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Final Order 12

CNR DLCT01008441202428 Oct 2025
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Final Order 12 · 28 Oct 2025 · CNR DLCT010084412024

Order Details: COPY OF JUDGMENT
Pdf Text: RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 1 of 10
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
& RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL (CENTRAL )
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
RCT No. 26/2024
CNR No. DLCT01-008441-2024
Smt. Saroj Aggarwal
R/o EA-105, UGF, Inder Puri,
New Delhi-110012
…..…...Appellant
Versus
Sh. Nimish Singhania (HUF)
Through its Karta Sh. Nimish Singhania
R/o 10, Alipur Road, Civil Lines
Delhi-110054
......…...Respondent
Date of filing of appeal : 30.05.2024
Date of arguments : 26.09.2025
Date of Judgment : 28.10.2025
JUDGMENT:
1. The appellate jurisdiction of this court has been invoked
under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in short, the
DRC Act impugning the order dated 19.04.2024 vide which the
Ld. ARC has dismissed the application under section 19 (2) of
DRC Act.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Sh.
Nimish Singhania (HUF) hereinafter referred as
landlord/respondent filed an eviction petition no. 16/2012 under
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section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act on the ground of bona fide
requirement for eviction of Smt. Saroj Aggarwal hereinafter
referred as tenant/applicant from one showroom and bathroom
bearing privet number 1B, GF, A-14/3 Jamna Bhawan, Asif Ali
Road, New Delhi hereinafter referred as tenanted premises.
3. The tenant/applicant moved application for leave to defend
but the same did not found favour and the eviction order was
passed by Ld. ARC vide order dated 26.11.2014.
4. The tenant/applicant filed RC Revision no. 250/2015
before Hon’ble High Court of Delhi challenging the eviction
order dated 26.11.2014. The revision was dismissed by the
Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 01.12.2016 upholding the
eviction order passed by the Ld. ARC.
5. The tenant/applicant challenged the order of the Hon’ble
High Court of Delhi before the Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No.
21773/2017. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP vide order
dated 29.08.2017 observing as follows:
“While we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned
order of eviction yet we grant liberty to the petitioner to
vacate the premises and hand over possession to the
landlord by the end of February, 2018, failing which the
petitioner shall be liable for contempt of this Court.
The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.”
6. In pursuance to this order the tenant applicant handed over
the vacant physical possession of the tenanted premises to the
landlord/respondent on 28.02.2018.
7. The tenant/applicant on 05.04.2019 filed the application
under section 19(2) of DRC Act seeking order of re-entry in the
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tenanted premises alleging that the landlord/respondent has not
occupied the tenanted premises with in two months from the date
of delivery of vacant possession and the same is lying locked and
there is also no consumption of electricity.
8. Notice of the application was given to the
landlord/respondent who filed reply to the same taking the
objection that the application is barred by limitation and no
application under section 5 of Limitation Act has been moved
seeking condonation of delay.
9. It is alleged that the allegation that the landlord/respondent
has not occupied the premises is false, baseless and motivated. It
is alleged that the tenanted premises were in dilapidated
condition and were not habitable therefore necessary
repairs/renovation was being conducted to make it habitable. He
has also placed on record certain photographs of the premises
before and after, but the first contractor did not finish the work.
In March 2018 the parents of the respondent met with a road
accident wherein the mother sustained fracture of wrist and father
has to undergo lip surgery. Due to this reason, he could not keep
track of the renovation work.
10. It is also alleged that possession has been delivered
voluntarily by the tenant/applicant pursuance to the order of the
Supreme Court and not in execution and hence application is not
maintainable.
11. The applicant filed the rejoinder to the reply denying the
averments made in the reply and re-asserted the facts alleged in
the application.
