Final Order 7

Order Details: COPY OF ORDER
Pdf Text: IN THE COURT OF SHRI CHANDER MOHAN
DISTRICT JUDGE-14 (LAC): CENTRAL DISTRICT
TIS HAZARI COURTS: DELHI
CS No. 217/2026
CNR No. : DLCT01-004623-2026
In the matter of:-
SANGEETA JAIN
W/o Sh. Naveen Jain
R/o C-1 1/92, Yamuna Vihar, Delhi-110053 ……… Plaintiff
VERSUS
1. SRIMANDER DASS & SONS
(Through its Partner/Representative)
2. Mr. Naresh Jain
3. Mr. Aman Jain
4. Mr. Samit Jain
5. Mr. Ankit Jain
6. Mrs. Shweta Jain w/o Mr. Ankit Jain
All at: Ground Floor, Part of Property
No. 345, Naya Katra, Chandni Chowk,
New Delhi-06 ……… Defendants
Date of institution
: 13.03.2026
Date of arguments
: 02.05.2026
Date of decision
: 16.05.2026
ORDER UNDER ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC
01. In nutshell, plaintiff has instituted the present suit for recovery
of Rs. 30,43,800/- from the defendants. Defendant no. 1 is a
partnership firm and defendant no. 2 to 6 are its partners. As per
contents of the plaint, plaintiff acceded to the requests of the
defendants and advanced a total sum of Rs. 22,00,000/- as a friendly
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loan for the purpose of business expansion. The following chart
mentioned in para no. 4 of the plaint contains the date, amount and
mode of advancement of loan by the plaintiff to the defendant:-
Date Amount Mode of transaction
20.03.2013 5,00,000/- Cheque No. 315554
14.04.2013 3,00,000/- Cheque No. 315556
16.04.2013 1,00,000/- Cheque No. 315557
17.07.2014 2,00,000/- Cheque No. 036351
07.04.2015 2,00,000/- Cheque No. 036355
18.04.2016 2,00,000/- Cheque No. 036358
02.04.2017 3,50,000/- Cheque No. 036366
01.04.2019 3,50,000/- Cheque No. 171560
Total 22,00,000/-
02. It is further pleaded that aforesaid amount was advanced by
the plaintiff to defendants from time to time at the interest at the rate
of 15% per annum and defendant also issued
receipt/acknowledgment of debts for each transaction. Plaintiff has
placed on record the copies of the acknowledgment/debt receipts
signed by defendant no. 4 on behalf of defendant no. 1 and also
pleaded that all these transactions were coordinated and executed
through one intermediary Virender Jain.
03. It is further pleaded that pursuant to the aforesaid loan
arrangement, interest has been paid by defendant no. 1 to the
plaintiff in her bank account/cash every four months over the period
of time thereby acknowledging both the principle liability and also
liability to pay the interest. Further, as per the plaintiff since initially
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defendants have been making regular and timely interest payments,
therefore, in good faith the plaintiff lend the defendant money at
further intervals. Thereafter in June 2020, the Defendants through
the intermediary approached Plaintiff and requested that they would
be repaying the money at reduced interest rate, citing their alleged
“financial hardships," and the Plaintiff after acceding the request,
reduced the prior agreed Rate of Interest i.e. 15% per annum to
13.2% per annum. However, the Defendants were paying
incomplete amount of interest to the Plaintiff. When the Plaintiff
raised concerns regarding the Defendants' conduct with Mr.
Virender Jain (the intermediary), he too expressed his unwillingness
to vouch for or to ensure the Defendants' credibility in respect of
repayment of the loan, and expressly advised the Plaintiff to recover
the outstanding amount directly from the Defendants, i.e., the
borrower partnership firm and its partners. Thereafter, the Plaintiff
visited and confronted the Defendants for making incomplete and
irregular payments and the Defendants reassured that they shall
continue to make timely payments without errors, and would repay
the outstanding amount within reasonable time. However, no future
part payments or whole due amount was paid and even such
irregular payments were stopped altogether after year 2023 by the
defendant. It is further averred in the plaint that the Plaintiff time
and again made requests to the Defendants for the complete
repayment of the said loan as promised by the Defendants but the
Defendants wilfully ignored the requests of the Plaintiff. After being
exhausted and ultimately after having no alternative, the Plaintiff
during the series of requests approached the Defendants in person
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for repayment of the said loan. Whereupon the Defendant No. 1 on
19.08.2024 transacted the part interest payment of Rs. 1,00,000/-
(Rs. One Lakhs Only) in favor of Plaintiff in pursuant to the loan of
Rs. 22,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Two Lakhs Only). Having no
alternative, the Plaintiff even sent a Legal Notice dated 14.11.2025
vide registered post, to the Defendants for the recovery of Due
amount but the same was returned back with the remark as 'refused'.
