Full Order Text
Final Order 2 · 18 Sept 2026 · CNR DLCT110008422026
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: 1 In the Court of Dig Vinay Singh, Special Judge, PC Act, (CBI)-09, MPs/MLAs Cases, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi. In re : New Crl. Rev. No. 48/2026 (Old Crl. Rev. No. 257/2025) CNR No. DLCT-11-000842-2026 & New Crl. Rev. No. 49/2026 (Old Crl. Rev. No. 186/2025) CNR No. DLCT11-000843-2026 Naveen Jindal S/o Late O. P. Jindal R/o Jindal Centre, 12, Bhikaji Kama Place, New Delhi …….. Revisionist (In 48/2026) And Dinesh Kumar Bhargava S/o Late P. N. Bhargava R/o H-707, Surya Vihar Dunda Hera, Gurugram, Haryana …….. Revisionist (In 49/2026) Vs. 1. State through Public Prosecutor 2. XYZ (identity concealed) W/o N.L R/o Village P, Tehsil T, District R, Chhattisgarh ……… Respondents Date of institution of Crl. Revision No. 48/2026 : 19.05.2025 Date of institution of Crl. Revision No. 49/2026 : 22.04.2025 Date of arguments : 09.09.2026 Date of order : 18.09.2026 ORDER 1. By this common order, this Court shall dispose of the two connected criminal revision petitions preferred U/S 438 of Bharatiya Nagarik Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 1 of 19 -- 1 of 19 -- 2 Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) (corresponding to Sec. 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr. P. C). 1.1. Criminal Revision Petition No. 48 is preferred by Naveen Jindal, a sitting MP. Criminal Revision Petition No. 49 is preferred by Dinesh Bhargava. 1.2. Both revision petitions challenge the legality, propriety and correctness of the same impugned order dated 15.02.2025, passed by Ld. JMFC- 06, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (Ld. Trial Court), in Complaint Case CC No. 14585/2018 titled “XYZ vs. Dinesh Kumar Bhargava & Ors.". 1.3. By the said impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court took cognizance and issued summons to both the revisionists, with revisionist Dinesh Bhargava as accused no. 1 and revisionist Naveen Jindal as accused no. 2. The revisionists have been summoned to face trial for offences punishable U/S 323/506/120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). 1.4. The impugned order of the Ld. Trial Court explicitly held that the Delhi Court had jurisdiction only over the incident dated 09.07.2018 committed within the jurisdiction of PS Civil Lines. 1.5. The said order was passed on the basis of a complaint case instituted on 21.07.2018 by respondent no. 2, whose real name is concealed and who is given the assumed name ‘XYZ’. She filed the complaint U/S 200 of the Cr. P. C., in which she made exhaustive allegations spanning from the year 2000 to 2015 against both the revisionists regarding land grabbing, harassment, sexual abuse, physical assault, abduction, sexual violence, and rape, allegedly committed at District Raigarh, Chhattisgarh. 1.6. In addition to the Chhattisgarh incident, the complainant alleged a specific local incident in Delhi dated 09.07.2018, as contained in Para Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 2 of 19 -- 2 of 19 -- 3 no. 19 of the complaint. She alleged that on 09.07.2018 at about 8.00 PM, while she, along with her associate “ABC” (name concealed), was returning from Tis Hazari Courts towards Karol Bagh in an auto rickshaw, three unknown persons intercepted their auto near the flyover next to Tis Hazari Metro Station. She alleged that these three unknown men dragged them out, assaulted them, tore their clothes, snatched her file containing legal and other documents, and threatened them with dire consequences if they did not withdraw their pending complaints against the revisionists. 1.7. In pre-summoning evidence, besides examining herself as CW1, the complainant also examined her husband as CW2 and her co-victim/acquaintance (“ABC”) as CW3. Relying on the testimonies of the three pre-summoning witnesses, CW1 to CW3, Ld. Trial Court concluded that since the three unknown attackers mentioned the name of Naveen Jindal, “it cannot be ruled out that the attack made on the victims on 09.07.2018 was after hatching criminal conspiracy and at the instance of accused persons”. 1.8. Accordingly, process was issued for 02.05.2025 under the above- mentioned sections. 2. It may be clarified here that though the State has been made a party in these two revision petitions, the State has no role to play in the revisions, as the impugned order originates from a complaint case which is not Sessions triable and it is essentially a lis between the complainant and the accused. There was no necessity of impleading the State as a party in the present revision because of a warrant-triable complaint case, not being a Sessions-triable offence, and no FIR or any inquiry through police U/s 202 of Cr.P.C. is in issue. Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 3 of 19 -- 3 of 19 -- 4 3. For brevity, the grounds challenging the impugned order need not be set out separately here, as they would be clear from the arguments of the revisionists. 4. Ld. Senior Advocate Mr Tanvir Ahmad Mir and counsel for the revisionists assailed the impugned order, stating that it was passed on 15.02.2025, i.e., well after the enforcement of BNSS on 01.07.2024. Under the first proviso to Sec. 223(1) of BNSS, cognizance could not have been taken without giving the accused an opportunity of being heard. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Parvinder Singh Vs. DoE 2026 SCC Online SC 903, wherein the Supreme Court held that where cognizance is taken post 01.07.2024, the mandatory proviso to Sec. 223(1) must be complied with, and any order without affording the proposed accused an opportunity of being heard would be illegal, vitiating the order taking cognizance. Reliance is also placed upon the cases of Deepu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. 2024 SCC Online All 4289, Basanagouda R Patil Vs. Shivananda S Patil 2024 SCC Online Karnataka 96, and Suby Antony Vs. JMFC 2025 SCC Online Kerala 532. 4.1. He also argues that one of the revisionists, Dinesh Kumar Bhargava, is a resident of Gurugram, Haryana, and the second revisionist, Naveen Jindal, is a resident of Bikaji Cama Place, both residing well beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Ld. JMFC-06, Central District. Yet, a mandatory inquiry U/s 202(1) Cr.P.C. was not conducted, nor was the police directed to investigate. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Odi Jerang Vs. Nabajyoti Baruah & Ors., SLP (Crl.) No. 2135 of 2022, decided on 22.08.2023, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 4.2. He also argues that none of the revisionists was present at the spot, and the alleged attackers were three unknown persons. No evidence or Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 4 of 19 -- 4 of 19 -- 5 material shows any communication, meeting of minds, or call records connecting the revisionists to the three unknown assailants. Thus, there is no material to infer conspiracy merely because the unknown assailants uttered the names of the revisionists. In this regard, he relies upon the case of P. S. Sharma Vs. State & Anr., Crl. M.C. 2014 of 2007, decided on 14.07.2015, by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court. 4.3. He submits that the Ld. Trial Court conducted no independent inquiry, did not call for the Police Status Report regarding the 09.07.2018 incident, examined no CCTV footage of the flyover court gates, collected no cell locations, and verified no medical report MLC despite allegations of physical assault. Relying on the cases of Pepsi Foods Limited Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749; Devindra & Ors. Vs. State of U.P., (2009) 7 SCC 495; and Giridhir Lal Mohta Vs. CBI, 2013 SCC Online Delhi 4172, the material is claimed to be grossly insufficient to summon the revisionists. 4.4. It is also argued that the impugned order erroneously records that CW2 & CW3 deposed on the same lines as the complainant, whereas, admittedly, CW2, the husband of the complainant, was not even present at the spot and never deposed about the incident in question. 4.5. The allegations of threat U/s 506 of IPC are claimed to be unsubstantiated, and in this regard reliance is placed upon the case of Neeraj Verma Vs. State, Crl. M.C. No. 3770 of 2005, decided by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court on 13.08.2007. 4.6. It is also argued that allegations regarding similar train attacks were already quashed by the Delhi High Court in FIR No. 213/2015, in Crl. M.C. No. 2522 of 2015, dated 17.11.2016, which the Hon’ble Supreme Court affirmed in SLP (Crl.) No. 3513/2017. Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 5 of 19 -- 5 of 19 -- 6 4.7. It is also argued that taking cognizance U/s 120 B of IPC for minor offences is barred U/s 196(2) of the Cr.P.C., and in this regard reliance is placed upon the case of Rahul Kanwal Vs. State (2004) 113 DLT 296. 5. On the other hand, Counsel for the complainant/respondent no. 2 strongly opposed the revision petitions, both orally and by filing written submissions. 5.1. It is argued that the scope of revision is extremely limited, particularly at the stage of summoning, and that a Revisional Court cannot re- appreciate evidence or substitute its own view for that of the Trial Court unless the order suffers from patent illegality or perversity. 5.2. It is further argued that the attack on 09.07.2018 was the direct continuation of the previous harassment faced by the complainant. The unknown assailants' object was to compel the complainant to withdraw her litigation against the revisionists. This establishes a clear and reasonable link connecting the petitioners as the beneficiaries and the masterminds behind the attack. 