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12. The application under section 5 of Limitation Act was also
moved on 30.01.2020 seeking condonation of delay in moving
the application under section 19 (2) of DRC Act. It is alleged that
the tenant/applicant is an old lady of more than 85 years of age
and finds it heard to move around in view of the advanced age
and physical condition. It is alleged that in the month of
November 2018 she approached her advocate and told him that
the tenanted premises has not been occupied. The counsel asked
her to bring the relevant documents. But she could not trace the
record of the previous litigation. After much efforts she could
trace the records and handed over the same to her counsel in
January 2019. The counsel also asked her to bring some
photographs and the electricity bills, which took considerable
time and handed over to her counsel in May 2019. It is alleged
that delay in moving the application was only due to these
reasons. It is prayed that the delay be condoned.
13. The landlord/respondent filed the reply to the application
alleging that this application is an after thought as she could not
bear to see the landlord/respondent occupying and using the
tenanted premises. The application is moved only when during
arguments it was pointed out that the application under section
19(2) is barred by limitation.
14. There is delay of more than 200 days in moving the
application itself, that also without any justification as to why the
application was not moved in time. It is prayed that the
application be dismissed as there is no explanation as to why the
application under section 19(2) DRC act and this application
could not be filed in time.
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15. I have heard the Learned counsel for the tenant/applicant,
Ld. Counsel for the landlord/respondent and perused the record.
16. Firstly, I decide the application under section 5 of the
limitation Act.
17. For deciding this issue, it will be convenient to read
section 19 of DRC Act.
“19 (1). Recovery pf possession for occupation and re-
entry. – Where a landlord recovers possession of any
premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made
under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section 1 of section 12
(or under sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C, 14-D and 21), the
landlord shall not, except with the permission of the
Controller obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the
whole or any part of the premises within three years from
the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting such
permission, the Controller may direct the landlord to put
such evicted tenant in possession of the premises.
(2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as
aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord
or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held,
within two months of obtaining such possession or the
premises having been so occupied are, at any time within
three years from the date of obtaining possession, re-let to
any person other than the evicted tenant without obtaining
the permission of the Controller under sub-section (1) or the
possession of such premises is transferred to another person
for reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona
fide, the Controller may, on an application made to him in
this behalf by such evicted tenant within such time as may
be prescribed, direct the landlord to put the tenant in
possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation
as the Controller thinks fit.”
18. Rule 4 of The Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 provides the
limitation for moving such application and it reads as follows:
“4. Application for re-enter. – An application by a tenant
under sub-section (2) of section 19 or under sub-section (3)
of section 20 for putting him in possession of the premises
or part thereof shall be made within six months from the
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date on which cause of action for re-entry arises and shall
state the grounds on which such possession is claimed.”
19. It is important to note here that the application for re-entry
has been moved on the ground that the landlord/respondent after
getting possession has not occupied the tenanted premises within
two months as required under sub-section (2) section 19 of DRC
Act. The Rule (4) of The Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959
provides that the limitation for filing the application for re-entry
is six months from the date the cause of action has arisen. In this
case the possession was delivered on 28.02.2018. Period of two
months expires on 30.04.2018. the period of six months as
prescribed under Rule 4 of The Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959,
starts running from 01.05.2018 and expires on completion of six
months i.e. 31.10.2018. The application for re-entry has been
filed on 05.04.2019. It is also important to note that the
application for condonation of delay was not filed along with the
application for re-entry, it was filed only on 30.01.2020. The
reply to the application for re-entry was filed on 06.07.2019
taking the objection about limitation and copy supplied.
20. These facts are mentioned only to bring on record that
even after coming to know that the application was barred by
limitation the tenant/applicant did not move the application for
condonation of delay immediately.
21. As discussed above there is delay firstly in moving
application for re-entry, it should have been filed between
01.05.2018 to 31.10.2018. The application has been filed only on
05.04.2019. There is delay of 156 days in moving the application
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of re-entry. There is further delay in moving the application
under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay as
the same was filed only on 30.01.2020. There is nothing on
record as to why the application was not filed earlier.
22. It is settled law that the applicant who seeks condonation
of delay has to explain the reasons justifying the condonation. In
the present case the only ground taken is that she is old age and
not physically fit, this is too general and does not explain the
delay of 156 days in moving the application for re-entry and also
the further delay in moving application for condonation of delay.
