Final Order 10

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF MS. ANJU BAJAJ CHANDNA
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
CENTRAL DISTRICT : TIS HAZARI COURTS : DELHI
CNR No. DLCT01-013227-2025
RCT No. 94/2025
Smt. Ram Ditti (since deceased through her legal heir)
Sh. Kishan Lal
S/o Late Sh. Gurditta Mal
R/o H. No. J-3/82, Rajouri Garden
New Delhi-110027
...Appellant
Versus
Sh.Surinder Kumar (since deceased through his legal heirs)
1. Sh.Rahul Varun
S/o Late Sh.Surinder Kumar
R/o 29/03, Sector-8, Indra Nagar
Lucknow-226016.
2. Sh.Harsh Varun
S/o Late Sh.Surinder Kumar
R/o 29/03, Sector-8, Indra Nagar
Lucknow-226016.
3. Ms.Preeti Singh
W/o Sh.Manmohan Singh
R/o 1001/47, Shalimar Garden Ext.
Sector-8, Indira Nagar
Lucknow-226016
4. Ms. Namrata Bharti
W/o Sh.Deshmukh Bharti
R/o Pariwar CGHS Building-12
JVLR Road, Gali No.6, Powai
Mumbai-400072
...Respondents
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 1 of 14
-- 1 of 14 --
Date of institution : 03.09.2025
Arguments heard on : 17.07.2026
Date of pronouncement : 29.07.2026
Appearance:
Sh. Prabhat Ranjan and Ms.Simran Gublani,
Ld. Counsel for appellant.
Sh.Sahib Gurdeep Singh, Ld. Counsels for
respondent.
O R D E R :
1. Present appeal has been directed against the
judgment dated 24.08.2023 and order dated 04.08.2025 passed by
the court of Ld. SCJ-cum-RC, Central in the matter of Surinder
Kumar (landlord) vs Ram Ditti (tenant).
2. The matter relates to shop no. 1678, Nai Sarak,
Delhi with respect to which an eviction petition was filed by
landlord under Section 14 (1) (a) and (b) of Delhi Rent Control
Act (DRC Act) 1958. The matter was decided vide judgment
dated 24.08.2023 and the eviction petition was allowed with
respect to the ground under Section 14 (1) (a) while the petition
was dismissed with respect to the ground under Section 14 (1) (b)
Delhi Rent Control Act 1958.
3. Thereafter, on application under Section 14 (2)
Delhi Rent Control Act for benefit under Section 15 (6) Delhi
Rent Control Act 1958 filed on behalf of respondent (tenant), the
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 2 of 14
-- 2 of 14 --
order dated 04.08.2025 was passed with the observations that
respondent has defaulted in payment of rent in terms of Section
15 (1) of Delhi Rent Control Act and therefore not entitled to the
benefit under Section 14 (2) DRC Act and is liable to be evicted
from the tenanted premises. The application was dismissed and
respondent/ tenant was directed to vacate the tenanted premises.
4. An application under Section 38 (2) read with
Section 5 Limitation Act 1963 for condonation of delay in filing
the present appeal against judgment dated 24.08.2023 has also
been filed by the appellant (tenant) on the pretext that appeal
could not be filed in time on account of bonafide mistake and
belief that same can be filed only after passing of final order
which was passed on 04.08.2025. Accordingly, delay in filing
the appeal be condoned.
5. It has been argued on behalf of appellant (tenant)
that delay in filing the appeal needs to be condoned by adopting
liberal approach. Even otherwise, the judgment dated 24.08.2023
is a nullity as no prior permission of slum authority was taken
before filing the eviction petition. In this respect the judgment of
Delhi High Court, titled Lalit Dutt Sharma vs Lokesh Jasoria,
RSA 60/2018 dated 13.07.2018 has been relied upon wherein
following observations has been made:-
“41.I am, with respect, unable to agree with the
reasoning given in Chiraguddin and Tulsi Dass Ahuja
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 3 of 14
-- 3 of 14 --
supra. In my view, statutory bar created by Section 19
of the Slum Act is incapable of being waived and binds
the Court to the same extent as Section 14(1) and
Section 50 of the Rent Act. However propriety demands
for the said question to be referred to a larger Bench,
instead of taking a view different from that taken in
Chiraguddin and Tulsi Dass Ahuja. Need therefor
however is not felt because, for this Second Appeal to
be allowed, my findings on the other two substantial
questions of law are enough and it is felt that the
appeal should not be kept pending awaiting the
decision of the larger Bench and in which time the
respondent/plaintiff, if desirous of invoking provisions
of Rent Act for eviction of the appellant/defendant,
would be precluded therefrom also.”
