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Order 8

CNR DLET01006290202426 May 2025
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Order 8 · 26 May 2025 · CNR DLET010062902024

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF VIKAS GARG, DISTRICT
JUDGE-05 (EAST),
KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI.
CS No. 651/2024
CNR No. DLET01-006290-2024
Nivedita Magon
W/o Sh. P. N. Magon
R/o D-30, Bhakti Kunj, Ist Floor
Pandav Nagar, Delhi
Alternate Address:-
A-44, 1st Floor, Ganesh Nagar
Pandav Nagar Complex, Delhi.
………..Plaintiff.
Versus
Ramashray Yadav
S/o Sh. Chillar Ram
R/o A-44, 2nd Floor Front Side,
Ganesh Nagar Pandav Nagar Complex
Delhi-110092.
…………Defendant.
SUIT FOR POSSESSION, RECOVERY OF ARREARS OF RENT,
DAMAGES/MESNE PROFITS AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION
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JUDGMENT
[On the Application of the Plaintiff under Order 12 Rule 6 read with
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)]
This suit has been instituted by the plaintiff seeking possession,
recovery of arrears of rent, damages/mesne profits, and permanent
injunction in respect of the suit property.
The plaintiff asserts ownership of the suit property and claims to
have rented it to the defendant for a period of 11 months
commencing from 01.11.2023, pursuant to a rent deed executed
between the parties. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to
pay rent since March 2024, thereby breaching the rent agreement,
which entitles the plaintiff to possession and other reliefs. The
plaintiff now seeks a decree in its favor under Order 12 Rule 6 of the
CPC based on admissions made by the defendant.
Admissions by the Defendant:
The defendant has admitted to the tenancy, the landlord-tenant
relationship, the plaintiff’s ownership of the suit property, and the
duration of the tenancy. Relevant excerpts from paragraphs 3 to 5 of
the preliminary objections in the defendant’s written statement are
reproduced as follows:
“3. That the plaintiff has not come to this Hon'ble Court with clean
hands and has concealed the true and correct material acts from
this Hon'ble Court. It is submitted that at the time of letting out the
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suit property, the defendant has paid a sum of Rs.1,65,000/- in
cash on 15.11.2023 to the plaintiff for installation of lift in the suit
property with an assurance that the said amount either adjust in the
rent or the same will return to the defendant at the time of vacating
the tenanted premises. It is further submitted that the answering
defendant has paid rent to the plaintiff till July 2024 and as and
when the defendant asked rent receipt from the plaintiff, the
plaintiff stated to the defendant that she is the owner of the
tenanted/ suit property and no other tenant come for asked the rent
receipt and due to the said reason the plaintiff has not issued rent
receipt for the tenanted premises regarding acceptance of the rent
from the defendant has loosed HRA benefit Sum of Rs.2,50,000/-
from his Department due to non-producing of rent receipts. Apart
from this Defendant is paying Rs.2,000/- Per Month for parking
and other charges as per rent agreement but respondent did not
provide the same and the said very fact has been concealed by the
plaintiff before this Hon'ble Court, hence the suit is liable to be
dismissed with heavy costs.
4. That on dated 12.08.2024 the entire kitchen overhead wardrobe
fell down on the wife of the defendant while she was working in
the kitchen which caused injury on her head and hand including
damage of many objects kept in the wardrobe. The information of
this accident was provided to the plaintiff through Whatsapp but
plaintiff did not even react on this accident. Due this accident the
defendant suffered physical, mental and financial loss of
Rs.50,000/-.
5. That on 02.02.2024, plaintiff and the builder, namely Amar
Bajpai got involved in huge scuffle for the possession of those
flats which was builder's share and this scuffle turned into physical
scuffle which later damaged electricity connection, water motor
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connection and main-gate-auto-lock-system. After intervention of
P.S. Mandawali only electricity connection was restored after 3
days and all the residents of the building had to survive without
water and electricity for next 3 days, even till now all the residents
have to go to ground floor to switch-on water motor and open the
main gate when someone comes-in the building. Due to this type
of bad activities of plaintiff, defendant suffered official work,
study of defendant's children and daily uses work for another three
days. That the defendant requested many times to plaintiff to
restore the electricity connection but plaintiff did not hear
defendant's request. Ultimately defendant gave an
application/complaint to the SHO P.S. Mandawali, Delhi on dated
21.03.2024.”
Additionally, paragraphs 1 to 3 of the plaint and the corresponding
replies in the defendant’s written statement are pertinent and
reproduced as follows:
Sr. No. Para of 1 to 3 of plaint Para of 1 to 3 of reply in
WS
1. That plaintiff is absolute
owners of property No. A-44,
situated at Ganesh Nagar,
Pandav Nagar Complex, Delhi
92.
