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Final Order 10

CNR DLCT03000770202513 May 2026
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Final Order 10 · 13 May 2026 · CNR DLCT030007702025

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF SH. DEVANSHU SAJLAN, CCJ CUM
ARC, CENTRAL, TIS HAZARI COURTS
RC ARC/76/2025
DLCT030007702025
In the matter of :
1. Ramesh Chander Gupta,
2. Krishan Chandra Gupta, and
3. Aman Gupta
...Petitioners
v.
Punjab National Bank
...Respondent
1. Date of Institution : 03.02.2025
2. Date of Reserving Order : 28.03.2025
3. Date of Decision : 13.05.2026
4. Decision : Leave to defend application
dismissed, petition allowed
Argued by -: Mr. Vinay Gupta and Ms. Niyati Shriparna, Ld. Counsels for
the petitioner.
Mr. Rajesh Khanna, Ld. Counsel for the respondent.
ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND
1. Vide this order, this Court shall decide the application filed
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.1/23
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by the respondent under Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (hereinafter, the ‘DRC Act’) seeking leave to defend the
present eviction petition. The eviction petition was filed by the
petitioner against the respondent under Section 14(1)(e) DRC Act
on 03.02.2025 qua first floor and basement of the property
bearing Municipal No. 8-A, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-110007.
2. It is pertinent to mention that the family of the petitioners
is residing on the second floor of the demised premises. The first
floor and the basement of the demised premises is occupied by
the respondent. Further, the ground floor of the demised premises
is occupied by another tenant, i.e., Weights and Measures
Department of the GNCT of Delhi.
3. The present case has been filed for the residential bona
fide need of (i) the petitioner No. 2 and his wife; (ii) the senior
citizens of the family of the petitioners who are currently residing
on the second floor of the demised premises; and (iii) the 06
sisters of the petitioners, who are married but visit the maternal
home, i.e., the demised premises, to meet their siblings and
families. The specific need of the aforesaid persons is mentioned
below:
(i) Petitioner No. 2 and his wife: Petitioner No. 2 and his wife
are senior citizens. It has been submitted that initially, all the
petitioners were residing together in the demised premises.
However, on account of scarcity of space, petitioner No. 2, with
his family, left the demised premises in the year 2005, and shifted
to his current residence situated in Rohini. It has been further
submitted that the children of the petitioner No. 2 are no longer
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.2/23
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residing with him due to the exigencies of their profession, and
that the petitioner No. 2 and his wife feel lonely in their current
residence. It has been further submitted that the petitioner No. 2
and his wife now wish to return to the demised premises and
reside with the rest of the family so that they can enjoy with their
siblings and get moral support from them during their old age. It
has been further submitted that even otherwise, whenever the
petitioner No. 2 comes to visit the family house situated at the
demised premises, it becomes a very tedious task for him to
climb the stairs for two floors to meet his family (since currently,
the family members are residing on the second floor of the
demised premises).
(ii) Senior citizens of the family: It has been submitted that
petitioner No. 1 and his wife, as well as the mother of petitioner
No. 3, are senior citizens and are currently residing on the second
floor of the demised premises. It has been submitted that it is
very difficult for the senior citizens of the family to climb two
floors since there is no elevator/lifts in the building complex. It
has been submitted that the said senior citizens wish to shift to
the first floor so that they are able to perform minor day to day
errands without needing to climb two floors on a regular basis.
(iii) Married sisters of the petitioner: It has been submitted that
there are 06 married sisters of the petitioners, who visit the
family house occasionally, but are unable to reside comfortably
during their visits due to paucity of accommodation. It has been
further submitted that particularly, sister of the petitioner No. 3,
who is married and currently living in Shimla with her family,
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.3/23
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visits the family house from time to time to meet her widow
mother and her brother. However, it has been submitted that
whenever she comes to visit, she is unable to stay comfortably
due to paucity of accommodation in the family house situated at
the demised premises.
4. Arguments on the leave to defend application have been
heard.
5. Before examining the merits of the case, it would be
appropriate to refer to the legal position governing Section 14(1)
(e) of the DRC Act and the principles applicable while deciding
an application for leave to defend. It is settled law that, to
succeed under Section 14(1)(e), the landlord must establish:
i. Existence of a landlord-tenant relationship;
ii. Bona fide requirement of the tenanted premises for the
landlord or any family member dependent upon him/her;
and
iii. Non-availability of any other reasonably suitable
alternative accommodation.
