Full Order Text
Final Order 10 · 13 May 2026 · CNR DLCT030007702025
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF SH. DEVANSHU SAJLAN, CCJ CUM ARC, CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS RC ARC/76/2025 DLCT030007702025 In the matter of : 1. Ramesh Chander Gupta, 2. Krishan Chandra Gupta, and 3. Aman Gupta ...Petitioners v. Punjab National Bank ...Respondent 1. Date of Institution : 03.02.2025 2. Date of Reserving Order : 28.03.2025 3. Date of Decision : 13.05.2026 4. Decision : Leave to defend application dismissed, petition allowed Argued by -: Mr. Vinay Gupta and Ms. Niyati Shriparna, Ld. Counsels for the petitioner. Mr. Rajesh Khanna, Ld. Counsel for the respondent. ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND 1. Vide this order, this Court shall decide the application filed RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.1/23 -- 1 of 23 -- by the respondent under Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter, the ‘DRC Act’) seeking leave to defend the present eviction petition. The eviction petition was filed by the petitioner against the respondent under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act on 03.02.2025 qua first floor and basement of the property bearing Municipal No. 8-A, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-110007. 2. It is pertinent to mention that the family of the petitioners is residing on the second floor of the demised premises. The first floor and the basement of the demised premises is occupied by the respondent. Further, the ground floor of the demised premises is occupied by another tenant, i.e., Weights and Measures Department of the GNCT of Delhi. 3. The present case has been filed for the residential bona fide need of (i) the petitioner No. 2 and his wife; (ii) the senior citizens of the family of the petitioners who are currently residing on the second floor of the demised premises; and (iii) the 06 sisters of the petitioners, who are married but visit the maternal home, i.e., the demised premises, to meet their siblings and families. The specific need of the aforesaid persons is mentioned below: (i) Petitioner No. 2 and his wife: Petitioner No. 2 and his wife are senior citizens. It has been submitted that initially, all the petitioners were residing together in the demised premises. However, on account of scarcity of space, petitioner No. 2, with his family, left the demised premises in the year 2005, and shifted to his current residence situated in Rohini. It has been further submitted that the children of the petitioner No. 2 are no longer RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.2/23 -- 2 of 23 -- residing with him due to the exigencies of their profession, and that the petitioner No. 2 and his wife feel lonely in their current residence. It has been further submitted that the petitioner No. 2 and his wife now wish to return to the demised premises and reside with the rest of the family so that they can enjoy with their siblings and get moral support from them during their old age. It has been further submitted that even otherwise, whenever the petitioner No. 2 comes to visit the family house situated at the demised premises, it becomes a very tedious task for him to climb the stairs for two floors to meet his family (since currently, the family members are residing on the second floor of the demised premises). (ii) Senior citizens of the family: It has been submitted that petitioner No. 1 and his wife, as well as the mother of petitioner No. 3, are senior citizens and are currently residing on the second floor of the demised premises. It has been submitted that it is very difficult for the senior citizens of the family to climb two floors since there is no elevator/lifts in the building complex. It has been submitted that the said senior citizens wish to shift to the first floor so that they are able to perform minor day to day errands without needing to climb two floors on a regular basis. (iii) Married sisters of the petitioner: It has been submitted that there are 06 married sisters of the petitioners, who visit the family house occasionally, but are unable to reside comfortably during their visits due to paucity of accommodation. It has been further submitted that particularly, sister of the petitioner No. 3, who is married and currently living in Shimla with her family, RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.3/23 -- 3 of 23 -- visits the family house from time to time to meet her widow mother and her brother. However, it has been submitted that whenever she comes to visit, she is unable to stay comfortably due to paucity of accommodation in the family house situated at the demised premises. 4. Arguments on the leave to defend application have been heard. 5. Before examining the merits of the case, it would be appropriate to refer to the legal position governing Section 14(1) (e) of the DRC Act and the principles applicable while deciding an application for leave to defend. It is settled law that, to succeed under Section 14(1)(e), the landlord must establish: i. Existence of a landlord-tenant relationship; ii. Bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for the landlord or any family member dependent upon him/her; and iii. Non-availability of any other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. 6. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua, AIR 2022 SC 1778, wherein it was observed that: 12. