20222+-.DOC officer, who was not empowered under Section 5A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Supreme Court enunciated the position in law as under : "119. It has been ruled by this Court in several decisions that Section 5-A of the Act is mandatory and not directory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality but that illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case is proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby See (1) H.N.Rishbud and Inder Singh V/s. State of Delhi57; (2) Major E.G.Barsay v/s. State of Bombay58; (3) Munna Lal V/s. State of Uttar Pradesh 59; (4) S.N.Bose V/s. State of Cr. Rev. 79/2025 5/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 5 of 13 -- 6 Bihar60; (5) Muni Lal V/s. Delhi Administration61; (6) Khandu Sonu Dhobi V/s. State of Maharashtra62. However, in Rishbud Case, and Muni Lal Case, it has been ruled that if any breach of the said mandatory proviso relating to investigation is brought to the notice of the court at an early stage of the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders as may be called for to rectify the illegality and cure the defects in the investigation." (emphasis supplied) 122. The submission of Mr. Ponda, based on the prosecution not being completely vitiated by an illegality in investigation does not afford a 57(1955) 1 SCR 1150 58(1962) 2 SCR 195 59(1964) 3 SCR 88 60(1968) 3 SCR 563 61 (1971) 2 SCC 48 62 (1972) 3 SCC 786 WP2517-20222+-.DOC complete answer to the issue raised by Mr. Ostwal. The patent illegality in the order of the Magistrate passed under Section 156(3) of the Code, as is evident, relates to at a stage anterior to investigation. In a sense, the order passed by the Magistrate, in the circumstances, highlighted above, takes the colour of an order passed in breach of a jurisdictional condition, either prescribed by the statute or postulated by a precedent. Thus, we are afraid to accede to the submission that such an illegality in the order can be equated with an illegality committed during the course of investigation. 125. To equip the revisional court to exercise the discretion in a correct manner, it may be advantageous for the revisional court to ascertain whether, pursuant to the direction of the Magistrate, FIR has, in fact, been registered. Two situations are conceivable : pre and post-registration of FIR pursuant to the order by the Magistrate. 126. (a) If the FIR is yet not registered, an interim order passed by the revisional court, staying effect and operation of the impugned order under Section 156(3), will have full play and the investigating agency cannot proceed to register the FIR and enter into investigation lest the order passed by the revisional court would be denuded of the meaning and content. (b) Such an interim order before the registration of the FIR will operate with full force and vigor, irrespective of the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order which weighed with the revisional court to stay such an WP2517-20222+-.DOC order. Cr. Rev. 79/2025 6/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 6 of 13 -- 7 (c) On the other hand, if the FIR has already been registered, before the revisional court passes an interim order, then the nature of the infirmity in the impugned order may become relevant. (d) If the revisional court finds that the impugned order suffers from jurisdictional error, (of the nature referred to in Para Nos.119, 120 and 122 above), in our considered view, the revisional court must be construed to have the power to stay further proceedings pursuant to the registration of the FIR if the matter is still at the stage of investigation. (e) We hasten to add that while passing such an order of stay of the proceedings at the stage of investigation, the revisional Court ought to record reasons which weighed with the court to hold that there appears a jurisdictional error in passing an order under Section 156(3) of the Code and thereupon, in terms, direct that the further proceedings be stayed. (f) However, where the investigation culminates into lodging of the chargesheet and/or cognizance has been taken by the jurisdictional court, the interim order or final order passed by the revisional court setting aside the order passed by the Magistrate under Section 156(3), will not have the effect of quashing the resultant prosecution. 127. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr. Desai that the view that after FIR is registered revision is not an efficacious remedy, would render the statutory remedy of revision redundant. The order passed by the revisional Court setting aside a direction for WP2517- 20222+-.DOC investigation, even after registration of the FIR, cannot be said to be bereft of any utility. If such an order is passed before the completion of investigation, the investigating agency may take the same into account in determining the course the investigation shall culminate into. If such an order is passed, post lodging of the chargesheet, the jurisdictional Magistrate may have the benefit of the said order at the stage of taking cognizance or during the course of the inquiry, as envisaged by the Code. The High Court may also have due regard to the order of the revisional Court while considering the prayer for quashing the FIR and/or prosecution in exercise of writ or inherent jurisdiction. 