Final Order 17

Order Details: COPY OF JUDGMENT
Pdf Text: CR No. 164/2024
Gopal Tiwari & Ors. v. State & Anr.
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IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No. DLCT01-006840-2024
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 164/2024
1. GOPAL TIWARI,
S/o. Shri. Janardan Tiwari,
R/o. A-480, Nehru Vihar,
Timarpur, Delhi-110054.
2. RAMA WATI DEVI,
W/o. Shri. Janardan Tiwari,
R/o. A-480, Nehru Vihar,
Timarpur, Delhi-110054.
3. JANARDAN TIWARI,
S/o. Late Shri. Kanhji Tiwari,
R/o. A-480, Nehru Vihar,
Timarpur, Delhi-110054. … REVISIONISTS/
PETITIONERS
VERSUS
1. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI.
2. RAJENDER SINGH,
S/o. Late Shri. Kanwar Singh,
Presently residing at;
H. No. 764, Bhagtan,
Mohalla Ghonda Chowk,
Delhi-110084. … RESPONDENTS
Date of filing : 03.05.2024
Date of institution : 04.05.2024
Date when judgment was reserved : 05.12.2025
Date when judgment is pronounced : 13.01.2026
J U D G M E N T
1. The present revision petition has been filed under
Sections 397/399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(
hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C.’)/
pari materia with Sections
438/440 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
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(
hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), against the notice/order dated
02.03.2024 (
hereinafter referred to as ‘impugned notice/order’),
passed by Ld. Sub-Divisional Magistrate/Ld. SDM, Civil Lines,
Khasra No. 549. 1st Floor, Old NDPL Building, Burari (
hereinafter
referred to as the ‘Ld. SDM/Ld. Magistrate’)
, in case bearing as;
‘
Rajender Singh v. Gopal Tiwari & Ors., Case No.
145/SDM/RA/CL/86/2024/482-86’, in proceedings initiated in
terms of the provisions under Section 145 Cr.P.C. Pertinently, by
virtue of the impugned notice, the Ld. SDM, while directing the
revisionists and respondent no. 2 to maintain
status quo on/in
relation to property bearing;
khasra no. 134/17, 16/2, admeasuring
1900 sq. yds., situated in Village Jharoda Majra, Milan Vihar,
Delhi-110084, directed the said parties to appear before him/Ld.
SDM to present their respective case.
2. Succinctly, the genesis of the present proceedings is
a complaint dated 01.03.2024, filed by/on behalf of respondent no.
2 before the concerned DCP, North, which was forwarded to the
concerned Ld. SDM/Ld. SDM, Civil Lines, Burari, Delhi in terms
of the provisions under Section 145 Cr.P.C.
vide Diary No. 1104.
Markedly, under the said complaint, respondent no. 2
inter alia
asserted that respondent no. 2 had purchased the property
bearing;
khasra no. 134/17, 16/2, admeasuring 1900 sq. yds.,
situated in Milan Vihar, Burari, Jagatpur-Jharodha
bandh, Delhi
(
hereinafter referred to as the ‘property in question/premise in
question/disputed property’) from one Babu Khan, S/o. Sh. Afsar
Ali Khan. As per respondent no. 2, the said property had a
boundary wall at that point in time, besides some dilapidated
structures were also present there (
khandarnuma kamre bane hue
the). It was further asserted by respondent no. 2 under his
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complaint that after purchase of the said property, he used to visit
the said premise, occasionally for its look-after/take care.
Correspondingly, as per respondent no. 2, the revisionists were
also in possession of a premise admeasuring 250 sq. yds., adjacent
to the property in question and that the revisionists used to also
frequent the said premise for its look-after.
2.1. As per respondent no. 2, on 26.02.2024, he had gone
to Ahmedabad, Gujarat for some work and upon returning from
Gujarat, at around noon, he/respondent no. 2, sent his son, Nitin to
the property in question for its look-after. However, it was
determined by respondent no. 2 that the revisionists, upon
breaking the boundary wall of the property in question, were in the
process of creating new boundary wall, solely to illegally and
unlawfully occupy/grab the possession/trespass the said
premise/property. Ergo, as per respondent no. 2, his son called the
police at the said spot and the concerned police officials, upon
reaching there halted such/alleged illegal construction activities
by/at the behest of the revisionists. Congruently, as per respondent
no. 2, the revisionists were cautioned not to continue/carry out
further construction on the disputed property unless the dispute
pertaining to the said property was resolved. However, it is the
case of respondent no. 2, at around 08:00 p.m., on the same day
,
i.e., on 26.02.2024, it was determined by him/respondent no. 2 that
the revisionists had again started their illegal construction
activities. As per respondent no. 2, the revisionists, continued their
activities unabashed, despite the fact that they were in possession
of only the adjacent plot/property, admeasuring 250 sq. yds.
Congruently, under the said complaint, respondent no. 2 further
proclaimed that, even otherwise, no such construction activities
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could have been undertaken by the revisionists as a stay was
already in operational at that point in time in relation to the
property in question in Civil Suit bearing no. 831/2021.
2.2. Relevantly, under the aforesaid complaint,
respondent no. 2 further proclaimed that the revisionists had no
right to the said property and despite his/respondent no. 2’s
entreaties, the revisionists failed to abide by his requests, rather,
abused, threatened and harassed him. Ergo, under such facts and
circumstances, the instant complaint came to be filed by/at the
behest of respondent no. 2. As aforenoted, respondent no. 2 also
addressed an application for
ad-interim order of
status quo from
the Ld. SDM, upon such complaint being filed and forwarded.