6. In this regard, reliance may be placed on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua,
AIR 2022 SC 1778, wherein it was observed that:
12. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular
mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an
application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for
his bona fide requirement, the learned Rent Controller may
dispense with the protection prescribed under the Act and then
grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of
bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable
accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on
two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.4/23
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and (ii) the non availability of a reasonably suitable resi-
dential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with
suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord
and not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to
the conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with
the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential
accommodation, the twin conditions mandated Under Section
14(1)(e) stand satisfied.
7. The concept of bona fide need has been further elucidated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Mahesh
Chand Gupta, 1999 INSC 364, wherein it was held that the re-
quirement must be based on a sincere, honest, and natural desire
as distinguished from a mere pretext:
A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome
of a sincere, honest desire, in contra-distinction with a
mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of
the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or
for any member of the family would entitle him to seek
ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any set-
ting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of
landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully
withstanding the test of objective determination by the Court.
The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of
the landlord and then ask the question to himself-whether
in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to
occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere,
honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is
bonafide. The failure on the part of the landlord to substanti-
ate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material
brought on record by the tenant enabling the court drawing an
inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord
was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for
getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the
Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord.
Once the court is satisfied of the bonafides of the need of the
landlord for premises or additional premises by applying ob-
jective standards then in the matter of choosing out of more
than one accommodation available to the landlord his subjec-
tive choice shall be respected by the court. The court would
permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing
the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most
suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case
thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by
holding that not one but the other accommodation must be
accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need. In short,
the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.5/23
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practical approach instructed by realities of life. An approach
either too liberal or two conservative or pedantic must be
guarded against.
8. Thus, for the petitioners to succeed, it must be shown that
they are the owner of the property, that a landlord-tenant
relationship exists, that they have a bona fide requirement of the
premises, and that no other suitable alternative accommodation is
available. Once these essential ingredients are proved, the
petition succeeds.
9. At the same time, it is mandated under Section 25B(5) of
the DRC Act that where the application for eviction on the
ground of bona fide requirement is filed under Section 14(1)(e),
the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the
application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts
as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the
recovery of possession of the premises. It was held in Inderjeet
Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706, that at the stage of
deciding leave to defend application, the real test is whether the
facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave to defend
prima facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from
obtaining an order of eviction. Similarly, in Nem Chand Daga v.
Inder Mohan Singh Rana, 94 (2001) DLT 683, it was held that:
…before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show
that some triable issues which disentitle the applicant from
getting the order of eviction against the respondent and at the
same time entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed.
The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the
eviction follows.
10. In the following paragraphs, this Court shall determine
whether the petitioners have established the essential ingredients
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.6/23
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of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, and whether the respondent
has raised any triable issue warranting the grant of leave to
defend.
A. LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP/OWNERSHIP:-
11. With respect to the first ingredient, it is well-settled that for
the purposes of Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act, a landlord is
not required to establish absolute ownership in the manner
contemplated under the Transfer of Property Act. It is sufficient
for the landlord to demonstrate that their title is superior to that
of the tenant. In Shanti Sharma & Ors. v. Ved Prabha & Ors.,
(1987) 4 SCC 193, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the term
“owner” in this context is to be understood vis-à-vis the tenant,
meaning thereby that the landlord must show himself to be
“something more than the tenant.” Reliance may also be placed
on Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. Leela Wati & Ors., 155
(2008) DLT 383, wherein the same principle was reiterated.
12. With respect to ownership, the petitioners have placed on
record the registered article of agreement dated 27.02.1950
executed by Municipal Committee of Delhi in favour of the
father of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 (see page No. 62 to 76 of the
documents annexed with the eviction petition). It is not in dispute
that the father of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 passed away in 1987.
With respect to the devolution of the property after the demise of
the father of petitioner No. 1 and 2, they have placed on record
the registered relinquishment deed dated 01.04.2019 executed in
favour of the petitioners by the other family members of the
petitioners (see page No. 92 to 106 of the documents annexed
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.7/23
-- 7 of 23 --
with the eviction petition). It is pertinent to note that in its reply
to the legal notice to the petitioners, the respondent Bank
admitted that the father of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 was the
erstwhile owner of the demised premises (see page No. 116 of
the documents annexed with the eviction petition). Therefore, in
light of the documents placed on record and the admission of the
respondent, there is no dispute regarding the fact that the father
of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 i.e., Shri Ram Chander Gupta, was
the original owner of the demised premises. The petitioners have
demonstrated their ownership on the basis of intestate succession
and the registered relinquishment deed dated 01.04.2019.