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, the learned Rent Controller may dispense with the protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.4/23 -- 4 of 23 -- and (ii) the non availability of a reasonably suitable resi- dential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated Under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied. 7. The concept of bona fide need has been further elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999 INSC 364, wherein it was held that the re- quirement must be based on a sincere, honest, and natural desire as distinguished from a mere pretext: A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any set- ting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court. The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substanti- ate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the landlord for premises or additional premises by applying ob- jective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjec- tive choice shall be respected by the court. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.5/23 -- 5 of 23 -- practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be guarded against. 8. Thus, for the petitioners to succeed, it must be shown that they are the owner of the property, that a landlord-tenant relationship exists, that they have a bona fide requirement of the premises, and that no other suitable alternative accommodation is available. Once these essential ingredients are proved, the petition succeeds. 9. At the same time, it is mandated under Section 25B(5) of the DRC Act that where the application for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement is filed under Section 14(1)(e), the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises. It was held in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706, that at the stage of deciding leave to defend application, the real test is whether the facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave to defend prima facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction. Similarly, in Nem Chand Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana, 94 (2001) DLT 683, it was held that: …before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable issues which disentitle the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the same time entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed. The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows. 10. In the following paragraphs, this Court shall determine whether the petitioners have established the essential ingredients RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.6/23 -- 6 of 23 -- of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, and whether the respondent has raised any triable issue warranting the grant of leave to defend. A. LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP/OWNERSHIP:- 11. With respect to the first ingredient, it is well-settled that for the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, a landlord is not required to establish absolute ownership in the manner contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act. It is sufficient for the landlord to demonstrate that their title is superior to that of the tenant. In Shanti Sharma & Ors. v. Ved Prabha & Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 193, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the term “owner” in this context is to be understood vis-à-vis the tenant, meaning thereby that the landlord must show himself to be “something more than the tenant.” Reliance may also be placed on Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Leela Wati & Ors., 155 (2008) DLT 383, wherein the same principle was reiterated. 12. With respect to ownership, the petitioners have placed on record the registered article of agreement dated 27.02.1950 executed by Municipal Committee of Delhi in favour of the father of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 (see page No. 62 to 76 of the documents annexed with the eviction petition). It is not in dispute that the father of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 passed away in 1987. With respect to the devolution of the property after the demise of the father of petitioner No. 1 and 2, they have placed on record the registered relinquishment deed dated 01.04.2019 executed in favour of the petitioners by the other family members of the petitioners (see page No. 92 to 106 of the documents annexed RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.7/23 -- 7 of 23 -- with the eviction petition). It is pertinent to note that in its reply to the legal notice to the petitioners, the respondent Bank admitted that the father of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 was the erstwhile owner of the demised premises (see page No. 116 of the documents annexed with the eviction petition). Therefore, in light of the documents placed on record and the admission of the respondent, there is no dispute regarding the fact that the father of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 i.e., Shri Ram Chander Gupta, was the original owner of the demised premises. The petitioners have demonstrated their ownership on the basis of intestate succession and the registered relinquishment deed dated 01.04.2019. Accordingly, the petitioners have been able to show a better title than the respondent. 