Skip to main content
Court Order

Final Order 13

CNR DLCT03004399202312 May 2026
Back to Case

Full Order Text

Final Order 13 · 12 May 2026 · CNR DLCT030043992023

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 1 of 15
IN THE COURT OF SH. GAURAV GOYAL, ARC-01,
TIS HAZARI COURTS, CENTRAL DISTRICT, DELHI
RC ARC No. 542/2023
Sh. Hari Mohan Sharma
S/o Late Sh. Kishan Sharma,
R/o 3887, Choori Walan,
Sadak Prem Narayan,
Bazar Sita Ram,
Delhi – 110006 ................................................................Petitioner
Versus
1. Sh. Vijay Kumar Jain
S/o Late Sh. Sumant Prashad Jain @ Sumant Prasad Jain
R/o House no. 2303, Dharam Pura,
Infront of Chakki nearby Vijay Goyal’s Haveli,
Dharampura,
Delhi – 110006
Also, at:
Shop no. 3888, Ground Floor,
Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan,
Bazar Sita Ram,
Delhi – 110006
2. Sh. Rakesh Jain
S/o Late Sh. Sumant Prashad Jain @ Sumant Prasad Jain
R/o Shop no. 3888, Ground Floor,
Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan,
Bazar Sita Ram,
Delhi – 110006 ............................................................... Respondents
Date of Institution of the case 10.08.2023
Under Section 	14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B, Delhi
Rent Control Act.
Date of reserving of Order 	18.03.2026
Date of Order 	12.05.2026
Decision 	Leave to defend application is
dismissed and eviction order is
passed
-- 1 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 2 of 15
Argued by:
a) 	Sh. Rajiv Kumar Trivedi, Ld. Counsel for petitioner.
b) 	Sh. Anees Ahmad and Sh. Rizwan Ahmad, Ld. Counsels for
respondent.
ORDER
1) 	This order shall dispose off application for leave to defend filed by the
respondent/tenant in an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act (hereinafter called as the DRC Act). The present eviction
petition has been filed for seeking eviction of respondent from Shop no.
3888, Ground Floor, Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram,
Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as tenanted premises) and more
specifically shown in red colour in the site plan.
PETITION
2) 	Briefly stated, it is alleged by the petitioner that the petitioner is the
owner/landlord of shop no. 3888, Ground Floor, Choori Wala, Sadak Prem
Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi-110006. That initially the shop was let out
to Sumant Prasad Jain, the father of the respondents. That after the death of
Sumant Prasad Jain, the respondents became the tenants in the tenanted
premises being the legal heirs of Late Sumant Prasad Jain. That the
petitioner is a senior citizen aged 64 years and requires the tenanted
premises to run grocery shop to earn his livelihood as he is jobless. That
respondent no. 1 has filed a civil suit no. 443/2023 against the petitioner
seeking permanent injunction, wherein the respondent has categorically
stated that the father of the respondents had been tendering rent to the
petitioner in respect of the tenanted premises. The petitioner has averred
that he has no other alternative accommodation available with him; thus,
the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for his bonafide need as it is
suitable for the petitioner. Hence, it is prayed that an eviction order may be
passed in favour of the petitioner. Along with the eviction petition,
-- 2 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 3 of 15
petitioner has filed site plan, copy of Aadhar Card of the petitioner, copy of
plaint of civil suit pending between the parties and copies of rent receipts.
LEAVE TO DEFEND
3) 	Upon issuance of summons under the Third Schedule of the DRC Act, the
respondent appeared and filed the leave to defend application within the
prescribed time period. In the leave to defend application the respondent
has contested the claims of the petitioner on the following grounds: -
(a) That the petitioner is not the owner of the tenanted premises as no
ownership documents have been filed along with the petition and there
is no relationship of landlord and tenant between them.
(b) That there is no need or bonafide requirement on part of the petitioner
as the petitioner has concealed availability of other shops.
(c) The respondent is dependent upon the tenanted premises.
(d) The petitioner has not disclosed the details of alternative suitable
accommodations to fulfill his need.
(e) That the respondent has become the owner of the premises by way of
adverse possession.
4) 	Along with leave to defend application, respondent filed copy of agreement
dated 10.06.1952 along with English translation, copies of house tax
receipts and copy of Aadhar card of respondent.
