Order 6

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: Suit No 719/24 Pg 1 of 16
IN THE COURT OF AYUSH SHARMA: CIVIL JUDGE,
EAST DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
Reserved on: November 8th, 2024
Pronounced on: November 19th, 2024
SUIT NO: 719/24
IN THE MATTER OF: -
MADHO MANDAL ...PLAINTIFF
Through: Sh. Dalvinder Singh,
Advocate.
VERSUS
ALL INDIA PANCAHYAT PARISHAD
& ORS. ...DEFENDANTS
Through: Sh. Sunil Kumar,
Advocate for
Defendant no.1.
Sh. Rahul Garg,
Advocate for
Defendant no.2
Sh. S.S Vijay Mishra,
Advocate for
Defendant no.4.
ORDER
1. The present order shall dispose of the application filed under order
XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) by the plaintiff
seeking the following reliefs:
“(a) an ad-interim order in favour of the plaintiff and
against the Defendant No.1 & 3, their agents,
attorneys, legal heirs and servants/workers etc.
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 2 of 16
restraining them not to dispossess the plaintiff from
the suit property without adopting due process of law,
which is more specifically shown in the red color in
the annexed site plan,
(b) pass an ad-interim injunction order for restraining
the Defendant No.1 & 2 from creating any hindrance
in the enjoyment of the suit property i.e. one room
being occupied by the plaintiff within the suit property
i.e. one room set within the premises of All India
Panchayat Parishad at 368, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I,
Delhi, as shown more specifically in the site plan
attached with the present suit,
(c) a decree of mandatory injunction against the
Defendant No.1,2 and 3 to restore the electricity
connection supplied to the portion being occupied by
the plaintiff i.e. suit property.
(d) a decree of mandatory injunction against the
Defendant no.1 and 3 to issue NOC in favour of the
plaintiff so that he can get the separate electricity
connection in his name from the office of the
Defendant no. 2, if they cannot provide electricity
supply to the portion of the plaintiff, which is suit
property, as shown more specifically in the site plan
attached with the present suit.”
2. Brief facts necessary to determine the present application are
mentioned as under:
2.1 The plaintiff’s case, as presented in the plaint, is that on 26.04.2013,
the plaintiff submitted an application to join the defendants’ office as a
driver, to provide services as a daily-wage employee. Subsequently, on
24.05.2013, the defendants temporarily appointed the plaintiff as an
assistant driver on the condition that he would receive daily wages only
for the days he rendered his services. On 27.05.2013, the plaintiff accepted
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 3 of 16
the appointment letter, submitted a written acknowledgment, and began
working for the defendants.
2.2 On 15.06.2014, the plaintiff was provided legitimate
accommodation consisting of a one-room set located within the premises
of the All India Panchayat Parishad at 368, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”), which is specifically
marked in red on the site plan.
2.3 The plaintiff claims that defendants no. 1 and 3 both identify
themselves as authorized executives of the All India Panchayat Parishad,
and the appointment letter and confirmation order were issued with their
consent. Consequently, both defendants no. 1 and 3 have been made parties
to this suit. The plaintiff further alleges that defendant no. 1 is pressuring
him to vacate the premises without following the due process of law.
Defendant no. 2, allegedly in collusion with defendants no. 1 and 3,
disconnected the electricity connection to the suit property and is
demanding a no-objection certificate from defendants no. 1 and 3. Despite
presenting the order dated 12.05.2017, passed by the Hon’ble High Court
of Delhi, defendant no. 2 has refused to restore the electricity connection.
2.4 The plaintiff states that he has been continuously residing in the suit
property since his appointment and was issued an election ID card on
03.12.2014, at the same address. Furthermore, the Hon’ble High Court of
Delhi, in its order dated 12.05.2017, passed in W.P. (C) No. 3902/2017,
recognized the plaintiff as a bona fide resident. This order was issued
during a dispute between the two contesting parties (defendants) that led
to proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C., resulting in the plaintiff’s
residential portion being sealed. The Hon’ble High Court directed the de-
sealing of the plaintiff’s residence.
