Full Order Text
Final Order 12 · 28 Oct 2025 · CNR DLCT010084412024
Order Details: COPY OF JUDGMENT Pdf Text: RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 1 of 10 IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE & RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL (CENTRAL ) TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI RCT No. 26/2024 CNR No. DLCT01-008441-2024 Smt. Saroj Aggarwal R/o EA-105, UGF, Inder Puri, New Delhi-110012 …..…...Appellant Versus Sh. Nimish Singhania (HUF) Through its Karta Sh. Nimish Singhania R/o 10, Alipur Road, Civil Lines Delhi-110054 ......…...Respondent Date of filing of appeal : 30.05.2024 Date of arguments : 26.09.2025 Date of Judgment : 28.10.2025 JUDGMENT: 1. The appellate jurisdiction of this court has been invoked under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in short, the DRC Act impugning the order dated 19.04.2024 vide which the Ld. ARC has dismissed the application under section 19 (2) of DRC Act. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that Sh. Nimish Singhania (HUF) hereinafter referred as landlord/respondent filed an eviction petition no. 16/2012 under -- 1 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 2 of 10 section 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act on the ground of bona fide requirement for eviction of Smt. Saroj Aggarwal hereinafter referred as tenant/applicant from one showroom and bathroom bearing privet number 1B, GF, A-14/3 Jamna Bhawan, Asif Ali Road, New Delhi hereinafter referred as tenanted premises. 3. The tenant/applicant moved application for leave to defend but the same did not found favour and the eviction order was passed by Ld. ARC vide order dated 26.11.2014. 4. The tenant/applicant filed RC Revision no. 250/2015 before Hon’ble High Court of Delhi challenging the eviction order dated 26.11.2014. The revision was dismissed by the Hon’ble High Court vide order dated 01.12.2016 upholding the eviction order passed by the Ld. ARC. 5. The tenant/applicant challenged the order of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi before the Apex Court in SLP (Civil) No. 21773/2017. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP vide order dated 29.08.2017 observing as follows: “While we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order of eviction yet we grant liberty to the petitioner to vacate the premises and hand over possession to the landlord by the end of February, 2018, failing which the petitioner shall be liable for contempt of this Court. The special leave petition is disposed of accordingly.” 6. In pursuance to this order the tenant applicant handed over the vacant physical possession of the tenanted premises to the landlord/respondent on 28.02.2018. 7. The tenant/applicant on 05.04.2019 filed the application under section 19(2) of DRC Act seeking order of re-entry in the -- 2 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 3 of 10 tenanted premises alleging that the landlord/respondent has not occupied the tenanted premises with in two months from the date of delivery of vacant possession and the same is lying locked and there is also no consumption of electricity. 8. Notice of the application was given to the landlord/respondent who filed reply to the same taking the objection that the application is barred by limitation and no application under section 5 of Limitation Act has been moved seeking condonation of delay. 9. It is alleged that the allegation that the landlord/respondent has not occupied the premises is false, baseless and motivated. It is alleged that the tenanted premises were in dilapidated condition and were not habitable therefore necessary repairs/renovation was being conducted to make it habitable. He has also placed on record certain photographs of the premises before and after, but the first contractor did not finish the work. In March 2018 the parents of the respondent met with a road accident wherein the mother sustained fracture of wrist and father has to undergo lip surgery. Due to this reason, he could not keep track of the renovation work. 10. It is also alleged that possession has been delivered voluntarily by the tenant/applicant pursuance to the order of the Supreme Court and not in execution and hence application is not maintainable. 11. The applicant filed the rejoinder to the reply denying the averments made in the reply and re-asserted the facts alleged in the application. -- 3 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 4 of 10 12. The application under section 5 of Limitation Act was also moved on 30.01.2020 seeking condonation of delay in moving the application under section 19 (2) of DRC Act. It is alleged that the tenant/applicant is an old lady of more than 85 years of age and finds it heard to move around in view of the advanced age and physical condition. It is alleged that in the month of November 2018 she approached her advocate and told him that the tenanted premises has not been occupied. The counsel asked her to bring the relevant documents. But she could not trace the record of the previous litigation. After much efforts she could trace the records and handed over the same to her counsel in January 2019. The counsel also asked her to bring some photographs and the electricity bills, which took considerable time and handed over to her counsel in May 2019. It is alleged that delay in moving the application was only due to these reasons. It is prayed that the delay be condoned. 13. The landlord/respondent filed the reply to the application alleging that this application is an after thought as she could not bear to see the landlord/respondent occupying and using the tenanted premises. The application is moved only when during arguments it was pointed out that the application under section 19(2) is barred by limitation. 14. There is delay of more than 200 days in moving the application itself, that also without any justification as to why the application was not moved in time. It is prayed that the application be dismissed as there is no explanation as to why the application under section 19(2) DRC act and this application could not be filed in time. -- 4 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 5 of 10 15. I have heard the Learned counsel for the tenant/applicant, Ld. Counsel for the landlord/respondent and perused the record. 16. Firstly, I decide the application under section 5 of the limitation Act. 17. For deciding this issue, it will be convenient to read section 19 of DRC Act. “19 (1). Recovery pf possession for occupation and re- entry. – Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises from the tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section 1 of section 12 (or under sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C, 14-D and 21), the landlord shall not, except with the permission of the Controller obtained in the prescribed manner, re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of obtaining such possession, and in granting such permission, the Controller may direct the landlord to put such evicted tenant in possession of the premises. (2) Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises as aforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within two months of obtaining such possession or the premises having been so occupied are, at any time within three years from the date of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other than the evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of the Controller under sub-section (1) or the possession of such premises is transferred to another person for reasons which do not appear to the Controller to be bona fide, the Controller may, on an application made to him in this behalf by such evicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises or to pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.” 