REPLY TO LEAVE TO DEFEND APPLICATION
5) 	In reply to the leave to defend application supported with the
accompanying affidavit, petitioner has denied the averments of the
respondent and reiterated the Bonafide requirement of the tenanted
premises. Hence, it is prayed that the leave to defend application is liable
to be dismissed.
-- 3 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 4 of 15
REJOINDER
6) 	In rejoinder, thereafter, the respondent denied the averments of the
petitioner made in the reply to the leave to defend application and reiterated
their grounds of leave to defend.
FINDINGS
7) 	Arguments were then advanced by respective counsels of both the parties
on leave to defend application. At the outset, it is stated that there is no
doubt regarding the case laws relied upon on behalf of both the parties
where the Superior Courts have laid down the principles with respect to
provisions of the DRC Act, 1958 in different factual scenarios. However,
each case has its own distinguishing facts and circumstances and each
matter has to be decided in its own factual background. It is trite to state
that in a petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in order to get an eviction order
the petitioner/landlord is required to establish the following: -
(i) 	That he/she is the owner/landlord of the property;
(ii) 	That he/she requires the premises bonafide and
iii) That he/she does not have any other alternative suitable
accommodation for this purpose.
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP
8) 	As far as the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned, the respondent has
disputed the same. It is contended that there is no landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties and respondent is owner of the premises
by being in continuous uninterrupted possession of the premises for the last
many decades by way of adverse possession. However, it is not in dispute
that his father was inducted as a tenant in the premises. Once the
respondent has admitted that his predecessor was a tenant under the
predecessor of the petitioner, he, therefore, cannot deny the title of the
successor of the erstwhile landlord. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
-- 4 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 5 of 15
case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3
SCC 91 had held that:
".....13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that where a
person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the
landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of
the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will give rise
to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord
and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been
incorporated by the legislature in the said section.”
9) 	Even otherwise, it is pertinent to note that petitioner has placed on record
plaint of civil suit filed by the respondent himself against the petitioner
whereby the respondent himself has admitted that the predecessor of the
respondent was a tenant in the tenanted premises. The contention of the
respondent that he has been falsely shown as a tenant, is devoid of merits.
Therefore, at one end, respondent himself is corroborating the version of
the petitioner by acknowledging the status of his predecessor as a tenant in
the subject premises. But at the other end, he is challenging the title of the
petitioner with respect to demised premises on the basis of a bald averment.
It is no longer res integra that mere raising of baseless contentions
against the landlord cannot be a ground for being granted leave to defend
to the petitioners. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of the
Hon'ble High Court passed in the case of Mohd. Naseer Vs. Mohd. Zaheer
and Anr. RC Rev. No. 267/2016 dated 03.11.2016. It is trite to state that
respondent cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. "Approbate
and reprobate" is a legal principle, also known as the doctrine of
election, meaning a party cannot simultaneously approve (approbate) and
reject (reprobate) the same thing, transaction, or position, especially to gain
an unfair advantage. Essentially, you cannot "blow hot and cold", as it is a
fundamental rule of equity that prevents inconsistent claims or benefits
from the same matter. Hence, a bald averment has been made in this regard
and therefore the said contention is devoid of merits.
-- 5 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 6 of 15
10) 	Hence, the objection with respect to title of petitioner also does not amount
to any triable issue as imperfectness of title does not bar a petition u/s 14
(1) (e) of the DRC Act. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the
principle laid down in the case of Sh. Bharat Bhushan Vs. Arti
Teckchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247 which is as follows: -
“The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation
governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished
from the one in a title suit. If the premises was let out by a person
and after his death, the premises has come in the hands of
beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the
title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner
the tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises,
he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal
heirs of the deceased and ask the Court to decide as to who shall
be the landlord/owner after the death of the original owner.’’
11) 	Besides in the present case, the petitioner has not to prove absolute
ownership. He only has to show that he has a better title than that of the
tenant. The principle is very clear that once a tenant always a tenant.
The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his successor-in-
interest. Hence, the contention that title of the petitioners is not valid does
not amount to any triable issue when the respondent himself has attorned to
the petitioner by tender of rent. Thus, the petitioner has to show that he has
a better title than that of the tenant. In this regard, reliance is placed upon
the case of Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT
450 wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held: -
".......... The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot
stand in the way of an eviction petition under section 14 (1) (e) of
the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea
of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too
when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116
of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A
tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the
premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such
-- 6 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 7 of 15
a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to
whom he is paying rent acts dishonestly.........".