2.5 The plaintiff claims that an electricity connection was available
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 4 of 16
from the main meter supply for essential usage, including lighting, ceiling
fans, and a submersible pump, until 28.08.2024, when it was abruptly
disconnected by the defendants. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants
also threatened to demolish his residence. On 16.11.2021, the defendants
allegedly coerced the plaintiff into signing blank stamp papers, which they
may have misused. The plaintiff reported this incident to the Station House
Officer (SHO), Pandav Nagar, Delhi.
2.6 On 28.08.2024, the plaintiff approached the defendants, requesting
the restoration of the electricity connection to ensure the comfort of his
school-going children. Defendant no. 1 not only denied the request but also
threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences if he continued to stay in
the suit property. Apprehending foul play, the plaintiff sent a written
request to defendant no. 1 on 28.08.2024, via registered/speed post.
2.7 On 01.09.2024, the defendants visited the suit property, which is in
the plaintiff’s possession, created a scene, attempted to remove the
plaintiff’s belongings, and threatened to lock the premises. The plaintiff
claims he somehow managed to retain possession of the suit property but
alleges that the defendants warned they would return with anti-social
elements to forcibly take possession. Hence, the present suit.
2.8 The defendant no.1 has filed a short reply to the contest this
application. The defendant no.1 denies the allegations in the plaint,
asserting that the plaintiff has not approached the court with clean hands.
The defendant further claims that the suit should be dismissed as the
plaintiff has concealed material facts. It is stated that while the plaintiff has
a jhuggi within the defendant’s premises, it is unoccupied and nobody is
residing therein. The plaintiff is actually residing with his wife and
children at the following address: Top Floor, No. 38, Patparganj Village,
Mayur Vihar Phase-I, Delhi.
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 5 of 16
2.9 The defendant no.1 is a registered public trust under Registration
No. 2061, dated 1966, managed in accordance with its duly registered
constitution. According to Article 9 of the constitution, the General
Secretary of All India Panchayat Parishad (AIPP) has the authority to sue
or defend on behalf of the organization. As per the constitution of AIPP,
the Executive Committee (EC) is the highest executive authority and is
answerable to the All India Panchayat Council (AIPC). Article 5(2)(iii)
stipulates that the EC must present every agenda in AIPC meetings and
submit reports on proceedings. All appointments in the organization
require approval from the AIPC during general meetings. Any appointment
letter issued by an office bearer without such approval is not final. The
plaintiff claims to have been appointed on a daily-wage basis and
subsequently regularized/confirmed through letters dated 24.05.2013 and
15.06.2014. However, these appointment and confirmation letters were not
approved by the AIPC, rendering the plaintiff’s appointment and
confirmation invalid.
2.10 The defendant no.1 alleges that the plaintiff is a trespasser who has
encroached upon the defendant’s premises. Consequently, legal action was
initiated by filing a police complaint against the plaintiff on 11.12.2023.
The suit property belongs to the defendant no.1, and the plaintiff has no
legal right, title, or interest in it. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot claim
possession of the suit property. The defendant contends that the plaintiff
filed this suit solely to assert possession over the suit property under the
guise of seeking an electricity connection. The defendant asserts that the
plaintiff cannot claim an electricity connection as a matter of right when
he is not residing on the premises.
2.11 The defendant no.4 has filed the written statement claiming
ownership of the entire land, including the suit property, asserting that no
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 6 of 16
other organization has the authority to grant residential rights to anyone.
Defendant No. 4 states that the plaintiff used to assist with dropping the
children of the late Sh. Rajender Tripathi to school and was allowed to park
his three-wheeler at night as per a purported letter dated 24.05.2013.
However, this permission was revoked on 25.05.2013, by the General
Secretary of the headquarters, rendering the plaintiff's alleged joining
dated 27.05.2013, inconsequential.
