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Order 14

CNR DLCT02022240202304 Jun 2026
Tis Hazari, CMM Court
delhi · Delhi (DL)
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Order 14 · 04 Jun 2026 · CNR DLCT020222402023

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IN THE COURT OF MR. ARVIND TOMAR
JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS (NI ACT)-07
CENTRAL/TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI
CC NI ACT/ 7372/2023
PURAN DASS GUPTA Vs. PURAN KUMAR
04.06.2026
ORDER
1. Vide this order, I shall dispose of the application filed by the
complainant u/s 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter “the
NI Act”), whereby it is prayed that the accused be directed to pay interim
compensation to the extent of 20% of the cheque amount to the complainant.
2. Arguments were heard from both sides at length. File perused.
3. During arguments, the Ld. Counsel for the complainant has
submitted that the complainant is a senior citizen who is presently suffering
from cancer and is undergoing treatment. It is submitted that the financial
burden of medical treatment has placed the complainant under severe hardship
and the grant of interim compensation is therefore urgently warranted. It is
further urged that the case of the complainant is well-documented and
supported by cogent evidence, and that the accused has not denied his
signatures on the cheques in question. Accordingly, it is prayed that 20% of the
cheque amount be awarded as interim compensation.
4. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the accused has vehemently
opposed the application. It is submitted that there is no legally enforceable
liability of the accused towards the complainant. The accused has stated in his
plea of defence recorded on 18.08.2025 that his wife had met with an accident
and he needed money for her treatment; that the complainant had promised to
assist him in obtaining a loan from a bank and requested him to give two blank
signed cheques for that purpose; that the complainant failed to assist with the
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loan but instead misused the said blank signed cheques and presented them. On
these grounds, it is urged that the application deserves to be dismissed.
5. Before proceeding to decide the application, it would be useful
to refer to the relevant statutory provision. Section 143A of the NI Act reads as
under:
"143A. Power to direct interim compensation —
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court
trying an offence under section 138 may order the
drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to
the complainant — (a) in a summary trial or a
summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the
accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any
other case, upon framing of charge."
6. Thus, as per the above provision, it appears that the
requirements for grant of interim compensation are as follows: (i) it should be
a summary/summons trial case; (ii) notice should have been framed against the
accused u/s 251 Cr.P.C.; and (iii) the accused should have not pleaded guilty in
the matter. It is undisputed that all three conditions are satisfied in the present
case. A notice of the substance of accusation has been framed against the
accused u/s 251 Cr.P.C., which he has denied, and has claimed trial.
7. However, the satisfaction of the above conditions is only a
threshold requirement and does not automatically entitle the complainant to
interim compensation. The use of the word 'may' in Section 143A makes it
abundantly clear that the power to grant compensation thereunder is
discretionary and not mandatory. This position stands settled by the Hon'ble
High Court of Delhi in JSB Cargo and Freight Forwarder (P) Ltd. v. State, 2021
SCC OnLine Del 5425, and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan
Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235. Accordingly,
it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether a case is made
out for grant of interim compensation or not.
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8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Srivastava
(supra) laid down the following broad parameters to be considered while
exercising the discretion u/s 143A NI Act:
"(i) The court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of
the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the
defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the
application. The financial distress of the accused can also be
a consideration. (ii) A direction to pay interim compensation
can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima
facie case. (iii) If the defence of the accused is found to be
prima facie plausible, the court may exercise discretion in
refusing to grant interim compensation. (iv) If the court
concludes that a case is made out to grant interim
compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the
quantum of interim compensation to be granted. (v) There
could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of
a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The
parameters stated above are not exhaustive."
9. Turning to the facts of the present case, perusal of the plea of
defence recorded on 18.08.2025 reveals that the accused has taken a specific
and coherent stand. He has stated that his wife had met with an accident and
that he was in need of funds for her medical treatment. On the assurance and
promise given by the complainant that he would help the accused in obtaining
a bank loan, the accused handed over two blank signed cheques to the
complainant. It is his case that the complainant, having failed to assist in
obtaining any loan, misused the blank signed cheques and presented them as
if they represented a legally enforceable liability.
10. The stand taken by the accused is neither vague nor an
afterthought. The defence of misuse of blank signed cheques is a well-
recognized and recurring defence in NI Act matters and has been consistently
acknowledged by courts as a plausible defence deserving adjudication at trial.
The background narrated by the accused i.e. a family medical emergency
creating vulnerability, lends contextual coherence to the plea that the cheques
were parted with in trust and subsequently misused. The said plea of defence,
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at this stage, cannot be dismissed as improbable or a mere attempt at delay. The
dispute, at its core, pertains to the existence of a legally enforceable liability,
which is a matter to be decided during trial after evidence is adduced.
11. The Court is mindful of the personal circumstances of the
complainant as projected in the application. The fact that the complainant is a
senior citizen suffering from cancer and undergoing treatment is noted with
empathy. However, it must be observed with equal candor that Section 143A
does not contemplate the personal health condition or financial distress of the
complainant as a ground for grant of interim compensation. The legislative
scheme of Section 143A is structured around the conduct of the accused and
the prima facie merits of the case, not around the medical condition of the
complainant. To grant interim compensation on the basis of the complainant's
illness, however genuine, would effectively convert a discretionary statutory
remedy into a sympathy-driven exercise, which is impermissible in law.
12. Undoubtedly, the accused has not denied his signatures on the
cheques. However, the existence of signatures alone does not resolve the
question of whether the cheques were issued against a legally enforceable
liability or whether they were blank signed instruments that were misused. The
statutory presumption u/s 139 NI Act is a rebuttable one, and the accused has
placed before the Court a specific and prima facie plausible case for rebuttal.
In
Rakesh Ranjan Srivastava (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
unequivocally held that if the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie
plausible, the court may exercise its discretion in refusing to grant interim
compensation. That principle squarely applies to the present case.
13. It is also relevant to note that none of the circumstances
enumerated by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in L.G.R. Enterprises & Ors. v.
P. Anbazhagan, Cr.O.P. No. 15438 of 2019, which ordinarily justify the
exercise of discretion in favour of grant of interim compensation, are attracted
in the present case. The accused has not absconded, has not evaded service, has
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appeared before the Court upon issuance of summons, has not dragged the
proceedings, and had his plea recorded in a timely manner. In fact, there is
nothing on record to suggest any dilatory conduct on the part of the accused.
14. After considering the aforementioned factors, this Court is of
the considered view that the facts of the present case do not persuade it to
exercise the discretion u/s 143A NI Act in favour of the complainant/applicant.
The defence raised by the accused is prima facie plausible and raises a triable
issue regarding the existence of a legally enforceable liability and the alleged
misuse of blank signed cheques. Granting interim compensation at this stage
would, in effect, amount to pre-judging the merits of the case, which is not the
intent of the provision.
15. Accordingly, the application filed by the complainant u/s 143A
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is disposed of as DISMISSED.
Observations made hereinabove shall have no bearing on the merits of the case.
(Arvind Tomar)
JMFC (NI ACT)-07 (Central)/THC
04.06.2026
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