6. With respect to order on the application under
Section 14 (2) DRC Act (dated 04.08.2025) is concerned, it is
contended that rent was refused by the landlord despite there
being an order under Section 15 (1) DRC Act. Therefore, rent
was deposited under Section 27 of Delhi Rent Control Act and
same was allowed. At no point of time, landlord / petitioner filed
any application under Section 15 (7) DRC Act seeking striking
off the defence. There is no three consecutive defaults so as to
deprive the tenant / appellant for protection under the scheme of
Delhi Rent Control Act.
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 4 of 14
-- 4 of 14 --
7. On behalf of landlord (respondent herein), it is
contended that there is inordinate delay in filing the present
appeal as against the judgment dated 24.08.2023. The eviction
petition was duly contested by the tenant and in the written
statement, no objection was taken about permission from slum
authority. Even an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was
filed on this ground during the proceedings but the same was
dismissed vide order dated 02.09.2022. The said order was not
challenged and therefore, the same has attained finality. The
judgment of Satender Jain vs Satya Narain Sanjiv Gupta,
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4436 has been relied upon wherein
following observations were made:-
“30. There is another dimension to the argument under
Section 19of the Slums Act. The objection under
Section 19 is one that can be waived by the tenant if
the same is either not pleaded or the tenant's conduct
disentitles him to the said defence. This is clear from
the decision in Shri Chiraguddin (supra) wherein Ld.
Single Judges have held:
"9. In my opinion, learned counsel for the
respondents/landlords is justified in placing reliance
upon the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in
the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) and which
clearly holds that if the provision of a statute gives
certain right to a tenant, such a right is available to a
tenant and can be waived by him. In my opinion, the
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 5 of 14
-- 5 of 14 --
right given as per Section 19 of the Slum Act is a right
available with the petitioner/tenant in his personal
capacity, and once no such objection was taken before
the Additional Rent Controller who decided the main
case under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, such a right
has clearly been waived by the petitioner/tenant. The
impugned judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal has
effectively held the same vide para 13 of the same, and
to which reasoning the ratio of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd.
(supra) is to be added.
10. I may note that if the argument which is urged on
behalf of the petitioner with respect to non-
maintainability of the petition under Section 14(1)
(a) of the Act is accepted on the ground that there was
no jurisdiction of the Additional Rent Controller to
pass the judgment decreeing the petition under Section
14(1)(a) of the Act, the same would create a very
peculiar position because it is perfectly possible that
an eviction petition may be decreed right till the
Supreme Court and thereafter in execution proceedings
an objection would be taken with respect to the fact
that the eviction petition itself was not maintainable in
view of the fact that the premises are situated in a slum
area and permission of the slum authority was not
taken under Section 19 of the Slum Act. To accept such
an argument would mean grave harassment of the
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 6 of 14
-- 6 of 14 --
landlady and allowing a tenant to plead the rights
which were waived by him i.e. the tenant will be
allowed to plead non-existence of jurisdiction although
such an issue is an issue of a right which can be
waived, and was in fact waived by not raising the
same. After many years of litigation in which the
landlady is successful in obtaining an eviction order, to
argue that the entire proceedings for eviction must fail
cannot be accepted. I cannot subscribe to such a view
in view of the categorical ratio of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd.
(supra). In para 14 of the judgment in the case of
Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) Supreme Court has
applied the principle of estoppel in a case having facts
such as the present because if objection under Section
19 of the Slum Act was taken in the written statement,
the landlords would have simply withdrawn the
petition at that stage and sought permission
under Section 19 of the Slum Act. Thus, landlords
having changed their position to their detriment by
pursuing the eviction petition for a longer period of
time (at least eight years), petitioner is estopped from
raising the issue of maintainability only before the first
appellate court."