2.12 Defendant No. 4 further asserts that Mr. Anil Sharma, General
Secretary, did not have the authority to regularize any appointment or
allocate residential quarters in the organization. Additionally, the
organization holds no records regarding any residential accommodation
being allotted to the plaintiff. The defendant No. 4 describes the plaintiff
as a trespasser who initially parked his three-wheeler behind the officials’
residential quarters by erecting a jhuggi. Following a complaint by the
foundation, the plaintiff vacated the premises and returned to his residence
at 38, Patparganj, Major Wali Gali, Mayur Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi-91.
2.13 Defendant No. 4 alleges that in 2017, the plaintiff, in connivance
with Ms. Satyabhama Tripathi and Surendra Thakur, unlawfully
encroached on the Panchayat’s property. Furthermore, in Civil Suit No.
590/18, this court, by order dated 08.01.2024, declared Ms. Satyabhama
Tripathi a trespasser.
2.14 On 11.12.2023, Defendant No. 4 filed a complaint with the
concerned SHO to remove the plaintiff’s illegal encroachment from the
Panchayat’s land, following which action was taken against him. The
defendant concludes that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit
property and has filed the present case based on false and frivolous claims.
3. Sh. Singh, Ld. counsel for the plaintiff, argued that since the plaintiff
is in possession of the suit property, he cannot be dispossessed without
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 7 of 16
following due legal process. He referred to the order dated 12.05.2017,
passed by the Hon’ble High Court in WP (C) 3902/2017, which indicates
that the de-sealing of the plaintiff’s residential premises was completed,
and since then, the plaintiff has been in possession of the property.
Furthermore, he contended that the electricity supply to the suit property
was disconnected on 28.08.2024, and submitted that Defendant No. 2 be
directed to provide a fresh electricity connection in the plaintiff’s name.
4. Sh. Kumar, Ld. counsel for Defendant No. 1, argued that the plaintiff
is not in possession of the suit property and that the plaintiff has filed the
suit by concealing material facts. He stated that the plaintiff resides with
his wife and children on the top floor of House No. 38, Mayur Vihar,
Phase-I, Delhi. Additionally, he argued that the All India Panchayat
Council (AIPC) serves as the highest authority for approving
appointments. He asserted that the appointment letter dated 24.05.2013,
and the residential accommodation letter dated 15.06.2014, were never
approved by the AIPC, rendering them invalid. He further contended that
the plaintiff has no legal right, title, or interest in the suit property and that
the relief sought in the current application is aimed solely at asserting or
regaining possession of the suit property.
5. Sh. Mishra, Ld. counsel for Defendant No. 4, argued that the
Balwant Rai Mehta Panchayati Raj Foundation is the rightful owner of the
entire property, and no one has the authority to allot its land to any third
party. He further stated that the plaintiff’s appointment was cancelled on
25.05.2013, by the General Secretary, Headquarters, and there is no record
within the organization of any residential quarter being allotted to the
plaintiff. He asserted that the plaintiff is a trespasser on the suit property
and that his illegal encroachment was removed by the police following a
complaint lodged by Defendant No. 4. He also contended that the plaintiff
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 8 of 16
is not in possession of the suit property.
6. I have perused the record and heard the respective counsels of the
parties at length. It is trite that temporary injunction can be granted if the
case is covered by the three principles namely, (i) on making out a prima
facie case, (ii) on showing balance of convenience in plaintiff’s favour, in
that the refusal of injunction would cause greater inconvenience to them,
and (iii) whether on refusal of injunction they would suffer irreparable loss.
The plaintiff, through the present application, seeks a temporary injunction
to restrain the defendants from dispossessing him from the suit property
without following the due process of law. Additionally, the plaintiff seeks
a mandatory injunction for the restoration of electricity supply. In the
alternative, if restoration cannot be facilitated by Defendants No. 1 and 3,
the plaintiff requests that a No Objection Certificate (NOC) be issued in
his favour to enable him to obtain an electricity connection in his name
from Defendant No. 2.
7. The plaintiff’s case is based on his claim that he was appointed as a
driver in the defendant’s organization and, subsequently, in 2014, was
allotted the suit property for accommodation. The defendants oppose this
application on two grounds: firstly, that the plaintiff is not in possession of
the suit property, and secondly, that the plaintiff’s appointment is invalid
and was later on cancelled. From the pleadings and arguments, it emerges
that the plaintiff’s status in the suit property is that of a licensee. To
determine the plaintiff’s entitlement to interim injunction, it is essential to
examine the issue of possession and the principles governing licenses.