Noticeably, upon such complaint/petition having been
filed/forwarded, the Ld. SDM/Ld. Magistrate
vide order/notice
dated 02.03.2024/impugned notice/order,
inter alia directed as
under;
“…Whereas, a Petition U/s 145 CrPC was
received on 01.03.2024 vide Diary No. 1104
alongwith copy of complaint to DCP, North dated
01.03.2024, in the court of undersigned in respect of
Kh. No. 134/17, 16/2 admeasuring 1900 Square Yards
situated in the area of Village Jharoda Majra, Colony
known as Milan Vihar, Delhi 84, along with copy of
GPA & Agreement to sell and receipt etc. in his
favour, wherein the Petitioner has reported dispute
between the parties Sh. Rajender Singh S/o. Lt. Sh.
Kanwar Singh R/o. H.No. 764, Bhagtan Mohalla,
Ghonda Chowk, Delhi called Petitioner and (i) Sh.
Gopal Tiwari (ii) Sh. Janardan Tiwari (i) Ram Wati
Tiwari All residents of A-480 Nehru Vihar,
Delhi-110084 called Respondent.
Whereas, considering submissions of the
petitioner and contents of the petition, it appears that
this dispute between both the parties is likely to
induce a breach of the peace in the area. Hence to
maintain peace, I consider it appropriate to bind both
the parties under reference to maintain the STATUS
QUO on Kh. No. 134/17, 16/2 admeasuring 1900
SQY situated in the area of Village- Jharoda Majra.
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Colony known as Milan Vihar, Delhi-84, till further
order. Further, both the parties are again directed to
appear before the undersigned on 11.03.2024 at 03:00
PM to present their case before the undersigned.
SHO, PS Wazirabad is directed to ensure
compliance of the above said directions and also
submit the status report…”
(Emphasis supplied)
3. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists vehemently
contended that the impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial
Court on mere conjunctures, surmises and in contravention of the
settled principles of law, deserving the same to be outrightly set
aside as amounting to abuse of process of law. As per the Ld.
Counsel, the impugned order is neither sustainable nor
maintainable as the revisionists are victims in the hand of
respondent No. 2. As per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. SDM Court
erroneously allowed respondent no. 2’s complaint
ex-parte,
without affording, revisionists an opportunity to be heard and
without calling for the police report, which is one of the
essential/mandatory requirements to pass any injunction order
under Section 145 of Cr.P.C. or for recording satisfaction to the
extent that the present dispute between the parties would lead to
breach of peace. Congruently, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel,
that while passing the impugned order/notice, Ld. SDM failed to
take into consideration, settled judicial precedents, in particular, to
satisfy itself that there must be a real threat of breach of peace
inviting said proceedings; there must be material on record to
prove the actual breach of peace; and to reach a subjective
satisfaction on the basis of record, that grounds exist for initiation
of such proceedings. Further, it was argued by the Ld. Counsel that
the Ld. SDM, while passing the impugned order/notice failed to
appreciate that the purpose of Section 145 Cr.P.C. is not to evict a
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person from any land, rather, to prevent breach of peace by
declaring the party found in possession to be entitled to remain in
possession until evicted therefrom.
3.1. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists further submitted
that the Ld. Magistrate, hastily determined the complaint of
respondent no. 2, without application of mind and failed to
consider that whether or not the alleged dispute would amount to
breach of public peace. In this regard, Ld. Counsel further
submitted that it is mandate of the law to hear both the parties
before passing any order which would adversely affect the rights
of other party. Correspondingly, it was argued despite respondent
no. 2 having allegedly filed all the documents in favour of
his/respondent no. 2’s cause, Ld. SDM persevered to conduct a
roving inquiry about the title of the property in question and kept
on giving opportunities to respondent No. 2 to fill-in the lacunae.
Ergo, it was submitted that the said conduct of the Ld. SDM is
unwarranted and arbitrary in nature. Even otherwise, Ld. Counsel
for the revisionists submitted that the Ld. SDM, though,
specifically recoded under its order dated 19.04.2024 that
respondent no. 2 had not produced any document(s) regarding his
alleged possession over the property in question, however, the
order of alleged stay/injunction is continuing till date. Even
otherwise, Ld. Counsel for the revisionists fervently reiterated that
the impugned order/notice is patently illegal, arbitrary and against
the principles of natural justice, in as much as the Ld. SDM issued
directions/order for
status quo on the property in dispute without
any due enquiry to ascertain true facts.
3.2. Ld. Counsel for the revisionists further submitted
that the Ld. Magistrate misdirected itself in proceeding with a
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preconceived notion/predetermined mindset that respondent no. 2
was an aggrieved party. Further, it was submitted by the Ld.
Counsel that the Ld. SDM erred in not considering that any order
passed without the due consideration of the documents,
demonstrating exclusive possession of a party would not be in the
interest of justice, rather, divorced from the factual aspects of the
controversy and the matter in dispute. It was further submitted by
the Ld. Counsel that before an order of
status quo in respect of the
property in question was passed by the Ld. SDM, due regard
should have been given to the status and previous antecedents of
the parties, seeking Ld. SDM to pass any such order. Even
otherwise, it was argued that the Ld. Magistrate, passed an order
in favour of respondent no. 2, failing to consider that respondent
no. 2 was guilty of intentionally and deliberately concealing all the
material facts related to the documents of property in question.
Congruently, as per the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. SDM erred in passing
the impugned order without any due consideration to the facts of
the case as well as settled judicial dictates. Consequently, it was
prayed that the impugned order/notice is liable to be set aside as
violative of both law and facts, as well as in contravention to the
principles of natural justice. In support of the said contents,
reliance was placed upon the decisions in;
Smt. Sudha Gupta &
Anr. v. State & Ors., W. P. CRL. No. 1028 of 2009, dated
08.10.2010 (Hon’ble DHC); Murari Mirchandani v. State & Ors.,
Crl. MC No. 2611/2021, dated 02.06.2022 (Hon’ble DHC); Mohd.