Accordingly, the petitioners have been able to show a better
title than the respondent.
13. Further, the respondent has admitted itself to be a tenant in
the tenanted premises (see paragraph No. 4 of the leave to
defend application). However, the respondent has disputed the
landlordship of the petitioners on the ground that the true
landlord of the tenanted premises is a partnership firm by the
name of M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company (see paragraph No. 11
of the leave to defend application). It has been submitted that the
respondent had become a tenant of the aforesaid partnership firm
by way of a registered lease deed dated 06.11.1969 and hence,
there is no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties in
question.
14. It is not in dispute that the petitioner No. 1 and 2 are the
sons of one of the partners of the said firm (i.e., Shri Ram
Chander Gupta), and that the petitioner No. 3 is the grandson of
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.8/23
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the said partner. It is pertinent to note that the petitioners have
stated that the aforesaid firm stood automatically dissolved upon
the death of Shri Ram Chander Gupta, who was one of the four
partners of the said firm (see paragraph No. 2 of the reply to the
leave to defend application). It has been further submitted that
while M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company was the landlord qua the
premises in question, the owner of the concerned premises was
Shri Ram Chander Gupta individually (see also the ownership
documents in the name of Shri Ram Chander Gupta from page
No. 62 to 76 of the documents annexed with the present petition).
Accordingly, it is submitted that upon his demise, the property
vested in his LRs and hence, the petitioners herein are the owners
qua the demised premises. It has been further submitted that
since the aforesaid partnership firm stood dissolved, the
landlordship has also devolved upon only the petitioners herein,
since they are the LRs of the original owner Shri Ram Chander
Gupta.
15. It is pertinent to note that a legal notice was sent by the
petitioners to the respondent informing it about the demise of
their father, and also calling upon the respondent to pay the rent
to them (see page No. 113 of the documents annexed with the
present petition). In its reply to the said legal notice, the
respondent admitted that (i) Shri Ram Chander Gupta was the
owner of the demised premises; (ii) Shri Ram Chander Gupta
was one of the partners of M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company; and
(iii) Shri Ram Chander Gupta passed away on 14.02.1987 (see
page No. 116 of the documents annexed with the present
petition). The respondent’s only contention is that no deed of
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.9/23
-- 9 of 23 --
dissolution of the concerned firm has been filed on record by the
petitioners herein. It has been further submitted that even if the
said firm has been dissolved, the landlordship would also
devolve upon the LRs of the other three partners of the concerned
firm, i.e., Shri Kanshi Ram Agarwal, Shir Chatur Bhuj Garg and
Shri Ratan Lal Garg.
16. However, firstly, with respect to the contention about the
absence of deed of dissolution, it is settled law that subject to the
contract between the partners, a firm stands dissolved by death of
a partner (see Section 42 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932).
Therefore, ordinarily, a partnership firm stands dissolved upon
the death of a partner, and it will continue to exist only if a
specific clause to this effect is added in the partnership deed. The
petitioners have stated on oath that the firm M/s Jai Bharat
Trading Company stood dissolved upon the death of their father.
They have also annexed a Gazette notification dated 25.01.1988
in which the factum of dissolution of the aforesaid firm was duly
published (see Annexure CA1 to the reply to the leave to defend
application). The respondent has not filed any contrary material
to show that the said firm is still in existence.
17. Therefore, in light of the statutory provision and the
Gazette notification on record, it stands established that the firm
M/s Jai Bharat Trading Company is no longer in existence and
has been dissolved. Therefore, after the dissolution of the said
firm, the LRs of Shri Ramesh Chander Gupta became the
landlords qua the tenanted premises on account of being the
owners of the tenanted premises (As noted above, the respondent
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-- 10 of 23 --
has admitted that Shri Ramesh Chander Gupta was the owner of
the tenanted premises prior to his death. Accordingly, after his
death, the petitioners, being his sons/ grandson, became co-
owners pursuant to internal family arrangement/ registered
relinquishment deed dated 01.04.2019). In this regard, reliance
may be placed upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi in Phulgita v. Shri Krishan Kumar & Ors, RC
Rev. 527/11, in which it was held that every owner of a property
is automatically a landlord of a property since an owner is always
entitled to receive rent. The respondent has also contended that
since the demised premises was constructed from the money of
the concerned partnership firm, the said partnership firm became
the owner of the demised premises. However, the said contention
is without any merit. The ownership of a property is determined
based upon the sale/ allotment documents and not on the basis of
whose funds have been used to construct the property. It is not in
dispute that the demised premises was alloted/ sold to Shri Ram
Chander Gupta in his individual capacity by the concerned
authority and hence, the respondent cannot contend that the said
property became vested in the partnership firm solely on the
basis that the money of the firm was used to construct the
demised premises.