8. The plaintiff relies on his appointment letter, the allotment letter
dated 15.06.2014 for the suit property, his election ID card, and the order
dated 12.05.2017 passed by the Hon’ble High Court in WP (C) 3902/2017
to establish his possession over the suit property. However, in the court’s
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 9 of 16
opinion, none of these documents serve as contemporary evidence that
demonstrates his possession of the suit property. Both defendant no. 1 and
defendant no. 3, despite their internal differences, have consistently
asserted that the plaintiff is residing at another property in Mayur Vihar,
Phase-I, Delhi. They also contend that the plaintiff’s appointment was
illegal and invalid, as it was not approved by the All India Panchayat
Council (AIPC) and was cancelled on 25.05.2013. Furthermore, both
defendants claim that the plaintiff’s alleged illegal encroachment on the
suit property was removed with police assistance. The court finds that the
plaintiff’s application appears to be an attempt to regain possession of the
suit property under the pretext of obtaining an electricity connection.
9. In addition to this, a licensee upon the revocation of a license, is
entitled to reasonable time to vacate the property, but this does not require
the licensor to undertake an eviction through formal legal proceedings. The
rationale behind this principle lies in the very nature of a license. A license
does not confer any interest or proprietary rights over the property to the
licensee. The ownership and control of the property remain with the
licensor throughout. In this context, reference may be made to the
judgment of Hon’ble Bombay High Court in New Shivam Co-op. Hsg.
Society limited Vs. Raj Publicity, Bandra (W)1
“43. Now we will examine another Supreme Court
decision: Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu
[(2004) 1 SCC 769]. Here two persons owned
neighbouring plots of lands. But who owned what
extent was in dispute. At any rate, the plaintiff was
raising construction over the piece of land in his
possession, and that was obstructed by the defendant,
claiming that the land formed part of his property. The
1 2019 (6) Bom CR 543.
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 10 of 16
plaintiff asserted his title as also his possession over
the disputed piece of land. The Trial Court found that
although the plaintiff had failed to prove his title, he
had proven his possession over the property.
44. In the above context, the Supreme Court has held
that even if a trespasser is in settled possession of the
property, its rightful owner shall have to take recourse
to law; he cannot take the law in his own hands and
evict the trespasser or interfere with his possession.
The law will come to the aid of a person in peaceful
and settled possession by injuncting even a rightful
owner from using force or taking law in his own
hands.
45. In Rame Gowda, as we can see, the title remained
obscure; and the plaintiff did not acknowledge the
defendant’s title. Nor has he been in permissive
possession of the true owner. Conspicuously absent
is the question of license, which wold have made all
the difference.
What is Due Process of Law?
46. Indeed, the licensee sought an injunctive relief; it
has asserted that the licensor should not dispossess it
without taking recourse to due process of law. Then,
what is due process of law? Usually, in most tenancy
cases, leaving aside the cases of license, the tenancy
may expire by efflux of time, or may stand
terminated, or the tenant may even acknowledge that
he has no right to continue; yet he sets up a plea that
he has been in “peaceful, settled possession” of the
property. Peaceful he may not, but settled he is. He
gets characterised as, say, a tenant at sufferance.
There are jurisprudential rumblings about the nature
of his possession—legal or illegal. That said, he
claims an indefeasible right to possess and enjoy the
property until he is evicted—evicted by due process
of law, at that. In other words, the tenant—again if
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 11 of 16
we defer our discussion on a licensee— proclaims,
“I have no right to be in possession, yet I am in
possession. I commit an illegality, but you have no
right to match my illegality. You must be law abiding;
you take recourse to due process of law.” This
common law concept having its hoary origins has, in
a country like India with abnormal decisional
delays, engendered kangaroo courts and muscle
men’s bailiwicks. In a place like Mumbai, any
eviction proceeding—even if you are very
optimistic—on an average takes two decades, even
three.