Taiyab Khan v. State of Bihar, 2023 SCC Online Pat. 4105;
Prem Chand v. Panchhi Ram, 2019 SCC Online HP 3775; Raj
Kumar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC Online Pat.
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357; and
Osman Ali Saikia v. Chand Mahamod Saikia, 2023 SCC
Online Gau. 5425.
4.
Per contra, Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that
the impugned order was passed by the Ld. SDM, after due
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and,
as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further
submitted that no irregularity, impropriety, or incorrectness can be
attributed to the impugned order, which was passed by the Ld.
Magistrate, cognizant of the principles of law, as well as wary of
the facts and circumstances brought forth. Ergo, Ld. Addl. PP for
the State reiterated that the impugned order was passed by the Ld.
Magistrate, being wary of the facts as well as law and as such,
deserves no interference from this Court.
4.1. Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that the
Ld. SDM passed the impugned order/notice, being wary of the
settled law/judicial dictates as well as the facts of the present case,
deserving no interference from this Court. As per the Ld. Counsel,
the Ld. SDM was well within his jurisdiction to pass an
ex-parte
order under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in a situation of urgency, where
there is a likelihood of breach of peace and the order must be
preliminary, in nature to secure
status quo until the matter is
properly adjudicated on merits. It was further submitted by the Ld.
Counsel that the order impugned herein, aligns with the
preliminary role of the Ld. SDM
, i.e., to maintain law and order,
not to adjudicate on the civil rights or ownership of parties. It was
further argued by the Ld. Counsel that the impugned order was not
passed in haste, rather, the Ld. SDM duly/carefully read
respondent no. 2’s complaint, wherein it was clearly specified that
the revisionists were repeatedly infringing/interfering with the
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possession of the said respondent as well as endeavouring to
illegally occupy/grab respondent no. 2’s land, despite PCR call on
29.02.2024 and PCR staff stopped the work, however, no action
was taken by the concerned police officials. In this regard, Ld.
Counsel for respondent no. 2 further fervently argued that the
passing of the impugned order/notice was mandated for the reason
that despite repeated requests/entreaties from respondent no. 2,
police officials initiated no action against the revisionists, clearly,
demonstrating collusion between the revisionists and concerned
police officials.
4.2. Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 further submitted
that the Ld. SDM also called for the status report from the
concerned SHO. PS. Wazirabad, whereupon, report dated
26.04.2024 was filed under the signatures of SI Sawai Singh. In
this regard, it was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that under
the said report, the concerned police official, specifically admitted
that the police received complaints from the revisionists and
respondent no. 2, casting allegations of illegal occupation of the
property in question. Correspondingly, it was submitted that under
the said status report, it was specifically recorded that one of the
revisionists made a PCR call of gun firing, which was eventually
determined to be false. Ergo, it was argued that the revisionists’
conduct explicitly demonstrate that they persistently created panic
and tried to disturb the law and order of the area. Consequently,
Ld. Counsel for respondent no. 2 submitted that under such
circumstances the impugned order/notice was passed by the Ld.
SDM being wary of the facts as well as settled law. Further, it was
argued that the Ld. SDM under order dated 19.04.2024, clearly
recorded that all the documents, regarding the alleged ownership
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of the land in question, provided by the revisionists related to
khasra No. 17,
khata/khatauni no. 109/133, whereas, the
land/property under dispute pertains to
khasra No. 134/17,
khata
No. 1357, Village Burari, Milan Vihar, Delhi. Even otherwise, as
per the Ld. Counsel, the instant proceedings are extremely
premature in nature as the revisionists, even prior to proving their
possession/right in the property in question, opted to challenge the
impugned order/notice. Consequently, it was fervently reiterated
that the present petition amounts to abuse of process of law, as
such, deserving outright dismissal. In support of the said
contentions, reliance was placed upon the decision(s) in;
R.H.
Bhutani v. Mani J. Desai, AIR 1968 SC 1444.
5. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the revisionists,
Ld. Addl. PP for the State/respondent no. 1 and that of Ld. Counsel
for respondent no. 2 have been heard as well as the record(s),
including the records of Ld. SDM, case laws, written
submissions/arguments and other material placed on record by the
parties, thoroughly perused.
6. Before proceeding with the determination of the
merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be
apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions
under law, as under;
“3971. Calling for records to exercise of powers of
revision - (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
1
Pari materia with Section 438 BNSS, which provides;
“438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-(1)
The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior
Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of
any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any
sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail
bond pending the examination of the record.*** (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not
be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied).
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propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded
or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings
of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such
record, direct that the execution of any sentence or
order be suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own
bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation - All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to
the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section
and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding...”
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Pertinently, from a perusal of the above, it is quite
manifest that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be
invoked either
suo motu or an application of parties, that too in a
case(s) where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the
provision of law, decision of Trial Court being completely
erroneous or where the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in
Amit Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC
460, wherein the Hon’ble Court while explicating the various
contours of the provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. (
pari materia
with Section 438 BNSS) observed as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to
the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,
which upon the face of it bears a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance with
law. If one looks into the various judgments of this
Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can
be invoked where the decisions under challenge are
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grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on
no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These
are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.