31. This view is further reiterated in Tulsi Das (supra)
wherein the Court observed:
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 7 of 14
-- 7 of 14 --
"9. (i) The third and the last argument urged on behalf
of the appellants/defendants was that the suit land was
situated in a slum area and once the suit land is
situated in a slum area then by virtue of Section 19 of
the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act,
1956 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Slum Act') the suit
could not lie in the civil court unless permission was
first taken of the competent authority under the Slum
Act.
(ii) Even this argument urged on behalf of the
appellants/defendants lacks substance because the first
appellate court has rightly relied upon a judgment
passed by this Court in the case of Shri Chiraguddin v.
Smt. Urmila Rani & Ors. MANU/D E/2335/2014 : 213
(2014) DLT 699 and which holds that unless objection
as to lack of permission required under Section 19 of
the Slum Act is taken at the very first opportunity in the
trial court, such objection has to be taken to be
waived. This was so held by this Court because if the
objection is taken at the first opportunity then the
landlord does not prejudicially suffer the continuation
of the legal proceedings for the entire period of the
proceedings in the trial court if the objection was taken
the suit would have been withdrawn at the initial stage
itself for taking permission under Section 19 of the
Slum Act. Consequently it has to be held that the bar
of Section 19 of the Slum Act is waivable and was
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 8 of 14
-- 8 of 14 --
waived as the appellants/defendants did not take up
this defence in the trial court.
xxx
I cannot however agree with the argument urged on
behalf of the appellants/defendants because no doubt
evidence was led with respect to the property falling or
not falling within the Slum Act before the first
appellate court, but that evidence was led before the
first appellate court and no such defence was taken or
issue raised by the appellants/defendants in terms
of Section 19 of the Slum Act before the trial court.
The ratio of the judgment passed by this Court in the
case of Chiraguddin (supra) therefore clearly applies
and the first appellate court has rightly dealt with
this issue in paras 13 to 15 of its judgment…"
8. I have given due consideration to facts and issues
involved as well as examined the record and rival submissions
raised by counsels.
9. So far as the issue of condonation of delay is
concerned, the impugned judgment was passed on 24.08.2023
whereby eviction petition filed by petitioner / landlord was
finally decided. The judgment dated 24.08.2023 shows that dasti
copy was given to both the sides and file was ordered to be
consigned to record room. It is thus clear that eviction petition
was finally decided by the court of Ld. SCJ-cum-RC on
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 9 of 14
-- 9 of 14 --
24.08.2023. So far as the order dated 04.08.2025 whereby
benefit of Section 14 (2) was declined in favour of tenant is
concerned, the proceedings were initiated on the basis of
application moved by respondent / tenant under Section 14 (2).
Therefore, the plea taken by appellant that he was under the
bonafide impression that appeal could be filed only after the final
order under Section 14 (2), is misconceived. Even otherwise,
ignorance of law and bonafide mistake cannot be valid grounds
for granting condonation of delay particularly when there is
inordinate delay in filing the appeal. The judgment dated
24.08.2023 could be challenged within a period of 30 days
whereas the appeal has been filed on 03.09.2025 i.e. after more
than two years of passing the judgment.
10. In the judgment of Ajay Dabra vs. Pyare Ram &
Ors (2023) SCCR 304, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed
that appeal has to be filed within the stipulated period prescribed
under law and belated appeal can only be condoned on sufficient
reasons as explained before the court for delay. The appellant
who seeks condonation of delay must explain delay of each day.
The court should not be pedantic in their approach while
condoning delay and explanation of each day's delay should not
be taken literally, but there must be reasonable explanation for
delay.
11. In my view, appellant has failed to show sufficient
cause to explain the delay in filing this appeal qua the judgment
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 10 of 14
-- 10 of 14 --
dated 24.08.2023, hence the application under Section 5 of
Limitation Act is dismissed.
12. The tenant / appellant has also raised the plea that
judgment is a nullity as no permission from competent authority
(slum) was taken before filing the eviction petition but this plea
also cannot be sustained, firstly because the order dated
02.09.2022 passed in this respect by the trial court was not
challenged in appeal and same has become final and secondly at
the time of filing of written statement, no specific objections in
this respect were taken by the tenant. The judgment of Satender
Jain (supra) is clear wherein earlier judgments of Chiraguddin
vs Urmila Rani (2014) 213 DLT 699 and Tulsi Dass Ahuja vs
Chattar Singh 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10964 have also been
discussed and it is held that requirement of permission under
Section 19 can be considered as waived off by the tenant, if the
tenant does not raise any objection in prior proceedings.