18. Secondly, even if the contention of the respondent is
accepted to the extent that the landlordship qua the tenanted
premises also devolved upon the LRs of the other three partners
of the concerned firm, it is a settled position of law that a co-
owner can maintain an eviction petition on their own and the
consent of other co-owners is assumed as taken unless it is shown
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.11/23
-- 11 of 23 --
that the other co-owners were not agreeable to eject the tenant
(India Umbrella Mfg. Co. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla, (2004) 3
SCC 178; Col. Inderjeet Singh v. Mr. Vikram Singh, 194 (2012)
DLT 209; Yashpal v. Chaman Lal Sachdeva, 129 (2006) DLT
200). No objection has been filed on behalf of any of the LRs of
the remaining partners of the firm M/s Jai Bharat Trading
Company. Accordingly, the respondent’s objection is not
tenable, and no triable issue exists regarding the landlord-
tenant relationship between the parties.
B. BONA FIDE NEED:-
19. The pleaded bona fide need has been reproduced in detail
in paragraph No. 3 of the present order.
20. In respect of the question of bona fide requirement, it is a
settled law that the court must presume the bona fide requirement
of the landlord and that the burden to refute the said presumption
squarely lies on the tenant. A mere assertion on the part of the
tenant is insufficient. It was held in Sarla Ahuja v. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 that:
when a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his
own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the
presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other
conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord
shows a prima facie case, it is open to the Rent Controller to
draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is
bona fide.
21. Similar observations made in case of Baldev Singh Bajwa
v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778 are as under:
A heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.12/23
-- 12 of 23 --
is not genuine. The tenant is required to give all the necessary
facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence if
available to prove his plea in the affidavit itself so that the
Controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the
question of genuine or bona fide requirement of the landlord; a
mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient
to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his
requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine.
22. With respect to the pleaded bona fide need, the respondent
has taken an objection that the premises in question is not a
residential property since it consists of a banking hall and two
rooms. It has been submitted that there is no kitchen, or separate
bathrooms on the first floor and hence, the premises is unfit to be
used as a residential premises.
23. However, the said objection is misconceived in my humble
opinion. An identical objection was dealt with and rejected in the
case of Hot Chand v. Dhanpat Rai, 2010 (168) DLT 78. In the
said case also, an objection was taken that the premises is
situated in a commercial area with only a single hall and no
bathroom. However, the said objection was rejected by the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi with the following observation:
5. The second contention raised by the Counsel for the
petitioner/tenant is that the premises is situated in a
commercial area and that considering the fact that the
premises is only a single hall without any bathroom
facilities or any water connection, it is not understood how
the respondents/landlords would put it to use for residential
purpose.
6. It is not the case of the petitioner that the civic authority, on
an application being received, would decline to grant a water
connection to the tenanted premises merely because it is
situated in a commercial area. Insofar as the toilet facilities are
concerned, as stated by the Counsel for the petitioner/tenant
himself, the tenanted premises is a single hall in his occupation
along with respondents No. 9 to 13, the legal heirs of late Shri
Daulat Ram. The Municipal Bye-laws do not bar the
respondents from internally partitioning the said hall into
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-- 13 of 23 --
rooms by constructing walls including a toilet, after obtaining
necessary sanctions in that regard. There is no law that
prohibits the respondents from making such an application,
and the civic authority entertaining the same if it is in
accordance with the Building Bye-laws.
7. It is not for the petitioners to question the decision of the
respondents to put the tenanted premises to use for residential
purposes. The petitioners do not claim that the area in
question has been declared as non-residential by the civic
authority. The respondents cannot be held to be suspect
merely because they have opted to reside in an area which is
now stated to be largely put to commercial use. The option
still lies with the respondents to make it habitable and
having exercised the said option, it is not for the petitioners
to question the same.