The Office Copy of the Legal Notice dated 14.11.2025 sent by the
Plaintiff. Accordingly, plaintiff has instituted the present suit for
recovery of aforesaid principle amount of Rs. 22,00,000/- along
with interest.
04. I have heard counsel for the plaintiff on the issue of limitation
and perused the record.
05. Vide the present suit, plaintiff seeks to recover the loans
advanced by him to the defendant beginning from 20.03.2013 till
01.04.2019. The suit stands instituted on 13.03.2026 i.e. clearly
beyond the period of 3 years after the payment of even the last loan
installment of loan. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff argues that his case is
covered by Article 19 of the Limitation Act as defendant has been
paying interest on the aforesaid amount from time to time. He relies
on a chart filed by the plaintiff (the same was filed as per directions
of this court) recording the receipt or interest by the plaintiff from
the defendant from 18.04.2013 to 19.08.2024. As per Ld. Counsel
for plaintiff if the period of limitation is calculated from the last
installment of payment of interest i.e. 19.08.2024 then the limitation
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period is still 18.08.2027. He further relies on the handwriting
acknowledgment of defendant acknowledging payment of interest
etc. issued in year 2024, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff further relies upon
judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in case titled as Virender
Kumar Jain vs M/s Alumate (India) Pvt Ltd, RFA No.153/2004
decided on 02.03.2012 to argue that when no period is fixed for
repayment then it has to be calculated from the demand.
06. Law is well settled as far as interpretation of Section 19 of
Limitation Act is concerned. To take benefit of Section 19 of
Limitation Act, there have to be specific pleadings in the suit.
07. The following observations of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case
titled as M/s Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd vs. Assam State Electricity
Board & Ors. etc (Review Petition No. 786-787/2019 in Civil
Appeal No. 8442-8443 of 2016, Review Petition No. 789/2019 in
Civil Appeal No. 8450 of 2016, Review Petition No. 788/2019 in
Civil Appeal No. 8445 of 2016) are relevant:-
“The above provision makes it clear that in event, a suit is instituted
after the prescribed period, it shall be dismissed although limitation has not
been set up as a defence. The Court by mandate of law, is obliged to dismiss the
suit, which is filed beyond limitation even though no pleading or arguments are
raised to that effect. The provisions of Sections 4 to 20 are exceptions when
suit beyond the period of limitation as prescribed in the Schedule shall not be
dismissed as required by Section 3. In this context, we need to refer to Order
VII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code. Order VII deals with plaint. Order VII
Rule 6 contains a heading “Grounds of exemption from limitation law”. Order
VII Rule 6 is as follows:-
“6. Grounds of exemption from limitation law. - Where the suit is
instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of
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limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which exemption
from such law is claimed:
Provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to claim exemption
from the law of limitation on any ground not set out in the plaint, if
such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint."