Each case would have to be determined on its own
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it
should not be against an interim or interlocutory
order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise
of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed
properly and in accordance with law in a given case,
it may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing
of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings
under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Correspondingly, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
in
V.K. Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC Online Del 1192, in a similar
context noted, as under;
“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test
the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court
below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does
not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the
case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy
itself about the legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from substituting its
own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed
to make out a case for exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the
impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the
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revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order
of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a
settled law2 that in a case where the order of subordinate Court
does not suffer from any illegality
, “merely because of equitable
considerations, the revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-
consider the matter and pass a different order in a routine manner.”
Reference in this regard is made to the decision in
Taron Mohan
v. State, 2021 SCC Online Del 312, wherein the Hon’ble High
Court of Delhi expounded the law, as under;
“9. The scope of interference in a revision petition
is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397
CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts
jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the
regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It
is also well settled that while considering the
legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a
conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell
at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A
court in revision considers the material only to
satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the
findings, sentence and order and refrains from
substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate
consideration of evidence…”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Ergo, in light of the foregoing discussion, however,
before proceeding with the assessment of the rival contentions of
Ld. Counsel for the revisionist and that of Ld. Counsel for the
respondent, this Court deems it apposite to reproduce the relevant
provisions under law/Cr.P.C., germane for the present
adjudication, as under;
“145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or
water is likely to cause breach of peace-(1) Whenever
an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a
police officer or upon other information that a dispute
likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning
2
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC Online MP 4458; and
Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC Online MP
958.
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any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his
local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing,
stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and
requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to
attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified
date and time, and to put in written statements of their
respective claims as respects the fact of actual
possession of the subject of dispute.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the expression
“land or water” includes buildings, markets, fisheries,
crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits
of any such property.
(3) A copy of the order shall be served in the
manner provided by this Code for the service of a
summons upon such person or persons as the
Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be
published by being affixed to some conspicuous place
at or near the subject of dispute.
(4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to
the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a
right to possess the subject of dispute, peruse the
statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such
evidence as may be produced by them, take such
further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if
possible, decide whether any and which of the
parties was, at the date of the order made by him under
sub-section (1), in possession of the subject of
dispute:
Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that
any party has been forcibly and wrongfully
dispossessed within two months next before the date
on which the report of a police officer or other
information was received by the Magistrate, or after
that date and before the date of his order under sub-
section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as
if that party had been in possession on the date of his
order under sub-section (1).
(5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party
so required to attend, or any other person interested,
from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists
or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall
cancel his said order, and all further proceedings
thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such
cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-
section (1) shall be final.
(6)(a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the
parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section
(4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said
subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to
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	Page No. 15 of 28
be entitled to possession thereof until evicted
therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all
disturbance of such possession until such eviction;
and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section
(4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and
wrongfully dispossessed.***”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Notably, from a scrupulous analysis of the aforesaid
provisions, it is observed that the said provision is aimed to
maintain law and order3 as well as to prevent breach of peace by
maintaining one or other of the parties in possession of the
premise/land or water, rather than to evict any person from
possession. Quit evidently, the expanse of enquiry under the said
provision/under Section 145 Cr.P.C. has been repeatedly avowed
by the superior courts4 to be limited to the extent of actual
possession, without reference to the merits or claim of any of the
parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute. Reference in this
regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of
Allahabad in
Hosnaki v. State, 1955 SCC Online All 414, while
delving into the scope and ambit of the said provision5, remarked,
as under;
“10. The object behind the provisions of S. 145 is
merely to prevent a breach of the peace by
maintaining one party to the dispute in possession and
forbidding the other on pain of a penalty to interfere
with it. When there is a dispute concerning land,
neither party is prepared to have it decided by a Court
of competent jurisdiction and they cannot exercise the
right claimed by them without causing a breach of the
peace, it becomes necessary for a Magistrate to
prevent a breach of the peace by taking some action.
11. A breach of the peace must be prevented & the
3 Reference is made to the decision of Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in
Thakur Jaikrit Singh v. Sohan Raj, 1958
SCC Online Raj 78, wherein the Hon’ble Court
inter alia noted in an akin context,
“61. The object of Section 145
of the Cr PC is to prevent breach of peace arising out of dispute relating to immovable property and if the Magistrate
is satisfied that such a dispute is likely to cause breach of peace, he should make an order stating the grounds of his
satisfaction and require the parties concerned in such a dispute to attend his court land file written statements of their
respective possession over the subject of dispute…” (Emphasis supplied)
4
Ashok Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 3 SCC 366.
5
Pari materia provision under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.
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	Page No. 16 of 28
legislature has thought that the best way of doing it is
by maintaining one party in possession and forcing the
other party to go to a court of competent jurisdiction
for a decision of title. The orders that a Magistrate
passes under S. 145 are merely “police orders” in the
words of Lord Lindley in — ‘Dinomoni v. Brojo
Mohini’, 29 Ind App 24 (PC) (A).
12. For a Magistrate to have jurisdiction to
proceed under S. 145 there must exist a dispute
likely to cause a breach of the peace. He is only
concerned with the existence of a dispute; he is not
concerned at all with the questions how it arose, which
party is on the aggressive or unreasonable, whether
the dispute had been decided remotely or even
recently by a Court of competent jurisdiction or
whether an alternative remedy is open to the party that
seeks his assistance.
13. The law has not made his assumption of
jurisdiction dependent on any of these matters. The
use of the word “shall” in sub-s. (1) makes it
obligatory upon him to assume jurisdiction on being
satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the
peace exists. Neither is any other fact require to exist
before he can assume jurisdiction nor is his
jurisdiction barred by the existence of any fact.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Consequently, being mindful of the foregoing
provision(s) and judicial dictates, this Court would now proceed
with the determination of the rival contentions of the parties. In
this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly note that the
Ld. Counsel for the revisionists has vehemently argued that no
such order of
status quo, qua the property in dispute could have
been passed by the Ld. SDM, in the absence of any formal report
having first been called from the concerned police officials.