18. Rule 4 of The Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 provides the limitation for moving such application and it reads as follows: “4. Application for re-enter. – An application by a tenant under sub-section (2) of section 19 or under sub-section (3) of section 20 for putting him in possession of the premises or part thereof shall be made within six months from the -- 5 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 6 of 10 date on which cause of action for re-entry arises and shall state the grounds on which such possession is claimed.” 19. It is important to note here that the application for re-entry has been moved on the ground that the landlord/respondent after getting possession has not occupied the tenanted premises within two months as required under sub-section (2) section 19 of DRC Act. The Rule (4) of The Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 provides that the limitation for filing the application for re-entry is six months from the date the cause of action has arisen. In this case the possession was delivered on 28.02.2018. Period of two months expires on 30.04.2018. the period of six months as prescribed under Rule 4 of The Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959, starts running from 01.05.2018 and expires on completion of six months i.e. 31.10.2018. The application for re-entry has been filed on 05.04.2019. It is also important to note that the application for condonation of delay was not filed along with the application for re-entry, it was filed only on 30.01.2020. The reply to the application for re-entry was filed on 06.07.2019 taking the objection about limitation and copy supplied. 20. These facts are mentioned only to bring on record that even after coming to know that the application was barred by limitation the tenant/applicant did not move the application for condonation of delay immediately. 21. As discussed above there is delay firstly in moving application for re-entry, it should have been filed between 01.05.2018 to 31.10.2018. The application has been filed only on 05.04.2019. There is delay of 156 days in moving the application -- 6 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 7 of 10 of re-entry. There is further delay in moving the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay as the same was filed only on 30.01.2020. There is nothing on record as to why the application was not filed earlier. 22. It is settled law that the applicant who seeks condonation of delay has to explain the reasons justifying the condonation. In the present case the only ground taken is that she is old age and not physically fit, this is too general and does not explain the delay of 156 days in moving the application for re-entry and also the further delay in moving application for condonation of delay. 23. Ld. Counsel for the tenant/applicant has relied upon the judgments cited as N. Balakrishnan v M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123; Ram Nath Sao v Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195; Sesh Nath Singh & Ors. v Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd. & Anr., (2021) INSC 199 and Sabarmati Gas Ltd. v Shah Alloys Ltd., MANU/SC/0008/2023 and prayed that keeping in view the law as settled by the Apex Court a liberal approach be taken and the delay be condoned in moving the application. 24. Ld. Counsel for the landlord/respondent has submitted that the law favours only those who are diligent and also who has valid reasons. In this case the tenant/applicant has not been able to explain the reasons of delay and hence the application be dismissed. 25. No doubt the law on the point of condonation of delay is liberal and the courts also have the liberal approach. The Supreme Court in the case cited as Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of -- 7 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 8 of 10 India, 2023 INSC 885, has distinguished between “explanation” and “excuse” and held as follows: “29. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an `explanation' and an `excuse'. An `explanation' is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an `explanation' from an `excuse'. Although people tend to see `explanation' and `excuse' as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. An `excuse' is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an `excuse' would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.” 26. The supreme Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, (1971) 2 SCC 860, has held as under: -- 8 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 9 of 10 "The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims." 27. In the light of the law as settled by the Apex Court it is clear that if sufficient cause is shown then the court shall be liberal in condoning the delay, but only if the applicant is diligent not who is sleeping over his rights. In the present case the tenant/applicant has not come up with any explanation for delay but has mentioned the excuses why application could not be moved in time. Those excuses also are not sufficient to explain the delay of 156 days in filing the application. Keeping in view the facts of the case and the law on the point in my opinion the Ld. ARC has rightly decided the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 28. Even on merit of the application it is clear that the tenant/applicant had handed over the vacant physical possession of the tenanted premises to the landlord/respondent without any process of law. The possession was handed over by the tenant/applicant of her own volition within extended period than as provided under section 14 (7) of the DRC Act. It is important to note here that the Apex Court while dismissing the SLP -- 9 of 10 -- RCT No. 26/2024 Saroj Aggarwal Vs Nimish Singhania (HUF) Page 10 of 10 preferred by the tenant/applicant herein has given him further time of six months to hand over the vacant physical possession to the landlord of the tenanted premises. Therefore, he enjoyed the premises for further period of six months and the landlord also could not ask for the execution. Now after enjoying that extended period of six months and surrendering the possession voluntarily beyond the expiry of period as provide under section 14 (7) of DRC Act he cannot be allowed to come under section 19 (2) of the DRC Act as held by the Hon’ble High Court in the case titled Harjit Singh Sahni v Sidhant Gupta, CM (M) 286/2022 D.O.D. 28.06.2024. 29. In view of the above discussion, I found that the Ld. ARC has rightly dismissed the application. There is no merit in the appeal, same is dismissed. 30. Copy of order along with record of Ld. ARC be sent back. 31. The appeal file be consigned to record room. Announced in the open Court on 28th day of October, 2025 (Virender Kumar Bansal) Principal District & Sessions Judge Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi(D) -- 10 of 10 --
