Full Order Text
Final Order 13 · 12 May 2026 · CNR DLCT030043992023
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 1 of 15 IN THE COURT OF SH. GAURAV GOYAL, ARC-01, TIS HAZARI COURTS, CENTRAL DISTRICT, DELHI RC ARC No. 542/2023 Sh. Hari Mohan Sharma S/o Late Sh. Kishan Sharma, R/o 3887, Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi – 110006 ................................................................Petitioner Versus 1. Sh. Vijay Kumar Jain S/o Late Sh. Sumant Prashad Jain @ Sumant Prasad Jain R/o House no. 2303, Dharam Pura, Infront of Chakki nearby Vijay Goyal’s Haveli, Dharampura, Delhi – 110006 Also, at: Shop no. 3888, Ground Floor, Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi – 110006 2. Sh. Rakesh Jain S/o Late Sh. Sumant Prashad Jain @ Sumant Prasad Jain R/o Shop no. 3888, Ground Floor, Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi – 110006 ............................................................... Respondents Date of Institution of the case 10.08.2023 Under Section 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B, Delhi Rent Control Act. Date of reserving of Order 18.03.2026 Date of Order 12.05.2026 Decision Leave to defend application is dismissed and eviction order is passed -- 1 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 2 of 15 Argued by: a) Sh. Rajiv Kumar Trivedi, Ld. Counsel for petitioner. b) Sh. Anees Ahmad and Sh. Rizwan Ahmad, Ld. Counsels for respondent. ORDER 1) This order shall dispose off application for leave to defend filed by the respondent/tenant in an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter called as the DRC Act). The present eviction petition has been filed for seeking eviction of respondent from Shop no. 3888, Ground Floor, Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as tenanted premises) and more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan. PETITION 2) Briefly stated, it is alleged by the petitioner that the petitioner is the owner/landlord of shop no. 3888, Ground Floor, Choori Wala, Sadak Prem Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi-110006. That initially the shop was let out to Sumant Prasad Jain, the father of the respondents. That after the death of Sumant Prasad Jain, the respondents became the tenants in the tenanted premises being the legal heirs of Late Sumant Prasad Jain. That the petitioner is a senior citizen aged 64 years and requires the tenanted premises to run grocery shop to earn his livelihood as he is jobless. That respondent no. 1 has filed a civil suit no. 443/2023 against the petitioner seeking permanent injunction, wherein the respondent has categorically stated that the father of the respondents had been tendering rent to the petitioner in respect of the tenanted premises. The petitioner has averred that he has no other alternative accommodation available with him; thus, the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for his bonafide need as it is suitable for the petitioner. Hence, it is prayed that an eviction order may be passed in favour of the petitioner. Along with the eviction petition, -- 2 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 3 of 15 petitioner has filed site plan, copy of Aadhar Card of the petitioner, copy of plaint of civil suit pending between the parties and copies of rent receipts. LEAVE TO DEFEND 3) Upon issuance of summons under the Third Schedule of the DRC Act, the respondent appeared and filed the leave to defend application within the prescribed time period. In the leave to defend application the respondent has contested the claims of the petitioner on the following grounds: - (a) That the petitioner is not the owner of the tenanted premises as no ownership documents have been filed along with the petition and there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between them. (b) That there is no need or bonafide requirement on part of the petitioner as the petitioner has concealed availability of other shops. (c) The respondent is dependent upon the tenanted premises. (d) The petitioner has not disclosed the details of alternative suitable accommodations to fulfill his need. (e) That the respondent has become the owner of the premises by way of adverse possession. 4) Along with leave to defend application, respondent filed copy of agreement dated 10.06.1952 along with English translation, copies of house tax receipts and copy of Aadhar card of respondent. REPLY TO LEAVE TO DEFEND APPLICATION 5) In reply to the leave to defend application supported with the accompanying affidavit, petitioner has denied the averments of the respondent and reiterated the Bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises. Hence, it is prayed that the leave to defend application is liable to be dismissed. -- 3 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 4 of 15 REJOINDER 6) In rejoinder, thereafter, the respondent denied the averments of the petitioner made in the reply to the leave to defend application and reiterated their grounds of leave to defend. FINDINGS 7) Arguments were then advanced by respective counsels of both the parties on leave to defend application. At the outset, it is stated that there is no doubt regarding the case laws relied upon on behalf of both the parties where the Superior Courts have laid down the principles with respect to provisions of the DRC Act, 1958 in different factual scenarios. However, each case has its own distinguishing facts and circumstances and each matter has to be decided in its own factual background. It is trite to state that