23. Ld. Counsel for the tenant/applicant has relied upon the
judgments cited as N. Balakrishnan v M. Krishnamurthy,
(1998) 7 SCC 123; Ram Nath Sao v Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3
SCC 195; Sesh Nath Singh & Ors. v Baidyabati Sheoraphuli
Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr., (2021) INSC 199 and
Sabarmati Gas Ltd. v Shah Alloys Ltd., MANU/SC/0008/2023
and prayed that keeping in view the law as settled by the Apex
Court a liberal approach be taken and the delay be condoned in
moving the application.
24. Ld. Counsel for the landlord/respondent has submitted that
the law favours only those who are diligent and also who has
valid reasons. In this case the tenant/applicant has not been able
to explain the reasons of delay and hence the application be
dismissed.
25. No doubt the law on the point of condonation of delay is
liberal and the courts also have the liberal approach. The
Supreme Court in the case cited as Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of
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India, 2023 INSC 885, has distinguished between “explanation”
and “excuse” and held as follows:
“29. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot
be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that
substantive rights of private parties and the State are not
defeated at the threshold simply due to technical
considerations of delay. However, these decisions
notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay
being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of
discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of
the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the
explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or
an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the
shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain
other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the
courts must distinguish between an `explanation' and an
`excuse'. An `explanation' is designed to give someone all of
the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify
the circumstances of a particular event and allows the
person to point out that something that has happened is not
his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be
taken to distinguish an `explanation' from an `excuse'.
Although people tend to see `explanation' and `excuse' as
the same thing and struggle to find out the difference
between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is
real. An `excuse' is often offered by a person to deny
responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort
of a defensive action. Calling something as just an `excuse'
would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to
be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all
situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay
based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be
decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament
that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more
often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard
public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda
is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the
higher courts for adjudication.”
26. The supreme Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v.
The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860,
has held as under:
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"The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure
that actions are commenced within a particular period,
firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as
well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim
against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law
does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his
rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to
remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law.
The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed
in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura
subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful
and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the
statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his
right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage
and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims."
27. In the light of the law as settled by the Apex Court it is
clear that if sufficient cause is shown then the court shall be
liberal in condoning the delay, but only if the applicant is diligent
not who is sleeping over his rights. In the present case the
tenant/applicant has not come up with any explanation for delay
but has mentioned the excuses why application could not be
moved in time. Those excuses also are not sufficient to explain
the delay of 156 days in filing the application. Keeping in view
the facts of the case and the law on the point in my opinion the
Ld. ARC has rightly decided the application under section 5 of
the Limitation Act.
28. Even on merit of the application it is clear that the
tenant/applicant had handed over the vacant physical possession
of the tenanted premises to the landlord/respondent without any
process of law. The possession was handed over by the
tenant/applicant of her own volition within extended period than
as provided under section 14 (7) of the DRC Act. It is important
to note here that the Apex Court while dismissing the SLP
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preferred by the tenant/applicant herein has given him further
time of six months to hand over the vacant physical possession to
the landlord of the tenanted premises. Therefore, he enjoyed the
premises for further period of six months and the landlord also
could not ask for the execution. Now after enjoying that extended
period of six months and surrendering the possession voluntarily
beyond the expiry of period as provide under section 14 (7) of
DRC Act he cannot be allowed to come under section 19 (2) of
the DRC Act as held by the Hon’ble High Court in the case titled
Harjit Singh Sahni v Sidhant Gupta, CM (M) 286/2022 D.O.D.
28.06.2024.
29. In view of the above discussion, I found that the Ld. ARC
has rightly dismissed the application. There is no merit in the
appeal, same is dismissed.
30. Copy of order along with record of Ld. ARC be sent back.
31. The appeal file be consigned to record room.
Announced in the open Court
on 28th day of October, 2025
(Virender Kumar Bansal)
Principal District & Sessions Judge
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi(D)
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