12) 	Further, it is settled law that the petitioner is not required to prove absolute
ownership, he only has to show that he has a better title than that of the
respondent. In this regard it is necessary to mention the law laid down in
the judgment titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma vs. Smt. Leela Wati
reported as 155 (2008) DLT 383, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held
that:-
".....It is settled law that for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of
Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to prove
absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act.
He is required to show only that he is more than a tenant. In this
case, the landlady had placed on record the documents by which
she became owner. The attornment given by the erstwhile landlord
in her favour as well as an admission made by the tenant by filing
petition under section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act
acknowledgment the landlordship of landlady. Thus, the
conclusion arrived at by the ARC regarding ownership and
relationship of landlord and tenant were based on sound legal
position and the cogent material before it....…”
13) 	A tenant is estopped from challenging the ownership or denying the
title of the landlord. Therefore, the objection on the ground that house tax
receipts are proof of ownership of respondent does not amount to any triable
issue as they are merely proof of possession of the respondent. The
possession of the respondents in the property is admitted by the petitioner
himself. The claim of ownership by the respondents is a bald averment. By
merely making payment of house tax does not alter the status of the property
and confer ownership of property to the respondents. In this regard, reliance
is placed upon the case of G.D. Seigell & Co. Pvt. Vs. Swarn Nijhawan &
Ors. in CM Appl. 41461/2022 decided on 20.09.2024; wherein Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi held: -
-- 7 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 8 of 15
14.1. The trial court observed that the perusal of the
Settlement Agreement dated 12.02.2014 also reflects that the
property bearing no. 1560, Church Road, Kashmere Gate,
Delhi was under occupation of the petitioner as a tenant on
monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and Rajinder Nijhawan,
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, would alone be
entitled to release of the rent deposited by the petitioner in the
court. The trial court has also observed that the petitioner has
failed to file any title documents to show its ownership of the
portion mentioned as property no. 1560/A by the petitioner in
his site plan as a separate property owned by him. The trial
court did not accept the property tax challan in respect of the
property bearing no. 1560/A as well as 1/1560 paid by the
petitioner and observed that merely making payment of
property tax vide two separate numbers by the petitioner does
not alter the relationship of the landlord and tenant between
the parties. The trial court has also relied upon the judgments
passed in Mukesh Nigam v. Arun Kumar Khandelwal (supra)
and Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad v. Purushottam (supra). It
was observed in Mukesh Nigam v. Arun Kumar
Khandelwal (supra) that as per section 108(d) of Transfer of
Property Act, 1882, if any accession is made to the leasehold
property during the continuance of the lease, then such
accession is deemed to be comprised in the lease. The
Supreme 	Court 	in Chapsibhai 	Dhanjibhai
Danad v. Purushottam (supra) held that if accession is by
encroachment and the tenant acquires title thereto by
prescription then he must surrender such accession together
with leased premises to the landlord.
14.2. The petitioner has not placed any relevant document
which can reflect that the properties bearing nos. 1/1560 and
1560/A are two separate properties and property no. 1560/A
is under the ownership of the petitioner as claimed by the
petitioner. The trial court has rightly observed that merely
making the payment of property tax separately in respect of
property bearing nos. 1/1560 and 1560/A does not confer any
ownership, right, title or interest in respect of the petitioner
regarding property no. 1560/A. It is also an accepted
proposition of law that if any accession is made in the tenanted
premises, then the accession is also liable to be vacated in
pursuance of the eviction order. The arguments as advanced
by the counsel for the petitioner are without any force.
-- 8 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 9 of 15
14) 	Further, with respect to the contention of adverse possession, it is no longer
res integra that a plea of adverse possession can be only taken against the
true owner. Adverse possession is hostile possession by assertion of a
hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner as held in M. Venkatesh
v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1: (2017) 5 SCC (Civil) 387. Thus, on the one
hand, the respondent has denied the petitioner to be the owner of the
tenanted premises while on the other hand, he has taken resort to the plea
of adverse possession. As stated before, the plea of adverse possession can
only be taken against the true owner and hence the averments of the
respondent are contradictory in nature. Moreover, the principle of once a
tenant always a tenant comes into a play. The respondent cannot take the
plea of adverse possession and claim ownership over the tenanted
premises simply on the ground of being in possession of the tenanted
premises for the past many years.