13. Further, the respondent has admitted itself to be a tenant in the tenanted premises (see paragraph No. 4 of the leave to defend application). However, the respondent has disputed the landlordship of the petitioners on the ground that the true landlord of the tenanted premises is a partnership firm by the name of M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company (see paragraph No. 11 of the leave to defend application). It has been submitted that the respondent had become a tenant of the aforesaid partnership firm by way of a registered lease deed dated 06.11.1969 and hence, there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties in question. 14. It is not in dispute that the petitioner No. 1 and 2 are the sons of one of the partners of the said firm (i.e., Shri Ram Chander Gupta), and that the petitioner No. 3 is the grandson of RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.8/23 -- 8 of 23 -- the said partner. It is pertinent to note that the petitioners have stated that the aforesaid firm stood automatically dissolved upon the death of Shri Ram Chander Gupta, who was one of the four partners of the said firm (see paragraph No. 2 of the reply to the leave to defend application). It has been further submitted that while M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company was the landlord qua the premises in question, the owner of the concerned premises was Shri Ram Chander Gupta individually (see also the ownership documents in the name of Shri Ram Chander Gupta from page No. 62 to 76 of the documents annexed with the present petition). Accordingly, it is submitted that upon his demise, the property vested in his LRs and hence, the petitioners herein are the owners qua the demised premises. It has been further submitted that since the aforesaid partnership firm stood dissolved, the landlordship has also devolved upon only the petitioners herein, since they are the LRs of the original owner Shri Ram Chander Gupta. 15. It is pertinent to note that a legal notice was sent by the petitioners to the respondent informing it about the demise of their father, and also calling upon the respondent to pay the rent to them (see page No. 113 of the documents annexed with the present petition). In its reply to the said legal notice, the respondent admitted that (i) Shri Ram Chander Gupta was the owner of the demised premises; (ii) Shri Ram Chander Gupta was one of the partners of M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company; and (iii) Shri Ram Chander Gupta passed away on 14.02.1987 (see page No. 116 of the documents annexed with the present petition). The respondent’s only contention is that no deed of RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.9/23 -- 9 of 23 -- dissolution of the concerned firm has been filed on record by the petitioners herein. It has been further submitted that even if the said firm has been dissolved, the landlordship would also devolve upon the LRs of the other three partners of the concerned firm, i.e., Shri Kanshi Ram Agarwal, Shir Chatur Bhuj Garg and Shri Ratan Lal Garg. 16. However, firstly, with respect to the contention about the absence of deed of dissolution, it is settled law that subject to the contract between the partners, a firm stands dissolved by death of a partner (see Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932). Therefore, ordinarily, a partnership firm stands dissolved upon the death of a partner, and it will continue to exist only if a specific clause to this effect is added in the partnership deed. The petitioners have stated on oath that the firm M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company stood dissolved upon the death of their father. They have also annexed a Gazette notification dated 25.01.1988 in which the factum of dissolution of the aforesaid firm was duly published (see Annexure CA1 to the reply to the leave to defend application). The respondent has not filed any contrary material to show that the said firm is still in existence. 17. Therefore, in light of the statutory provision and the Gazette notification on record, it stands established that the firm M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company is no longer in existence and has been dissolved. Therefore, after the dissolution of the said firm, the LRs of Shri Ramesh Chander Gupta became the landlords qua the tenanted premises on account of being the owners of the tenanted premises (As noted above, the respondent RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.10/23 -- 10 of 23 -- has admitted that Shri Ramesh Chander Gupta was the owner of the tenanted premises prior to his death. Accordingly, after his death, the petitioners, being his sons/ grandson, became co- owners pursuant to internal family arrangement/ registered relinquishment deed dated 01.04.2019). In this regard, reliance may be placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Phulgita v. Shri Krishan Kumar & Ors, RC Rev. 527/11, in which it was held that every owner of a property is automatically a landlord of a property since an owner is always entitled to receive rent. The respondent has also contended that since the demised premises was constructed from the money of the concerned partnership firm, the said partnership firm became the owner of the demised premises. However, the said contention is without any merit. The ownership of a property is determined based upon the sale/ allotment documents and not on the basis of whose funds have been used to construct the property. It is not in dispute that the demised premises was alloted/ sold to Shri Ram Chander Gupta in his individual capacity by the concerned authority and hence, the respondent cannot contend that the said property became vested in the partnership firm solely on the basis that the money of the firm was used to construct the demised premises. 