However, the said contention fails to impress this Court in light of
the words, ‘other information’ used under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C.
and the repeated avowals of the superior courts6
inter alia affirming
that the words, ‘other information’ under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C.
6
R.H. Bhutani v. Mani J. Desai, 1968 SCC Online SC 5; Kauleshari v. Binda Pandey, 1975 SCC Online Pat 184;
and
Moti v. State, 1976 SCC Online HP 44.
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	Page No. 17 of 28
are wide enough to include the knowledge derived from ‘any
source whatever’ and that it is not necessary that any person should
have actually informed the Ld. Magistrate/Ld. SDM of such a
breach of peace/likelihood of breach of peace or that a police
report is filed in this regard. In fact, the intiation of such
proceedings, as per the superior courts, can even be based on the
personal knowledge of the concerned Magistrate. Pertinent in this
regard to make reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Allahabad
High Court in
Ganga Bux Singh v. Sukhdin, 1958 SCC Online All
297, wherein the Hon’ble Court whilst being confronted with an
akin conundrum, unambiguously noted as under;
“13. Sec. 145(1) does not specifically mention any
petition. The Magistrate has to be satisfied from a
‘police report’ or ‘other information’. That
‘information’ may be an application by an interested
party or a third party or even the Magistrate's personal
information. The information may have been
communicated to him in writing or orally or he may
have even noticed some conduct of a party which
might have given him an indication of an
apprehension of a breach of the peace. It would thus
appear that no application is, strictly speaking,
necessary for the initiation of the proceedings. It is not
that a party comes to the Magistrate with a cause. The
starting point of an application or even a police report
may not be available in every case and thus when the
Magistrate, himself suspecting an apprehension of a
breach of the peace, makes certain enquiry and is then
satisfied of the existence of the apprehension of a
breach of the peace and makes an order in writing
stating the grounds of his being satisfied, the date of
his order cannot be referred back to the first
information received by him. From this it is clear
that the starting point of the proceedings is not the
information received by the Magistrate or the
application made to him or even the police report but
his satisfaction recorded in writing. Subha Rao, C.J. in
Padmaraju Subha Raju v. Padmaraju Koneti Raju
[A.I.R. 1955 Andhra 99.] (supra) emphasised the
same point and stated:
“Though it often happens that a Magistrate is
moved by an application by the affected party, a
preliminary enquiry also need not be at the
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instance of a particular party. The Magistrate
may initiate it suo motu. Even if he initiates it at
the instance of an affected party, he may drop it if
he is not satisfied that the necessary conditions
exists.”
14. The proceedings start not on the complaint or
the police report but on the subjective satisfaction of
the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach
of the peace exists. The crucial date in all the
subjections is the date of the Magistrate's recording
his satisfaction. That is the date on which the
possession of parties has to be enquired into and that
is also the date from which the period of two months
mentioned in the first proviso to sub-sec. (4) of Sec.
145, Cr. P.C. has to be counted. Thus it is clear that
the Legislature clearly intended that this date should
be treated as the date of the initiation of the
proceedings and not the date of the original first
information given to the Magistrate. In the
circumstances it is difficult to apply the argument of
casus omissus which, was accepted by the High Court
of Hyderabad.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Notwithstanding the foregoing, here it is apposite to
note that this Court is cognizant that an order under Section 145(1)
Cr.P.C. has to be speaking/reasoned in nature. In fact, the superiors
courts have painstakingly proclaimed that before proceedings in
terms of the provisions under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. are initiated
by Ld. Magistrate/Ld. SDM, he must satisfy himself that a dispute
regarding land or wafer exists and that such dispute is likely to
cause a breach of peace. In fact, the law is trite that it is only when
the Ld. Magistrate arrives at a satisfaction of the said two
conditions, he assumes jurisdiction to make an order under the said
section. Congruently, Ld. Magistrate, while initiating such
proceedings/passing an order in terms of Section 145(1) Cr.P.C.,
initiating the proceedings under the said Section is required to
record the grounds for such satisfaction. Reference in this regard
is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in
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	Page No. 19 of 28
Amulya Ratan Halder v. Bidya Bhusan Naskar, 1979 SCC Online
Cal 137, wherein the Hon’ble Court explicate the law in this
regard, as under;
“3. To appreciate the respective contentions of the
parties it will therefore be necessary first to ascertain
the requirements for drawing up a proceeding under S.
145 of the Code and whether failure to comply with
such requirements make the proceeding void ab initio.
From a plain reading of S. 145(1) it would appear
that before initiating a proceeding the Magistrate must
satisfy himself that a dispute regarding land or wafer
exists and that such dispute is likely to cause a
breach of peace. It is only when the Magistrate arrives
at his satisfaction of those two conditions that the
Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to make an order
under the said section. The other requirement of the
section in to record the grounds for such satisfaction
in the initiatory order. In other words, while the
satisfaction gives the jurisdiction to the Magistrate to
pass an order, the recording of such satisfaction is
the mode of exercise of such jurisdiction. It
necessarily follows that if the learned Magistrate
records an order without the satisfaction he wrongly
assumes the jurisdiction but if the satisfaction is
there but the grounds of satisfaction are not stated in
the initial order he wrongly exercises the jurisdiction.