12. Order VII Rule 6 uses the words “the plaint shall show the ground upon
which exemption from such law is claimed”. The exemption provided under
Sections 4 to 20 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are based on certain facts and
events. Section 19, with which we are concerned, provide for a fresh period of
limitation, which is founded on certain facts, i.e., (i) whether payment on
account of debt or of interest on legacy is made before the expiration the of the
prescribed period by the person liable to pay the debt or legacy, (ii) an
acknowledgment of the payment appears in handwriting of, or in a writing
signed by, the person making the payment. We may notice the judgment of this
Court dealing with Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which was akin to
present Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In Sant Lal Mahton Vs. Kamla
Prasad and Others, AIR 1951 SC 477, this Court held that for applicability of
Section 20 of the Limitation Act, 1908, two conditions were essential that the
payment must be made within the prescribed period of limitation and it must be
acknowledged by some form of writing either in the handwriting of the payer
himself or signed by him. This Court further held that for claiming benefit of
exemption under Section 20, there has to be pleading and proof. In paragraphs
9 and 10, following has been laid down:
“9. It would be clear, we think, from the language of s. 20, Limitation
Act, that to attract its operation two conditions are essential : first, the
payment must be made within the prescribed period of limitation and
secondly, it must be acknowledged by some form of writing either in
the handwriting of the payer himself or signed by him. We agree with
the Subordinate Judge that it is the payment which really extends the
period of limitation under s. 20, Limitation Act; but the payment has
got to be proved in a particular way and for reason of policy the
legislature insists on a written or signed acknowledgment as the only
proof of payment and excludes oral testimony. Unless, therefore, there
is acknowledgment in the required from, the payment by itself is of no
avail. The Subordinate Judge, however, is right in holding that while
the section requires that the payment should be made within the
period of limitation, it does not require that the acknowledgment
should also be made within that period. To interpret the proviso in that
way would be to import into it certain words which do not occur
there. This is the view taken by almost all the High Courts in India
and to us it seems to be a proper view to take (See Md. Moizuddin v.
Nalini Bala A.I.R. (24) 1937 Cal 284 : I.L.R. (1937) 2 Cal. 137; Lal
Singh v. Gulab Rai 55 All 280, Venkata Subbhu v. Appu Sundaram 17
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Mad. 92, Ram Prasad v. Mohan Lal A.I.R. (10) 1923 Nag 117 and
Viswanath v. Mahadeo 57 Bom. 453.
10. …………………………………If the plaintiff's right of action is
apparently barred under the Statute of limitation, O. 7, R. 6, Civil P.C.
makes it his duty to state specifically in the plaint the grounds of
exemption allowed by the Limitation Act upon which he relies to
exclude its operation; and if the plaintiff has got to allege in his plaint
the facts which entitle him to exemption, obviously these facts must
be in existence at or before the time when the plaint is filed; facts
which come into existence after the filing of the plaint cannot be
called in aid to revive a right of action which was dead at the date of
the suit. To claim exemption under s. 20. Limitation Act the plaintiff
must be in a position to allege and prove not only that there was
payment of interest on a debt or part payment of the principal, but that
such payment had been acknowledged in writing in the manner
contemplated by that section…………………………”
13. We need to notice as to whether the petitioners in plaint have pleaded
any exclusion of time under Section 19 of the Act or not. The plaint is filed as
Annexure P/2 in Civil Appeal Nos. 8442-8443 of 2016. A perusal of the plaint
indicates that there is no pleading as to exception of limitation by running any
fresh period of limitation as per Section 19……….”
08. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff seeks to place reliance on various
acknowledgments purportedly issued by defendants acknowledging
the receipt of loan. There are dated 20.03.2013, 14.04.2013,
16.04.2013, 17.07.2014, 07.04.2015, 18.04.2016, 02.04.2017 and
01.04.2019. As per the mandate of Section 18 of Limitation Act,
acknowledgment has to be made by the defendant before the expiry
of period of limitation. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot take benefit of
acknowledgments issued by the plaintiff which are dated
20.03.2013, 14.04.2013, 16.04.2013, 17.07.2014, 07.04.2015,
18.04.2016, 02.04.2017 and 01.04.2019 to file a suit in the year
2026. Counsel for plaintiff further relies on Annexure D. As per
counsel, this sheet contains list of series of transaction that took
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place between the plaintiff and defendant and was provided by
defendant no. 4 to plaintiff. I have carefully perused the same. It
records purportedly payment of interest upto 31.03.2024 meaning
thereby this acknowledgment was made well after the expiry of
limitation i.e. on or after 31.03.2024. As already noted, period of
limitation does not get extend by acknowledgments made after
expiry of period of limitation. So plaintiff cannot take any benefit of
this purportedly handwritten acknowledgment also.
09. Moving further, it is not the case of plaintiff that there was an
agreement between the parties prescribing the particular date and
time for the repayment of loan. In fact, it is contented by Ld.