That the contents of Para
No.1 of the plaint are
matter of record, need no
reply.
2. That on 01.11.2023, the
defendant entered into the rent
agreement with plaintiff with
respect of one flat consisting
two room set along with one
dining room, Kitchen,
bathroom and latrin situated at
That the contents of Para
No.2 of the plaint are
matter of record, need no
reply.
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the IInd floor of the property
bearing No. A- 44 area
measuring 100 sq yds. Situated
at Ganesh Nagar, Pandav Nagar
Complex, Delhi-110092 fitted
with electricity meter and with
all fitting and fixtures (hereafter
called the tenanted premises), at
a monthly rent of Rs.18,000/-.
Pm excluding electricity and
water charges on or before 10th
day of each English calendar
month and Rs.2,000/- pm for
parking of Vehicle and other
charges.
3. That the said agreement was
entered for a period of eleven
months commencing from
01.11.2023. The defendant paid
Rs. 60,000/- on 01.11.2023 in
which includes Rs. 5,000/- for
police verification and rent
agreement. The plaintiff
adjusted Rs. 55,000/- in the rent
of month November, December
and January which was
remaining with her.
That the contents of Para
No.3 of the plaint are
partly wrong and denied,
and partly admitted. It is
admitted that the rent
agreement was executed
between plaintiff and
defendant. It is denied
that the rent agreement
commencing from
01.11.2023. It is
submitted that the rent
agreement was executed
on 15.11.2023 and
plaintiff intentionally
mentioned the date of 15
commencement as
01.11.2023. It is also
denied that the defendant
paid Rs.60,000/- on
01.11.2023 which
includes Rs.5,000/- for
police verification and
rent agreement. It is
submitted that the
defendant paid
Rs.1,65,000/- in cash for
installation of lift in the
suit property as advance
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demanded by plaintiff
and Rs.60,000/- as one
month advance rent and
security deposit of two
months. It is denied that
plaintiff adjusted
Rs.55,000/- in the rent
for the month of
November, December
and January. It is
submitted that defendant
regularly paid the rent of
suit property on time for
each and every month.
Further, paragraph 2 of the preliminary objections in the defendant’s
reply to the application under Order 12 Rule 6 read with Section 151
CPC is relevant and reproduced as follows:
“2. That in written statement filed by the defendant only admitted
the relationship of landlord and tenant and also rent agreement
executed between the parties on dated 15.11.2023, but in para no.
3 of the written statement filed by the defendant, defendant raised
some objection/defends i.e. defendant has paid a sum of
Rs.1,65,000/- to the plaintiff in cash for installation of lift in the
suit property with an assurance that the said amount either adjust
in the rent or the same will return to the defendant at the time of
vacating the tenanted premises. It is further submitted that the
answering defendant has paid rent to the plaintiff till July 2024, as
cash because plaintiff used to force for cash payment of rent from
initial period, as and when the defendant asked rent receipt from
the plaintiff, the plaintiff stated to the defendant that she is the
owner of the tenanted / suit property and no other tenant come for
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asked the rent receipt and due to the said reason the plaintiff has
not issued rent receipt for the tenanted premises regarding
acceptance of the rent from the defendant and the said fact has
been concealed by the plaintiff before this Hon'ble Court, hence
the present application is liable to be dismissed with heavy costs.”
Analysis:
The defendant’s written statement and reply to the application
clearly admit the plaintiff’s ownership, the existence of the tenancy,
the landlord-tenant relationship, the execution of the rent deed, and
the tenure of the tenancy. The plaintiff’s suit is primarily based on
the alleged breach of the rent agreement due to non-payment of rent.
Whether such a breach occurred is a matter requiring trial and
cannot be determined under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC in the present
circumstances. However, it is undisputed that the tenancy was for a
fixed term of 11 months. Even if the defendant’s claimed
commencement date of 15.11.2023 is considered, the tenancy has
expired by efflux of time.
The defendant has raised various grievances, including disputes over
the commencement date of the rent agreement, payments made for a
lift installation, non-issuance of rent receipts, an incident involving a
kitchen wardrobe, and disruptions caused by a scuffle involving the
plaintiff. These issues, however, do not confer any lien or right over
the suit property to the defendant and are insufficient to preclude the
Court from granting a decree of possession in favor of the plaintiff.
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Judicial Precedent:
The observations of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in
Abdul
Hameed Vs. Charanjeet Lal Mehra are directly applicable to the
present case and are reproduced as follows:
“12. From the bare perusal of the lease deed filed by the
defendants on record, it is seen therefrom that the lease deed is for
119 months. In para-2 of the said lease deed, it has been mentioned
that lease was for 119 months beginning from 2.12.1986 and
thereafter the lease was to expire by efflux of time on 2.11.1996.