47. So what is due process of law? Does it necessarily
mean that the landlord should go to a court of law and
secure a decree for eviction? In other words, is due
process of law synonymous with a court decree? It is
not. I am afraid it is a misconception that gets
perpetuated. Due process of law, I reckon, is nothing
more than following the procedure that is legally
ordained or permitted. If a statute provides a method,
and somebody follows that method, that suffices.
Even if, say, a contract provides for a method of
eviction—and that method does not conflict with any
law—then the party’s following that method should
amount to due process of law. For a contract is the
law between the parties.
48. Now, let us examine the statutory significance of
due process of law. In the neighbouring front, Sakkeer
v. The Director of Panchayath [2015 (3) KHC 207] is
the decision the Kerala High Court has rendered, per
me. In that case, the gravamen of the dispute is that
the petitioners, though continued to be duly inducted
tenants in peaceful possession as the tenements, had
been forcefully evicted by the Grama Panchayat,
without its following the due process of law. In other
words, though the petitioners’ possession always
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 12 of 16
remained legal, they were treated as trespassers and
were subjected to summary eviction, which is
impermissible in law.
49. In that background Sakkeer has held that 'due
process' is a facet of fairness, for justice is fairness in
action. But fairness, as an essential concomitant of the
principles of natural justice, is neither nebulous nor
boundless: It runs its writ where the statute is silent.
It is axiomatic that any common law principle of
whatever vintage has to give way to the statutory
stipulations. If we examine the Easements Act, Section
63 speaks of the licensee's rights on revocation; it is
profitable to extract it:
"63. Licensee's rights on revocation. --Where a license
is revoked, the licensee is entitled to a reasonable time
to leave the property affected thereby and to remove
any goods which he has been allowed to place on such
property."
50. From the above statutory extract, it is clear that a
licensee, on revocation of license, is entitled to a
reasonable time to leave the property. It does not
contemplate eviction by due process. And, in fact,
that waiting period is the due process, so to speak.
The reason for this proposition, even de hors the
statutory support, is not far to seek: a license creates
no interest in the property; the seisin remains with
the owner. In other words, the licensee only may use
the immovable property, with no actual transfer of
the very property.
51. Then, Sakkeer quoted with approval Chandu Lal
v. MCD [AIR 1978 Delhi 174 (FB)], a Full Bench
decision of Delhi High Court. In fact, Chandu Lal, as
noted by Sakkeer, has held that a bare licensee
having no interest in the property cannot maintain
an action for its possession. A mere licensee has only
a right to use the property. Such a right does not
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 13 of 16
amount to an easement or an interest in the property,
but is only a personal privilege. The license
terminated, the licensor may deal with the property
as he likes. This right he gets as the owner in
possession of his property. He need not secure a
decree of the Court to obtain this right.
52. Chandu Lal notes that a licensor can use
reasonable force to secure or protect his possession.
If he, however, uses excessive force, he may make
himself liable to be punished under a prosecution, but
he will infringe no right of the licensee. Then, it
acknowledges that a person in exclusive possession of
the property, no doubt, is prima facie considered a
tenant, but he would not be held to be so if the
circumstances negative any intention to create a
tenancy.”
10. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, in the case of Chandu Lal v.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi2, elaborated on the legal position of a
licensee after the revocation of a license. The Court held:
“26. There is a catene, of authorities in support of the
proposition that in the case of a license there is
something less than a right to enjoy the property in
the licensee; it cannot be exercised by servants and
agents and is terminable while on the other hand, in
the case of a lease, there is a transfer to a right to
enjoy the property or in other words the lessee is
entitled to enjoy the property. A bare licensee having
no interest in the property cannot maintain an action
for its possession. A mere licensee has only a right to
use the property. Such a right does not amount to an
easement or an Interest in the property but is only a
personal privilege to the licensee. After the
2 AIR 1978 Del 174
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 14 of 16
termination of the license, the licensor is entitled to
deal with the property as he likes. This right he gets
as an owner in possession of his property. He need
not secure a decree of the Court to obtain this right.
