Full Order Text
Final Order 1 · 14 Jan 2025 · CNR DLCT110000182025
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL JUDGE (PC ACT) (ACB)-02, ROUSE AVENUE DISTRICT COURTS, NEW DELHI Presided Over by: Ashish Aggarwal, DHJS Bail Application Nos. 285/2024, 286/2024, 04/2025, 05/2025, 10/2025, 11/2025 IA No. 4/2024, IA No. 10/2024. FIR No. 5/2023 and FIR No. 22/2024 PS Anti-Corruption Branch. State v (1) Imran, (2) Akram Ali, (3) Hanzala, (4) Intezar, (5) Ankur Saluja (6) Parmod Kumar. (7) Manoj Goyal, (8) Manoj Kumar. 14.01.2025 (04:00 pm) File is taken up today on applications for bail filed by accused persons Imran, Akram Ali, Hanzala, Intezar, Ankur Saluja, Parmod Kumar, Manoj Goyal and Manoj Kumar. Present : Sh. Manoj Kumar Garg, Ld. Public Prosecutor for State. Sh Mohd. Asif, Ld. Counsel for applicant Akram Ali, Hamzala and Interzar. Sh. Ankit Bhatia, Ld Counsel for applicant Manoj Goyal. 1. This order shall decide the applications for bail filed by accused persons Imran, Akram Ali, Hanzala, Intezar, Ankur Saluja, Parmod Kumar, Manoj Goyal and Manoj Kumar. 2. The submissions advanced by Ld. Counsels for accused persons are set forth as follows: 1/17 -- 1 of 17 -- (a) that co-accused persons Mukesh Kumar Saini, Surjeet Singh, Raj Singh, Narender Kumar Saini, Vishal Kumar and Lalit Kumar have been granted bail; (b) that the order of taking cognizance has been stayed by order dated 10.12.2024 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi and the custody of applicants Manoj Kumar and Manoj Goyal now is illegal; (c) that the charge-sheet makes mention of 96 firms which had already obtained GST refund from the same GST officer but the applicants are not owners of the firms; (d) that no action has been taken against the owners or authorized signatory of the firms; (e) that the applicants cooperated in investigation and had joined investigation as and when called by the investigating officer; (f) that the investigating officer has left out certain individuals and entities whose involvement is writ large from the record for reasons best known to him; (g) that disclosure statements of co-accused persons is the basis of the case built up by the prosecution but the same is a weak piece of evidence; (h) that the applicants are poor persons with limited means; (i) that the applicants are not a flight risk; 2/17 -- 2 of 17 -- (j) that the case of the prosecution is based on documents which have already been seized by the investigating officer; (k) that the applicants cannot be kept in custody as a punitive measure; (l) that the applicants satisfy the triple test for grant of bail; (m) that as against accused Manoj Kumar and Manoj Goyal, there are 191 witnesses and voluminous documents running into thousands of pages and the trial is not likely to be completed any time soon, whereas as against other accused persons charge-sheet has not been filed and is unlikely to be filed any time soon while ninety days since arrest have been completed; 3. Ld. Public Prosecutor has opposed the applications for bail. The Public Prosecutor has not been able to respond to the query of the Court as to how accused persons Manoj Kumar and Manoj Goyal can be kept in custody after stay of the order of cognizance. 4. I have gone through the record. 5. Co-accused Mukesh Kumar Saini, Surjeet Singh, Raj Singh, Narender Kumar Saini, Vishal Kumar and Lalit Kumar have been granted bail. The applicants have sought bail on the ground of parity. It is not the case of the prosecution that the role played by the applicants was greater than that of co-accused persons who have been granted bail. The grounds of bail apply to the 3/17 -- 3 of 17 -- applicants as well. The reasons for grant of bail are extracted from order dated 18.12.2024, as under: “The only ground that subsists which the prosecution is canvassing in order to stymie the prayer for bail is the gravity of the offence. However, as held in the case of P. Chidambram (supra) and Sanjay Chandra (supra), this ground alone cannot preclude the grant of bail. One can also not lose sight of the fact that cognizance of the offences has been taken by order dated 08.11.2024. However, the order of taking cognizance has been stayed by order dated 10.12.2024 passed by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in WP(Crl.) No.3859/2024. Since the order of cognizance has been stayed, the applicant cannot be remanded to custody under Section 309 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Nor can Section 167(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure be pressed into service since investigation qua the applicant is reported to be complete and also because the period prescribed under Section 167(2) Proviso of Code of Criminal Procedure has expired. Another factor that needs to be taken into consideration is