18. Secondly, even if the contention of the respondent is accepted to the extent that the landlordship qua the tenanted premises also devolved upon the LRs of the other three partners of the concerned firm, it is a settled position of law that a co- owner can maintain an eviction petition on their own and the consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.11/23 -- 11 of 23 -- that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant (India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla, (2004) 3 SCC 178; Col. Inderjeet Singh v. Mr. Vikram Singh, 194 (2012) DLT 209; Yashpal v. Chaman Lal Sachdeva, 129 (2006) DLT 200). No objection has been filed on behalf of any of the LRs of the remaining partners of the firm M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company. Accordingly, the respondent’s objection is not tenable, and no triable issue exists regarding the landlord- tenant relationship between the parties. B. BONA FIDE NEED:- 19. The pleaded bona fide need has been reproduced in detail in paragraph No. 3 of the present order. 20. In respect of the question of bona fide requirement, it is a settled law that the court must presume the bona fide requirement of the landlord and that the burden to refute the said presumption squarely lies on the tenant. A mere assertion on the part of the tenant is insufficient. It was held in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 that: when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. 21. Similar observations made in case of Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778 are as under: A heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.12/23 -- 12 of 23 -- is not genuine. The tenant is required to give all the necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the affidavit itself so that the Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord; a mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine. 22. With respect to the pleaded bona fide need, the respondent has taken an objection that the premises in question is not a residential property since it consists of a banking hall and two rooms. It has been submitted that there is no kitchen, or separate bathrooms on the first floor and hence, the premises is unfit to be used as a residential premises. 23. However, the said objection is misconceived in my humble opinion. An identical objection was dealt with and rejected in the case of Hot Chand v. Dhanpat Rai, 2010 (168) DLT 78. In the said case also, an objection was taken that the premises is situated in a commercial area with only a single hall and no bathroom. However, the said objection was rejected by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi with the following observation: 5. The second contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioner/tenant is that the premises is situated in a commercial area and that considering the fact that the premises is only a single hall without any bathroom facilities or any water connection, it is not understood how the respondents/landlords would put it to use for residential purpose. 6. It is not the case of the petitioner that the civic authority, on an application being received, would decline to grant a water connection to the tenanted premises merely because it is situated in a commercial area. Insofar as the toilet facilities are concerned, as stated by the Counsel for the petitioner/tenant himself, the tenanted premises is a single hall in his occupation along with respondents No. 9 to 13, the legal heirs of late Shri Daulat Ram. The Municipal Bye-laws do not bar the respondents from internally partitioning the said hall into RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.13/23 -- 13 of 23 -- rooms by constructing walls including a toilet, after obtaining necessary sanctions in that regard. There is no law that prohibits the respondents from making such an application, and the civic authority entertaining the same if it is in accordance with the Building Bye-laws. 7. It is not for the petitioners to question the decision of the respondents to put the tenanted premises to use for residential purposes. The petitioners do not claim that the area in question has been declared as non-residential by the civic authority. The respondents cannot be held to be suspect merely because they have opted to reside in an area which is now stated to be largely put to commercial use. The option still lies with the respondents to make it habitable and having exercised the said option, it is not for the petitioners to question the same. 24. Even in the present case, it is not the case of the respondent that the area in question has been declared to be non- residential by the civic authority. In fact, part of the family of the petitioners is already residing on the second floor of the demised premises. Therefore, once the area is not claimed to be non- residential as per the MCD sanction plan/ rules, the respondent cannot take this objection to avoid eviction from the tenanted premises. As stated in the aforesaid judgment, it is for the petitioners to make the premises habitable for residential use after taking its possession from the respondent. 