Counsel for plaintiff that loan was repayable on demand. As per the
settled law, once the loans are paid on different dates, the limitation
will commence from the date of grant of each of the loan. The
following observations of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Mr. Dev
Ranjan Mittra & Anr. vs. Aditya Barna Mittra, CS (OS) 440/2020,
decided on 31.05.2023:-
“
10. In Gautam Seth(supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court held
that once the loans are paid on different dates, then as per Article 19
of the
Limitation Act, the limitation will commence from the date of grant of each of
the loans. I may quote from the judgment as under:-
"7. Trial court has held that the suit is barred by limitation because
each of the entry of grant of loan is a separate cause of action and
for each separate cause of action limitation commences from three
years from the date of grant of the loan. I may note that Article 19
of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the limitation period is
three years from grant of the loan for filing a suit for recovery of
loan which is granted. Once loans are paid on different dates then as
per Article 19 of the Limitation Act, limitation will commence from
the date of grant of each of the loan, and the trial court has rightly
observed that it is not the case of the appellant/plaintiff that a
specific large amount was agreed to be given as loan and which was
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thereafter given in different installments thereafter for smaller
amounts.
8. The subject suit admittedly has been filed on 22.3.2013. Any
loan therefore granted before 22.3.2010 would become barred by
limitation. Trial court has observed that the case of the
appellant/plaintiff as argued, (and which was different from the
content of para 4 of the plaint) is that actually the loan granted is
only totaling to Rs.15,00,000/- and which is on account of the three
entries dated 5.12.2000 (sic.:5.12.2007) of Rs.10,00,000/-, on
27.8.2008 of Rs.3,00,000/- and on 8.4.2009 of Rs.2,00,000/-, and
all of which dates are before three years of the date of filing of the
suit on 22.3.2013, and hence the suit is time- barred."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. In Balbir Rajput (supra), another learned Single Judge of this Court
reiterated that each transaction of loan being independent from one another, as
per Article 19 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the limitation for a suit for
the money payable for money lent, of three years, begins to run from the time
when the loan is made. It was held that the limitation for the loans made from
16.11.2011 to 15.10.2013 therein, would be till 16.11.2014 and 15.10.2016.
12. In Radha Exports (India) Private Limited v. K.P. Jayaram & Anr., (2020) 10
SCC 538, while considering maintainability of an application under Section 7
of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, The Supreme Court observed
that under Clauses 19 to 21 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, the period of
limitation for initiation of a suit for recovery of money lent is three years from
the date on which the loan is paid.
13. In Harcharan Singh (supra), a learned Single Judge of this Court explained
the situations covered by Article 19 to 22 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
as under:-
"15. The appellant/plaintiff claims the money to have been lent vide
a cheque. If the period of three years from when the cheque is paid
is counted, the suit would definitely be barred by time. However the
receipt proved to have been executed by the respondent/defendant
at the time of loan provides the loan to be for a period of one year
with interest at 12% per annum to be paid after one year along with
principal amount. The case pleaded by the appellant/plaintiff also is
of the said loan being repayable after one year. Even if three years
are to be counted from expiry of the said one year, the suit would
still be barred by time."
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10. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff seeks to place reliance on judgment
of Hon’ble High Court in Virender Kumar Jain (Supra) and contend
that where is loan is given without fixing any date of repayment, the
period of limitation would commence when the demand for
repayment is made. Plaintiff cannot take benefit of the observations
of Hon’ble High Court. The ratio of Virender Kumar Jain (Supra)
was considered by Hon’ble High Court in the judgment of Dev
Ranjan Mittra (Supra). Para no. 14, 15 and 16 are relevant:-
14. It is no doubt true that in Virender Kumar Jain (supra), a learned Single
Judge of this Court, who was also the author of the judgment of this Court in
Gautam Seth (supra), in absence of the counsels therein and without adverting
to Article 19 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, has held that where the loan
is given without fixing any date of repayment, the period of limitation would
commence when the demand for repayment thereof is made, in my view, the
said judgment is clearly per incuriam as the same has failed to take note of
Article 19 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act. In fact, the same learned
Single Judge in RMS Consultants Pvt. Ltd. vs. Proactive Universal Trading Pvt.