that owing to further investigation which is pending, the trial of the 4/17 -- 4 of 17 -- applicant cannot commence. If the applicant is left to languish in custody for the said further investigation to be completed, it would frustrate the objective of Section 167(2) Proviso of Code of Criminal Procedure which guarantees to the accused the right not to be detained beyond ninety days on account of pendency of investigation. It has been stressed by Ld. Counsel for applicant/accused that there are several persons against whom the investigating officer did not proceed despite the fact that their role was identical to that of the applicant. Ld. Counsel for applicant/accused has alleged discriminatory treatment on the part of the investigating officer. The charge-sheet discloses the role played by Akhilesh Kumar Pandey. Yet he has not been made an accused. An exculpatory statement has been recorded suggesting that somebody may have forged the signatures of the said person but no attempt has been made to find out whether the signatures were actually forged and if so what was the identity of the forger. It is not even the case of the prosecution among the allegations enlisted in the charge-sheet that the signatures have been forged by somebody else. It appears that 5/17 -- 5 of 17 -- it is nobody’s case that signatures of the said person were forged and there is also no explanation as to why the said person would submit his identity related documents to somebody else. This person has not been arrayed as an accused without any explanation. He is not the only person so left out. There are scores of persons who have neither been arrested nor proceeded against although the allegations point towards their involvement to an extent greater than those indicted. In the charge-sheet, there are details of ninety-six firms that were sanctioned undue refund allegedly in connivance with the same GST officer. However, only a handful of those firms have been proceeded against by the Anti-Corruption Branch and regarding the others there is a studied silence. Even among the firms that have been so chosen, there are only some of the persons in their management who have been arrested by the investigating officer. The only entity with which the applicant is shown to be associated is M/s. S. Satyam Aviation Pvt. Ltd. As per the statement of the applicant which is part of the charge-sheet, there are three directors in the said entity. The other directors in the company are stated to 6/17 -- 6 of 17 -- be Harshit Saini and Sanket Mahesh Patil. Neither of them have been arrested and it is nowhere stated that the said directors were unaware of the business and operations of the said entity. It does not behove an investigating officer to randomly pick up one person or one entity in the chain of money trail and foist responsibility for the crime upon him, while leaving out the prime offender who directly committed the offence. In case of Chandra Prakash Khandelwal v Directorate of Enforcement Bail Application No.2470/2022 dated 23.2.2023, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi, while granting bail to the accused took note of the fact that no action was taken against the intermediary company through which the link had proceeded. The following passage is relevant: “It is submitted the action was not taken upon the intermediary companies then how can action could be taken against an investment company which is down in the line, more specifically when the investment were accepted prior to 2014 when till that time the PACL was not declared as a corrective 7/17 -- 7 of 17 -- investment scheme. xxx Moreso, Ramchand Karunakaran, Managing Director vs. Directorate of Enforcement in CRL.A.1650/2022 decided on 23.09.2022; Dr. Bindu Rana v Serious Fraud Investigation Office in Bail Appln.3643/2022 decided on 20.01.2023, the bail was granted in PMLA and SFIO cases where co-accused with similar roles were not put to custody by the agency. xxx What weight the statements under Section 50 of PMLA would carry at the end of trial cannot be tested at the stage of bail, more importantly when the intermediary companies were never made an accused in the present ECIR.” In the case of Ramesh Manglani v Directorate of Enforcement, Bail Application No.3611/2022 dated 30.05.2023, bail was granted by taking into account that similarly placed co-accused persons had 8/17 -- 8 of 17 -- not been arrested by the investigating agency. The relevant passage is extracted thus: “Insofar as the ED not having arrested similarly placed co-accused persons; and not even having arraigned some other persons evidently connected with the offending transactions as accused in the prosecution complaint, though these aspects would not be dispositive of a bail plea one way or the other, they are also not wholly irrelevant