25. In any case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the landlord is the best judge of the nature, extent and manner of their requirement, and that it is not for the Court or the tenant to dictate the petitioner regarding the same (see Prativa Devi v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353, Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222, Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679 and Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy (2001) 8 SCC 561). The principles established in the aforesaid judgments were succinctly RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.14/23 -- 14 of 23 -- summarized in Dharampal v. Chaudhary Ram Chander, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12980, in the following manner: (a) the landlord is the best judge of his requirement; (b) he has complete freedom in the matter; (c) it is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he should use his property or to prescribe a standard therefor; (d) there is no law which deprives a landlord of beneficial enjoy- ment of his property; (e) the Court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; (f) the Court will not thrust its own wisdom upon the choice by the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his need; (g) the Judge, should place himself in the place of the landlord and then answer whether the bona fide requirement is outcome of a sincere, honest desire, instructed by realities of life; and, (h) the law does not command or compel the landlord to squeeze him- self and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenant's continued occupation. 26. Therefore, the respondent’s objection regarding the premises being unfit for residential use is without any merit. 27. Next, it has been contended that prior building sanction plans have not been obtained from the MCD. It has been submitted that the building in question is very old and no structural changes can be allowed in the building without the prior sanction from the MCD. It has been contended that in absence of the said sanction plans, the pleaded bona fide need is not genuine. 28. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that prior statutory approvals are not required before filing an application u/s 14(1) (e) of the DRC Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harrington House School v. S. M. Ispahani, (2002) 5 SCC 229, held that the absence of sanctioned plans does not defeat a petition based on RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.15/23 -- 15 of 23 -- bona fide requirement and that questions of municipal approval arise, if at all, only at a later stage. Similarly, in Hari Dass Sharma v. Vikas Sood, (2013) 5 SCC 243, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that prior sanction is not an indispensable prerequisite for ordering eviction. Thus, the respondent’s objection is legally irrelevant at this stage. 29. In any case, the tenant has no locus standi to challenge the lack of approvals/ sanctions on the part of the petitioner. Whether any statutory/ regulatory permission/ sanction is required to be taken or not is the inter se arrangement between the petitioner and the regulatory authorities and the respondent/ tenant cannot challenge any illegality/ lack of approval as a ground to resist their eviction from the tenanted premises. In this regard, reliance may be placed upon the judgment of Gulshan Rai v. Samrendra Bose Secy, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 444, in which it was observed that: Record shows that it is an admitted fact that a guest house is being run from a part portion of the disputed premises; whether it is legal or illegal is a matter inter se between the landlord and the MCD; the tenant has no locus standi to challenge this illegality of his running a guest house which is admittedly being run by the landlord from the portion immediately adjacent to the Bengali Club. The tenant has also not disputed the specific averment made by the landlord that the portions shown as letters A and B in the site plan were actually tin sheds and where he has now been made an unauthorized construction. Submission of the landlord is that after obtaining the possession of the disputed portion he will take the necessary permissions and after removing the unauthorized construction, he will expand his business of the guest house from the disputed portion. The building Bye-laws for the Union Territories of Delhi, 1983 have also been perused. They do not prohibit such an activity. Clause 23.1, 23.2 and 23.9 are relevant. A heritage building is required to be conserved and preserved; this is the responsibility of the owner of the heritage building; if the owner agrees to maintain the RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.16/23 -- 16 of 23 -- heritage building in its existing state and to preserve its heritage status with due repairs and gives a written undertaking to that effect, he may then be allowed, with the approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee to carry out commercial use/office/hotels even from a non-commercial area. This is specifically stated in clause 23.9; this is an incentive use of a heritage building. Contention of the landlord specifically in the eviction petition is to the effect that after he gets the tenanted portion vacated and after taking necessary permission from the Department, he will get the unauthorized constructions (raised by the tenant) removed and thereafter after obtaining necessary permissions will expand