128. The conspectus of aforesaid discussion is that in our view, the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Kailash Dattatraya Jadhav (supra), that in a case where on the basis of an order under sub-Section (3) of Section 156 of the Code, FIR is registered, the remedy of revision under the Code, is not an efficacious remedy, lays down the correct position in law. Cr. Rev. 79/2025 7/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 7 of 13 -- 8 4.2 Further emphasizing on para 126 (d) which I have also underlined he emphasized that the impugned order suffers from non application of judicial mind coupled with the fact that it did not correctly appreciate the law on the subject which is adumbrated in Alok Kumar v/s Harsh Mander & Ors, (supra) and thus the impugned order is liable to be set aside by exercising revisional jurisdiction. In simpler words the Ld. Trial Court had committed a jurisdictional error and had not followed the settled precedent on the subject matter. He contended that already a civil suit was filed which was pending adjudication and the complainant had not been able to receive any favourable result till now and in those circumstances the recourse of criminal action was to somehow or the other convert a civil wrong into a criminal act. Somehow or the other coerce the revisionist to yield to his illegal demand once he has been unsuccessful in the civil suit. Furthermore the Investigating Officer/Enquiry Officer had reported in the ATR that no cognizable offence is made out and the Ld. Trial Court/CJM had brushed aside those aspects/did not consider the same. The impugned order is liable to be set aside accordingly. 5. On the other hand Ld. Sr. Advocate Sh. Madhav Khurana appearing on behalf of the complainant argued that in fact in the judgment of Arun P. Gidh v/s Chander Prakash Singh & Ors. itself particularly para 126(d) points out to certain eventualities as referred to in para no. 119,120 and 122 and none of the said eventualities or infirmities are made out in the given facts. Cr. Rev. 79/2025 8/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 8 of 13 -- 9 5.1 He argued that Ld. CJM had noted the facts of the case, considered the ATR report, relied on the judicial precedents particularly the binding ratio of leading case of Lalita Kumari v/s State and thus, had applied his judicial mind and passed a reasoned order in favour of the complainant and that view cannot be substituted by the revisional Court moreso when the FIR has already been lodged. 6. If I just have a re-look at para 126 onwards, para 126 (a) and (b) deals with the situation when the FIR is not yet registered - the operation of the impugned order can be stayed by the revisional Court - the revisional Court has full powers staying the operation of the impugned order and the Investigating Agency cannot enter the domain to investigate unless and until the revisional Court decides the matter. Para No.126 (b) reclarifies this aspect that before registration of the FIR irrespective of the nature of the infirmity which weighed with the revisional Court to stay such an order. Meaning thereby at that juncture the revisional Court has all the powers to check as to the propriety, correctness and legality of the impugned order. The usage of the words irrespective of the nature of the infirmity is for the reason that in para 126(c) the said aspect becomes important or relevant post registration of the FIR. This particular aspect has been clarified, in my humble opinion in para no.126(b) wherein certain instances have been quoted. 6.1 Coming to the nature of infirmity in the impugned order the infirmity should of such a nature which is adumbrated in para 119, 120, 122 of the said judgment : Cr. Rev. 79/2025 9/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 9 of 13 -- 10 i) First infirmity which has been pointed is with regard to the non compliance of the ratio of Priyanka Srivastava which pre supposes filing of an affidavit in support of the complaint. ii) Secondly an order has been passed in respect of an ACT done by a public servant while acting in official capacity or in discharge of his official duties without the previous sanction envisaged U/s 197 Cr.PC. iii) Another category of cases was culled out with reference to doctors wherein the question of medical negligence is in question particularly in reference to the criminal aspect wherein additional safeguards have been provided to prevent wanton misuse of the provision of the criminal law - as so held in the leading case of Jacob Methews v/s State of Punjab & Ors. wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has directed that a private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence of a competent doctor particularly in reference to a charge of rashness and negligence viz a viz the accused doctor. Non compliance of such a mandate would itself means that there is a violation of a settled law and any action taken in contravention thereof is illegal and nonest. 