If the former is absent the order and all further
proceeding which follows the order, will be therefore
without jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Here, this Court deems it further pertinent to make a
reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in
Md. Ansar Uddin v. State of Assam, 2007 SCC Online Gau 93,
wherein the Hon’ble Court, while inter alia delving into the aspect
of effect of non-mentioning of grounds of satisfaction under an
order passed in terms of Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. and the
jurisdiction of revisional courts, under such case, observed as
under;
“6. What is, now, of paramount importance to note
is that mere omission to record the grounds of
satisfaction by the Magistrate, who draws the
proceeding, under section 145, cannot ipso facto make
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	Page No. 20 of 28
the order illegal or without jurisdiction. In such
circumstances, it is the duty of the Revisional Court to
ascertain as to what were the materials placed before
the Magistrate on the basis whereof the proceeding
was drawn. If the materials justify drawing of the
proceeding, then, satisfaction of the Magistrate, which
is subjective in nature, cannot be interfered with.
Hence, if the materials, on record based on which a
proceeding is drawn, makes out a case for drawing of
a proceeding under section 145, Revisional Court will
not interfere with such an order, for, interference, in
such a case, would be hyper-technical approach to an
order drawing the proceeding. Even if, on the basis of
the materials on record, there are two views possible
and if an Executive Magistrate is found to have
adopted the view that the materials on record justified
drawing of a proceeding, Revisional Court would not
interfere with such an order. In the present case,
therefore, it is necessary to determine if the
materials, on record, justified drawing of a proceeding
under section 145, Cr. P.C.
7. While considering the above aspect of the
matter, it needs to be noted that the very case, set up
by the first party, clearly reflects that the dispute, in
question, was a dispute confined to the parties to the
proceeding. Such a dispute is a private dispute and
does not involve the members of the public, in
general. When the members of the public have no
interest in a dispute, such a dispute cannot become the
foundation for exercise of powers under section
145(1).
9. A close analysis of the provisions of section 145
shows that the Magistrate is empowered to draw a
proceeding, under sub-section (1) of section 145, if he
is satisfied from report of a police officer or upon
other information that a dispute likely to cause breach
of the peace exists concerning any land or water or the
boundaries thereof within his local jurisdiction. A
careful reading of section 145(1) also shows that on
receipt of report or information as aforementioned, the
Magistrate shall make an order, in writing, stating
the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring
the parties concerned, in such dispute, to attend his
Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date
and time, and to put in written statements of their
respective claims as respects the fact of actual
possession of the subject of dispute.
10. The provisions, contained in sub-section (1) of
section 145, show that the source of information for
the purpose of drawing a proceeding, under sub-
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	Page No. 21 of 28
section (1) of section 145, is not material; what is
material is that the Executive Magistrate must feel
satisfied about existence of a dispute as envisaged in
section 145(1) and must assign the grounds of his
being so satisfied. This apart, the dispute must relate
to any land, water or boundary thereof and the dispute
must be such, which is likely to cause breach of the
peace. The expression “breach of the peace” does not
really mean mental peace of the parties concerned.
Disturbance of public order is distinct and different
from actions of the individuals, which do not disturb
the society to the extent of vibrating a general
disturbance of public order. The breach of peace,
envisaged under section 145, Cr. P.C., means
disturbance of the even tempo of the life of the
community in a given locality. When a party
illegally or forcibly occupies land of another party,
people, in general, or even neighbours of such a
party may be shocked and mentally disturbed, but life
of the community may still move keeping pace with
the even tempo of life of the community. If by such
act of dispossession, even tempo of life of the
community is disturbed or jeopardized, it may become
a case of disturbance of public order and tranquillity.
The acts of a private party, which affect personal
rights of another party, do not disturb the even tempo
of the society, for, such feuds are private feuds. Basis
of jurisdiction under section 145(1) is a dispute, which
is likely to cause a breach of the peace. Ordinarily, a
person, dispossessed from his land, shall sue for
recovery of the immovable properly under the
provisions of the Specific Relief Act and if there is a
threat of his dispossession, he should institute a suit to
obtain injunction. These are, ordinarily, forum for
establishing rights of the litigants. A proceeding under
section 145 is, therefore, an extra-ordinary provision
to grant extra-ordinary relief, when there is likelihood
of breach of the peace in a given locality. The final
order of the Magistrate is subject to the decision of the
Civil Court. It is, therefore, clear that private dispute
between two persons, which does not disturb law and
order or occasion breach of the peace in the locality,
cannot form basis for drawing a proceeding under
section 145, Cr. P.C. and the forum for obtaining
relief, in such a case, is the Civil Court of competent
jurisdiction and not the Executive Magistrate's Court.
In Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. [(1985)
1 SCC 427: AIR 1985 SC 472 : 1985 (22) ACC 45
(SC).] the Apex Court has discouraged drawing of
proceedings under section 145 as far as possible. In
fact, Ram Sumer Puri Mahant (supra) lays down that
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	Page No. 22 of 28
the Magistrate should initiate a proceeding under
section 145 only when the essential elements of the
provisions contained in section 145 are found to be
present in a given case.
11. What emerges from the above discussion is
that exercise of power under section 145(1) cannot
be arbitrary and the provisions of section 145 cannot
be invoked unless the conditions precedent prescribed
therein are satisfied.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Remarkably, from a conjoint perusal of the
aforenoted judicial dictates, it is perspicuously deduced that where
an initiatory order under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. is passed by Ld.
Magistrate/Ld. SDM, without recording satisfaction of likelihood
of breach of peace from a dispute, as per the superior courts, he/Ld.
Magistrate wrongly assumes jurisdiction. However, when the
grounds of such satisfaction are not recorded under such an
initiatory order, though, a satisfaction is recorded, Ld. Magistrate
is held to wrongly exercise jurisdiction. In fact, as per the Hon’ble
Calcutta High Court in
Amulya Ratan Halder v. Bidya Bhusan
Naskar (Supra.) in the former case, proceeding which follows such
an initiatory order are
null and
void and without jurisdiction.