5.3. Sec. 223(1) proviso BNSS is claimed to be inapplicable, as three witnesses were examined on multiple dates before BNSS came into existence, and the same reasoning applies to the effect that the inquiry contemplated U/s 202 Cr. P.C. was also conducted. Section 196(2) Cr. P.C. is also claimed to be inapplicable. 6. Having heard both sides and having perused the Trial Court record, this Court is of the following opinion. 6.1. This Court is well aware that the scope of revision U/s 438/440 of BNSS, which corresponds to Sec. 397/399 of the erstwhile Cr.P.C., is Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 6 of 19 -- 6 of 19 -- 7 limited. It should be exercised sparingly, especially when the decision under challenge is clearly erroneous, there is non-compliance with legal provisions, the Trial Court's finding is based on no evidence, material evidence has been ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely in framing the charge. In view of this limited scope, the facts of the case and the contentions raised by the revisionist shall be examined. 6.2. First, the objection to non-compliance with Sec. 223(1) proviso by the revisionists must be rejected. In this case, the complaint was filed in July 2018. On 07.08.2018 itself, the complainant was examined as CW1, and thereafter the matter was posted for recording the evidence of other witnesses. CW2 was examined on 19.09.2018 & 15.10.2018, and CW3 was examined on 09.01.2019. The complainant’s pre- summoning evidence was closed on 09.01.2019. 6.2.1. Initially, vide an order dated 02.08.2019, a summoning order was passed by the then Ld. MM-06, Central District (as they were then designated), holding that both the revisionists had already been summoned by that very Court in another case on the same incident titled ABC Vs. Dinesh Kumar Bhargava & Ors., bearing complaint case no. CIS No. 14584-2018, and that the two trials on the same incident cannot continue. The complaint was thus dismissed on 02.08.2019. 6.2.2. Thereafter, the Ld. Revisional Court of Additional Sessions Judge, vide its order dated 23.05.2022, partially set aside the order dated 02.08.2019, holding that the complaint filed by the complainant and the earlier complaint filed by CW3 can continue separately, and that the Ld. Magistrate must rehear the complainant on the point of summoning and pass a speaking order. The matter again came back to the Ld. Trial Court, which heard it and passed the impugned order. Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 7 of 19 -- 7 of 19 -- 8 6.2.3. Thus, an inquiry, i.e., recording of the evidence of the complainant and her witnesses in the pre-summoning evidence, was already underway before the Ld. Trial Court when BNSS came into force. 6.2.4. There is a saving provision in BNSS U/s 531, which provides that if before the date of coming into force of BNSS, any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation is pending, then such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of or continue, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of Cr.P.C. 6.2.5. The pendency of the inquiry before the Trial Court before the date of coming into force of BNSS takes the case of the revisionists out of the purview of the provisions of Sec. 223(1) of BNSS. 6.2.6. The case of Parvinder Singh Vs. DoE (Supra), relied upon by the revisionists, is distinguishable on the facts, since in that case, upon receipt of a PMLA complaint, no inquiry had commenced till 01.07.2024 (date of coming into force of BNSS) and the matter was simply adjourned by the Special Court, whereas in the present case the inquiry was indeed pending. 6.2.7. Similarly, the case of Deepu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. 2024 SCC Online Allahabad 4289, Basanagouda R Patil Vs. Shivananda S Patil 2024 SCC Online Karnataka 96; and Suby Antony Vs. Judicial First Class Magistrate & Ors. 2025 SCC Online Kerala 532, are clearly distinguishable on the facts. As is also the case of R P F Vs. Dharmendra @ Dharma Crl. LP 472 of 2024 decided by Hon’ble Delhi High Court, and the case of Prince Vs. State of NCT Delhi & Ors. 2024 SCC Online Delhi 4909. 6.2.8. The contention of the revisionists regarding non-compliance of the provisions of Sec. 223(1) of BNSS, is thus rejected. 