He is entitled to resist in defense of his property the
attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property by
exerting the necessary and reasonable force to expel
a trespasser. If, however, the licensor uses excessive
force, he may make himself liable to be punished
under a prosecution, but he will Infringe no right of
the licensee, No doubt a person in exclusive
possession of the property is prima facie to be
considered to be a tenant, nevertheless he would not
be held to be so if the circumstances negative any
intention to create a tenancy.
27. In the instant cases the petitioners’ possession of
the premises (Kiosk) on the facts and circumstances of
the case, cannot be held to be conclusive evidence of
their being a lessee as the grant was not coupled with
an interest in the property. The principle once a
licensee always a licensee apples proprio vigore in
these cases. The petitioners are not entitled to retain
possession against the Corporation, which can take
possession of the Kiosk and would not be driven to a
Court of law as the mere physical possession of the
petitioners confers no right on them. The petitioners.
Therefore, in law are not entitled to retain possession
against the Corporation, having only the personal
privilege to carry on their business which otherwise
without the permission granted by the Corporation
would be an unlawful act. These well-settled
principles - find support from Satwant Singh v.
Assistant Passport Officer, New Delhi ; Associated
Hotel's case (supra); B. M. Lall v. M/s. Dunlop Rubber
Co. (India) Ltd., Air 1%8 Sc 175; Miss Aninha
D'Costa v. Mrs. Parvatibai M. Thakur, ; Beant Singh
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 15 of 16
v. Cantonment Executive Officer, Jammu Air 1960 J
and K 83, Chinna Pillai v. N. Govindaswami Naidu, ;
Milka Singh v. Diane Air 1964 J and K 99 and Raj
Singh v. Union of India, . (A Bench decision of this
Court).
34. Shri Saigal. then submitted that the petitioners
were in possession of- the Kiosk since Jan- 1974 and
being in settled possession, the petitioners were not
liable to be evicted except in due course of law and
that they were further entitled to defend their
possession even against the rightful owner who may
try to dispossess them. This submission was sought to
be reinforced on the basis of case in Puran Singh v.
State of Punjab . Reliance then was placed on a
Branch decision of East Punjah High Court in State
of Patiala and E P. States Union v. Mohinder Singh,
and Vasudeva Kurup v, Ammini Amma, 1964 Ker Lt
468 wherein it was observed that a person in
possession albeit without title, was entitled to remain
in possession, even against the lawful owner until
evicted in due course of law and that a right course of
action in such a case was to bring an appropriate
action against the person in possession and secure his
eviction in accordance with the provisions of law. It
was accordingly contended that the Corporation was
not entitled to take the law into its hands and throw
out the petitioners. There is a fallacy in the
submission. The petitioners being licensees with
liberty to occupy and use the Kiosk for a period of 11
months in the first instance could not be said to be in
legal possession of the premises, the legal possession
all along remained with the Corporation. On
revocation of the license they ceased to enjoy the
liberty to continue to occupy the Kiosk so as to drive
the Corporation to evict them in due course of law,
nor can the petitioners' possession be said to be
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Suit No 719/24 Pg 16 of 16
"settled possession" as was sought to be made out.”
11. It is undisputed that the plaintiff is no longer employed by defendant
no. 1 and 3, for which purpose he was initially provided residential
accommodation. The nature of his possession was permissive, with the
legal possession of the suit property remaining with the defendant
organization at all times. On termination of the services, plaintiff ceased to
enjoy the liberty to continue to occupy the suit property so as to drive the
defendants to evict him in due course of law, nor can the plaintiff’s
possession be said to be “settled possession” as was sought to be made out.
12. Before seeking a temporary injunction, the plaintiff was required to
demonstrate that he holds a legal right, which has been infringed upon. The
plaintiff has failed to establish any legal right in his favor and does not
have a prima facie case in his favour entitling him to the reliefs sought.
Therefore, the application is dismissed and disposed of.
(AYUSH SHARMA)
CJ/EAST/KARKARDOOMA
DELHI/19.11.2024
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