15) 	Accordingly, it can be stated that the petitioner is the owner /landlord of the
tenanted premises and the respondent is the tenant in the said premises.
Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant relationship between the
parties in the present case, stands established.
BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT
16) 	Moving forward, in order to succeed in his petition, petitioner is required to
establish his Bonafide need. Petitioner has averred that he requires the
tenanted premises for his bonafide need as he wishes to start grocery shop
since he is jobless. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondent
that the sole purpose of the present petition is to evict the respondent as the
petitioner wants to re-let the suit property at an exorbitant rate and earn
premium. But the Hon’ble Supreme court in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs
Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has held that whenever a landlord seeks
eviction of the tenant for bonafide need, the controller shall presume the
-- 9 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 10 of 15
need as genuine and bonafide. Additionally, the burden to refute the said
presumption squarely lies on the tenant and mere assertion on the part of
tenant is insufficient. Hence, mere assertion of the respondent in this regard
does not amount to any triable issue. Further, in this regard, the provision
of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which protects a tenant
in case the landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises
are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the
premises are held within two months of obtaining such possession or having
obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other person within three
years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus, the said contention is
also devoid of merits.
17) 	Firstly, it is contended that the need of the petitioner is not genuine as the
petitioner is having other independent sufficient sources of income.
However, it is pertinent to note that a person cannot be expected to sit idle
and reach a state of starvation before his need is considered bonafide.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chaganlal Sunderji
& Co. AIR 1999 SC 3864 wherein it was observed that:
“A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it
nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must
get possession of his premises for establishing a business.”
18) 	It is a matter of common knowledge that litigation can continue for many
years and therefore, the petitioner cannot be expected to remain idle during
the said period. From the record, it is clear that though the present petition
was instituted in the month of August 2023, and it is only in May 2026 that
the leave to defend has reached the stage of order. Therefore, for these
months, it would be unjust to expect them to remain idle and reach a state
of starvation. Further, I find it pertinent to refer to the case of Gaya Prasad
Vs. Shri Pradeep Srivastava, Appeal Civil No. 1071/1072 of 2001
-- 10 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 11 of 15
wherein it was observed as under: -
10. 	“….. During 23 years after the landlord moved for
eviction on the ground that his son needed the building.
Neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle
without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or
starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his
requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that
the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the
number of developments sprouting up during the long
interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a
new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks
eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed
enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent
developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the
litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its
surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that
is needed is to erase the patina and see the glose. It is
pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before
an appellant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after
passing through all the previous levels of the litigation,
merely on the ground that certain developments occurred
pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in
prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.”
19) 	Further, it is contended that the respondent has no other property or shop
available to him and has no the means to arrange another accommodation.
However, it is trite to state that for the purpose of eviction petition u/s 14
(1) (e) of the DRC Act, it is the bonafide requirement of the
petitioner/landlord which is to be seen and not the purpose for which the
respondent/tenant is using the premises. If the need of the landlord is
genuine, then merely because the tenant has no other premises for his
residence is no bar for the grant of eviction order. Hence, the said contention
by itself does not amount to any triable issue. Furthermore, it is a well
settled principle of law that a Rent Controller has to see the bonafide
requirement of the petitioner and not the comparative hardship of the
respondent. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the Apex Court’s decision
-- 11 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 12 of 15
in Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors (1979) AIR 272
that the inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of decree of
eviction in favour of the landlord far outweigh the prejudice or the
inconvenience which will be caused to the tenant.
20) 	Hence, I find the petitioner has been able to establish his Bonafide
requirement for the tenanted premises.
ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION
21) 	With regard to the plea of alternative accommodation, it is contended by the
respondent that the petitioner has concealed the various alternative
accommodations which are available with the petitioner. However, it is a
well settled proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the
property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule out the
benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available with the
petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable property. In M M
Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court has
that the landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises
but merely showing that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his
possession may not be sufficient to negative the landlord’s claim if the
vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he required the
premises.