6.3. The next contention of the revisionists regarding failure to conduct the Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 8 of 19 -- 8 of 19 -- 9 mandatory inquiry U/s 202(1) Cr.P.C. has also to be rejected, since not only was the complainant examined, but two more witnesses were also examined, and the act of recording the statements of the complainant and witnesses is indeed within the purview of the inquiry contemplated U/s 202(1) Cr.P.C. 6.3.1. Reliance placed by the revisionists on the case of Odi Jerang (Supra) also does not help the revisionists, as in para 2 of the said case it is mentioned that the summoning was done after examining the complainant (only) U/s 200 Cr.P.C. and thereafter seven witnesses were recorded in the pre-charge evidence. 6.3.2. In the case of Vijay Dhanuka & Ors. Vs. Nazima Mamtaz (2014) 14 SCC 638, it is held that where the complainant and two witnesses were examined on oath before summoning, there was substantial compliance with Sec. 202(1). It is held therein that in the inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code, the witnesses are examined, whereas under Section 200 of the Code, only the complainant is examined, with the option of examining the witnesses present, if any. This exercise by the Magistrate, to decide whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code. 6.3.3. As mentioned above, in the present case, not only was the complainant examined as CW1, but two more witnesses were also examined by her as CW2 & CW3, including the eyewitness CW3. 6.3.4. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that no inquiry contemplated U/s 202(1) Cr.P.C. took place before the Ld. Trial Court before summoning the revisionists. This argument is also rejected. 6.4. So far as the arguments of the revisionist as to the taking cognizance U/s 120B of IPC for minor offences without statutory consent U/s Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 9 of 19 -- 9 of 19 -- 10 196(2) of the Cr.P.C. is concerned, this argument is misplaced. 6.4.1. Sec. 196(2) provides that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence of any criminal conspiracy punishable U/s 120B, other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, without written consent of the District Magistrate or the State Government as to the initiation of the proceedings, except to the offence to which provisions of Sec. 195 Cr.P.C. apply. 6.4.2. In the present case, the summoning order is not only U/S 323 IPC, but also for criminal intimidation punishable U/s 506 IPC. Though the Ld. Trial Court did not specify whether it was summoning the accused persons under Part 1 of Sec. 506 or Part II thereof, but a perusal of the impugned order and the evidence of CW1 and CW3 reflects that the criminal intimidation to kill is alleged, which brings it within the purview of Part II of Sec. 506 of IPC. 6.4.3. The case of Rahul Kanwal (Supra) relied upon by the revisionist is distinguishable on facts, as in that case the conspiracy was concerning Sections 447 & 448 of IPC. This argument is also rejected. 6.5. However, the revisions ought to succeed for the following reasons. 6.6. Firstly, in view of the earlier summoning order dated 02.08.2019 on the complaint of ABC, in which present complainant XYZ was also examined as a witness in pre summoining evidence, for the same offence and the same incident, second complaint cannot continue. Two cases against the same accused for the same offence cannot continue. 6.7. Additionally, invocation of criminal conspiracy by the Ld. Trial Court is based on tenuous grounds. The physical assault was allegedly executed by unknown henchmen. Admittedly, the revisionists were not present at the spot on 09.07.2018, and the assault was alleged against three Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 10 of 19 -- 10 of 19 -- 11 unknown persons. Those three persons were never identified. To summon a person who was not present at the spot for vicarious criminal liability under Section 120 B of the IPC, there must be prima facie legal evidence establishing a meeting of minds or a direct nexus between the named accused and the unknown assailants. The Ld. Trial Court inferred conspiracy solely because the complainant claimed to recognise the unknown goons as past henchmen based on earlier encounters. But she or her associate never even mentioned in which particular previous incident those henchmen were seen. Drawing a legal presumption of criminal conspiracy without any independent material exceeds the permissible scope. 6.7.1. When the two revisionists were not even present at the spot when the assault was committed by three unknown persons, summoning them for an offence under Sec. 120B IPC, which makes criminal conspiracy punishable, is legally unsustainable. 6.7.2. To summon a person for criminal conspiracy, there must exist prima facie legal evidence showing a meeting of minds, an agreement to commit the offence, or at least some communication between the main conspirators and the actual perpetrators. Merely because the complainant claims that the assailants named the revisionists at the spot would be insufficient, particularly as the assailants remain unidentified till now. Without any express material reflecting criminal conspiracy, suspicion cannot replace proof. 