and the ‘doctrine of parity’ is not immaterial. As held by this Court in Ashish Mittal (supra) considering the nature of the offence, where the gravamen of the offence is that several persons acting in concert have siphoned-off and ‘laundered’ monies, it is manifestly arbitrary for the ED to have made selective arrests and arraignments.” The above judgments apply on all fours since a reading of the charge-sheet, supporting documents and statements under Section 9/17 -- 9 of 17 -- 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure show that the Anti-Corruption Branch has been proceeding against persons in a selective manner. The liberty of a citizen cannot be left at the mercy of the whims of the investigating officer. In this background, it is also to be noted that the name of the applicant does not figure in the list of twenty-four firms mentioned in the charge-sheet as those chosen to be investigated and to whom the GST refund was allegedly sanctioned. It is not the case of the prosecution that any of the mobile phone numbers used for registering the said firms belongs to the applicant. Just because some money was received in the account of the company in which the applicant was a director, it cannot be said that the applicant was involved in making a false claim of GST refund, more particularly when the GST refund was not claimed by the entity owned by the applicant and when no action has been taken against the entity which claimed the refund or its controller. There is nothing to show that the applicant had committed any forgery of a document. The standard required to be achieved before one can be alleged to be involved in forgery is laid down by 10/17 -- 10 of 17 -- Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheila Sebastian V. R. Jawaharaj & Anr. (2018) 7 SCC 581 wherein it was observed as follows: “Keeping in view the strict interpretation of penal statue i.e. referring to rule of interpretation wherein natural inferences are preferred, we observe that a charge of forgery cannot be imposed on a person who is not the matter of the same. As held in plethora of cases, making of a document is different than causing it to be made.” In the present case too the applicant is not alleged to be the maker of the document. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to conclude as follows: “Law is well settled with regard to the fact that however strong the suspicion may be, it cannot take the place of proof. Strong suspicion, coincidence, grave doubt cannot take the place of proof. Always a duty is cast upon the Courts 11/17 -- 11 of 17 -- to ensure that suspicion does not take place of the legal proof. In this case, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court carried away by the fact that accused is the beneficiary or the executant of the mortgage deed, where the prosecution miserably failed to prove the first transaction i.e PoA as a fraudulent and forged transaction. The standard of proof in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt because the right to personal liberty of a citizen can never be taken away by the standard of preponderance of probability. This case on hand is a classic example of poor prosecution and shabby investigation which resulted in the acquittal of the accused. The Investigating Officer is expected to be diligent while discharging his duties. He has to be fair, transparent and his only endeavour should be to find out the truth.” 12/17 -- 12 of 17 -- The concluding paragraph of the charge-sheet, not being substantiated by the preceding paragraphs of the charge-sheet and the supporting documents, has been demonstrated to be hyperbole. The only evidence marshalled by the prosecution, apart from the said money received in the account of the company in which the applicant is director and which is stated to be legitimate money, is confession of co-accused person which is not substantive evidence as held in the case of Haricharan Kurmi v State of Bihar (1964) 6 SCR 623 in the following words: “As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person.” The most startling of facts is that the investigating officer has not disclosed the aspect of illegal gratification in the charge-sheet. It has not been asserted that bribe was paid, nor has any detail been provided about the date and place of demand of bribe, or of 13/17 -- 13 of 17 -- acceptance of bribe. Nor has any such sum been recovered. Inspite of this, the prosecution is trying to portray that a case under Prevention of Corruption Act is made out against the applicant and others. In the case of Neeraj Dutta v State (2023) 4 SCC 731, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that for making out a case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the prosecution must prove both demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. More than two months have passed after dismissal of the previous bail application of the applicant. At that time, investigation was pending. The charge-sheet has now been filed. In the case of Babu Singh & Ors. V State of U. P. (19789) 1 SCC 579, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the dismissal of previous application for bail does not preclude filing of second application for bail on a later occasion “giving more materials, further developments and different considerations ”. The case is not making any headway. There are 191 witnesses in the list that has been sent so far. The total number of pages among the charge-sheet and relied upon documents over 14,000. Trial, whenever it commences (since further investigation is going on), 14/17 -- 14 of 17 -- will take substantial period. In the case of Manish Sisodia v Directorate of Enforcement SLP (Crl.) No.8772/2024 dated 09.08.2024, bail was granted because there was no likelihood of trial being concluded in the near future, given the volume of documents. The presence of accused at the trial can be secured by imposing conditions. In my opinion, in light of the aforesaid circumstances, the application for bail deserves to be allowed.” 6. Since the aforesaid grounds apply to the applicants, by applying the rule of parity, the applicants too are entitled to be released on bail. In this behalf, reference is made to the decision of Vishnu Ram Chandra Maheshwari v State of M.P. (1999) 1 MPLJ 516 and Bajrang Gupta v CBI Bail Application No.2497/2015. I also find that the decision of Kanchaman Yonjan v State (2024) SCC OnLine Del 4734, in which it has been held that each day spent in custody provides a new cause of action to seek bail, supports the maintainability of the present bail applications. 7. It has also been noted by this Court by order dated 21.12.2024 that the investigating agency has been arbitrary in the choice of who to indict as accused and who is to be arrayed as witness regardless of the role surfaced by the evidence on record. This runs foul of the decisions reported as Banu 15/17 -- 15 of 17 -- Singh v Emperor (1906) ILR 33 CAL 1353, Laxmandas Chaganlal Bhatia & Ors. v State (1966) SCC OnLine BOM 17 and Laxmipat Choraria & Ors. v State of Maharashtra AIR 1968 SC 938. It has been further noted in the order dated 21.12.2024 that there is sufficient indication about involvement of persons by name of Ravi Mehra, Tarun Verma, Ashwani Kumar Pandey, Akhilesh Kumar Pandey, Vipin Kumar Singh, Rameshwar Kumar, Raj Kumar, Sameer and several others (the identity of the forger of the document mentioned in page 91 of the charge-sheet, those persons who gave incorrect addresses in order to commit these offences, those who actually owned and controlled the 96 firms which had already obtained GST refund and the authorized signatory of the firms, those who had got sim cards issued which were used in commission of the offences) and yet no action has been taken against them. 8. The applicants are poor persons who are languishing in custody for about ninety days. In light of the aforesaid circumstances, all the eight applications for bail are allowed. Applicants Imran, Akram Ali, Hanzala, Intezar, Ankur Saluja, Parmod Kumar, Manoj Goyal and Manoj Kumar are directed to be enlarged on bail, on each furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.20,000/- with one surety in the like sum and subject to the following conditions: a. The applicants shall not leave the country without prior permission of this Court. 16/17 -- 16 of 17 -- b. The applicants shall not misuse the benefit of bail by indulging in commission of similar offences in future. c. The applicants shall not contact any of the witnesses of the case or extend, directly or indirectly, any inducement or threat to the witnesses. d. The applicants shall appear before this Court on each and every date of hearing. e. The applicants shall intimate this Court in case of change of their address. 9. If the applicants are found to be violating any of the above conditions, the State shall be at liberty to move an application for cancellation of bail. 10. Copy of this order be given dasti to Ld. Counsel for applicants. 11. It is made clear that pursuant to the submissions of the investigating officer recorded in a separate order dated 14.01.2025, accused persons Ankur Saluja and Parmod Kumar are now in custody in the present FIR, and not in FIR No. 22/2024, PS Anti-Corruption Branch and hence the order of bail has been passed in the present FIR. The said accused persons shall be deemed to be released in FIR No. 22/2024 PS Anti-Corruption Branch. 12. Put up on date fixed i.e. 30.01.2025. (Ashish Aggarwal) Special Judge (PC Act)(ACB)-02 Rouse Avenue District Courts, New Delhi 14.01.2025 17/17 -- 17 of 17 --