22) 	In the present matter, however, no particulars of any purported alternative
accommodation have been pleaded by the respondent. It is trite to state that
the burden is upon the tenant to show that other alternative suitable
accommodation is available with landlord and how the said premises were
suitable for the pleaded requirement. Reference is made to the judgment of
the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs.
Sita Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del 13026, wherein it was held as under:-
-- 12 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 13 of 15
“18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the
requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord,
though at the time of requirement having alternate premises,
having not used the same and instead having commercially
exploited the same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of
such premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c)
that the said premises were vacant and available for use at the time
of pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were
suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the landlord has
deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said
pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be
proved.”
23) 	It is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs.
Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 has held for availing leave to defend a
mere assertion by the tenant is insufficient. Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act
creates a presumption in favour of the landlord regarding bona fide
need, which is rebuttable only with substantive material capable of
raising a triable issue. It was further held that the burden of proof is on the
tenant to demonstrate, with cogent evidence, that the landlord’s requirement
is not genuine. The Court also reiterated the settled principle of law that
leave to defend should not be granted on mere asking but when the pleas
and contentions raise triable issues.
24) 	Therefore, even if the landlord has other premises available to him, if the
landlord intends to use the premises in occupation of the tenant for bonafide
need, the Court cannot intervene in the same. Even in the case of K.K.
Sarin Vs. M/s Pigott Chapman & Co. 46 (1992) DLT 352, the Hon'ble
Delhi High Court held that the tenant has to produce material on which he
is relying upon. Thus, it is not for the tenant who can dictate the terms to
the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not.
However, bald averment has been made without placing any material on
record which would result in a triable issue qua the suitability of the said
purported alternative accommodations. Evidently, as per record the
-- 13 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 14 of 15
respondent has not filed any document to substantiate the plea. Therefore,
no triable issue arises in this regard as well.
25) 	Furthermore, while deciding the question of bonafide requirement of the
landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the
landlord could have adjusted. In the case of Ravichandran and Ors. Vs
Natrajan Nadar and Ors. (2004) 1 MLJ 458, it was held: -
“Even assuming that other premises are available, then the
choice is left to the landlord to decide as to which non-
residential premises he should occupy, and the tenant
cannot have any say in the matter. If the landlord is able to
show the bonafide, then the tenant cannot dictate terms to
the landlord that he should occupy some other building and
not the one mentioned in the petition.”
26) 	Even otherwise, it is the prerogative of the landlord to determine which
premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to state that an alternative
accommodation, to entail denial of claim of landlord, must be reasonably
suitable, obviously in comparison with tenanted premises, wherefrom the
landlord is seeking eviction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Delhi
High Court have repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair
of the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the landlord
is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his
property and is the best person to decide which property is to be utilized in
what way. The respondent cannot dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize
his property. The landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their
specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not
within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the landlord
regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted
premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from prescribing any standard or
guidelines for the landlord's choices (residential or commercial). Reliance
is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of
-- 14 of 15 --
RC ARC No. 542/2023 	Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain 	Page no. 15 of 15
Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj & Ors. RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard.
Therefore, the said contention is a bald averment and without any
particulars of any purported alternative accommodation, does not amount
to any triable issue.
27) 	Hence, I find that the respondent has failed to raise any triable issue on
the aspect of alternative accommodation as well.
RELIEF
28) 	Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings, I hold that the
petitioner has been able to establish the essential ingredients of petition u/s
14 (1) (e) of DRC Act i.e. landlord-tenant relationship, Bonafide necessity
and absence of reasonably suitable accommodation. Hence, in view of the
foregoing discussion, this court is of the view that no triable issue has been
raised by the respondent in his leave to defend application. Accordingly, the
leave to defend application is hereby dismissed and consequently, an
eviction order u/s 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B, DRCA is passed in favor of
petitioner and against the respondent with respect to the tenanted
premises i.e. Shop no. 3888, Ground Floor, Choori Walan, Sadak Prem
Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as tenanted
premises) and more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan.
However, in light of Section 14(7) DRCA, the eviction order shall not be
executable for a period of six months from today. No order as to costs.
File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
(Announced in the Open Court)
(GAURAV GOYAL)
ARC-01, Central District, THC
Delhi/12.05.2026
-- 15 of 15 --

TrustJury presents public court-record information for legal discovery and reference. Record availability and detail can vary by source and case.