6.7.3. In the case of P. S. Sharma (Supra), complaints were lodged against employees and employers, alleging that the employees took photographs of victims at the behest of the employers. The Delhi High Court quashed the summoning order against the employers, holding that though conspiracies are not hatched in the open and it may not always Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 11 of 19 -- 11 of 19 -- 12 be possible to have direct evidence, but to establish it by circumstantial evidence or conduct of the parties, mere suspicion would not be enough to proceed, and the circumstantial evidence link has to be a complete chain. Conspiracy cannot be assumed from unconnected facts or from conduct exhibited by different accused persons at different places and times without a reasonable link. Meeting of minds or the element of agreement is the essence of the offence. Mere relationship of employer and employee cannot lead to an inference of meeting of mind, and it cannot constitute a valid foundation for proceedings against the employer with the aid of Sec. 120B IPC for the individual acts of the employees. It was also held that an offence of conspiracy requires some manifestation of agreement, such as meetings and communications, which was lacking therein. It is also lacking herein. 6.7.4. In the present case, there is not an iota of evidence connecting the two revisionists with the so-called three attackers who allegedly carried out the assault on 09.07.2018. 6.7.5. Inferring conspiracy U/s 120B of IPC purely because unknown assailants uttered the names of the revisionists is a leap of faith, based solely on conjecture, which is impermissible in law. 6.8. CW1 or CW3 did not make a PCR call immediately after the incident. They examined no independent witness. There is no MLC or any injury, even shown in photographs taken or produced before the Court. No details of the auto rickshaw are provided, and the claim is that the auto rickshaw driver fled. No mobile call details between the complainant, her associate and the so-called lawyer who instructed them to visit Tis Hazari have been put forth. No mobile site locations have been furnished. No police complaint was made in writing regarding the incident. The complainant did not even pray in her complaint that the Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 12 of 19 -- 12 of 19 -- 13 police investigate her case, so the police could have fairly investigated the matter and collected evidence, if required. 6.8.1. The absence of any PCR complaint, police complaint, MLC or any other supporting evidence, and the fact that after more than ten days the complaint is lodged directly with the Court, without an iota of mention that any kind of police inquiry or investigation be got conducted or any kind of evidence be got preserved, makes the claim highly suspicious. 6.8.2. No PCR call or police complaint was made on the date of the incident, throughout the night, or even the next day. Though the complainant attributed this to fear and alleged police collusion with the accused, the same appears to be a stereotyped and farcical claim. One doesn’t understand how the police of the entire country remain in collusion with anyone. The complainant ought to have lodged the police complaint at least even if they had no hope that the police would act. 6.8.3. The claim that the gates of Tis Hazari were found closed at 8 PM is also apparently false. It is well known that the gates of the Tis Hazari complex remain open late at night, and anyone wanting to meet a lawyer can enter the lawyer chamber area. Although a person may not be able to enter the main Court building, the chambers are located outside the building. 6.8.4. No details of the lawyer, except the first name, have been set out, and neither the chamber number nor her mobile number has been supplied. It therefore cannot be corroborated that the complainant actually wanted to meet any such lawyer or was present in the area at the time claimed. 6.8.5. These points are important in this matter for a particular reason, and they may not have been important in some other case, given the long history of complaints made by the complainant against the revisionists Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 13 of 19 -- 13 of 19 -- 14 spanning more than a decade. A few of those complaints were found baseless and quashed, including one relating to the incident on the train. In one complaint against Dinesh Bhargava, he was found not to be present in the city on the date, at the time and place claimed by the complainant. That long history of repeated complaints makes this Court cautious in approaching the matter and evaluating the material. 