7. The instances which have been articulated which is clear by the usage of the word " in a sense, the order passed by the Magistrate in the circumstances, highlighted above, takes the colour of an order passed in breach of a jurisdictional condition, either prescribed by the statue or postulated by judicial precedents" suggest that the infirmities are of such a nature which at the first instance would not have led to the registration of the FIR. In simpler words at the stage post registration of the FIR the Cr. Rev. 79/2025 10/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 10 of 13 -- 11 interdict by the Court or intervention is considerably narrower or only in exceptional circumstances where there is a breach of jurisdictional condition and not otherwise to substitute another view against the view taken by the Ld. Trial Court/Ld. CJM. 8. The complaint and the application U/s 156(3) Cr.PC is supported with the affidavit of the complainant. It is also not a complaint wherein any public servant or any medical professional is involved. There is no patent or gross violation of any statute or a leading precedent which constitutes to be a breach of jurisdictional condition. 9. Ld. Sr. Advocate on behalf of the revisionist has not been able to point out any fragrant violation except contending to the fact that already a civil suit was filed and the ATR is in their favour. In my considered opinion these are not infirmities which Court should now consider once the FIR has been registered. Still, in order to lend completeness to the present order I have examined the same as well. 9.1 The crux of the submission of the Ld. Sr. Advocate on behalf of the revisionist is that the Ld. CJM should not have ordered registration of the FIR and should have opted/taken recourse to the procedure U/s 200/202 Cr.PC which facet is also substantiated by the fact that the ATR had also concluded that no cognizable offence is made out. Now on this aspect i.e. whether the Ld. CJM should have taken/adopted the second path instead of ordering the registration of FIR U/s 156(3) Cr.PC, in my considered opinion the primary test or the basic test with respect to the registration of the FIR is whether the complaint discloses any cognizable Cr. Rev. 79/2025 11/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 11 of 13 -- 12 offence or not. Once answer to this is in affirmative then the next question for consideration is as to whether Court should order registration of the FIR or proceed by treating the same to be a complaint case. Now the Ld. CJM had categorically formed the opinion that on the basis of the complaint and the material relied upon by the complainant coupled with the ATR this matter requires to be investigated by registration of FIR. This particular aspect or opinion cannot stated to be perverse. In fact the Ld. CJM had taken due note of the judgment/the ratio of Ravinder Lal Airi (supra) and Alok Kumar (supra) and taken note of the ATR which has been filed. Ld. CJM had taken note of the facts of the case as so stated in para 2 of the impugned order and also taken note that the amount was duly acknowledged coupled with the fact that the accused had agreed to dispose of the property of his company of which the complainant was earlier also a director and later on the said property was fraudulently sold for a pittance i.e. much less than the market rate to negate/wriggle out of the obligations by causing change in shareholding in contravention of the Companies Act. Apart thereof the money trail also requires to be investigated. 9.2 Considering the totality of facts and circumstances the need for investigation the second test U/s 156(3) Cr.PC apart from the disclosure of a cognizable offence was adjudicated/held in favour of the complainant and the said opinion to my mind cannot be faulted moreso once crystallized in the registration of the FIR cannot be reversed by exercising the revisional jurisdiction which is even much more restricted post registration of the FIR/subsequent to the registration of the FIR. Cr. Rev. 79/2025 12/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 12 of 13 -- 13 10. With the aforesaid discussion the present revision petition is liable to be dismissed. The same is dismissed. File be consigned to Record Room. TCR alongwith copy of the order be sent to the Ld. Trial Court. Pronounced in open Court on 25.02.2025 (Sumit Dass) Additional Sessions Judge -05 New Delhi District, Patiala House Courts New Delhi. Cr. Rev. 79/2025 13/13 Arvind Saraf v/s State -- 13 of 13 --