However, in so far as the latter case is concerned
, i.e., where the
initiatory order under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C. fails to record the
grounds for satisfaction of Ld. Magistrate to initiation such
proceedings, law obligates a revisional court to ascertain/evaluate
the material placed before the Ld. Magistrate on the basis whereof
the proceeding was drawn. In fact, as aforenoted, as per the
Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in
Md. Ansar Uddin v. State of
Assam (Supra.), where upon such an evaluation, it is determined
by a revisional court that the material brought forth justify drawing
of the proceeding, then, satisfaction of Ld. Magistrate cannot be
interfered/found fault with, being subjective in nature. However,
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	Page No. 23 of 28
again, the Hon’ble Gauhati High Court in the said dictate
accentuated that while drawing such satisfaction, Ld. Magistrate
is bound to be cautious of the fact that the terms, ‘breach of the
peace’, encompassed under Section 145 Cr.P.C. do not denote
mental peace of the parties concerned and that a distinction has to
be drawn between disturbance of public order
vis-à-vis actions of
the individuals, which do not disturb the society/disturbing public
order.
16. Therefore, with the foregoing understanding, when
the impugned order/notice of the Ld. SDM is scrupulously
perused, it is noted that the said order, nowhere records the
grounds of satisfaction of the Ld. SDM, while passing an order of
status quo in respect to the property in question as well as directing
the revisionists and respondent no. 2, to appear and answer to such
notice. However, the said order/notice, does record the satisfaction
of the Ld. SDM to pass such initiatory order under Section 145(1)
Cr.P.C.
inter alia under the observation, “…
considering
submissions of the petitioner and contents of the petition, it
appears that this dispute between both the parties is likely to
induce a breach of the peace in the area…”. Ergo, under such
circumstances, in the present revision, this Court is obligated to
look at the material placed before the Ld. SDM which convinced
the Ld. SDM to pass such an order/impugned order. However,
when the material brought forth, including the ‘other information’
in the form of respondent no. 2’s complaint, is conscientiously
perused by this Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that
the Ld. Magistrate, erred to proceed in terms of the provisions
under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in the instant case. In this regard, it is
noted from a thorough perusal of the records of the Ld. SDM/Ld.
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	Page No. 24 of 28
Magistrate that except the initial complaint dated 01.03.2024 and
application for stay, there is no material forthcoming on record of
Ld. SDM to even
prima facie demonstrate the existence of element
of ‘breach of peace’ in the instant case. In fact, the documents
placed on record, merely exhibit/bespeak of the existence of
inter-
se dispute between the revisionists as well as respondent no. 2 in
respect of the property in question, in contrast, to an act/omission,
which may amount to disturbance of public order. Needless to
mention that even the complaint as well as respondent no. 2’s
application seeking
status quo order from the Ld. SDM is silent as
to the element of breach of peace in the instant case, except to such
general assertion. Here, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce
the relevant extracts from respondent no. 2’s complaint dated
01.03.2024, as under;
“…8. यह किमैं ने	 	 उपरो क् त आ रो किपयसे 	शां	  कितपर्व 
तरोसे  आग्  रोह किय किर्व 	मे	 	 री जमे न परी कब् ज करीन क
क शि न करीले  शिकन उपरी क् त आ री पगण गन् दी गन् दी
ग ले  -गले च परी उतरी आये ,ले	ड़ा	 ई-झगड़ा करीन	ले ग,
मे
रीपट परी उत रू हो गए, ज नसे 	मे	 रीन क धमे क दीनले ग
तथा झ%ठे कसे '	मे	 	फं	 '	से
न क धमे क दीनले ग ।
8. मैं ह दय,मैं 	 एशां  कितकिपरोय भारोतयने 	ग्	 किरो ह
औरोमैं 	 किसे 	से  थ भा लड़ा ई-झग्	ड़ा	  रोने	मैं	 %	 किर्व	श्र्व	 से
ने
ह रोखत ह लकिने उपरो क् त आ रो पग् ण जबरीदीस् तमे  री
जमे न कब् ज न क क शि करी रीहो हो+ इसे शिले एमे  री आपसे
हो था ज ड़ा करी शि-नत हो.,मे  रीमे दीदी करी तथा था न -जरी ब दी
क प/शिले	से	 क आदीशि त करी उपरी क् त	ले	 ग ' क	 मे	  रीप्ले	 1 ट
परी आन ए-' कब् ज करीनसे  री क ज ये  तथा	 मे	 	 री -मे  री
पशिरी- री कसे दीस्ये '	 क ज न -मे	 ले	 क रीक्षा क ज ये  ।
मैं
ह दय आपसे परोथने ह) कि उपरी क् त तथ्	ये	 '	 क आध री
परी उपरी क् त	ले	 ग 'द्वा री से शिज क तहोत प5री था6 कसे	म्	 प शि8
परी कब् ज करीन, कब् ज करीन क नये तसे  दी- री क शिनमे 6 ण
करीन, शि-री ध करीन परी ग ले  -गले च -ले	ड़ा	 ई-झगड़ा करीन
- ज नसे 	मे	 रीन क धमे क दीन क ए-जमे  कसे दीज6 करीसे	ख्	 त
से
	से	ख्
त क न%न क ये 6 - हो क ज ये  , इन् ह%मैं  रो जमैं	ने	 परो आने
से

रो  जय, कियग् ए दर्व रो  किनेमैं  ण  हटर्व य जय,
मैं

रोर्व	मैं	 	 रो पकिरोर्व रो  अन्य	से	 दस् य  जने	र्व	मैं	  ल 
रोक्षा  जय तकिमैं 1 झन् यय किमैं लसे , आप अकित 2प
…”
ह ग्  ।
(Emphasis supplied)