6.8.6. It is also particularly important to note that, though the claim is that the unknown persons were chasing them from another State until the place of incident and even when they reached Karol Bagh after the incident, they remained unidentified, either by name, designation, or any photograph obtained through mobile or otherwise. They did not complain to any policemen on the way. 6.8.7. The absence of an MLC is another factor that makes the story uninspiring. The two ladies' claim that their clothes were torn yet they could reach Karol Bagh is unconvincing. They do not explain how they reached Karol Bagh in their torn clothes. There is no supporting evidence as to where they went in Karol Bagh. If the henchmen followed them even to Karol Bagh, why did they not call the police or seek assistance? 6.8.8. The affidavit of the Supreme Court lawyer who instructed the complainant to meet the lawyer, Suman, in Tis Hazari was never filed. That lawyer was never examined to support the complainant's version. Advocate Suman was also never examined, nor was her affidavit filed. 6.8.9. In this regard, it would also be important to note some contradictions in the version claimed in the complaint lodged by XYZ, the complaint lodged separately by ABC, and the evidence of both those ladies in the two cases. 6.8.10. In her complaint, ABC stated that the assailants “forcefully hold my Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 14 of 19 -- 14 of 19 -- 15 hand/chest & pulled my hair and pulled out from auto rickshaw”. In her Court testimony on 09.01.2019, ABC modified her description, stating that three henchmen pulled them out “by holding our blouse and hair”. On the other hand, XYZ deposed that three unknown persons dragged her out while pulling her hair, twisted her arm, assaulted her on the chest, gave them severe beatings, and tore their clothes. 6.8.11. As to the verbal threats, ABC, in her complaint and deposition, stated about generalised threats where the goons warned them to withdraw existing FIRs/complaints and threatened to kill them and their families if they approached any Court against the revisionist Naveen Jindal. On the other hand, XYZ introduced specific verbal threats in her testimony, alleging that the attackers explicitly said, “tum logo ko nanga kar ke yahan ghumayengey agar yahan dobara aaye to” (we will parade you naked if you come here again), in addition to threatening to kill them and demanding the withdrawal of complaints against both the revisionists. ABC’s complaint and deposition contain no explicit threat of public humiliation. 6.8.12. There are also contradictions as to whether public witnesses were present versus whether the location was deserted. In her deposition on 09.01.2019, ABC testified, “I noted it was dark and some construction work of the flyover was going there on the spot but found no person to protect us”. In contrast, XYZ testified on 07.08.2018, stating, “public gathered there, and the accused persons fled from the spot after snatching my case file and bag”. In ABC’s complaint, she stated that the goons “snatched their beg/file”, whereas in her deposition she stated they “took away my files”. On the other hand, XYZ’s complaint specified that the snatched bag contained her “all original complaints, papers, land papers and legal documents and medical reports”, and in Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 15 of 19 -- 15 of 19 -- 16 her testimony XYZ added that her case file and bag were taken. 6.8.13. Even ignoring these narrative overlaps and contradictions at the stage of summoning, still the revisions ought to succeed, and the impugned order needs to be set aside for the above-mentioned and following reasons. 6.9. The impugned order states that there was no reason to disbelieve the witnesses' testimonies, which were supported by case property filed on record, i.e., torn clothes. The torn clothes corroborate nothing as to the occurrence. The Trial Court relied on the torn clothes produced as case property, which the complainants furnished during pre-summoning evidence a few months after the alleged incident. In the complete absence of any contemporaneous medical examination report or any police report, mere self-production of torn clothes does not furnish objective physical corroboration. 