13. In view of aforesaid observations, the appeal qua the
impugned order dated 24.08.2023 being time barred as well as on
merits is dismissed.
14. Coming to the order dated 04.08.2025, Ld. SCJ-cun-
RC analysed the contentions of both the sides as well as material
available on record and found that there has been delay on the
part of tenant / respondent in complying with the order of
deposition of rent dated 05.03.2015 passed under Section 15 (1)
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 11 of 14
-- 11 of 14 --
of Delhi Rent Control Act and therefore not entitled to the benefit
as such. The main contention raised on behalf of tenant has been
that despite the order dated 05.03.2015 under Section 15 (1),
petitioner / landlord refused to accept the rent and therefore rent
was deposited by filing petition under Section 27 DRC Act.
15. It is contended by respondent (landlord) that order
passed under Section 15 (1) Delhi Rent Control Act has to be
strictly complied with. The tenant was required to deposit the
rent before the court in terms of order under Section 15 (1) DRC
Act but the tenant deliberately filed separate petitions under
Section 27 DRC Act without any need or necessity. In essence,
the order under Section 15 (1) DRC Act has not been complied
with. The judgment of Mohd. Idris vs Sadat Ali Khan, CM (M)
1022/2013 is relied upon wherein following observations were
made:-
“28. Section 14(2) of the Act provides that an order for
recovery of possession cannot be passed "if the tenant
makes payment or deposit as required by Section 15".
In other words, a tenant is entitled to claim the benefit
of Section 14(2) of the Act if he complies with an order
passed under Section 15 of the Act. This is clear from a
plain reading of Section 14(2) of the Act. Conversely,
and if I may use a cricketing term, a "reverse sweep" of
this would mean that if a tenant fails to pay or deposit
rent as required by Section 15, an order for recovery of
possession can be passed against him”.
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 12 of 14
-- 12 of 14 --
16. On behalf of landlord, it is next submitted that rent
was required to be deposited on monthly basis in compliance to
Section 15 (1) Delhi Rent Control Act. Although consolidated
advance rent was deposited but there was delay in depositing
such rent. Tenant never raised any issue before the court
concerned about refusal of landlord in accepting the rent. Record
specifically reveals that rent for the period 01.03.2018 to
28.02.2019, 01.03.2019 to 31.03.2020 and 01.04.2021 to
31.03.2023 was deposited after much delay.
17. After considering the submissions of both sides, I
find no reason to set aside impugned order dated 04.08.2025. On
perusal of the order dated 05.03.2015, it is clear that tenant /
respondent was directed to pay the rent at the rate of Rs.120/- per
month and to pay future rent by 15th of each succeeding English
Calender month. It is evident that order dated 05.03.2015 has not
been complied with strictly in letter and spirit. The rent was
required to be deposited on monthly basis in the court where the
proceedings regarding eviction were pending but tenant opted to
file separate petitions to deposit the rent and also there has been
instances of delayed deposition of rent (as per record, rent for
the period 01.03.2018 to 28.02.2019 was deposited on
18.09.2018, rent for the period 01.03.2019 to 31.03.2020 was
deposited on 14.05.2019 and rent for the period 01.04.2021 to
31.03.2023 was deposited on 01.02.2022)
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 13 of 14
-- 13 of 14 --
18. Taking over all view of facts and circumstances, I
find that there has been violation on the part of tenant in
depositing the rent and no liberal approach can be taken in this
regard. Therefore, protection/ benefit as available under the
provisions of Delhi Rent Control cannot be extended to the
tenant.
19. In view of above observations, I find no illegality or
impropriety in the impugned order dated 04.08.2025. No ground
for interference is called for. Appeal is accordingly dismissed.
20. Copy of this order along with record be sent to the
concerned court.
21. File be consigned to the record room.
(Anju Bajaj Chandna)
Principal District & Sessions Judge
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts
Delhi / 29.07.2026
RCT No. 94/2025
page no. 14 of 14
-- 14 of 14 --