Full Order Text
Order 14 · 04 Jun 2026 · CNR DLCT020222402023
Order Details: COPY OF ORDER Pdf Text: 1 IN THE COURT OF MR. ARVIND TOMAR JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS (NI ACT)-07 CENTRAL/TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI CC NI ACT/ 7372/2023 PURAN DASS GUPTA Vs. PURAN KUMAR 04.06.2026 ORDER 1. Vide this order, I shall dispose of the application filed by the complainant u/s 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter “the NI Act”), whereby it is prayed that the accused be directed to pay interim compensation to the extent of 20% of the cheque amount to the complainant. 2. Arguments were heard from both sides at length. File perused. 3. During arguments, the Ld. Counsel for the complainant has submitted that the complainant is a senior citizen who is presently suffering from cancer and is undergoing treatment. It is submitted that the financial burden of medical treatment has placed the complainant under severe hardship and the grant of interim compensation is therefore urgently warranted. It is further urged that the case of the complainant is well-documented and supported by cogent evidence, and that the accused has not denied his signatures on the cheques in question. Accordingly, it is prayed that 20% of the cheque amount be awarded as interim compensation. 4. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the accused has vehemently opposed the application. It is submitted that there is no legally enforceable liability of the accused towards the complainant. The accused has stated in his plea of defence recorded on 18.08.2025 that his wife had met with an accident and he needed money for her treatment; that the complainant had promised to assist him in obtaining a loan from a bank and requested him to give two blank signed cheques for that purpose; that the complainant failed to assist with the -- 1 of 5 -- 2 loan but instead misused the said blank signed cheques and presented them. On these grounds, it is urged that the application deserves to be dismissed. 5. Before proceeding to decide the application, it would be useful to refer to the relevant statutory provision. Section 143A of the NI Act reads as under: "143A. Power to direct interim compensation — Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant — (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge." 6. Thus, as per the above provision, it appears that the requirements for grant of interim compensation are as follows: (i) it should be a summary/summons trial case; (ii) notice should have been framed against the accused u/s 251 Cr.P.C.; and (iii) the accused should have not pleaded guilty in the matter. It is undisputed that all three conditions are satisfied in the present case. A notice of the substance of accusation has been framed against the accused u/s 251 Cr.P.C., which he has denied, and has claimed trial. 7. However, the satisfaction of the above conditions is only a threshold requirement and does not automatically entitle the complainant to interim compensation. The use of the word 'may' in Section 143A makes it abundantly clear that the power to grant compensation thereunder is discretionary and not mandatory. This position stands settled by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in JSB Cargo and Freight Forwarder (P) Ltd. v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5425, and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand & Anr., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235. Accordingly, it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether a case is made out for grant of interim compensation or not. -- 2 of 5 -- 3 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rakesh Ranjan Srivastava (supra) laid down the following broad parameters to be considered while exercising the discretion u/s 143A NI Act: "(i) The court will have to prima facie evaluate the merits of the case made out by the complainant and the merits of the defence pleaded by the accused in the reply to the application. The financial distress of the accused can also be a consideration. (ii) A direction to pay interim compensation can be issued, only if the complainant makes out a prima facie case. (iii) If the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the court may exercise discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. (iv) If the court concludes that a case is made out to grant interim compensation, it will also have to apply its mind to the quantum of interim compensation to be granted. (v) There could be several other relevant factors in the peculiar facts of a given case, which cannot be exhaustively stated. The parameters stated above are not exhaustive." 9. Turning to the facts of the present case, perusal of the plea of defence recorded on 18.08.2025 reveals that the accused has taken a specific and coherent stand. He has stated that his wife had met with an accident and that he was in need of funds for her medical treatment. On the assurance and promise given by the complainant that he would help the accused in obtaining a bank loan, the accused handed over two blank signed cheques to the complainant. It is his case that the complainant, having failed to assist in obtaining any loan, misused the blank signed cheques and presented them as if they represented a legally enforceable liability. 10. The stand taken by the accused is neither vague nor an afterthought. The defence of misuse of blank signed cheques is a well- recognized and recurring defence in NI Act matters and has been consistently acknowledged by courts as a plausible defence deserving adjudication at trial. The background narrated by the accused i.e. a family medical emergency creating vulnerability, lends contextual coherence to the plea that the cheques were parted with in trust and subsequently misused. The said plea of defence, -- 3 of 5 -- 4 at this stage, cannot be dismissed as improbable or a mere attempt at delay. The dispute, at its core, pertains to the existence of a legally enforceable liability, which is a matter to be decided during trial after evidence is adduced. 11. The Court is mindful of the personal circumstances of the complainant as projected in the application. The fact that the complainant is a senior citizen suffering from cancer and undergoing treatment is noted with empathy. However, it must be observed with equal candor that Section 143A does not contemplate the personal health condition or financial distress of the complainant as a ground for grant of interim compensation. The legislative scheme of Section 143A is structured around the conduct of the accused and the prima facie merits of the case, not around the medical condition of the complainant. To grant interim compensation on the basis of the complainant's illness, however genuine, would effectively convert a discretionary statutory remedy into a sympathy-driven exercise, which is impermissible in law. 12. Undoubtedly, the accused has not denied his signatures on the cheques. However, the existence of signatures alone does not resolve the question of whether the cheques were issued against a legally enforceable liability or whether they were blank signed instruments that were misused. The statutory presumption u/s 139 NI Act is a rebuttable one, and the accused has placed before the Court a specific and prima facie plausible case for rebuttal. In Rakesh Ranjan Srivastava (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has unequivocally held that if the defence of the accused is found to be prima facie plausible, the court may exercise its discretion in refusing to grant interim compensation. That principle squarely applies to the present case. 13. It is also relevant to note that none of the circumstances enumerated by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in L.G.R. Enterprises & Ors. v. P. Anbazhagan, Cr.O.P. No. 15438 of 2019, which ordinarily justify the exercise of discretion in favour of grant of interim compensation, are attracted in the present case. The accused has not absconded, has not evaded service, has -- 4 of 5 -- 5 appeared before the Court upon issuance of summons, has not dragged the proceedings, and had his plea recorded in a timely manner. In fact, there is nothing on record to suggest any dilatory conduct on the part of the accused. 14. After considering the aforementioned factors, this Court is of the considered view that the facts of the present case do not persuade it to exercise the discretion u/s 143A NI Act in favour of the complainant/applicant. The defence raised by the accused is prima facie plausible and raises a triable issue regarding the existence of a legally enforceable liability and the alleged misuse of blank signed cheques. Granting interim compensation at this stage would, in effect, amount to pre-judging the merits of the case, which is not the intent of the provision. 15. Accordingly, the application filed by the complainant u/s 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is disposed of as DISMISSED. Observations made hereinabove shall have no bearing on the merits of the case. (Arvind Tomar) JMFC (NI ACT)-07 (Central)/THC 04.06.2026 -- 5 of 5 --