6.9.1. The impugned order also mentions that the witnesses claim to have recognised the attackers as henchmen of the accused from prior encounters, and therefore the claim of attack was plausibly pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. However, the attackers have never been identified/named directly or indirectly till now. 6.9.2. At the stage of issuing summons U/s 204 Cr.P.C., while the Magistrate is not required to conduct a full-fledged trial, the Magistrate must judiciously assess whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed and whether there is any trustworthy material. Instead, the Trial Court mechanically held that there was “no reason to disbelieve their testimonies” without addressing the glaring, irreconcilable contradiction, as noted above. A direct conflict between the testimonies of witnesses, whether the place of incident was deserted or a crowd had gathered, cannot be ignored, particularly in the absence of any medical Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 16 of 19 -- 16 of 19 -- 17 report, PCR call, police report or any independent witness. 6.9.3. As the above discussion shows, both complainants ABC & XYZ have a history of previous complaints and litigation spanning more than a decade; therefore, their testimonies must be evaluated carefully. The contradictions/conflict in the victims' versions undermine the prima facie credibility of their ocular account. 6.9.4. While fear of powerful individuals is offered as an explanation for the absence of any police report, there is no justification for no medical examination being conducted despite the fact that St. Stephen's Hospital was located at the spot itself. Absence of these things requires deeper judicial scrutiny before summoning any individual. 6.9.5. Here, it would be important to recapitulate what was held in the cases of Pepsi Foods Ltd., Devendra’s case. 6.9.6. In the case of Pepsi Foods, the Hon’ble Supreme Court specifically held as follows in para 28 :- “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.” 6.9.7. In Devendra’s case, relying on the case of State of Karnataka Vs. Pastor P Raju (2006) 6 SCC 728 and Pawan Kumar Shrama Vs. State Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 17 of 19 -- 17 of 19 -- 18 of Uttaranchal, Crl. Appeal No. 1692 of 2007, decided on 10.12.2007, it was held that it was obligatory on the part of the Ld. Magistrate to apply his mind to the contents of the charge sheet, and this should be reflected in the order. 6.9.8. In Giridhir Lal Mohta’s case, it was held that the IPC contains no deeming provision creating deemed criminal liability; for summoning an accused under Sec. 120B, there must be material on record from which such an inference can be drawn; there must be a legitimate basis to draw inferences of conspiracy. 6.10. Also, in para 4 of the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court observed that the complainant also examined her husband as CW2 and Ms ABC as CW3, who deposed on the same lines as the complainant. This observation is factually incorrect and reflects a lack of application of mind. CW2 was not present at the spot, and his testimony does not reveal that he stated a single word regarding the incident in question dated 09.07.2018. 6.11. Also, there are no ingredients of criminal intimidation against the revisionists in the absence of a direct threat made by them. 6.12. This Court need not comment on whether the second complaint by XYZ can continue when the first complaint by ABC for the same incident was already continuing, as another coordinate Court of Ld. ASJ, Tis Hazari, has already decided XYZ's revision petition under Criminal Revision Petition No. 33/2020, holding that both complaints can continue separately even though they relate to the same offence, and the order appears to have remained unchallenged. 6.13. The impugned summoning order dated 15.02.2025, thus, suffers from non-application of judicial mind. It was passed by overlooking major factual contradictions; it failed to factor in the absence of medical Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 18 of 19 -- 18 of 19 -- 19 reports, the absence of a PCR call, and the absence of any police report, and invoked criminal conspiracy purely on subjective suspicion; therefore, the order lacks legal justification. The impugned order thus suffers from illegality and impropriety. The impugned order dated 15.02.2025, passed by Ld. JMFC- 06, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (Ld. Trial Court), in Complaint Case CC No. 14585/2018 titled “XYZ vs. Dinesh Kumar Bhargava & Ors."summoning the two accused/revisionists, therefore, is set aside qua both the revisionists. The said complaint is dismissed. 6.14. A digitally signed copy of this order be placed in both the revision petitions as they stand disposed of. A digitally signed copy be also supplied to both the sides. 6.15. Revision files be consigned to the record room, Trial Court record be returned with a digitally signed copy of this order. Announced in the open Court on 18.09.2026 (Dig Vinay Singh) Special Judge (PC Act) (CBI)-09 MPs/MLAs Cases RADC/ New Delhi Order dated 18.09.2026 in Crl. Rev No. 48/2026 (Naveen Jindal Vs. State) & Crl. Rev No. 49/2026 (Dinesh Kumar Bhargava Vs. State) Page 19 of 19 -- 19 of 19 --