24. Even in the present case, it is not the case of the
respondent that the area in question has been declared to be non-
residential by the civic authority. In fact, part of the family of the
petitioners is already residing on the second floor of the demised
premises. Therefore, once the area is not claimed to be non-
residential as per the MCD sanction plan/ rules, the respondent
cannot take this objection to avoid eviction from the tenanted
premises. As stated in the aforesaid judgment, it is for the
petitioners to make the premises habitable for residential use
after taking its possession from the respondent.
25. In any case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that the landlord is the best judge of the nature, extent and
manner of their requirement, and that it is not for the Court or the
tenant to dictate the petitioner regarding the same (see Prativa
Devi v. T.V. Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353, Shiv Sarup Gupta v.
Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222, Ragavendra
Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679 and
Siddalingamma v. Mamtha Shenoy (2001) 8 SCC 561). The
principles established in the aforesaid judgments were succinctly
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.14/23
-- 14 of 23 --
summarized in Dharampal v. Chaudhary Ram Chander, 2017
SCC OnLine Del 12980, in the following manner:
(a) the landlord is the best judge of his requirement; (b) he has
complete freedom in the matter; (c) it is no concern of the
Courts to dictate to the landlord how and in what manner he
should use his property or to prescribe a standard therefor; (d)
there is no law which deprives a landlord of beneficial enjoy-
ment of his property; (e) the Court would permit the landlord to
satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which
the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; (f) the
Court will not thrust its own wisdom upon the choice by the
landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation
must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his need; (g) the
Judge, should place himself in the place of the landlord and
then answer whether the bona fide requirement is outcome of a
sincere, honest desire, instructed by realities of life; and, (h) the
law does not command or compel the landlord to squeeze him-
self and dwell in lesser premises so as to protect the tenant's
continued occupation.
26. Therefore, the respondent’s objection regarding the
premises being unfit for residential use is without any merit.
27. Next, it has been contended that prior building sanction
plans have not been obtained from the MCD. It has been
submitted that the building in question is very old and no
structural changes can be allowed in the building without the
prior sanction from the MCD. It has been contended that in
absence of the said sanction plans, the pleaded bona fide need is
not genuine.
28. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that prior statutory
approvals are not required before filing an application u/s 14(1)
(e) of the DRC Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harrington
House School v. S. M. Ispahani, (2002) 5 SCC 229, held that the
absence of sanctioned plans does not defeat a petition based on
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-- 15 of 23 --
bona fide requirement and that questions of municipal approval
arise, if at all, only at a later stage. Similarly, in Hari Dass
Sharma v. Vikas Sood, (2013) 5 SCC 243, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court reiterated that prior sanction is not an indispensable
prerequisite for ordering eviction. Thus, the respondent’s
objection is legally irrelevant at this stage.
29. In any case, the tenant has no locus standi to challenge the
lack of approvals/ sanctions on the part of the petitioner. Whether
any statutory/ regulatory permission/ sanction is required to be
taken or not is the inter se arrangement between the petitioner
and the regulatory authorities and the respondent/ tenant cannot
challenge any illegality/ lack of approval as a ground to resist
their eviction from the tenanted premises. In this regard, reliance
may be placed upon the judgment of Gulshan Rai v. Samrendra
Bose Secy, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 444, in which it was observed
that:
Record shows that it is an admitted fact that a guest house is
being run from a part portion of the disputed premises;
whether it is legal or illegal is a matter inter se between the
landlord and the MCD; the tenant has no locus standi to
challenge this illegality of his running a guest house which
is admittedly being run by the landlord from the portion
immediately adjacent to the Bengali Club. The tenant has
also not disputed the specific averment made by the landlord
that the portions shown as letters A and B in the site plan were
actually tin sheds and where he has now been made an
unauthorized construction. Submission of the landlord is that
after obtaining the possession of the disputed portion he will
take the necessary permissions and after removing the
unauthorized construction, he will expand his business of the
guest house from the disputed portion. The building Bye-laws
for the Union Territories of Delhi, 1983 have also been
perused. They do not prohibit such an activity. Clause 23.1,
23.2 and 23.9 are relevant. A heritage building is required to be
conserved and preserved; this is the responsibility of the owner
of the heritage building; if the owner agrees to maintain the
RC ARC 76/25 Ramesh Chander Gupta & Ors. v. Punjab National Bank Page No.16/23
-- 16 of 23 --
heritage building in its existing state and to preserve its
heritage status with due repairs and gives a written
undertaking to that effect, he may then be allowed, with the
approval of the Heritage Conservation Committee to carry out
commercial use/office/hotels even from a non-commercial
area. This is specifically stated in clause 23.9; this is an
incentive use of a heritage building.