in a petition u/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act in order to get an eviction order the petitioner/landlord is required to establish the following: - (i) That he/she is the owner/landlord of the property; (ii) That he/she requires the premises bonafide and iii) That he/she does not have any other alternative suitable accommodation for this purpose. LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP 8) As far as the landlord-tenant relationship is concerned, the respondent has disputed the same. It is contended that there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties and respondent is owner of the premises by being in continuous uninterrupted possession of the premises for the last many decades by way of adverse possession. However, it is not in dispute that his father was inducted as a tenant in the premises. Once the respondent has admitted that his predecessor was a tenant under the predecessor of the petitioner, he, therefore, cannot deny the title of the successor of the erstwhile landlord. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the -- 4 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 5 of 15 case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 had held that: ".....13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section.” 9) Even otherwise, it is pertinent to note that petitioner has placed on record plaint of civil suit filed by the respondent himself against the petitioner whereby the respondent himself has admitted that the predecessor of the respondent was a tenant in the tenanted premises. The contention of the respondent that he has been falsely shown as a tenant, is devoid of merits. Therefore, at one end, respondent himself is corroborating the version of the petitioner by acknowledging the status of his predecessor as a tenant in the subject premises. But at the other end, he is challenging the title of the petitioner with respect to demised premises on the basis of a bald averment. It is no longer res integra that mere raising of baseless contentions against the landlord cannot be a ground for being granted leave to defend to the petitioners. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble High Court passed in the case of Mohd. Naseer Vs. Mohd. Zaheer and Anr. RC Rev. No. 267/2016 dated 03.11.2016. It is trite to state that respondent cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. "Approbate and reprobate" is a legal principle, also known as the doctrine of election, meaning a party cannot simultaneously approve (approbate) and reject (reprobate) the same thing, transaction, or position, especially to gain an unfair advantage. Essentially, you cannot "blow hot and cold", as it is a fundamental rule of equity that prevents inconsistent claims or benefits from the same matter. Hence, a bald averment has been made in this regard and therefore the said contention is devoid of merits. -- 5 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 6 of 15 10) Hence, the objection with respect to title of petitioner also does not amount to any triable issue as imperfectness of title does not bar a petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. In this regard, it is important to bear in mind the principle laid down in the case of Sh. Bharat Bhushan Vs. Arti Teckchandani 2008 (153) DLT 247 which is as follows: - “The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises was let out by a person and after his death, the premises has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after the death of the original owner.’’ 11) Besides in the present case, the petitioner has not to prove absolute ownership. He only has to show that he has a better title than that of the tenant. The principle is very clear that once a tenant always a tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his successor-in- interest. Hence, the contention that title of the petitioners is not valid does not amount to any triable issue when the respondent himself has attorned to the petitioner by tender of rent. Thus, the petitioner has to show that he has a better title than that of the tenant. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT 450 wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held: - ".......... The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction petition under section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such -- 6 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 7 of 15 a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent acts dishonestly.........". 12) Further, it is settled law that the petitioner is not required to prove absolute ownership, he only has to show that he has a better title than that of the respondent. In this regard it is necessary to mention the law laid down in the judgment titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma vs. Smt. Leela Wati reported as 155 (2008) DLT 383, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held that:- ".....It is settled law that for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord is not supposed to prove absolute ownership as required under Transfer of Property Act. He is required to show only that he is more than a tenant. In this case, the landlady had placed on record the documents by which she became owner. The attornment given by the erstwhile landlord in her favour as well as an admission made by the tenant by filing petition under section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act acknowledgment the landlordship of landlady. Thus, the conclusion arrived at by the ARC regarding ownership and relationship of landlord and tenant were based on sound legal position and the cogent material before it....