Ltd. & Anr., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8550, referring to Article 19 of the
Limitation Act, has held as under:-
"7. It is seen that by the suit plaintiff seeks recovery of
Rs.4,89,35,000/- advanced by the plaintiff to the defendant no. 1.
Plaint, in my opinion, deliberately does not give the dates when the
different amounts totaling to Rs.4,89,35,000/- were advanced,
inasmuch as, factually it is seen that the amount which totalled to a
sum of Rs.4,89,35,000/- by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant no.
1 are with respect to drawing of entries commencing from the year
2008 with the last entry being dated 17.11.2012, and as seen from the
copy of the account filed by the plaintiff as a document. The present
suit is admittedly filed on 19.11.2015 i.e well beyond the period of the
last entry, taking the same reflecting advance made by plaintiff to
defendant no.1, which is actually dated 19.10.2012. In law, once there
is no date fixed for repayment of the loan, a period of three years of
limitation commences from the date of grant of loan as per Article 19
of the Limitation Act, 1963. With respect to loans given of the year
2008 the suit is barred by limitation because it had to be filed by the
year 2011 and considering even all the entries by which loans have
been given by the plaintiff to the defendant no. 1, and the last entry of
payment to the defendant no. 1 being dated 19.10.2012, the present
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suit which is filed on 19.11.2015 is in fact beyond three years of the
last entry, what to talk of earlier entries which are of around 4-8 years
earlier. Therefore, the suit is also otherwise barred by limitation."
15. In Harcharan Singh (supra), another learned Single Judge of this Court had
expressed similar doubts on the judgment in Virender Kumar Jain (supra) by
observing as under:-
"31. A learned Single Judge of this Court however in Sh. Virender
Kumar Jain Vs. M/s. Alumate (India) Pvt. Ltd.
MANU/DE/0885/2012 held that where a loan is given without fixing any date
of repayment, the loan would be repayable on demand and the period of
limitation therefor would be three years from the date of such demand. Article
19 was not adverted to, and the judgment was pronounced in the absence of the
counsels. The same learned Single Judge in Satish Kumar Vs. Reena Bhoumik
MANU/DE/2394/2012 and IFCI Venture Capital Funds Ltd. Vs. Santosh
Khosla MANU/DE/1078/2012 with regard to loans repayable after a particular
period of time has observed that in such cases the limitation cannot be said to
commence from the date of grant of loan within the meaning of Article 19 and
held that such cases would be governed by the residuary Article 113 with the
cause of action accruing to the plaintiff on the date of default i.e. the date when
the loan ought to have been repaid but is not repaid. However the possibility of
Article 55 applying to such cases was not explored."
(Emphasis Supplied)
16. Applying the above principles, the present suit is clearly barred by
limitation. As noted hereinabove, it is the own case of the plaintiffs that the
alleged loan was extended to the defendant between 28.06.2010 to 13.03.2015.
It is also the own case of the plaintiffs that no time period was fixed for the
repayment of the loan. In accordance with Article 19 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, therefore, the period of limitation for filing a suit seeking
recovery of each of these loan transactions would end between 28.06.2013 to
12.03.2018. No case for extension of this period of limitation under Sections 4
to 24 of the Limitation Act has been pleaded by the plaintiffs. Even the
payments alleged are between 27.06.2010 to 27.02.2015. The suit filed in
October 2020 is therefore, barred by limitation.”
11. To sum up, when loan is advanced in different installments
extending over a period of long time (which is 6 years in the present
case beginning from 2013 to 2019) the limitation will commence
from the date of grant of each of the loans and same cannot be
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treated as a single transaction, particularly when it is not the case of
the plaintiff that a specific large amount was agreed to be given as
loan and which was thereafter given in different installments.
Plaintiff also cannot take benefit of an averment that the last
installment of interest has been paid by the defendant within the
period of limitation, therefore, the limitation period for entire
amount advanced over a period of 7 years stands extended or that
benefit of Section 19 of Limitation Act is available to the plaintiff
for all the transactions. Further, payment of
interest/acknowledgment has to be within period of limitation.
12. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the plaint of the present suit
stands rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC being barred by law of
limitation.
13. File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Pronounced in the Open Court
On 16th May, 2026
(CHANDER MOHAN)
District Judge-14 (LAC)
Central, THC, Delhi/16.05.2026
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