Contention of the landlord specifically in the eviction petition
is to the effect that after he gets the tenanted portion vacated
and after taking necessary permission from the Department, he
will get the unauthorized constructions (raised by the tenant)
removed and thereafter after obtaining necessary permissions
will expand his business of the guest house which he is
admittedly carrying out from a portion of the first floor. This is
an inter se arrangement between the owner/landlord and
the MCD/Government Body, the tenant cannot raise an
issue that merely because the property owned by the
landlord is a heritage property he cannot run a guest
house. If such an argument raised by the tenant is accepted
then this would mean that in all such cases where the
owner/landlord owns a heritage building he would never
be able to get his property vacated only for the reason that
it has a heritage status. This is definitely not the import of
the Building Bye-laws which have been relied upon by the
Trial Court holding that triable issues have arisen. Triable
issues have to be gathered from the pleadings of the parties
which include the application for leave to defend, reply to the
said application as also the averments made in the eviction
petition. As matter of routine leave to defend cannot be
granted; if the defence raised is moonshine, sham, and illusory,
the leave to defend has to be refused; otherwise the whole
purpose and purport of the summary procedure as prescribed
under section 25B of the DRCA would be defeated. In cases
where no traible issue has been raised, the application for
leave to defend has to be declined. The only triable issue
raised by the tenant is that since it is a heritage property, a
guest house cannot be run; admittedly, a guest house is being
run from a portion of the said property; this has not been
disputed by the tenant in his application for leave to defend; it
is for the landlord to take the necessary permissions from
the Heritage Zone of the MCD to extend his business of
guest house to the disputed portion; nothing prevents him
from adding more rooms to his already existing guest
house; this he can do only after gets an eviction order.
30. Therefore, the tenant cannot resist eviction by relying upon
any lack of approval/ sanction for the alleged bona fide need on
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the part of the landlord. Accordingly, this objection on the part of
the respondent is also not tenable.
31. Lastly, in any case, the DRC Act itself contains protective
mechanisms in this regard. Section 19 of the DRC Act empowers
the tenant to seek re-entry if, after eviction on the ground of bona
fide requirement, the landlord does not occupy the premises or
uses it for a different purpose within the statutory period.
Accordingly, if the landlord fails to implement the proposed use,
including in a scenario where a sanction is eventually required
for making the tenanted premises habitable for residential, but
not granted, the tenant is not without remedy. The existence of
this statutory safeguard demonstrates that the legislature did not
intend the Rent Controller to insist upon prior statutory approvals
before adjudicating bona fide requirement. Therefore, the
objection regarding the lack of sanction plan from MCD/
structural safety of the tenanted premises is without any merit.
32. Next, it has been submitted that the petitioner No. 2 had
shifted to his residence in Rohini way back in 2005, and has been
comfortably living there since then. Accordingly, it has been
submitted that there is no bona fide need of the petitioner No. 2
to return to the demised premises in question, and the present
petition has been filed only to put the tenanted premises on rent
at a higher market rate. However, the said argument is not
tenable. It has been explained in detail in the eviction petition
that the petitioner No. 2 and his wife are senior citizens who are
living alone in Rohini since their children have left the said
residence due to their job commitments. It has been further
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explained that the petitioner No. 2 wishes to now return to the
family house situated in the demised premises so that he can
spend his old-age life with his family/siblings. It is a settled
position of law that the pleaded bona fide need carries with it a
presumption of genuineness. The said presumption cannot be
rebutted by making a bald assertion to the effect that the
petitioners only wish to re-let the property at a higher value. In
any case, as noted above, Section 19 of the DRC Act takes care
of the apprehension of the respondent in this regard since if the
petitioners do not utilize the first floor of the demised premises
for their residential use, the respondent can file an application u/s
19 of the DRC Act to seek re-possession. Lastly, the premises
situated at Rohini cannot be categorized as an alternate
accommodation since the whole case of the petitioners is that the
petitioner No. 2 wishes to shift back to the family house situated
at the demised premises and accordingly, he wishes to leave his
residence in Rohini. The purpose of filing of the present petition
is to ensure that the entire family of the petitioners can live
together in a single premises, and that purpose cannot be
achieved at the residence of the petitioner No. 2 situated in
Rohini.