…” 13) A tenant is estopped from challenging the ownership or denying the title of the landlord. Therefore, the objection on the ground that house tax receipts are proof of ownership of respondent does not amount to any triable issue as they are merely proof of possession of the respondent. The possession of the respondents in the property is admitted by the petitioner himself. The claim of ownership by the respondents is a bald averment. By merely making payment of house tax does not alter the status of the property and confer ownership of property to the respondents. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case of G.D. Seigell & Co. Pvt. Vs. Swarn Nijhawan & Ors. in CM Appl. 41461/2022 decided on 20.09.2024; wherein Hon’ble High Court of Delhi held: - -- 7 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 8 of 15 14.1. The trial court observed that the perusal of the Settlement Agreement dated 12.02.2014 also reflects that the property bearing no. 1560, Church Road, Kashmere Gate, Delhi was under occupation of the petitioner as a tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and Rajinder Nijhawan, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, would alone be entitled to release of the rent deposited by the petitioner in the court. The trial court has also observed that the petitioner has failed to file any title documents to show its ownership of the portion mentioned as property no. 1560/A by the petitioner in his site plan as a separate property owned by him. The trial court did not accept the property tax challan in respect of the property bearing no. 1560/A as well as 1/1560 paid by the petitioner and observed that merely making payment of property tax vide two separate numbers by the petitioner does not alter the relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parties. The trial court has also relied upon the judgments passed in Mukesh Nigam v. Arun Kumar Khandelwal (supra) and Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad v. Purushottam (supra). It was observed in Mukesh Nigam v. Arun Kumar Khandelwal (supra) that as per section 108(d) of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, if any accession is made to the leasehold property during the continuance of the lease, then such accession is deemed to be comprised in the lease. The Supreme Court in Chapsibhai Dhanjibhai Danad v. Purushottam (supra) held that if accession is by encroachment and the tenant acquires title thereto by prescription then he must surrender such accession together with leased premises to the landlord. 14.2. The petitioner has not placed any relevant document which can reflect that the properties bearing nos. 1/1560 and 1560/A are two separate properties and property no. 1560/A is under the ownership of the petitioner as claimed by the petitioner. The trial court has rightly observed that merely making the payment of property tax separately in respect of property bearing nos. 1/1560 and 1560/A does not confer any ownership, right, title or interest in respect of the petitioner regarding property no. 1560/A. It is also an accepted proposition of law that if any accession is made in the tenanted premises, then the accession is also liable to be vacated in pursuance of the eviction order. The arguments as advanced by the counsel for the petitioner are without any force. -- 8 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 9 of 15 14) Further, with respect to the contention of adverse possession, it is no longer res integra that a plea of adverse possession can be only taken against the true owner. Adverse possession is hostile possession by assertion of a hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner as held in M. Venkatesh v. BDA, (2015) 17 SCC 1: (2017) 5 SCC (Civil) 387. Thus, on the one hand, the respondent has denied the petitioner to be the owner of the tenanted premises while on the other hand, he has taken resort to the plea of adverse possession. As stated before, the plea of adverse possession can only be taken against the true owner and hence the averments of the respondent are contradictory in nature. Moreover, the principle of once a tenant always a tenant comes into a play. The respondent cannot take the plea of adverse possession and claim ownership over the tenanted premises simply on the ground of being in possession of the tenanted premises for the past many years. 15) Accordingly, it can be stated that the petitioner is the owner /landlord of the tenanted premises and the respondent is the tenant in the said premises. Thus, the first ingredient of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties in the present case, stands established. BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT 16) Moving forward, in order to succeed in his petition, petitioner is required to establish his Bonafide need. Petitioner has averred that he requires the tenanted premises for his bonafide need as he wishes to start grocery shop since he is jobless. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondent that the sole purpose of the present petition is to evict the respondent as the petitioner wants to re-let the suit property at an exorbitant rate and earn premium. But the Hon’ble Supreme court in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has held that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for bonafide need, the controller shall presume the -- 9 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 10 of 15 need as genuine and bonafide. Additionally, the burden to refute the said presumption squarely lies on the tenant and mere assertion on the part of tenant is insufficient. Hence, mere assertion of the respondent in this regard does not amount to any triable issue. Further, in this regard, the provision of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which protects a tenant in case the landlord recovers possession of any premises and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held within two months of obtaining such possession or having obtained the possession, the same are re-let to any other person within three years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus, the said contention is also devoid of merits. 17) Firstly, it is contended that the need of the petitioner is not genuine as the petitioner is having other independent sufficient sources of income. However, it is pertinent to note that a person cannot be expected to sit idle and reach a state of starvation before his need is considered bonafide. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chaganlal Sunderji & Co. AIR 1999 SC 3864 wherein it was observed that: “A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business.” 18) It is a matter of common knowledge that litigation can continue for many years and therefore, the petitioner cannot be expected to remain idle during the said period. From the record, it is clear that though the present petition was instituted in the month of August 2023, and it is only in May 2026 that the leave to defend has reached the stage of order. Therefore, for these months, it would be unjust to expect them to remain idle and reach a state of starvation. Further, I find it pertinent to refer to the case of Gaya Prasad Vs. Shri Pradeep Srivastava, Appeal Civil No. 1071/1072 of 2001 -- 10 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 11 of 15 wherein it was observed as under: - 10. “….. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building. Neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the glose. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an appellant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period.” 19) Further, it is contended that the respondent has no other property or shop available to him and has no the means to arrange another accommodation. However, it is trite to state that for the purpose of eviction petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, it is the bonafide requirement of the petitioner/landlord which is to be seen and not the purpose for which the respondent/tenant is using the premises. If the need of the landlord is genuine, then merely because the tenant has no other premises for his residence is no bar for the grant of eviction order. Hence, the said contention by itself does not amount to any triable issue. Furthermore, it is a well settled principle of law that a Rent Controller has to see the bonafide requirement of the petitioner and not the comparative hardship of the respondent. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the Apex Court’s decision -- 11 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 12 of 15 in Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahad Khan and Ors (1979) AIR 272 that the inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of decree of eviction in favour of the landlord far outweigh the prejudice or the inconvenience which will be caused to the tenant. 20) Hence, I find the petitioner has been able to establish his Bonafide requirement for the tenanted premises. ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION 21) With regard to the plea of alternative accommodation, it is contended by the respondent that the petitioner has concealed the various alternative accommodations which are available with the petitioner. However, it is a well settled proposition of law that it is not sufficient that any kind of the property should be available to the petitioner/landlord to rule out the benefit of 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act. The property available with the petitioner/landlord should also be reasonably suitable property. In M M Quasim vs/ Manohar Lal Sharma, (1981) 3 SCC 36, the Apex Court has that the landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises but merely showing that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession may not be sufficient to negative the landlord’s claim if the vacant premises were not suitable for the purpose for which he required the premises. 22) In the present matter, however, no particulars of any purported alternative accommodation have been pleaded by the respondent. It is trite to state that the burden is upon the tenant to show that other alternative suitable accommodation is available with landlord and how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement. Reference is made to the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of Lalta Prasad Gupta Vs. Sita Ram, 2017 SCC Online Del 13026, wherein it was held as under:- -- 12 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 13 of 15 “18. Thus, if the tenant seeks leave to defend controverting the requirement pleaded by landlord on the ground of the landlord, though at the time of requirement having alternate premises, having not used the same and instead having commercially exploited the same, the tenant must plead (a) the particulars of such premises; (b) the right/title of the landlord to the same; (c) that the said premises were vacant and available for use at the time of pleaded requirement of landlord; (d) how the said premises were suitable for the pleaded requirement; and (e) how the landlord has deprived himself thereof i.e. by sale or letting and support the said pleas with material on the basis whereof such pleas will be proved.” 