The averments made in the written statement read with the
documents filed and relied by the defendants makes it clear in
unequivocal and unambiguous terms that the lease was to expire
on 2.11.1996. It is well settled proposition of law that the relief
under Order 12, Rule 6 of the CPC is a discretionary relief and is
not a matter of right. However, in the case before me where the
defendants themselves have admitted the execution of the lease
deed, which is filed on record by them stipulating that lease shall
expire by efflux of time on 2.11.1996, having taken that stand in
the year 1990 when the written statement was filed, why should
plaintiff wait for final hearing of the matter which may take years
in this Court. To my mind, the essence of justice is expeditious
judgment if can be given on the admission of the defendants, why
Court should allow the defendants to remain in possession after
such a clear and unequivocal stand taken by the defendants on its
free Will. In somewhat similar circumstances, in S.L. Associates
Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Karnataka Handloom Development, Court held:
"Even assuming in favour of the plaintiff that the
lease was to be further extended for a period of
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three years without the consent of the plaintiff as
per the terms of the said agreement. That period of
three years has also now come to an end during the
pendency of the suit. No doubt, a suit must be
practical in all stages on the cause of action as it
existed on its date of commencement. But the Court
may however in suitable cases take notice of the
events which have happened since the institution of
the suit and afford relief to the parties on the basis
of altered conditions. This must be done by the
Court by giving relief to the parties on the basis of
altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation
and get complete justice between the parties.
The facts of the case before me are
exactly similar with the facts of the
case before the Division Bench of
the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
the case of Sikar Chand and Others
Vs. Mast Bari Bai and Others and in
that case also a decree for eviction
who passed in favour of the plaintiff
under the provisions of Rule
6, Order 12 of CPC."
13. In Sikar Chand and Others's case (supra) the Court held:
Where in a suit for eviction after the expiry of a
lease on the defense being taken that under a
compromise the term of the lease was extended by
10 years the plaintiff made an application (without
admitting the agreement) that even under Order 12,
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Rule 6 since the extended term had also expired, it
was open to the Court to base a judgment under
Order 12, Rule 6 against the defendant on the basis
of his own admissions because it is clear from the
case as set up by him that he was not entitled to
continue in possession of any case after the expiry
of the fresh term of 10 years..…
It is no doubt true that ordinarily the plaintiff is
entitled to a relief only on the basis of the cause of
action stated in the plaint but it is open to the Court
in suitable cases to afford a relief on the basis of the
case as set up by the defendant. In such a case there
is no prejudice to the defendant because the relief
legitimately springs from the case as set up by
him."
14. A Division Bench of this Court in Surjit Sachdev Vs.
Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd., 1997 II AD (Delhi) 518
held as under:
“The question now is that whether there is any
admission or not so as to entitle the plaintiff to have
a decree for possession. The factors which deserve
to be taken into consideration in order to enable the
Court to pass a decree in plaintiff's favour as
regards possession of the suit property by defendant
as a tenancy; and (b) determination of such relation
in any of the contingency as envisaged in Section
111 of the Transfer of Property Act. One of the
modes stated therein is by efflux of time limited by
the lease. Only on unequivocal admission of the
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above two factors will entitle the plaintiff to a
decree on admission. Admission need not be made
expressly in the pleadings. Even on constructive
admissions Court can proceed to pass a decree in
plaintiff's favour.”
15. This Court in Lakshmikant Shreekant (HUF) through its Karta
Vs. M.N. Dastur & Company Pvt. Ltd. took the similar view. In K.
Kishore & Construction (HUF) Vs. Allahabad Bank, 1998 , a
learned Single Judge of this Court held:
"A plaintiff may move for judgment under this
provision at any stage. This can obviously be
availed even after he has joined issues on the
defense. The admission may be made either in
pleadings or otherwise which means that the
admissions contained in documents written or
executed between the parties before the action is
brought are also sufficient for the purpose of this
rule."
16. Similar view was taken by another learned Single Judge of this
Court in Atma Ram Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Air India, 1991 I AD
(Delhi) 641. Even in Surjit Sachdev's case (supra), Division Bench
of this Court held that after the expiry of lease coming to an end
defendants had no right to continue in possession and admission
need not be made in the pleadings even constructive admission can
form the basis of a decree passed under Order 12, Rule 6.
17. Disapproving the arguments that under the provisions
of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act holding over
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possession by tenant after the expiry of period of lease, the
Division Bench in Surjit Sachdev's case (supra) held that:
"For holding over of tenancy is it absolutely
necessary that the lease is allowed to continue to
remain in possession of the property after expiry of
the period of lease."