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	Page No. 25 of 28
17. Markedly, it is seen from above that respondent no.
2’s complaint is completely silent as to the manner in which the
alleged acts of revisionists’ infringement on the property in
question would amount to ‘breach of peace’, so as to necessitate
initiation of proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C. Here, it is
further pertinent to reproduce the relevant extracts from
respondent no. 2’s application seeking ex-parte ad interim stay
before the Ld. SDM, as under;
“…4. That upon this the applicant and his son first
tried to convince them that they cannot occupy our
land wrongfully like this and tried to stop the work but
all in vain. They all were starting to threaten the
applicant and his son for dire consequences if they
were trying to stop them for their illegal construction
and also said that they have already given money to
the local SHO for this illegal construction on
applicant's land. The defendant no. 1 to 3 then
attacked upon applicant. To save themselves and due
to fear of disturbing the peace in the area, called
PCR on 112. That PCR came on the spot and
stopped the work at that time.
5. That it is pertinent to mention here that after
some time the defendant no. 1 to 3 along with their
associates again came on the property in question
and restart the illegal construction work on the
property in dispute. That upon this the applicant again
called the PCR but this time nobody came from the
police at spot. Then applicant and his son reached the
police station Wazirabad and complaint the incident at
the help desk of the police station and then he came to
know from the sources who were present at the
property in question that defendants and their
associates go back from the property in question but
they were threatening the applicant that they will
come back again within 2-3 days and dispossess him
from the property in question and will grab the said
property with power and nobody have courage to stop
them to do so.
6. That in above said facts and circumstances there
is each and every possibility to cause a breach of
peace exits concerning the property in question in the
area and disturb the possession of the applicant on his
property in question.
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	Page No. 26 of 28
7. That the applicant also given the written
complaint of this regards to the police station
Wazirabad, Delhi under DD Entry No. 85 of
01/03/2024 and also received the copy to DCP,
North and ACP, Sub-Diviion Timar Pur same day but
no action has been taken by the police till date. This
act of the police is clearly shows the collusion
between the Police and the defendant no. 1 to 3.
Hence, this application filed…”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Appositely, though, respondent no. 2 under his
aforesaid application asserted that the acts of the revisionists may
occasion into a possibility to cause breach of peace, however, from
a conscientious perusal of the records it is seen that the dispute in
relation to the property in question, in the considered opinion of
this Court, is nothing other than an
inter-se property dispute. Ergo,
in light of the foregoing observations and judicial dictates, in the
considered opinion of this Court, it was not within the jurisdiction
of Ld. Magistrate to pass the order, under Section 145(1) Cr.P.C.,
without properly appreciating the facts of the present case and
before first determining the aspect of a possibility of ‘breach of
peace’ in the instant case. Needless to mention, at the time of
passing of such intiatory order under Section 145 Cr.P.C., neither
a report from the concerned police official regarding the possible
breach of peach of the neighbours/other individuals, otherwise,
can be parties involved in this case was brought forth on record,
nor any finding demonstrable under the impugned order/notice to
the said effect.
19. Consequently, in light of the foregoing discussion,
in light of the facts and circumstances brought forth, case
laws/judicial dictates and arguments addressed by/on behalf of the
parties before this Court, and further being wary of the provisions
under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in light of the scope and ambit thereof,
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Gopal Tiwari & Ors. v. State & Anr.
	Page No. 27 of 28
this Court unambiguously reiterates that not only does the
impugned order/notice fails to record the ground of satisfaction
under Section 145 Cr.P.C., rather, from a conscientious perusal of
the material brought on record, it is not discernible that an element
of ‘breach of peace’, so as to amount to disturbance of public order
as distinct and different from actions of the individuals/private
dispute, which do not disturb the society to the extent of vibrating
a general disturbance of public order, exists in the instant case, so
as to necessitate exercise of jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr.P.C.
Needless to reiterate that the superior courts have painstakingly
asserted that the merely because there is interse dispute between
private individuals
qua immovable property, proceedings under
Section 145 Cr.P.C. could not be drawn, unless the Magistrate is
satisfied that the private dispute may also disturb peace and
tranquility of the area.
20. Conclusively, in light of the aforenoted discussion,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the present petition
deserves to be allowed and is hereby
allowed. As a corollary, the
order/notice dated 02.03.2024 passed by Ld. SDM, Civil Lines,
Burari in case bearing as; ‘
Rajender Singh v. Gopal Tiwari & Ors.,
Case No. 145/SDM/RA/CL/86/2024/482-86’, directing the
revisionists and respondent no. 2 to maintain
status quo in relation
to property bearing;
khasra no. 134/17, 16/2, admeasuring 1900
sq. yds., situated in Village Jharoda Majra, Milan Vihar, Delhi, as
well as directed the said parties to appear before him/Ld. SDM to
present their respective case is hereby
set aside. Apposite at this
stage for this Court to further note that, though, it/this Court holds
highest regard for the decision(s) relied upon by Ld. Counsel for
respondent no. 2, however, the same would not, in the considered
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	Page No. 28 of 28
opinion of this Court, come to the aid/rescue of the case put forth
by the said respondent, in the manner as prayed for, as the facts
and circumstances of the present case are clearly, distinguishable
21. Trial Court Record/Record of Ld. SDM be sent back
along with a copy of this order.
22. Revision file be consigned to record room after due
compliance.
Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 13.01.2026. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi
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