his business of the guest house which he is admittedly carrying out from a portion of the first floor. This is an inter se arrangement between the owner/landlord and the MCD/Government Body, the tenant cannot raise an issue that merely because the property owned by the landlord is a heritage property he cannot run a guest house. If such an argument raised by the tenant is accepted then this would mean that in all such cases where the owner/landlord owns a heritage building he would never be able to get his property vacated only for the reason that it has a heritage status. This is definitely not the import of the Building Bye-laws which have been relied upon by the Trial Court holding that triable issues have arisen. Triable issues have to be gathered from the pleadings of the parties which include the application for leave to defend, reply to the said application as also the averments made in the eviction petition. As matter of routine leave to defend cannot be granted; if the defence raised is moonshine, sham, and illusory, the leave to defend has to be refused; otherwise the whole purpose and purport of the summary procedure as prescribed under section 25B of the DRCA would be defeated. In cases where no traible issue has been raised, the application for leave to defend has to be declined. The only triable issue raised by the tenant is that since it is a heritage property, a guest house cannot be run; admittedly, a guest house is being run from a portion of the said property; this has not been disputed by the tenant in his application for leave to defend; it is for the landlord to take the necessary permissions from the Heritage Zone of the MCD to extend his business of guest house to the disputed portion; nothing prevents him from adding more rooms to his already existing guest house; this he can do only after gets an eviction order. 30. Therefore, the tenant cannot resist eviction by relying upon any lack of approval/ sanction for the alleged bona fide need on RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.17/23 -- 17 of 23 -- the part of the landlord. Accordingly, this objection on the part of the respondent is also not tenable. 31. Lastly, in any case, the DRC Act itself contains protective mechanisms in this regard. Section 19 of the DRC Act empowers the tenant to seek re-entry if, after eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, the landlord does not occupy the premises or uses it for a different purpose within the statutory period. Accordingly, if the landlord fails to implement the proposed use, including in a scenario where a sanction is eventually required for making the tenanted premises habitable for residential, but not granted, the tenant is not without remedy. The existence of this statutory safeguard demonstrates that the legislature did not intend the Rent Controller to insist upon prior statutory approvals before adjudicating bona fide requirement. Therefore, the objection regarding the lack of sanction plan from MCD/ structural safety of the tenanted premises is without any merit. 32. Next, it has been submitted that the petitioner No. 2 had shifted to his residence in Rohini way back in 2005, and has been comfortably living there since then. Accordingly, it has been submitted that there is no bona fide need of the petitioner No. 2 to return to the demised premises in question, and the present petition has been filed only to put the tenanted premises on rent at a higher market rate. However, the said argument is not tenable. It has been explained in detail in the eviction petition that the petitioner No. 2 and his wife are senior citizens who are living alone in Rohini since their children have left the said residence due to their job commitments. It has been further RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.18/23 -- 18 of 23 -- explained that the petitioner No. 2 wishes to now return to the family house situated in the demised premises so that he can spend his old-age life with his family/siblings. It is a settled position of law that the pleaded bona fide need carries with it a presumption of genuineness. The said presumption cannot be rebutted by making a bald assertion to the effect that the petitioners only wish to re-let the property at a higher value. In any case, as noted above, Section 19 of the DRC Act takes care of the apprehension of the respondent in this regard since if the petitioners do not utilize the first floor of the demised premises for their residential use, the respondent can file an application u/s 19 of the DRC Act to seek re-possession. Lastly, the premises situated at Rohini cannot be categorized as an alternate accommodation since the whole case of the petitioners is that the petitioner No. 2 wishes to shift back to the family house situated at the demised premises and accordingly, he wishes to leave his residence in Rohini. The purpose of filing of the present petition is to ensure that the entire family of the petitioners can live together in a single premises, and that purpose cannot be achieved at the residence of the petitioner No. 2 situated in Rohini. 