33. Next, it has been contended that part of the tenanted
premises is situated in the basement, which is clearly unfit for
residential use. However, the petitioners have nowhere stated in
the eviction petition that they wish to shift to the basement
portion. The need propounded in the eviction petition is that the
petitioners wish to shift to the first floor of the demised premises,
which is the major portion of the tenanted premises. It is settled
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law that a partial eviction of a tenanted premises cannot be
allowed and hence, the petitioners could not have filed the
present petition solely for the first floor. Further, in the reply to
the leave to defend application, the petitioners have stated that
the basement portion will be used for storing surplus household
goods. Therefore, the aforesaid contention of the respondent
regarding the basement portion is without any merit.
34. Accordingly, the burden placed upon the respondent to
rebut the genuineness of the bona fide need has not been
discharged since no tenable objection with respect to the bona
fide need of the petitioner has been raised. Therefore, no triable
issue is raised with respect to the aspect of bona fide
requirement.
C. AVAILABILITY OF SUITABLE ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION:
35. With respect to the third ingredient of availability of other
suitable alternate accommodation, it is to be noted that to entail
denial of the claim of the landlord, an alternate accommodation
must be reasonably suitable, in comparison with the tenanted
premises in question. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup
Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, AIR 1999 SC 2507, has
held that for an eviction petition to fail on the ground of
availability of alternate suitable accommodation, the availability
of another accommodation must be suitable as well as convenient
in all respects as the tenanted accommodation from which the
landlord seeks eviction of the tenant.
36. In the leave to defend application, no ground has been
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taken with respect to the availability of alternate suitable
accommodation. However, it has been submitted that even as per
the petitioners’ averments, there are 07 adults living on the
second floor, whereas as per the site plan, there are 08 bed rooms
available on the second floor and hence, there is sufficient
accommodation available with the petitioners to adequately
accommodate the entire family.
37. However, the said averment is not tenable since as
explained above, the present eviction petition has been filed for
the residential bona fide need of (i) the petitioner No. 2 and his
wife; (ii) the senior citizens of the family of the petitioners who
are currently residing on the second floor of the demised
premises (but wish to shift to the first floor in order to avoid
climbing stairs for two floors regularly); and (iii) the 06 sisters of
the petitioners, who are married but visit the maternal home, i.e.,
the demised premises, to meet their siblings and families.
Therefore, the bona fide need is not limited to the persons who
are already residing on the second floor of the tenanted premises.
In addition to the people who are already residing in the demised
premises, the bona fide need also contemplates the
accommodation requirement of the petitioner No. 2 and his wife
as well as the married sisters who visit the demised premises
from time to time (but are unable to stay due to lack of
accommodation for them). Therefore, the respondent cannot
dictate to the petitioners as to how much space is enough to
accommodate the entire family of the petitioners. Further, even if
the available rooms are presumed to be enough, it will not satisfy
the bona fide need to the extent that the senior citizens in the
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family wish to shift to the first floor of the demised premises so
that they are able to perform day to day minor errands without
having to climb two floors on a regular basis. Therefore, the
aforesaid contention of the respondent is not tenable.
38. Accordingly, no triable issue exists as far as the issue of
suitable alternate accommodation is concerned.
CONCLUSION
39. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that the
petitioner has established all the necessary ingredients for getting
an order of eviction on the ground of bonafide needs. Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC
706, has specified that leave to defend to a tenant cannot be
granted on mere asking or in a routine manner as it will defeat
the very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter III-
A of the DRC Act and what has to be seen while granting leave
to defend is that there is a strong prima facie case against the
landlord who is seeking eviction. Herein, the tenant has not been
able to show any prima facie case, and hence, is not held entitled
to leave to defend.
40. Accordingly, the leave to defend application filed by the
respondent stands dismissed.
41. The petition is consequently allowed, and it is directed that
the tenant shall hand over the vacant possession of the tenanted
premises i.e., first floor and basement of the property bearing
Municipal No. 8-A, Kamla Nagar, Delhi-110007 (as
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highlighted in red in the site plan), to the petitioner.
42. There shall be no order as to costs. In view of the
provisions of Section 14 (7) DRC Act, 1958, this order for
recovery of possession shall not be executed before the
expiration of a period of 6 months from this date.
Announced in open Court
on 13th Day of May, 2026
(Devanshu Sajlan)
CCJ-cum-ARC
(Central)THC/Delhi
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