18. It has not even been argued by the defendants that the plaintiffs
have allowed the defendants to continue in possession of the
property in question after expiry of lease period on 2.11.1996. In
any event of the matter holding over is an act of expiration of the
term which does not necessarily create a tenancy of any kind.
19. The intent and object of incorporating Rule 6 of Order 12 by
the Parliament in the Code of Civil Procedure is to enable a party
to obtain speedy judgment to the extent of the relief which
according to the admission of other party, he is entitled to. If a
relief emanates on the basis of case set up by the defendants, no
prejudice is caused to the defendants because the relief springs
from the case set up by the defendants. What is important to know
that unlike prior to the Amending Act, 1977 the filing of formal
application under Order 12, Rule 6 is not required now. Now
amended provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the CPC, judgment on
admissions, the Court may at any stage of the suit either on the
application of any party or on its own motion, make such order or
give such judgment as it may think fit having regard to such
admissions. Therefore, I have no hesitation in holding that in view
of the specific stand of defendants in para-1 of written statement
read with lease deed filed by the defendants themselves, there is an
unequivocal and unambiguous admission made by the defendants
that lease would expire by efflux of time on 2.11.1996. That being
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so, no other issue with regard to possession has to be taken into
consideration and aforesaid admission on the part of defendants
will entitle the plaintiffs for a judgment/decree on admission.
20. Coming to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for
the defendants that judgment on admission under Order 12, Rule 6
of the CPC is a matter of discretion and written statement was to
be read as a whole and, therefore, provisions of Order 12, Rule 6
of the CPC would not be applicable and the provisions of Order
12, Rule 6 be interpreted in restricted manner. I may quote the
following dictum of Jessel M.R. in Mellor Vs. Sidebottom, (1877)
5 Ch.342, interpreting Rules and Orders of the Supreme Court,
Order XXXII, Rule 6 which is in pari materia with the said rule.
The learned Judge declined to interpret Order Xll, Rule 6 so as to
restrict its operation stating:
"In my opinion, it would be lamentable if the
discretion, which, for the best of reasons, has been
left free and untrammelled by the Legislature, were
to be crystallized by judicial decisions, as it would
become in course of time, by one Judge attempting
to prescribe definite rules with a view to bind other
Judges in the exercise of the discretion which must
be applied with due regard to the varying
circumstances of each particular case. I must
consequently decline to interpret Order XII, Rule 6,
so as to restrict its operation to cases where the
plaintiff accepts the admission of the defendant in
its entirety or where the claim is server able into
distinct portions and the defendant admits his
liability in respect of one such fragment of the
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claim. I do not also feel pressed by the argument
that if a decree is made first on admission in respect
of one portion of the claim and then on
investigation as to the remainder, there may
ultimately be two decrees in same suit. I see
nothing objectionable in principle to such a result."
21. It would thus appear that the powers under Order XII, Rule 6
must be left free and untrammelled which cannot be crystallized
into any rigid rule of universal application but the discretionary
powers thereunder must be applied with due regard to the varying
circumstances of each particular case.
22. There is no force in the arguments of the learned Counsel for
the defendants that no fresh notice of termination of lease was
given by the plaintiff after expiry of lease period i.e. 2.11.1996
and, therefore, the defendants will be holding over the tenancy on
month to month basis and it would be necessary to have a notice
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and there will be
no question for determination of holding over of tenancy by efflux
of time under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. No plea
of holding over has been made by the defendants. In Smt. Shanti
Devi Vs. Amal Kumar Banerjee AIR 1981 SC 1550, it was held
that after expiration of the period of lease by efflux of time there
was no requirement of issuing notice for determination of the
lease.”
The Hon’ble Delhi High Court has clarified that courts may consider
subsequent events, such as the expiry of a tenancy, when passing a
decree under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. Furthermore, no notice is
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required for the termination of a lease that has expired by efflux of
time. These principles are directly applicable to the present case.
Conclusion:
In light of the admissions made by the defendant and the legal
principles outlined above, the plaintiff’s suit is partly decreed under
Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
possession for the suit property, described as one flat measuring 100
square yards on the second floor of property No. A-44, situated at
Ganesh Nagar, Pandav Nagar Complex, Delhi-110092.
Order:
The suit is partly decreed under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.
A decree of possession is granted in favor of the plaintiff for the suit
property, as described above.
The decree sheet shall be prepared accordingly.
The matter is listed for further proceedings regarding the remaining
reliefs on 30.07.2025.
Pronounced in the open court
on 26th May, 2025
(Vikas Garg)
District Judge-05 /EAST
KKD, Delhi- 26.05.2025
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