Order 4

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
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CA No. 84/2023
Inderpal Singh v. The State & Sarabjeet Singh
13.12.2023
Present: Appellant with counsel Sh. R. K. Singh.
Sh. Balbir Singh, Addl. PP for State – respondent no.
1.
Dr. Parul Yadav, counsel for respondent no. 2.
Today case is fixed for order on application under section 5
of Limitation Act, moved on behalf of revisionist for condonation
of delay in filing the revision petition.
2. Mr. R.K. Singh, learned counsel for revisionist submits
that appellant is victim-complainant and he learnt about the
acquittal of the respondent No.2 – accused on 07.01.2023 when
he was served upon with a notice dated 06.01.2023 issued on
behalf of respondent No.2 and thereafter he immediately applied
for certified copy of the judgment on 10.01.2023 which was
delivered on 13.01.2023 but the appeal could not be preferred
merely on the basis of judgment, the appellant applied for
certified copy of complete judicial file on 21.01.2023 which was
delivered to him on 16.03.2023 and therefore, there is no
deliberate or intentional delay in filing the appeal and therefore,
if there is any delay, same may be condoned.
3. On the other hand, Dr. Parul Yadav, Ld. Counsel appearing
for respondent No.2 has opposed the application contending that
appellant has mislead this court by saying that he was totally
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unaware about passing of said judgment and came to know about
the same only on 07.01.2023 whereas the appellant regularly
appeared in the similar/connected matter of the present case
pending against the appellant filed by respondent No.2 in the
same court i.e. Sh. Siddhartha Malik, Ld. CMM, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts and the said complaint as well as the present
FIR were listed on 20.04.2022 and the appellant duly appeared in
the present complaint which clearly shows from the order dated
20.04.2022 and it is unable to digest that the appellant did not
know about the proceedings of the FIR registered by him. The
judgment dated 27.07.2022 is well within the knowledge of the
appellant and it clearly shows from his appearance in Tis Hazari
Court Delhi where appellant appeared on 08.07.2022 and
18.10.2022 in the court of Ld. CMM when the judgment was
passed on 27.07.2022. The appellant also appeared on
05.12.2022 before Ld. CMM and this clearly shows that
judgment dated 27.07.2022 is well within the knowledge of the
appellant and even then the appeal has been filed with the delay
of 220 days without any sufficient cause and therefore, the
application for condonation of delay may be dismissed. Ld.
Counsel has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court
titled as Airports Authority of India v KGA Investments and
Anr. in LPA No. 779 of 2019 and Basawaraj and Anr. v The
Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, in Civil Appeal No. 6974.
4. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnagh and another Vs. MST. Katiji and
others, 1987 SCC 107 held as under:
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by
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enacting Section 51 (Any appeal or any application, other than
an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within such period) of the Indian
Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'.
The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is
adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice--that
being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of
Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making
a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court.
But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all
the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is
adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is con- doned the highest that
can happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why
not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The
doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense
pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or
on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not
on account of its power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning
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the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that
it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and
not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The
doctrine of equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant, are
accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even handed manner. There is no
warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when
the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of
delay. In fact experi- ence shows that on account of
an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the
matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought
to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-
mak- ing, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand
though more diffi- cult to approve. In any event, the
State which represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata
status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with
the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the
course of the interpretation of the expression
"sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to
be evidenced in its application to matters at hand
with the end in view to do even handed justice on
merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a
decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter
giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that
sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the
High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time
barred, is therefore. set aside. Delay is condoned.
And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The
High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits
after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to
both the sides."
5. In the case of Raheem Shah & Anr. Vs. Govind Singh &
Ors, Civil Appeal No. 4628 of 2023, decided on 24.07.2023,
Hon'ble Supreme Court retreated the Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. (supra) by holding as under:-
"4. This Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag & Anr. Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in (1987) 2
SCC 107 has held as hereunder:
"The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by
enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order
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to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by
disposing of matters on `merits'. The expression `sufficient
cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge
that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear
to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy.
And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is
realized that:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by
lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a
meritorious matter being thrown out at the very
threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As
against this when delay is condoned the highest that
can happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not
mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why
not every hour's delay, every second's delay ? The
doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense
pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other, cause of
substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the
other side cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or
on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not
on account of its power to legalize injustice on
technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this
perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning
the delay in the institution of the appeal."
5. The above decision expressing the intention of justice oriented
approach percolating down to all the courts was rendered nearly
three decades ago but unfortunately the case on hand
demonstrates the pervading insensitive approach, which apart
from continuing the agony of the litigants concerned has also
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unnecessarily burdened the judicial hierarchy which after going
through the entire process will have to set the clock back, at this
distant point in time and prolong their agony. If only the court
concerned had been sensitive to the justice oriented approach
rather than the ironcast technical approach, the litigation
between the parties probably would have come to an end much
earlier after decision on the merits of their rival contention."
6. It is clear from the Raheem Shah (supra) and The
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. (supra) that
refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter
being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being
defeated and that as against this when delay is condoned the
highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties. It is also clear that "Every day's
delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach
should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner.
7. In view of above discussion and the reasons mentioned in
the application, I am of the view that application should be
allowed. Accordingly, the application is allowed.
Put up for arguments in appeal, on 20.02.2024.
(Sanjeev Kumar-II)
Special Judge (NDPS)-02
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi /13.12.2023
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