33. Next, it has been contended that part of the tenanted premises is situated in the basement, which is clearly unfit for residential use. However, the petitioners have nowhere stated in the eviction petition that they wish to shift to the basement portion. The need propounded in the eviction petition is that the petitioners wish to shift to the first floor of the demised premises, which is the major portion of the tenanted premises. It is settled RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.19/23 -- 19 of 23 -- law that a partial eviction of a tenanted premises cannot be allowed and hence, the petitioners could not have filed the present petition solely for the first floor. Further, in the reply to the leave to defend application, the petitioners have stated that the basement portion will be used for storing surplus household goods. Therefore, the aforesaid contention of the respondent regarding the basement portion is without any merit. 34. Accordingly, the burden placed upon the respondent to rebut the genuineness of the bona fide need has not been discharged since no tenable objection with respect to the bona fide need of the petitioner has been raised. Therefore, no triable issue is raised with respect to the aspect of bona fide requirement. C. AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION: 35. With respect to the third ingredient of availability of other suitable alternate accommodation, it is to be noted that to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, an alternate accommodation must be reasonably suitable, in comparison with the tenanted premises in question. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507, has held that for an eviction petition to fail on the ground of availability of alternate suitable accommodation, the availability of another accommodation must be suitable as well as convenient in all respects as the tenanted accommodation from which the landlord seeks eviction of the tenant. 36. In the leave to defend application, no ground has been RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.20/23 -- 20 of 23 -- taken with respect to the availability of alternate suitable accommodation. However, it has been submitted that even as per the petitioners’ averments, there are 07 adults living on the second floor, whereas as per the site plan, there are 08 bed rooms available on the second floor and hence, there is sufficient accommodation available with the petitioners to adequately accommodate the entire family. 37. However, the said averment is not tenable since as explained above, the present eviction petition has been filed for the residential bona fide need of (i) the petitioner No. 2 and his wife; (ii) the senior citizens of the family of the petitioners who are currently residing on the second floor of the demised premises (but wish to shift to the first floor in order to avoid climbing stairs for two floors regularly); and (iii) the 06 sisters of the petitioners, who are married but visit the maternal home, i.e., the demised premises, to meet their siblings and families. Therefore, the bona fide need is not limited to the persons who are already residing on the second floor of the tenanted premises. In addition to the people who are already residing in the demised premises, the bona fide need also contemplates the accommodation requirement of the petitioner No. 2 and his wife as well as the married sisters who visit the demised premises from time to time (but are unable to stay due to lack of accommodation for them). Therefore, the respondent cannot dictate to the petitioners as to how much space is enough to accommodate the entire family of the petitioners. Further, even if the available rooms are presumed to be enough, it will not satisfy the bona fide need to the extent that the senior citizens in the RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.21/23 -- 21 of 23 -- family wish to shift to the first floor of the demised premises so that they are able to perform day to day minor errands without having to climb two floors on a regular basis. Therefore, the aforesaid contention of the respondent is not tenable. 38. Accordingly, no triable issue exists as far as the issue of suitable alternate accommodation is concerned. CONCLUSION 39. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the petitioner has established all the necessary ingredients for getting an order of eviction on the ground of bonafide needs. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706, has specified that leave to defend to a tenant cannot be granted on mere asking or in a routine manner as it will defeat the very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter III- A of the DRC Act and what has to be seen while granting leave to defend is that there is a strong prima facie case against the landlord who is seeking eviction. Herein, the tenant has not been able to show any prima facie case, and hence, is not held entitled to leave to defend. 40. Accordingly, the leave to defend application filed by the respondent stands dismissed. 41. The petition is consequently allowed, and it is directed that the tenant shall hand over the vacant possession of the tenanted premises i.e., first floor and basement of the property bearing Municipal No. 8-A, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-110007 (as RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.22/23 -- 22 of 23 -- highlighted in red in the site plan), to the petitioner. 42. There shall be no order as to costs. In view of the provisions of Section 14 (7) DRC Act, 1958, this order for recovery of possession shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of 6 months from this date. Announced in open Court on 13th Day of May, 2026 (Devanshu Sajlan) CCJ-cum-ARC (Central)THC/Delhi RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.23/23 -- 23 of 23 --