23) It is pertinent to note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC 30 has held for availing leave to defend a mere assertion by the tenant is insufficient. Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act creates a presumption in favour of the landlord regarding bona fide need, which is rebuttable only with substantive material capable of raising a triable issue. It was further held that the burden of proof is on the tenant to demonstrate, with cogent evidence, that the landlord’s requirement is not genuine. The Court also reiterated the settled principle of law that leave to defend should not be granted on mere asking but when the pleas and contentions raise triable issues. 24) Therefore, even if the landlord has other premises available to him, if the landlord intends to use the premises in occupation of the tenant for bonafide need, the Court cannot intervene in the same. Even in the case of K.K. Sarin Vs. M/s Pigott Chapman & Co. 46 (1992) DLT 352, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that the tenant has to produce material on which he is relying upon. Thus, it is not for the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and advise him what he should do and what he should not. However, bald averment has been made without placing any material on record which would result in a triable issue qua the suitability of the said purported alternative accommodations. Evidently, as per record the -- 13 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 14 of 15 respondent has not filed any document to substantiate the plea. Therefore, no triable issue arises in this regard as well. 25) Furthermore, while deciding the question of bonafide requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavor as to how else the landlord could have adjusted. In the case of Ravichandran and Ors. Vs Natrajan Nadar and Ors. (2004) 1 MLJ 458, it was held: - “Even assuming that other premises are available, then the choice is left to the landlord to decide as to which non- residential premises he should occupy, and the tenant cannot have any say in the matter. If the landlord is able to show the bonafide, then the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord that he should occupy some other building and not the one mentioned in the petition.” 26) Even otherwise, it is the prerogative of the landlord to determine which premises best suits his requirements. It is trite to state that an alternative accommodation, to entail denial of claim of landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with tenanted premises, wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court have repeatedly held that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord and dictate as to how the available property of the landlord is to be best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his property and is the best person to decide which property is to be utilized in what way. The respondent cannot dictate as to how the landlord is to utilize his property. The landlord possesses the prerogative to determine their specific requirements, exercising full autonomy in this regard. It is not within the purview of the courts to impose directives on the landlord regarding the nature or quality of their chosen usage of the tenanted premises. Therefore, the courts refrain from prescribing any standard or guidelines for the landlord's choices (residential or commercial). Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of -- 14 of 15 -- RC ARC No. 542/2023 Hari Mohan Sharma Vs. Vijay Kumar Jain Page no. 15 of 15 Praveen & Anr. Vs. Mulak Raj & Ors. RC Rev. 417/2016 in this regard. Therefore, the said contention is a bald averment and without any particulars of any purported alternative accommodation, does not amount to any triable issue. 27) Hence, I find that the respondent has failed to raise any triable issue on the aspect of alternative accommodation as well. RELIEF 28) Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussion and findings, I hold that the petitioner has been able to establish the essential ingredients of petition u/s 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act i.e. landlord-tenant relationship, Bonafide necessity and absence of reasonably suitable accommodation. Hence, in view of the foregoing discussion, this court is of the view that no triable issue has been raised by the respondent in his leave to defend application. Accordingly, the leave to defend application is hereby dismissed and consequently, an eviction order u/s 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25B, DRCA is passed in favor of petitioner and against the respondent with respect to the tenanted premises i.e. Shop no. 3888, Ground Floor, Choori Walan, Sadak Prem Narayan, Bazar Sita Ram, Delhi-110006 (hereinafter referred to as tenanted premises) and more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan. However, in light of Section 14(7) DRCA, the eviction order shall not be executable for a period of six months from today. No order as to costs. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance. (Announced in the Open Court) (GAURAV GOYAL) ARC-01, Central District, THC Delhi/12.05.2026 -- 15 of 15 --
